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Martin  Heidegger  in  'The  Origin  of  the  Work  of  Art'  seeks  to  approach  the  self- 
subsistent  nature  of  art.  The  Greek  Temple  opens  up  a  space  within  which  our  Being 
may  dwell.  It  is  the  site  of  human  civilization  and  religion,  and  of  our  capacity  to  dwell 
within  abstractions  like  peace,  justice,  truth  and  representation.  Art  breaks  open  a  new 
place  and  presents  things  in  a  fresh  light.  Language  is  the  primary  model  for  this 
activity. 
Paul  Celan  in  his  poetry  offers  a  challenge  to  Heideggerian  abstraction.  Both 
poet  and  philosopher  were  intimately  familiar  with  each  other's  work,  yet  there  is  no 
essay  on  Celan,  or  even  a  reference,  in  the  entire  Heideggerian  corpus.  Celan's  poem 
'The  Straitening'  conveys  the  breakdown  of  meaning  that  has  occurred  after  the 
holocaust.  In  form  and  content  it  challenges  any  Heideggerian  notion  of  the  higher 
univocity  achieved  by  great  poetry. 
We  will  explore  recent  examples  of  how  poets  have  examined  the  idea  of 
cultural  belonging  and  exclusion.  We  present  a  distillation  of  this  idea  in  the  writings  of 
Paul  Celan,  particularly  his  presentation  of  the  moment  of  'Shibboleth'.  We  explore  the 
biblical  origin  of  the  term  'Shibboleth'  in  a  conflict  between  the  army  of  Jephtah  and  the 
Ephraimites.  We  look  at  a  contemporary  poem  with  shibboleth'  as  its  theme,  Seamus 
Heaney's  'Broagh. 
A  consistent  theme  of  Maurice  Blanchot's  critical  reflection  from  The  Work  of 
Fire  in  1949  up  to  and  including  Yhe  Space  ofLiterature  in  1955,  is  the  manner  in 
which  our  being  creatures  unto  death  allows  us  to  create  art,  and  to  think  and  write  in 
the  abstraction  that  is  language.  Life  endures  death  and  maintains  itself  in  it.  For 
Blanchot  Rainer  Maria  Rilke  is  one  of  the  most  significant  modem  poets  in  the  way  in 
which  he  has  presented  and  explored  this  theme.  We  challenge  Blanchot's  inadequate 
reading  of  Rilke  in  The  Space  ofLiteature  as  an  instance  of  his  own  pre-conceived 
philosophical  nihilism. 
We  present  Jacques  Derrida's  essay  On  the  Name,  along  with  a  reading  of 
Seamus  Heaney's  poetry  in  the  light  of  this  essay,  as  an  attempt  to  keep  open  a  modem 
philosophical  horizon  to  the  invitation  of  the  transcendental  Other.  We  present 
Immanuel  Levinas'  thought  in  Totality  and  Infinity,  as  well  as  Derrida's  critique  of 
Levinas  in  Writing  and  Difference,  as  an  attempt  to  preserve  a  post-modem, 
intellectually  credible,  metaphysical  expression  f6r  thought. Acknowledgments 
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Bibliography Introduction: 
Unemployed  and  Homeless,  Theology  in  a 
Post-Modem  Space 
Rhere  does  thoughtfind  itself  today? 
Is  it  too  big  a  question  to  ask:  where  in  terms  of  intellectual  enterprise  does 
humanity  stand  today?  How  do  we  understand  ourselves,  the  world  we  live  in,  the 
shape  of  human  destiny,  the  purpose  of  existence?  What  answers  to  these  questions 
are  given  in  the  current  sociological  and  political  matrix;  how  are  these  questions 
answered  in  the  universities,  in  schools  around  the  world,  on  television  and  radio? 
Does  theology  or  religion  play  a  role  today  in  addressing  these  questions?  To  begin  to 
address  some  of  these  questions  we  will  commence  with  contemporary  academic 
philosopher  Simon  Critchley,  geographer  David  Harvey  and  finally  theologian  Jean- 
Luc  Marion. 
In  a  recent  publication  Simon  Critchley  states  the  problem  of  post-modernity 
quite  bluntly:  'the  task  ofphilosophical  modernity,  at  least  in  its  peak  experiences- 
Hegel,  Nietzsche,  Heidegger  -  is  a  thinking  through  of  the  death  of  God  in  terms  of 
the  problem  of  finitude".  This  has  radical  implications,  for  not  only  are  we 
considering  the  death  of  the  God  of  Judaeo-Christian  tradition,  but  also  the 
disappearance  of  many  of  the  ideals  that  have  given  to  humanity  a  purpose,  goal  and 
meaning  in  life.  We  are  witnessing  the  death  of  all  altruistic  principle,  ideal  or  rule  for 
Simon  Critchley:  Very  Little-Almost  Nothing.  Death,  Philosophy,  Literature:  Routledge:  London: 
2000,  p.  2 2 
governing  human  affairs;  we  have  seen  the  death  of  all  that  has  given  humanity 
direction  and  which  has  existed  as  a  font  of  human  aspiration  for  millennia.  Critchley 
writes:  'those  familiar  with  the  landscape  of  philosophical  modernity  will  recognize 
this  situation  as  a  description  of  the  problem  of  nihilism'2  . 
What  is  nihilism?  It  is  the 
breakdown  we  have  described;  where  all  of  our  systems  of  meaning  collapse,  where 
all  which  once  was  seen  as  a  transcendent  (meaning  above  and  beyond  our  world  to 
which  we  should  direct  ourselves)  source  of  value  is  denigrated  and  nullified. 
In  terms  of  philosophy  Critchley  tracks  down  the  wellsprings  of  this 
expression  of  thought.  He  sees  it  emerging  first  in  the  Enlightenment,  spreading  into 
modernity,  eventually  finding  its  current  form  in  a  distinctive  post-modem  nihilism. 
For  Critchley  it  is  broached  first  in  the  writings  of  Immanuel  Kant?  We  re-call  Kant's 
critique  of  metaphysics.  Kant  denied  human  beings  cognitive  access  to  the  speculative 
objects  of  classical  metaphysics,  realities  like  God  and  the  soul,  and  removed  the 
possibility  of  knowing  things-in-themselves  and  the  ground  of  the  self.  Kant's  goal 
was  to  achieve  epistemological  certainty  through  a  limitation  of  the  achievements 
actually  possible  or  attainable  by  human  cognition.  Friedrich  Nietzsche  took  this 
position  further  in  his  assembled  miscellany  The  Will  to  Power,  where  he  wrote  that: 
'the  highest  values  devalue  themselves.  The  aim  is  lacking;  "why'  finds  no  answer'. 
For  Martin  Heidegger  when  we  begin  to  contemplate  and  think  about  the 
essence  of  nihilism  we  are  brought  into  the  thought  of  Being  as  that  unthought  ground 
of  all  metaphysical  thinking.  We  cannot  overcome  nihilism  as  long  as  we  speak  the 
2  Critchley:  2000,  p.  3 
3  David  Harvey  writes:  'the  moral  crisis  of  our  time  is  a  crisis  of  Enlighterunent  thought':  77'e 
Or;  u  rd  Condition  of  Postmodernity.  -  An  Enquiry  into  the  gins  of  Cult  ral  Change:  Blackwell:  OxfO 
2000,  p.  41 
4  Critchley:  2000,  p.  7 3 
same  metaphysical  language  of  nihilism,  and,  for  Heidegger,  we  can  only  hope  to 
overcome  this  problem  by  a  radical  transformation  of  language.  Theodor  Adorno 
writes:  'the  only  philosophy  which  can  be  responsibly  practised  in  face  of  despair  is 
the  attempt  to  contemplate  all  things  as  they  would  present  themselves  from  the 
standpoint  of  redemption'.  5  For  Adomo  the  intellectual  task  is  to  fashion  perspectives 
that  reveal  the  world  as  it  will  appear  in  the  messianic  light,  as  needy  and  deformed 
and  in  need  of  transformation,  and  pointing  towards  what  that  change  would  look  like, 
if  realisable  or  realised.  We  must  achieve  this  goal  without  violence.  We  can  say,  at 
the  very  least,  that  this  perspective  has  the  merit of  keeping  open  the  horizon  of  future 
action. 
For  Martin  Heidegger,  especially  the  young  Heidegger,  death  is  something  to 
be  achieved  and  it  is  the  fundamental  possibility  that  permits  us  to  grasp  the  totality  of 
existence;  it  is  the  closure  that  makes  sense  of  the  open  possibility  of  Being.  For 
Maurice  Blanchot  death  is  something  that  we  are  unable  to  lay  hold  of  The  event  of 
our  death  is  always  too  late  for  us.  We  will  examine  Blanchot's  thought  in  greater 
detail  in  Chapter  Four  of  this  thesis.  For  him  death  is  radically  resistant  to  the  order  of 
representation.  We  will  question  this  closely  after  a  reading  of  the  poems  Seamus 
Heaney  has  written  about  the  death  of  his  parents.  In  a  sense  representations  of  death 
are  always  misrepresentations  or  representations  of  an  absence.  Poets  like  Heaney 
who  wish  to  speak  of  death  use  a  trope  like  prosopopeia,  the  trope  by  which  an 
imaginary  person,  or  an  absent  one,  is  presented  as  speaking  or  acting.  We  will 
5  Critchley:  2000,  p.  18 4 
examine  what  happens  in  this  act  of  the  creative  imagination.  Is  it  'the  failure  of 
presence'  Simon  Critchley  argues 
it  iS?  6 
How  do  we  charactedsepost-modernity? 
We  have  used  the  tenn  post-modernity  in  this  introduction.  What  do  we 
understand  by  this  term?  David  Harvey  in  his  academic  bestseller  The  Condition  of 
Postmodernity.  An  Enquiry  into  the  Origins  of  Cultural  Change  provides  us  with  a 
lucid  analysis  of  the  phenomenon  Tefeffed  to  as  post-modemity7.  What  cbamcteTises 
the  post-modem?  For  Harvey  a  mark  of  the  post-modem  is  the  acceptance  as 
inevitable  of  ephemerality,  fragmentation,  discontinuity,  and  the  chaotic;  the  post- 
modem  subject  swims  within  this  cultural  dislocation  as  if  that  is  all  there  is.  Within 
post-modem  art  forms  different  realities  coexist,  collide,  and  interpenetrate.  For 
example,  in  Salman  Rushdie's  recent  novel  The  Ground  Beneath  Her  Feet  there  is  a 
constant  shifting  of  narrative  worlds,  summed  up  in  the  abiding  metaphor  of  the  novel 
of  the  constant  seismic  activity  below  the  earth's  surface;  we  move  from  the  quiet 
low-key,  pre-colonial  preoccupations  of  a  family  in  Bombay,  to  the  modem  urban  city 
of  London,  England,  to  a  rock  band  performing  in  a  football  stadium,  just  one  product 
of  contempormy  bohemian  cultwe  in  the 
US.  8 
Another  example  will  serve  to  illustrate;  it  is  Ciaran  Carson's  Shamrock  Tea,  a 
book  about  which  we  may  ask:  is  it  a  novel,  or  a  text,  a  surrealist  memoir,  or  a 
fantasy?  The  central  conceit  of  the  work  features  The  Arnooni  Portrait  by  Jan  Van 
6  Critchley:  2000,  p.  26 
7  David  Harvey:  The  Conifition  of  Postmodernity.  -  An  Enquiry  into  the  Origins  of  Cultural  Change: 
BlackweU:  Oxford:  2000,  Chapter  Three 
8  Salman  Rushdie:  The  Ground  Beneath  Her  Feet.  BCA:  London:  1999 5 
Eyck.  The  core  protagonists  are  invited  to  enter  into  this  painting  rather  like  the 
characters  in  Lewis  Carroll's  Alice  in  Wonderland,  or  those  in  C.  S.  Lewis's  The  Lion, 
the  Witch  and  the  Wardrobe  as  they  enter  into  their  respective  fantasy  realms.  The 
second  device  is  the  magical  concoction  labelled  Shamrock  Tea,  an  invention  of  the 
imagination  of  Carson.  When  consumed  this  magical  substance  allows  the  participant 
to  enter  into  any  time  or  dimension,  to  see  reality  with  a  divine  perspective,  and  so  we 
enter  into  a  narrative  where  a  Wittgenstein  (yes,  the  philosopher)  converses  with 
contemporaries  of  a  young  boy  called  Carson  who  might  be  a  version  of  the  author, 
and  where  Oscar  Wilde,  Gerard  Manley  Hopkins,  and  Arthur  Conan  Doyle  mingle 
with  folk  of  many  centuries  and  locations,  as  real  or  authorial  presences,  with  the 
distinction  between  the  two  erased  as  a  logical  irrelevance  within  the  framework 
established  by  the  work. 
In  Shamrock  Tea  what  often  provides  the  only  narrative  logic  is  a  particular 
Saint  being  a  patron  of  an  art  practiced  well  by  a  protagonist.  Their  Saint's  day 
happens  to  fall  on  the  day  that  Oscar  Wilde  was  triedý  and  this  association  provides 
the  only  link  and  logic  connecting  the  next  event  that  is  about  to  occur  within  the 
book  with  that  which  has  proceeded  it.  There  are  no  weak  links  in  this  chain  and  this 
is  an  integral  part  of  its  point:  the  mystical,  almost  medieval  notion  of  the 
interconnectedness  of  all  reality  as  seen  from  God's  perspective.  Carson  does  pull  in 
post-Modem,  post-Enlightenment,  tricks  like  wormholes  and  space-time  continuums, 
drawn  as  much  from  the  world  of  Sci-Fi  and  Star  Trek  as  from  Stephen  Hawking. 
Carson  mimics  or  simulates  many  voices,  from  mock  seriousness  to  profound 
reflections  on  obtuse  topics,  to  the  lilted  perambulations  of  a  peasant  Irish  religious 
brother  serving  Shamrock  Tea  to  Gerard  Manley  Hopkins  in  the  grounds  of  a 6 
fictitious  Loyola  House  in  the  rolling  hills  of  the  Mourne  Mountains.  9  As  should  be 
evident  from  this  example  a  characteristic  of  post-modernity,  as  we  have  seen,  is  its 
foregrounding  of  the  situation  where  different  realities  co-exist,  collide  and 
interpenetrate. 
The  post-modem  city  consists  of  an  emporium  of  styles.  We  have  a  maniacal 
scrapbook  filled  with  colourful  entries.  An  example  from  close  to  hand,  in  order  to 
illustrate,  is  the  Clydesdale  bank  plaza  in  Edinburgh.  Here  we  have  a  typical  clash  of 
modernity  and  post-modemity;  on  the  one  hand  we  have  the  brash,  glass-fronted 
abstract  designs  of  modemity  and,  on  the  other,  these  sit  side  by  side  with  the  neo- 
classical,  grand  styles  of  post-modernity  which  simulate  a  past  world  and  its  attendant 
glories.  The  communication  of  knowledge  is  a  significant  factor  here.  For  through 
films,  television,  books  and  radio,  history  and  the  experience  of  the  past  is  turned  into 
a  seemingly  vast  archive  that  is  instantly  retrievable  and  capable  of  being  consumed 
endlessly  at  the  push  of  a  button.  Harvey  writes:  'the  post-modem  penchant  for 
jumbling  together  all  manner  of  references  to  past  styles  is  one  of  its  most  pervasive 
characteristics.  Reality,  it  seems,  is  being  shaped  to  mimic  media  images'.  10 
Harvey  identifies  mass  television  ownership,  satellite,  radio  and  other 
electronic  media  as  a  key  factor  influencing  the  contemporary  mindset  or  sensibility. 
The  world"s  different  times  and  spaces  have  been  collapsed  onto  the  depthless  surface 
of  the  television  screen.  The  world  can  watch  as  they  happen  and  observe  where  they 
happen  everything  from  the  Olympic  Games,  the  World  Cup,  to  a  deadly  tragedy  and 
the  rise  and  fall  of  political  dictatorships,  from  the  comfort  of  their  armchairs,  while 
9  Ciaran  Carson:  Shanwock  Tea:  Granta  Books:  London:  2001 
10  David  Harvey:  2000,  p.  85 7 
films  made  in  spectacular  locations  and  mass  tourism  have  made  available  to  many 
vicarious  or  simulated  experiences  of  different  cultures,  histories  and  locations. 
We  see  something  of  the  effects  of  such  stimulus  in  the  poetry  of  Matthew 
Sweeney,  a  poet  whose  original  imaginative  and  real  location  was  County  Donegal  on 
Ireland's  northwest  coastline,  but  who  has  lived  in  London  city's  cosmopolitan  milieu 
for  many  years  now.  In  the  world  of  the  poem  all  times  and  places  can  co-exist  in  a 
simultaneous  instance  of  imagining,  form,  line  and  word.  Post-modem  art  forms 
might  well  just  be  the  achievements  of  the  human  imagination  in  specific  fonns,  and 
yet,  ones  whose  realisation  have  only  been  technologically  achievable  in  recent 
decades  but  whose  potential  have  always  been  latent.  In  Sweeney's  poem  'In  the  Ice', 
itself  a  version  of  thirteenth  century  Italian  poet  Dante's  Inferno,  XXXH,  16  -  1392 
one  of  the  protagonists  swears  in  idiomatic  Hiberno-English:  'Fuck  off  and  don't 
annoy  me  finther'.  11  One  is  certain  a  vital  advocate  of  the  Tuscan  dialect  would 
appreciate  such  vernacular  genius.  'The  Tunnel'  presents  the  younger  poet's 
imaginary  journey  down  a  tunnel  running  underneath  the  island  of  Ireland  in  his 
homemade  dinghy,  having  entered  via  a  manhole  near  his  family  home  in  Donegal, 
emerging  eventually  as  if  in  Atlantis,  Mars  or  Florida  to  view  the  strange  (accents  of 
Cork  fishermen/  who  stood  and  watched  me  emerge'.  12  There  is  a  disruption  in  the 
concrete  locale  of  the  poem;  it  moves  easily  between  these  locations  within  its  world; 
as  opposed  to  the  early  poems  of  Seamus  Heaney,  work  that  is  characteristically 
strongly  rooted  in  its  sense  of  place,  Sweeny's  recent  work  as  an  aura  of  the  virtual 
about  it.  13 
11  Matthew  Sweeney:  A  Smell  of  Fish:  Jonathan  Cape:  London:  2000,  p.  45  -  47 
12  Matthew  Sweeney:  2000,  p.  5 
13  aturalist:  Faber  &  Faber:  See  poems  Eke  'Digging'  and  'Follower'  in  Seamus  Heaney's  Death  of  aN 
London:  1966 8 
Sweeney  frequently  deploys  such  imaginative  strategies  to  evoke  in  his  reader 
a  sense  of  the  brilliance  of  our  being  in  the  world,  the  spontaneity  of  the  senses  as 
they  comprehend  the  presence  of  the  world  to  them  in  a  moment  of  radical  encounter. 
This  is  often  coupled  with  a  confrontation  that  forces  us  to  face  the  radical 
contingency  of  our  being,  often  in  moments  of  danger  that  border  on  exhilaration. 
'The  Volcano'  could  be  a  news  reel  or  a  snippet  from  a  disaster  movie  in  its 
recounting  of  the  fleeing  of  a  couple  with  their  best  sari,  Armani  suit  and  monkey 
from  the  area  of  natural  disaster.  David  Harvey  might  read  this  poem  with  a 
commentary  like  'a  typical  middle-class  couple  with  their  eclectic  but  cool 
commodities  identifying  their  buying  power  and  class  status,  a  collage  of  random 
fashion  items  deconstructive  of  overarching  narratives  of  meaning,  inter-relatedness 
or  connection;  and  Sweeney's  ending  about  how  the  chairs  in  their  house  will,  by  the 
lava,  be  eventually  turned  'into  sculptures/  that  one  day  we'd  come  back  and  see'  is 
typical  of  this  group's  attraction  to  provocative  spectacle  lacking  in  ethical  and 
emotional  substance  or  depth.  14 
Another  contemporary  poet,  originally  hailing  from  New  York's  Irish 
community,  but  living  in  London  for  many  years,  Michael  Donaghy's  work  exhibits 
similar  post-modem  facets  and  exploits  comparable  tactics.  In  'Cruising  Byzantium' 
there  is  the  deliberate  echo  of  William  Butler  Yeats's  'The  Circus  Animals' 
Desertion'  (and  we  re-call  also  his  'Sailing  to  Byzantium'  and  'Byzantium')  in  the 
line  'and  not  such  lives  as  these  are  emblem  of  15.  We  witness  post-modem  quotation 
and  parasitism,  although  Donaghy's  poem  adopts  a  somewhat  sexier  take  on  things 
than  the  Sligo  bard  might  ever  have  conceived  even  in  a  Crazy  Jane  moment  (and  this 
14  Sweeney:  2000,  p.  10 
15  Michael  Donaghy:  Dances  Learned  Last  Night.  -  Poem  197S-199S:  Picador:  London:  2000,  p.  68 9 
is  altogether  in  keeping  with  a  post-modem  penchant  forjouissance  or  pleasure). 
Surrounded  by  middle-class  commodities:  'cash,  cashmere  coat  nor  cat',  Donaghy's 
narrator  is  still  in  search  for  love.  The  poem  does  explore  a  post-modem  dilemma 
with  its  presentation  of  the  photos  of  the  holiday  with  his  lover  in  Byzantium  and  how 
the  electronic  memory  or  preservation  of  the  event  is/was  as  important  as  the  event 
itself,  fore-grounded  within  the  choice  of  idiom  in  the  poem:  'You  have  become  the 
fetish  that  you  wear. 
The  problem  of  reference,  association  and  meaning  is  explored  explicitly  in 
'City  of  God'.  Augustine's  influential  work  City  ofGod  is  there  of  course,  and 
Augustinian  despair  at  the  fallenness  of  the  world  of  men.  The  poem  tells  the  story  of 
the  seminarian  whom  the  poet  knew  from  the  back  pews  of  his  local  church  and  his 
method  of  associating  one  thing  with  another  in  order  to  learn  for  exams,  how  the 
interior  of  a  church  can  be  read  as  a  manual  of  theology.  The  poet  imagines  the 
neighbourhood  transformed  by  this  student's  concern  with  salvation  and  damnation. 
By  implication,  the  poem  argues,  the  Christian  mindset  of  previous  centuries  intrudes 
into  present  consciousness  and  can  bear  an  oppressive  weight. 
Here  was  Bruno  Street  where  Bernadette 
collapsed,  bleeding  through  her  skirt 
and  died,  he  had  heard,  in  a  state  of  mortal  sin; 
here,  the  site  of  the  bakery  fire  where  Peter  stood 
screaming  on  the  red-hot  fire  escape, 
his  bare  feet  blistering  before  he  jumped; 
and  here  the  storefront  voodoo  church  beneath  the  el 10 
where  the  Cuban  bruja  bought  black  candles, 
its  window  strange  with  plaster  saints  and  seashells.  16 
From  the  sublime  concerns  of  theology  and  redemption,  the  next  poem  in  his  volume 
'Liverpool'  concerns  itself  with  tattoos  on  the  body.  17  And  so  the  poetic  landscape  of 
Donaghy's  work  resembles  the  pastiche  or  kitsch  of  a  contemporary  cityscape  where 
one  might  find  a  classical  church  beside  a  bizarre  market  pedalling  all  forms  of 
apparently  irredeemable  clutter. 
There  is  a  particular  aptness  to  Michael  Donaghy's  choice  of  title  for  his 
collection  Conjure.  18  In  the  poems  "My  Flu'  and  'Haunts'  memories  of  childhood, 
incidents  with  his  father  recently  deceased,  are  re-called  ftom  memory  by  the  Poet. 
What  happened  and  what  didn't?  The  poet  refers  to  film  as  a  means  of  preserving  the 
past  authentically  and  questions  that  proposition.  If  he  had  a  camera  recording  would 
that  tell  or  hold  the  truth  of  the  experience,  how  it  was  to  be  there?  Would  it  really 
contain  the  experience  of  what  it  was  like  to  be  sick  in  bed  with  the  flu  and  comforted 
by  his  father  way  back  in  1962.  'Haunts'  in  its  title  alone  suggests  the  territory  of 
ghostliness,  presence,  revenants  and  literary  quotation  and  life,  reading  Hamlet  into  an 
encounter  with  his  own  ghostly  father  and  his  telling  his  father  not  to  be  afraid  in  the 
dark  as  a  child,  in  a  deliberate  reversal  of  roles.  What  is  the  proper  perspective  from 
which  to  approach  the  world  or  reality?  Such  are  the  characteristic  pre-occupations  of 
the  post-modem  artwork. 
16  Donaghy:  Dances  Learned  Last  Night.  -  Poems  19  75  -  1995,  p.  69  -  70 
17  Donaghy:  Dances  Learned  Last  Night.  -  Poems  19  75  -  1995,  p.  71 
18  Michael  Donaghy:  Conjure:  Picador:  London:  2000 11 
Theological  Icons  and  idols 
What  is  the  theologian  to  make  of  all  this?  How  can  we  begin  to  critique  it? 
Does  it  have  a  positive  side,  and  do  we  necessarily  have  to  shout  'NoV, 
conservatively  assuming  that  such  change  is  a  bad  thing,  that  we  are  on  a  path  bound 
for  moral  and  cultural  ruination  in  the  end?  What  is  the  proper  task  of  the  theologian, 
if  any,  in  this  present  age?  Philosopher  and  theologian  Jean-Luc  Marion  has  spoken  of 
the  'I'  of  our  time  as  'a  modem  of  the  age  of  distress'19.  To  help  us  formulate  a  way 
of  approaching  post-modem  phenomena  critically  and  intelligently  we  turn  to  his  slim 
but  thoughtful  and  provocative  book  God  Without  Being. 
In  the  first  chapter  of  God  Without  Being  Marion  develops  a  distinction 
between  the  idol  and  the  icon.  Both  icon  and  idol  indicate  a  manner  of  being  for 
beirigs.  With  regard  to  aesthetic  production  they  indicate  works  of  art  that  are  so 
worked  that  they  no  longer  restrict  their  visibility  to  themselves.  However,  through 
remaining  absolutely  immanent  to  themselves  they  signal  indissolubly  towards 
another,  still  undetermined  term.  What  distinguishes  them  eventually?  The  idol  is 
characterised  by  the  fact  that  we  can  'see  it  so  visibly  that  the  very  fact  of  seeing  it 
suffices  to  know  it,  20 
.  And  so:  'in  this  stop,  the  gaze  ceases  to  overshoot  and 
transpierce  itself,  hence  it  ceases  to  transpierce  visible  things,  in  order  to  pause  in  the 
splendour  of  one  of  them'21  .  What  happens  with  the  idol  is  that  the  gaze  lets  itself  be 
filled,  and  instead  of  outflanking  the  visible,  of  not  seeing  it  and  rendering  it  invisible, 
the  gaze  discovers  itself  as  contained  and  held  back  by  the  visible.  The  idol  becomes 
19  Jean-Luc  Marion:  God  Without  Being.  -  Hors-Texte:  Univ.  of  Chicago  Press:  Chicago:  1995,  P.  15, 
Trans.  by  Thomas  A.  Carlson 
20  Jean-Luc  Marion:  1995,  p.  9 
21  Jean-Luc  Marion:  1995,  p.  II 12 
like  a  miffor,  a  miffor  reflecting  the  gaze's  image,  in  fact,  the  gaze's  aim  and  the 
scope  of  its  aim.  And  so  'with  the  idol,  the  invisible  miffor  admits  no  beyond,  because 
the  gaze  cannot  raise  the  sight  of  its  aim'22  . 
What  does  Marion  do  with  the  foregoing  reflection?  fie  utilises  it  to  critique 
the  methodology  of  philosophical  thought.  He  develops  his  notion  of  the  conceptual 
idol.  He  argues  that  in  concepts  thought  can  fteeze,  or  stop  at  a  particular  place  as 
much  as  the  imagination  can  within  the  medium  of  poetry  or  in  artistic,  visual 
representation.  Philosophy  itself  produces  idols:  'when  philosophical  thought 
expresses  a  concept  of  what  it  then  names  "God",  this  concept  functions  exactly  as  an 
idol.  It  gives  itself  to  be  seen,  but  thus  all  the  better  conceals  itself  as  the  miffor 
where,  thought,  invisibly,  has  its  forward  point  fixed,  so  that  the  invisible  finds  itself, 
with  an  aim  suspended  by  the  fixed  concept,  disqualified  and  abandoned,  thought 
freezes,  and  the  idolatrous  concept  of  "God"  appears,  where,  more  than  God,  thought 
judges  itself23.  Marion  is  then  in  a  position  to  speak  of  Nietzsche  as  a  breaker  of 
idols,  conceptually,  and  not  necessarily  an  irreligious  thinker.  His  assault  on  God  was 
upon  the  God  of  the  philosophers  whom  he  exposed  as  an  empty  idol,  worthy  of 
worship  no  longer.  He  may  well  have  done  thereby  some  good  service  to  religious 
thought. 
What  has  Marion  to  say  of  the  icon?  He  writes:  'the  icon  does  not  result  from 
a  vision  but  provokes  one'24  .  What  the  icon  achieves  is  to  allow  the  visible  to  be 
saturated  little  by  little  with  the  invisible,  and  thereby  summons  sight.  He  speaks  of. 
'the  invisible  bestowing  the  visible,  in  order  thus  to  deduce  the  visible  from  itself  and 
22  Jean-Luc  Marion:  1995,  p.  13 
23  Jean-Luc  Marion:  1995,  p.  16 
24  Jean-Luc  Marion:  1995,  p.  17 13 
to  allow  itself  to  appear  there  25.  A  feature  will  always  be  its  rendering  this  visible  this 
invisible  as  such  -  the  unenvisageable.  As  such  the  visible  will  always  refer  to 
something  other  than  itself;  without  however  rendering  or  reproducing  it  in  the 
visible.  He  writes:  'the  gaze  can  never  rest  or  settle  if  it  looks  at  an  icon;  it  always 
must  rebound  upon  the  visible,  in  order  to  go  back  in  it  up  the  infinite  stream  of  the 
invisible.  In  this  sense,  the  icon  makes  visible  only  by  giving  rise  to  an  infinite 
gaze  t26 
.  And  so  he  can  speak  of  'an  abyss  that  the  eyes  of  men  never  finish  probing'27 
Enough  then  of  fine  theological  conceptualisation;  can  we  find  any  examples, 
in  the  concrete,  as  it  were,  of  what  Marion  is  hinting  at?  One  is  drawn  to  a  book  by 
Seamus  Heaney  provocatively  titled  Seeing  Things  (1991).  Therein  we  find  the 
following  poem: 
Field  of  Vision 
I  remember  the  woman  who  sat  for  years 
In  a  wheelchair,  looking  straight  ahead 
Out  the  window  at  sycamore  trees  unleafing 
And  leafing  at  the  far  end  of  the  lane. 
Straight  out  past  the  TV  in  the  comer, 
The  stunted,  agitated  hawthorn  bush, 
The  same  small  calves  with  their  backs  to  wind  and  rain, 
The  same  acre  of  ragwort,  the  same  mountain. 
25  Jean-Luc  Marion:  1995,  p.  17 
26  Jean-Luc  Marion:  1995,  p.  18 
27  Jean-Luc  Marion:  1995,  p.  21 14 
She  was  steadfast  as  the  big  window  itself 
Her  brow  was  clear  as  the  chrome  bits  of  the  chair. 
She  never  lamented  once  and  she  never 
Carried  a  spare  ounce  of  emotional  weight. 
Face  to  face  with  her  was  an  education 
Of  the  sort  you  got  across  a  well-braced  gate- 
One  of  those  lean,  clean,  iron,  roadside  ones 
Between  two  whitewashed  pillars,  where  you  could  see 
Deeper  into  the  country  than  you  expected 
And  discovered  that  the  field  behind  the  hedge 
Grew  more  distinctly  strange  as  you  kept  standing 
Focused  and  drawn  in  by  what  barred  the  way.  28 
There  is  a  note  of  the  permanent  nature  of  the  vision  contemplated  and  seen  by 
the  woman  from  within  the  stasis  of  her  life.  She  is  fixed  like  the  gateway  described, 
and  is  a  gateway  of  sorts  herself  It  is  with  her  that  Heaney  has  to  contend  as  a  poet, 
with  her  steadfastness.  She  has  been  there  and  endured;  this  is  the  hint  of  the  items  , 
indicative  of  her  existence  provided  by  the  poem.  She  bypasses  the  medium  of  the 
modem  (dare  one  say  post-modem)  world  by  ignoring  her  TV  in  the  comer.  She  is 
almost  at  one  with  her  environment.  What  differentiates  her  is  her  moment  of  vision 
or  insight.  So  she  is  both  at  one  with  her  surroundings  and  different  at  the  same  time. 
In  nature  and  her  Heaney  can  encounter  the  visionary.  The  poem's  conclusion 
29  Seamus  Heaney:  Seeing  Things:  Faber  &  Faber:  London:  1991,  p.  22 15 
suggests  the  necessity  of  perspective,  of  a  framework;  otherwise,  we  would  not  know 
what  we  are  looking  at,  it  would  not  make  sense,  and  at  the  same  time  we  have  to 
allow  the  visionary  its  own  claim,  its  own  moment  of  difference,  that  takes  us  'deeper 
into  the  county  than  you  expected'  and  to  allow  access  to  the  'more  distinctly 
strange'.  The  merit  of  Heaney's  poem  is  how  it  grounds  the  visionary  within  the 
world  of  the  tangible,  the  accessible,  the  everyday  and  the  real.  In  tenns  of  the 
framework  elaborated  by  Jean-Luc  Marion  Heaney's  poem  does  not  present  the  vision 
as  such  and  really  just  leaves  open  the  possibility  of  illumination  from  unexpected  and 
strange  places;  so  rather  than  being  an  instance  of  the  religious  vision,  and  risking  the 
possibility  of  presenting  us  with  a  moment  of  artistic  idolisation,  it  leaves  open  rather, 
or  creates  an  aporia,  that  allows  for  the  movement  of  the  visionary,  or  religious  icon. 
In  this  thesis  we  will  examine  poetry  as  a  mode  of  accessing  the  distinctly 
strange,  as  retaining  a  capacity  to  force  open  our  conceptual  idols  when  they  settle 
down  in  either  of  the  discursive  modes  of  philosophy  and  theological  thought.  One  of 
our  major  concerns  will  be  with  the  poetry  of  Seamus  Heaney.  Why  the  poetry  of 
Seamus  Heaney  and  not  that  of  his  major  contemporaries  writing  in  the  English 
language:  Derek  Walcott,  Les  Murray,  or  John  Ashbery?  Any  of  the  above  poets 
could  have  been  used  in  the  present  study.  A  concern  for  the  religious  as  a  possibility 
or  impossibility  for  the  critically  reflective  human  being  today  is  found  in  all  of  their 
work.  In  Caribbean  poet  Derek  Walcott  we  find  the  following  reflection  in  a  poem 
about  the  premature  death  of  his  daughter: 16 
As  for  you,  little  star, 
my  lost  daughter,  you  are 
bent  in  the  shape  forever 
of  a  curled  seed  sailing  the  earth, 
in  the  shape  of  one  question,  a  comma 
that  knows  before  us  whether  death 
is  another  birth. 
29 
Walcott's  most  recent  ambitious  long  poem  Depolo's  Hound  is  a  poetic  analysis  of 
the  drift  into  what  we  have  identified  as  cultural  nihilism,  through  an  examination  of 
Impressionist  painting  and  the  major  currents  of  European  civilisation  in  the  late 
Enlightemnent  period  . 
30  Australian  Les  Murray  has  been  preoccupied  with  the 
question  of  religion  and  belief  throughout  his  writing  career  .31 
New  Yorker  John 
Ashbery  sounds  in  'The  Gods  of  Fairness'  as  if  he  has  read  Jean-Luc  Marion's  God 
Without  Being  with  its  argument  for  charity  as  the  greatest  moment  between  God  and 
humanity  when  he  writes: 
The  failure  to  see  God  is  not  a  problem 
God  has  a  problem  with.  Sure,  he  could  see  us 
if  he  had  a  hankering  to  do  so,  but  that's 
not  the  point.  The  point  is  his  concern 
for  us  and  for  biscuits.  For  the  loaf 
29  Derek  Walcott:  Collected  Poems  1948  -  1984:  Faber:  London:  1992,  p.  450 
"  Derek  Walcott:  771epolo's  Hound.  Faber:  London:  2000 
31  Up  to  and  including  one  of  his  best  recent  collections:  Subhuman  Redneck  Poems:  Carcanet: 
Manchester:  1996,  and  poems  like  'The  Say-but-the-word  Centurion  Attempts  a  SumnlarY',  P.  14 17 
of  bread  that  turns  in  the  night  sky  over  StockholM.  32 
So,  any  one  of  these  contemporary,  living  poets  could  have  been  a  focus  for  this 
study.  We  opted  for  Seamus  Heaney  because,  apart  from  his  being  one  of  the  most 
significant  poets  writing  today,  we  note  that  unlike  Walcott's  declared  disappearance 
of  faith  in  late  adolescence,  and  yet,  his  persistent  examination  of  this  issue,  and 
unlike  the  openly  accepted  and  traditional  religious  faith  of  Les  Murray,  Heaney  has 
sought  out  and  occupied  a  more  ambivalent  position,  not  overtly  religious,  and  yet  not 
sceptical  or  dismissive  of  it  either.  Most  pressingly  though  his  work  pursues,  in 
volumes  like  Seeing  Things,  The  Spirit  Levet33  and  Electric  Ligh?  4,  a  fascinating  path 
of  exposing  contemporary  poetry  to  the  contest  and  necessity  of  keeping  open 
horizons  of  vision  within  art,  thought  and  culture  that  challenge,  provoke  and  unearth 
us  from  easily  accepted  orthodoxies  of  any  ilk.  11is  achievements  in  this  respect  are 
intriguing  and  will  be  examined  closely  later.  We  will  read  Heaney's  work  within  the 
context  of  contemporary  Irish  poetry  and  culture,  utilising  the  work  of  his  fellow 
poets,  especially  his  most  significant  predecessor,  John  Montague.  Another  major 
poet  who  will  feature  significantly  in  this  thesis  is  the  Romanian/German  poet  Paul 
Celan  whom  many  have  written  of  as  the  most  significant  post  war  European  poet. 
We  will  place  our  thoughts  within  the  framework  of  post-modem  philosophy, 
starting  first  with  Martin  Heidegger's  essay  'The  Origin  of  the  Work  of  Art  35.  e 
will  do  this  in  Chapter  One.  This  essay  defines  the  agenda,  asking  first,  in  its  way, 
32  John  Ashbery:  Your  Name  Here:  Carcanet:  Manchester:  2000 
33  Seamus  Heaney:  The  Spirit  Level:  Faber  &  Faber:  London:  1996 
34  Seamus  Heaney:  Electric  Light:  Faber  &  Faber:  London:  2001 
35  Martin  Heidegger:  Basic  Wtifings:  Routledge:  London:  1999,  p.  139  -  212,  (ed.  )  David  Krell 18 
many  of  the  questions  pursued  by  subsequent  thought,  particularly  that  of  Maurice 
Blanchot.  We  will  examine  in  Chapter  Two  the  poetry  of  Paul  Celan  as  it  stages  a 
revolt  against  Heideggerian  totalitarian  philosophical  domination  and  we  will  read  his 
work  as  an  exemplary  instance  of  poetry's  capacity  to  resist  thought,  idolisation  and 
as  an  effective  way  to  force  open  alternative  horizons  for  contemplation  and 
engagement  with  reality.  In  Chapter  Three  we  will  examine  Cel&  s  work  as  a  way  of 
retaining  the  strange  and  the  Other,  of  creating  a  language  resistant  to  all  attempts  to 
domesticate  and  homogenise  it,  a  strategy  that  may  well  be  vital  in  an  era  of  post- 
modem  utilitarianism  and  commercial  exploitation.  In  Chapter  Four  we  will  engage 
with  the  nihilism  of  Maurice  Blanchot  and  suggest  avenues  of  challenge  to  his 
position.  In  Chapter  Five  we  will  examine  particular  outstanding  issues,  and  will 
confront  unresolved  questions  about  the  place  of  art  within  and  without  civilisation 
and  barbarism,  and  the  implications  that  this  might  have  for  theology,  as  well  as 
exploring  the  possibilities  of  a  t3rpe  of  post-modem  faith;  both  excavations  will  occur 
through  engaging  with  the  writings  of  Jacques  Derrida. 19 
Chapter  One: 
On  the  Path  to  Post-Modemity:  Clearances  and 
Presences,  a  Poetic  Chaflenge  for  Martin 
Heidegger's  'The  Ofigin  of  the  Work  of  Art' 
In  a  humble  gesture  Derek  Walcott  (unusual  for  this  poet  with  his  typically 
grand  pronouncements  and  tropes)  ventures  to  ask  in  an  elegiac  poem  'The  Bounty' 
(for  his  deceased  mother  Alix)  whether  his  poetic  re-creation  of  the  sea  and  its  echo  of 
Ovid  speaks  truly  of  continuity,  human  endurance  beyond  pain  and  death,  against 
mortality  and  decay.  He  then  writes:  'I  hope  this  settles  the  matter  //  of  presences". 
Belfast  poet  Derek  Mahon  begins  'A  Disused  Shed  in  Co.  Wexford'  with  the 
statement:  "Even  now  there  are  places  where  a  thought  might  grow  2.  And  he  suggests 
Peruvian  mines,  Indian  compounds  and  disused  sheds  in  Co.  Wexford.  All  are  places 
where  a  poem,  a  reflection,  a  fresh  start  or  reconsideration  might  begin.  What  is  the 
nature  of  these  worlds  imagined  within  the  real?  The  consideration  of  this  question  is 
a  central  starting  point  in  much  contemporary  reflection  on  art  and  literature.  Does  art 
touch  the  transcendental  in  some  way  or  is  it  touched  by  it?  Is  the  world  of  the 
imagination  an  illusory  pursuit  of  the  diminished  and  evasive  transcendent  God,  who 
was  only  a  mirage  in  the  very  first  instance?  Such  reflections  have  pre-occupied  many 
contemporary  theorists  of  art,  a  fact  revealed  by  only  a  cursory  glance  at  book  titles. 
George  Steiner  published  Real  Presences:  Is  there  anything  in  what  we  say?  "  in 
19893  . 
French  thinker  Jean-Luc  Nancy  published  a  series  of  reflections  The  Birth  to 
1  Derek  Walcott:  The  Bounty:  Faber:  London:  1997,  p.  11 
2  Derek  Mahon:  Collected  Poena:  Gallery:  Meath:  1999,  p.  89 
3  George  Steiner:  Red  Presences:  Faber:  London:  1991 20 
Presence  in  1993  4.  And  French  deconstructionist  (so-called)  Jacques  Derrida  set  the 
cat  amongst  the  critical  pigeons  early  on  with  his  challenge  to  the  transcendental 
signified  in  his  magnum  opus  of  the  1960s  QfGrammatoloe.  We  wish  to  propose  an 
earlier  starting  point  to  this  debate,  an  origin  indeed;  we  will  begin  with  the  much- 
discussed  essay  of  German  philosopher  Martin  Heidegger  'On  the  Origin  of  the  Work 
of  AA-)6. 
However,  before  moving  on  to  look  at  Heidegger  closely  we  will  have  a  brief 
look  at  what  Derrida  has  to  say  in  OfGrammatology.  Jacques  Derrida  writes  about  the 
traditional  association  of  signified  and  signifier,  of  writing's  intimate  connection  with 
sense,  in  that  the  written  word,  traditionally  understood,  captured  the  immediacy  of 
the  spoken  word  and  indeed,  of  the  world.  He  writes:  'the  age  of  the  sign  is  essentially 
theological  In  the  Middle  Ages  it  was  understood  that  a  sign  signified  'an  eternal 
verity,  eternally  thought  and  spoken  in  the  proximity  of  a  present  logos's.  However 
the  consciousness  revealed  in  Nietzche's  writing  signifies  a  break  with  this 
understanding,  in  that  he  understood  his  writing  to  be  'originary'  operations  in  that  he 
has  written  what  he  has  written  and  it  is  not  in  any  sense  originally  subordinate  to  the 
4  Jean-Luc  Nancy:  The  Birth  to  Presence:  Stanford  Univ.  Press:  California:  1993,  (Trans.  )  Brian 
Holmes  and  Others. 
5  Jacques  Derrida:  QjrGrantmatology:  Johns  Hopkins  Univ.  Press:  Baltimore:  1998,  (Trans.  )  Gayatri 
Chakravorty  Spivak 
6  In  1935,  the  year  in  which  Martin  Heidegger  gave  his  lecture  course,  'Introduction  to  Metaphysics', 
he  presented  a  lecture  in  Freiburg  to  the  Society  of  Art  Sciences  entitled  'Concerning  the  Origin  of  the 
Work  of  Art'.  When  asked  by  the  students  of  the  University  in  Zurich  to  give  a  talk  there  he  gave  the 
same  lecture  again.  That  was  in  January  1936.  A  short  time  thereafter  he  expanded  this  lecture  and  gave 
it  as  three  lectures  in  1936  in  Frankfurt.  These  three  lectures  were  published  in  Holzwege  in  1950  under 
the  title,  'The  Origin  of  the  Work  of  Art',  with  the  addition  of  an  Afterword,  written  in  part  after  1936. 
In  1956  Heidegger  wrote  an  Addendum  that  sought  to  clarify  some  aspects  of  the  essay.  The  version  I 
will  work  from  is  the  final  edition  published  by  David  Krell  in  his  anthology  of  Heidegger's  work 
entitled  Basic  Writings:  Routledge:  London:  1999,  p.  140  -  203.  Although  the  version  referred  to  by  the 
critic  FranWise  Dastur,  whom  I  quote  in  my  chapter,  is  the  first  draft,  Dastur  refers  to  it  as  the  Freiburg 
version  (FV)  and  it  was  published  first  in  1987. 
7  Of  Grammatology:  1998,  p.  14 
8  QjrGrantmatology:  1998,  p.  15 21 
logos  and  to  truth.  After  this  realisation  we  enter  into  the  realm  of  play,  with  Derrida 
writing,  'one  'could  call  play  the  absence  of  the  transcendental  signified  as 
limitlessness  of  play,  that  is  to  say  as  the  destruction  of  onto-theology  and  the 
metaphysics  of  presence'9.  For  Derrida,  this  is  where  we  are  now  in  terms  of  theology 
and  philosophy  of  language,  writing  and  their  comprehension,  and  in  many  ways, 
then,  the  philosophical  disciplines  of  epistemology  and  hermeneutics  remain 
challenged  by  this  radical  understanding  with  relation  to  the  connection  between 
thought  and  language,  writing  and  presence,  and  the  origin  of  all  meaning.  We 
consider  Martin  Heidegger's  The  Origin  ofthe  Work  qfArt  as  a  key  moment  in  the 
development  of  this  trend  of  intellectual  argument  and  understanding. 
Martin  Heidegger  begins  his  essay  Yhe  Origin  ofthe  Work  ofArt  with  the 
seemingly  obvious  position  that:  'Origin  here  means  that  from  which  and  by  which 
something  is  what  it  is  and  as  it  is"O.  Heidegger  states  that  'the  artist  is  the  origin  of 
the  work.  The  work  is  the  origin  of  the  artist'.  And  in  a  more  primary  sense:  "art  is  the 
origin  of  both  artist  and  work"'.  When  one  uses  the  language  of  origin  in  relation  to 
art  one  is  already  hinting  that  one  intends  to  speak  about  something  that  is 
fundamental.  We  might  expect  Heidegger  to  venture  into  developing  ideas  concerning 
the  related  issues  of  truth  and  essence,  and  it  no  surprise  to  see  him  do  so. 
9  Of  Grammatology:  1998,  p.  5o 
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"at  about  Things  and  the  Nature  of  their  Work? 
fleidegger  states  early  on  that  all  works  have  a  'thingly'  character'2.  In  fact 
they  would  be  precious  little  without  it.  Yet  we  always  claim  something  more  for  the 
work  of  art.  We  do  not  let  it  reside  in  its  thingliness  (sic!  )  alone.  For  example,  we 
commonly  assume  that  there  is  something  that  separates  the  vacuum  cleaner  and  the 
familiar  hairdryer  from  a  sculpture  by  Rodin.  There  is  something  different  about  the 
shoes  of  a  peasant  as  wom  in  the  fields  of  Flanders,  on  the  hills  of  Tuscany  or  on  a 
bog  in  Connemara,  compared  to  those  painted  by  Vincent  Van  Gogh.  We  often  assert 
that  it  is  this  something  else  that  constitutes  the  artistic  nature  of  the  work.  The 
artwork  is  a  crafted  object,  is  made  of  fabrics  and  such  like,  yet  we  say  it  says 
something  other  and  more  than  what  the  mere  thing  itself  is.  The  best  way  to  speak  of 
this  aspect  of  the  work  might  well  be  to  describe  the  work  as  intrinsically  allegorical, 
always  destined  to  manifest  something  wholly  other  than  itself  The  work  brings 
together  something  different  with  what  is  made  and  thus  is,  in  the  original  Greek 
sense,  symballein  a  work  of  the  symbolic. 
Hleidegger  states  that  his  objective  in  this  essay  is  to  approach  'the  immediate 
and  full  actuality  of  the  work  of  art'13  . 
We  must  first  view  the  thingly  element  in  the 
artwork  for  it  is  in  it  that  the  symbolic  is  made  to  do  its  work.  The  thingly  element  is 
the  foundation,  means,  medium  by  which  the  other,  proper  element  is  put  to  work. 
We  need  to  be  clear  about  the  nature  of  the  thing  before  we  proceed  to  elaborating  the 
nature  of  art.  We  must  know  what  a  thing  is  before  we  can  know  what  the  artwork  is, 
as  something  that  adheres  to,  dwells  within,  is  located  in,  the  thing.  it  is  only  after  we 
11  P.  143 
12  Baie  Wlilings:  1999,  P.  146 23 
have  grasped  this  point  that  we  can  begin  to  determine  with  confidence  and  clarity 
whether  the  work  is  in  the  end  something  else  and  not  a  thing  at  all. 
For  Heidegger  everything  that  is,  is  a  thing.  From  the  spoon  in  the  drawer,  to 
the  fiddle  on  the  wall,  the  tree  in  the  field  to  the  cow  in  the  byre;  all  of  these  are  things 
in  themselves,  in  short,  everything  that  we  can  say  is  about,  are  things.  At  the  same 
time  we  do  not  normally  consider  people  to  be  things,  or  God,  even  though  we 
presume  s/he  is,  a  thing.  In  common  parlance  we  speak  of  things  as  a  basic 
component,  or  self-contained  unit,  a  common  denominator,  such  as  a  clod  of  turf  or  a 
block  of  wood.  A  thing  here  means  that  which  is  nothing  more  than  a  mere  thing  and 
that  which  is  only  a  thing. 
Heidegger  describes  the  block  of  granite,  its  bulky  shape,  its  odd  colour  and  its 
rough  texture.  Thus  we  approach  its  thingliness.  However,  we  are  rarely  content  to 
leave  it  at  that.  We  often  speak  of  the  thing  as  that  around  which  the  properties  have 
assembled.  And  thus  we  begin  to  speak  of  the  core  of  things,  what  the  Greeks  spoke 
of  as  to  hypokeimenon,  the  core  that  lay  at  the  ground  of  the  thing,  what  is  already 
there.  And  the  characteristics  are  described  as  la  symbebekota,  as  that  which  has  , 
turned  up  already  with  the  given  core  and  occurs  along  with  it. 
The  centrality  of  language,  translation,  metaphor  and  poetry  to  all  thought  is 
highlighted  by  Heidegger?  s  concern  over  the  translation  of  these  tenns  from  Greek  to 
Latin  thought.  He  expresses  the  concern  that  we  have  translated  the  words  Without 
having  experienced  the  primary  event  that  forged  the  Greek  concepts  in  the  first 
13  p.  146 24 
instance.  The  word  hypokeimenon  becomes  subiectum;  hypostasis  becomes 
substantia;  symbebekos  becomes  accidens.  For  Heidegger  this  translation  marks  the 
rootlessness  of  Western  thought.  Something  quirky  creeps  in  due  to  the  syntactical 
structures  of  Latin.  We  combine  the  subject  of  the  sentence  with  what  is  stated  of  it  in 
the  predicate,  through  words,  and  assume  blindly  that  this  is  a  given  of  actuality. 
Heidegger  asks:  'Who  would  have  the  temerity  to  assail  these  simple  fundamental 
relations  between  thing  and  statement,  between  sentence  structure  and  thing- 
structureT  14  Heidegger  asks  what  will  later  become  an  abiding  question:  What  is  the 
primary  thing,  what  emerges  first,  reality,  or  the  language  through  which  we  structure 
it? 
Heidegger  proposes  that  the  truth  might  be  far  more  complicated  than  we  have 
previously  conceived  it  to  be.  He  proposes  that  the  sentence  and  thing-structure 
derive,  in  their  typical  form  and  in  their  possible  mutual  relationship,  from  a  far  more 
original  source.  First  Heidegger  questions  the  assumption  that  the  thing-concept  that 
sees  the  thing  primarily  as  the  bearer  of  its  characteristics  is  the  truth  of  things,  can  be 
assumed  to  be  true,  that  it  lies  at  a  moment  prior  to  all  questions  and  exists  before  all 
radical  thought.  Heidegger  argues  that  an  act  of  ancient  violence  of  thought  and  on 
thought  has  occurred  here.  When  we  seek  for  the  irrational,  as  an  other  to  the  rational, 
as  the  abortive  offipring  of  the  unthought  rational,  a  curious  by-product  we  discover, 
and  Heidegger  lays  claim  to  it,  is  that  the  cuffent  thing-concept  does  not  lay  a  hold  on 
what  is  essential  to  the  thing  as  it  is  in  its  own  being,  and  thus  does  not  assault  it. 
1413aSie  Wrilings:  1999,  P.  149 25 
How  can  we  avoid  such  an  act  of  verbal  or  intellectual  assault?  To  jump 
slightly  ahead  of  Heidegger  at  this  point  we  suggest  trying  to  create  an  opening 
through  language  itself  Through  language  we  can  create  a  free  field  within  which  the 
thing  may  display  its  thingly  character  directly.  Our  aim  at  this  stage,  as  Heidegger 
perceives  it,  is  to  dwell  before  the  ummediated  presencing  of  the  thing.  Heidegger  says 
wc  cannot  pcrccivc  the  abstract  sound  of  noisc,  but  can  only  perccivc  the  concrctc 
smashing  of  pottery,  the  throb  of  a  diesel  engine  over  the  drive  and  aggression  of  a 
petrol  one,  the  sound  of  a  guitar  as  opposed  to  the  notes  and  tones  of  an  abstract 
music.  We  cannot  listen  abstractly.  If  we  are  to  rely  on  our  senses  to  bring  the 
thingliness  of  things  to  us  it  seems  to  disappear  further  out  of  view.  We  must  strive  to 
allow  the  thing  to  remain  in  its  own  steaffastness  and  its  self-containment. 
Heidegger  proposes  another  traditional  option  about  which  he  has  some 
reservations.  He  considers  the  matter  of  things  within  which  the  form  is  already 
always  present,  coextensive  and  coexists  within  it.  The  thing  is  formed  matter.  This 
view  has  equal  application  to  nature  and  the  utensils  drawn  upon  by  the  intellectual 
capacity  of  humanity.  The  concepts  of  form  and  matter  have  been  used  extensively  in 
the  domain  of  aesthetics  and  beyond  for  many  a  long  year,  to  the  point  of  being  lazily 
assumed  to  be  true,  to  being  a  clichd  of  thought.  The  result  of  this  is  that  various 
subsequent  oppositions  are  conjoined  without  any  real  thought.  Form,  it  is  assumed,  is 
related  to  the  rational  and  matter  to  the  irrational;  the  rational  is  understood  to  be 
logical  and  the  irrational  illogical;  and  then  the  final  sin  and  aberration  of  original 
thought,  the  subject-object  relation  is  coupled  with  the  conceptual  pair  of  form-matter. 
Heidegger  is  keen  to  trace  down  the  origin  of  the  conceptual  framework  of  form  and 26 
matter  does  it  emerge  from  the  thingly  character  of  the  thing  or  in  the  workly 
character  of  the  artwork? 
We  are  aware  of  the  form  of  a  block  of  granite.  It  is  a  material  in  a  definite  if 
unshapely  form,  chiseled  out  from  the  mountainside  by  man,  woman,  machine  or 
dynamite  before  it  is  altered  or  worked  to  serve  a  definite  function.  We  are  aware  also 
of  the  forms  taken  by  a  cup,  boots,  or  an  umbrella.  The  form  determines  the 
distribution  of  the  matter  in  these  cases  and  is  determined  again  by  the  function  which 
these  objects  have  been  created  to  serve.  Usefulness  is  a  key  factor  in  considering 
these  objects  and,  in  fact,  grounds  their  matter  and  form.  However,  a  being  that  is 
useful  is  nearly  always  the  product  of  a  process  of  making  destined  for  a  particular 
end.  So  then,  as  determinations  of  beings,  matter  and  form  assume  their  proper  place 
under  the  rubric  of  equipment.  So,  matter  and  form  do  not  relate  in  any  essential  way 
to  the  thingness  of  the  mere  thing. 
Heidegger  admits  that  the  piece  of  equipment,  like  the  pair  of  shoes,  does  have 
a  self-contained  character  like  the  merest  of  objects.  However,  it  does  not  have  the 
character  of  possessing  this  innately,  of  having  taken  shape  of  its  own  accord,  like  the 
granite  boulder  lying  at  the  foot  of  the  mountainside.  The  shoes  though,  like  the 
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artwork  that  preoccupies  Heidegger,  are  made  objects,  the  product  of  human  activity. 
Yet,  by  its  self-sufficient  presencing  the  work  of  art  is  somewhat  closer  to  the  mere 
thing  that  has  given  birth  to  its  own  forni  and  is  self-contained.  And  yet  we  still  say 
that  the  work  of  art  is  separate  from  these  mere  things.  Is  it  because  of  the  middle 
ground  that  equipment  occupies  between  the  mere  thing  and  the  artwork,  a  fact  we 
determine  by  means  of  the  matter-form  formulation,  that  tempts  us  into  taking  this 27 
fonnulation  as  the  pathway  into  our  discussion  of  the  unique  properties  of  the  work  of 
art,  as  opposed  to  the  mere  thing?  The  biblical  tradition  gives  a  further  impetus  to  this 
tendency  by  its  support  for  the  view  that  God  has  made  everything,  and  in  some  sense 
form  has  been  pre-ordained  within  matter.  We  are  tempted  to  see  God  as  the  primary 
and  original,  originary  craftsman.  According  to  Heidegger  this  view  borrowed  from 
Scholastic  philosophy  still  remains  in  operation  in  Kantian  transcendentalism  and  can 
hinder  our  approach  to  the  thing-being  of  the  thing.  These  three  views  that  approach 
the  thing  as  a  bearer  of  traits,  a  unity  of  manifold  sensations  and  as  formed  matter 
actually  conceal  the  thingliness  of  the  thing  and  do  not  allow  us  to  approach  it  in  its 
naked  state,  in  its  thing-being  and  its  own  self  The  most  salient  lesson  that  is  to  be 
gathered  from  the  above  effort,  the  examination  of  misleading  modes  of  thought  and 
the  failure  to  describe  or  approach  the  thingliness  of  things,  is  that  obviously  this  is  a 
more  difficult  task  than  we  might  have  imagined.  As  Heidegger  writes:  'The 
unpretentious  thing  evades  thought  most  stubbornly"'.  We  have  made  mistakes,  and 
Heidegger  decides  to  take  up  the  most  misleading  and  widely  evident  error,  the  issue 
of  matter  and  form  and  equipmental  being  in  the  search  for  why  this  misadventure  has 
become  so  prominent,  for  this  might  lie  quite  close  to  the  true  nature  of  things., 
Heidegger  presents  us  then  with  the  infamous  example  of  the  peasant's  sboes, 
a  piece  of  equipment  that  recommends  itself  for  our  consideration  on  the  grounds  of 
simplicity  and  commonness.  16  Heidegger  speaks  of  Van  Gogh's  several  paintings  of 
peasant's  shoes.  He  proceeds  to  argue  that  the  equipmental  nature  of  things  is  best 
located  when  we  observe  them  being  used.  The  best  place  to  observe  the  peasant 
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woman's  shoes,  doing  that  for  which  they  received  their  form,  is  to  see  them  working 
in  the  field  where  they  disappear  into  their  function  and  are  hardly  considered  in 
themselves  at  all.  It  is  only  when  such  objects  fail  in  their  proper  function  that  we  give 
them  any  deliberation  at  all.  Van  Gogh's  painting  offers  us  no  clues  that  tell  us 
exactly  what  job  these  shoes  do. 
Heidegger  proceeds  from  the  entrance  into  the  shoes  for  one's  foot  to  a 
meditation  on  the  toilsome  labours  and  conditions  of  the  peasant  woman.  Heidegger, 
and  this  is  a  key  point,  reads  into  the  shoes  evidence  of  their  earthly  character  and 
thus  accesses  the  world  of  the  peasant  woman,  as  he  imagines  it,  a  world  within  which 
the  shoes  are  protected  and  where  they  most  truly  rest  within  themselves.  Heidegger 
draws  attention,  after  the  fact,  to  his  own  lyricism,  suggesting  that  it  is  only  within  the 
world  of  the  picture  that  we  can  read  such  imaginings  unfettered  and  free.  The  peasant 
woman,  in  herself,  only  wears  the  shoes.  Once  her  shoes  are  reliable,  once  they  still 
function,  they  will  not  be  a  source  for  reflection  or  contemplation  to  her.  This 
reliability  is  her  stability  and  guarantees  her  relation  to  the  earth  and  her  world  that 
grows  from  that  or  is  secure  in  that,  is  grounded  by  it.  World  and  earth  come  together 
in  the  equipment  and  guarantee  her  mode  of  being. 
However,  as  Heidegger  notes  without  a  note  of  sentimentality,  usefulness 
wears  out.  Shoes  deteriorate,  become  unreliable  and  are  used  up  and  thrown  away. 
The  shoe  recedes  into  the  background  as  mere  stuff.  And  this  dwindling  away 
highlights  the  essential  character,  the  original  essence  of  equipmental  being.  The  form 
imposed  on  this  matter,  we  have  the  impression,  is  just  a  mere  fabrication  that 
eventually  breaks  down  and  fades  away.  Yet  Heidegger  persists  that  in  its  genuinely 29 
equipmental  being,  eqwpment  stems  from  a  distant  source.  The  distinction  of  matter 
and  form  arises  from  a  deeper  origin. 
The  reliability  of  which  we  have  spoken  speaks  nothing  of  the  thingly 
character  of  things,  as  well  as  failing  to  move  us  any  closer  to  apprehending  the 
workly  character  of  the  work,  particularly  the  work  of  art.  Heidegger  says  that  our 
processes  of  inqwry  hitherto  have  not  been  wasted  for  we  realize  that  it  was  Van 
Gogh's  painting  of  the  peasant's  shoes  that  permitted  us  to  see  them.  They  did  not 
jump  up  and  do  a  jig  of  their  own  accord  to  draw  our  attention  to  them,  nor  did  they 
sing  a  song  or  call  out  to  us  and  thereby  allow  us  to  see  or  hear  them,  and  thus 
contemplate  them  in  themselves.  As  Heidegger  writes  of  Van  Gogh's  painting:  'In  the 
17 
nearness  of  the  work  we  were  suddenly  somewhere  else  than  we  usually  tend  to 
It  is  the  work  of  art  he  argues  that  allows  us  to  know  what  the  shoes  are  in  truth. 
Heidegger  states  that  it  is  not  his  reading  into  the  work  that  allows  the  shoes  to 
emerge  in  all  their  thingliness;  instead  it  is  true  to  say  that  'the  equipmentality  of 
equipment  first  expressly  comes  to  the  fore  through  the  work  and  only  in  the  work"g. 
How  does  Heidegger  describe  this  process?  What  happens  there?  He  argues 
that  Van  Gogh's  painting  offers  a  disclosure  of  the  truth  of  the  pair  of  shoes.  In  the 
work  of  art,  here  Van  Gogh's  painting  of  the  peasant's  shoes,  the  being  of  the  shoes 
emerges  into  the  unconcealment  of  its  Being.  The  ancient  Greeks  called  such 
unconcealment  of  beings  aletheia.  Heidegger  speaks  of  it  as  a  disclosure  of  a 
particular  being,  disclosing  what  and  how  it  is.  If  there  is  such  an  occurrence  within  a 
work  then  a  happening  of  truth  occurs.  And  it  appears  also  that  it  is  a  work  of  art. 
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Heidegger  writes:  'in  the  work  of  art  the  truth  of  beings  has  set  itself  to  work. 
'To  set'  means  here  'to  bring  to  stand'.  Some  particular  being,  a  pair  of  peasant  shoes, 
comes  in  the  work  to  stand  in  the  light  of  its  Being.  The  Being  of  beings  comes  into 
the  steadiness  of  its  shining"'.  And  so  the  essence  of  art,  for  Heidegger,  is  the 
instance  when  the  truth  of  beings  sets  itself  to  work.  This  has  the  air  of  a  new 
departure  about  it,  Heidegger  notes,  in  that  traditionally  aesthetics  concerned  itself 
with  beauty,  while  logic  concerned  itself  with  truth.  However  he  is  keen  to  distance 
himself  from  any  facile  mimetic  theory.  Traditionally  agreement  with  what  is  has 
been  seen  to  be  the  essence  of  truth.  Heidegger  is  after  a  more  elusive  idea.  He  says 
the  work  of  art  does  not  seek  a  purely  external  resemblance  to  things  but  wishes  to 
capture  things  in  terms  of  their  general  essence.  What  is  the  truth  of  a  temple?  What 
are  we  the  viewers  and  critics  to  check  the  artist's  representation  against?  If  we 
consider  Holderlin's  poem  The  Rhine,  what  is  pre-given  to  the  poet,  and  how,  so  that 
the  poet  may  re-give  it  again  in  the  poem?  Can  truth  appear  in  a  work  that  has  been 
created  in  a  historical  instance,  when  we  have  traditionally  conceived  of  truth  as 
something  atemporal  and  outside  history? 
A  Poetic  Interlude.,  The  Poem  asks  its  Question 
The  Peninsula 
When  you  have  nothing  more  to  say,  just  drive 
For  a  day  all  round  the  peninsula. 
The  sky  is  tall  as  over  a  runway, 
The  land  without  marks  so  you  will  not  arrive 
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But  pass  through,  though  always  skirting  landfall, 
At  dusk,  horizons  drink  down  sea  and  hill, 
The  ploughed  field  swallows  the  whitewashed  gable 
And  you're  in  the  dark  again.  Now  recall 
The  glazed  foreshore  and  silhouetted  log, 
That  rock  where  breakers  shredded  into  rags, 
The  leggy  birds  stilted  on  their  own  legs, 
Islands  riding  themselves  out  into  the  fog 
And  drive  back  home,  still  with  nothing  to  say 
Except  that  now  you  will  uncode  all  landscapes 
By  this:  things  founded  clean  on  their  own  shapes, 
Water  and  ground  in  their  extreMity. 
20 
Seamus  Heaney 
Seamus  Heaney  provides  us  in  this  poem  'The  Peninsula'  with  an  illustration 
of  the  problem  posed  by  Martin  Heidegger.  How  does  an  abstract  poetic  form,  the 
four  quatrains  of  this  poem,  come  to  contain  something  as  tangible  as  a  peninsula? 
What  happens  here  and  how  can  we  speak  of  it  in  intelligible,  conceptual  terms? 
In  this  poem  Seamus  Heaney  stresses  the  opposition  of  speech  and  writing. 
The  poem  is  a  meditation  upon  the  necessary  space  of  the  artwork  and  recounts  a 
journey  into  the  dark  night  of  silence  where  the  poet  is  blind  to  the  remarkable 32 
present.  Writing  is  seen  here  to  be  a  natural  complement  to  the  faculty  of  speech  and 
not  as  an  unnecessary  appendage  or  as  speech's  repressed  Other.  Initially  the 
landscape  is  presented  as  a  text  that  has  been  erased  of  all  trace  of  speech  and  writing. 
This  kenosis  has  the  status  of  a  necessary  beginning.  A  new  space  is  thereby  created 
whereby  a  new  annunciation  occurs  in  the  influx  of  fresh  images  and  new  words. 
Reality  undergoes  a  necessary  displacement  prior  to  being  re-called,  re-membered,  re- 
constituted  in  the  poem  by  the  artistic  mind  or  imagination. 
The  islands  and  the  birds  of  the  poem  become  emblems  of  the  poet  who  is 
doubled  back  on  himself  He  offers  the  reader  a  meditation  on  the  writer's 
imagination  by  means  of  the  writer's  imagination.  (What  else  could  he  use?  ).  After 
the  event  of  the  poem  things  may  be  grasped  in  what  Aquinas  and  Joyce  would 
identify  as  their  quidditas,  their  unique  'thingness,,  defined  radiantly  and  clearly. 
While  things  had  previously  been  unfocused  and  lacking  in  clarity,  now  they  present 
themselves  in  such  a  manner  that  the  landscape  has  been  uncoded  and  can  be 
translated  into  writing. 
Heaney's  use  of  the  self-reflexive  image  provides  images  of  the  self-conscious 
poet.  They  dramatize  the  paradox  of  creation,  a  creation  that  is  partly  controlled  and 
partly  uncontrollable.  The  poem  aims  for  a  poetic  re-creation,  a  re-birth  and  renewal. 
It  is  deeply  rooted  in  the  material  world  and  the  materiality  of  language  itself.  Heaney 
travels  through  linguistic  indifferences,  that  of  the  unmarked  landscape  and  his  own 
silence,  hoping  to  uncode  distinct  shapes  through  his  own  artistic  means. 
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Helen  Vendler  notes  another  quality  of  this  poem.  She  writes  of  'peninsular 
remoteness,  where  water  and  ground  meet  in  their  outennost  reach,  without 
distraction'21  .  She  observes  how  Heaney  essentially  re-writes  this  poem  many  years 
after,  with  'Postscript',  the  final  poem  of  his  collection  The  Spirit  Level  (Faber: 
London:  1996).  She  writes:  'Heaney  here  gratefully  pays  homage  to  the  sheer  power 
of  perception  itself  -  how  much  it  sees  in  a  glimpse,  in  a  glance  -  how  many  objects 
and  shades  it  absorbs  at  once,  how  breathtaking  the  conjunction  of  world  and  senses 
can  be,  breaking  open  the  shut  door  of  the  heart'22 
.  It  is  worth  observing  that  here  the 
self  is  'a  hurry  through  which...  things  pass',  nothing  more.  The  self  itself  is 
unfounded  and  thus  can  hardly  hope  to  'found  things'  in  the  way  his  younger  self 
possibly  hoped  to  do. 
The  Work  and  the  Nature  of  its  Truth 
'The  origin  of  the  artwork  is  art'  writes  Heidegger".  This  seems  on  the  surface 
at  least  to  be  a  paradox,  or  an  oxymoron  of  thought.  Is  Heideggerjust  being  perverse? 
Not  really,  insofar  as  Heidegger  wants  to  argue  for  the  thesis  that  the  work  of  art 
possesses  a  self-subsistence  unique  to  its  being:  'Nothing  can  be  discovered  about  the 
thingly  aspect  of  the  work  so  long  as  the  pure  self-subsistence  of  the  work  has  not 
distinctly  displayed  itself 
24. 
Heidegger  realizes  that  there  is  then  a  problem  about  our  access  to  the  artwork. 
Can  we  ever  access  it  in  its  true  self  if  it  is  caught  up  in  its  own  unique  self-subsisting 
world?  The  logic  of  his  position  would  push  him  to  the  conclusion  that  to  approach 
21  Helen  Vendler:  Seamus  Heaney:  Harper  Collins:  London:  1998,  p.  25 
22  Vendler:  1998,  p.  25 
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the  work  of  art  we  would  have  to  create  the  unlikely,  unsustainable  and  artificial 
situation  where  it  related  to  absolutely  nothing  other  than  itself,  standing  purely  on  its 
own  for  itself  alone.  The  artist  attempts  to  push  the  artwork  in  this  direction.  In  truly 
great  art  there  is  no  relationship  still  pertaining  between  the  artist  who  created  the 
V-  - 
work  and  the  work  itself,  the  work  exists,  subsists  and  consists  of  and  in  splendid 
isolation.  The  artist  is  similar  to  an  opening  in  the  fabric  of  reality  that  allows  the 
artwork  to  emerge  by  passing  through  her  or  him  and  then  they  must  erase  themselves 
at  the  end  of  the  process  of  becoming.  This  should  occur  once  the  work  of  art  has 
fully  emerged  and  is  capable  of  standing  on  its  own. 
Heidegger  notes  the  difficulty  of  approaching  the  artwork  on  its  own,  in  the 
world  of  its  own  self-subsistence.  In  the  gallery  the  painting  is  surrounded  by  other 
artworks.  In  the  gallery  the  artwork  is  surrounded  and  grounded  by  certain  agendas, 
presumptions  and  premises.  If  we  attempt  to  approach  the  Van  Gogh  painting  today, 
the  signature  in  the  comer  is  laden  with  many  connotations  that  exist  as  a  pre- 
judgement  and  which  presume  an  approach  to  the  world  contained  within  the  painting. 
The  Cathedral  in  the  town  or  city  square  is  a  focus  for  the  tourist.  The  world  of  the 
work  has  decayed  and  they  are  ruins  of  themselves,  given  over  to  a  realm  of  tradition 
and  decay.  The  instance  of  their  self-subsistence  has  fled.  A  key  distinction  emerges 
for  Heidegger  here.  Those  who  work  in  the  world  of  art  conservation  and  preservation 
only  deal  with  the  object-being  of  the  works  and  do  not  approach  the  world  of  the 
work-being  of  the  work.  As  Robert  Bernasconi  writes:  'Even  if  a  work  remains  in  its 
original  location,  as  usually  happens  with  architectural  works,  once  the  world  of  the 
work  has  perished,  nothing  can  be  done  to  restore  it.  As  a  result  of  the  withdrawal  and 
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decay  of  its  world,  the  works  are  no  longer  works  1.25  .  And  again:  'no  amount  of  textual 
emendation,  no  extensive  critical  apparatus,  can  restore  Sophocles'  text  to  its  own 
world  and  so  let  it  be  a  work  once  more'26  .  We  might  well  experience  and  enjoy  the 
splendour  of  the  Vatican,  the  Cathedral  at  Cologne  and  the  Castle  perched  atop  the 
Royal  Mile  in  Edinburgh;  these  may  well  attest  to  the  previous  artistic  aspirations, 
wealth,  pomp  and  power  of  their  respective  by-gone  eras,  and  are  expressions  of  such, 
but  none  of  them  because  of  the  very  demise  of  their  time  are  works  in  the  sense  that 
Heidegger  is  attempting  to  elucidate. 
Heidegger  is  urged  on  by  a  key  question:  can  we  really  conceive  of  a  work  of 
art  that  exists  outside  of  all  relations  at  all?  Is  it  not  of  the  essence  of  the  work  of  art 
that  it  exist  in  relationship?  Heidegger  will  say  of  course  it  does,  but  we  must 
determine  what  the  nature  of  that  relationship  is.  Heidegger  plays  a  trump  card  with 
the  assertion:  'the  work  belongs,  as  work,  uniquely  within  the  realm  that  is  opened  up 
by  itself  For  the  work-being  of  the  work  occurs  essentially  and  only  in  such  opening 
Upt27. 
We  have  an  interesting  example  of  this  process  at  work  in  John  Montague's 
poem  'Windharp'28.  It  provides  us  with  a  synthesis  of  'natural'  and  historical 
elements  that  are  culturally  specific.  The  wind  is  the  movement  of  becoming  of 
nature,  against  the  harp,  a  man-made  symbol  of  Ireland  and  its  national  culture.  What 
25  Robert  Bernasconi:  'The  Greatness  of  the  Work  of  Art',  from  Heidegger  Toward  the  Turn:  (ed.  ) 
James  Riser:  SUNY  Press:  New  York:  1999,  p.  103 
26  Bernasconi:  1999,  p.  103 
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is  produced  are  'the  sounds  of  Ireland'.  The  sound  emerges  from  'low  bushes  and 
grass',  'heatherbells  and  fern'  and  'wrinkling  bog  pools'.  Light  and  sound  come 
together  to  produce  a  vision  of  a  hand  combing  and  stroking  the  landscape  until 
the  valley  gleams 
like  the  pile  upon 
a  mountain  pony's  coat. 
We  witness  Montague  create  a  space  that  is  utterly  a  pure  creation  and  exists  only  in 
the  world  of  art. 
Heidegger  writes  that  it  is  necessary  for  us  to  approach  the  truth  question  in 
relation  to  the  work  of  art,  once  again.  He  selects  a  work  of  art  that  does  not  come 
from  the  realm  of  representational  art.  This  is  why  he  opts  for  the  example  of  the 
Greek  Temple.  The  Temple  exists  in  a  valley  and  houses  the  god.  The  presence  of  the 
god  is  an  extension  and  delimitation  of  the  precinct  as  a  holY  place.  However,  this 
temple  and  the  precinct  it  constructs  and  contains  does  not  fade  away  into  the 
indefinite,  and  here  we  reach  a  central  core  in  Heidegger's  essay.  He  writes:  'it  is  the 
temple-work  that  first  fits  together  and  at  the  same  time  gathers  around  itself  the  unity 
of  those  paths  and  relations  in  which  birth  and  death,  disaster  and  blessing,  victory 
and  disgrace,  endurance  and  decline  acquire  the  shape  of  destiny  for  human  being. 
The  all-governing  expanse  of  this  open  relational  context  is  the  world  of  this  historical 
people.  Only  from  and  in  this  expanse  does  the  nation  first  return  to  itself  for  the 
fulfillment  of  its  vocation'29.  We  recall  here  the  involvement  of  Heidegger  with  Nazi 
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socialism  in  the  nineteen-thirties  and  are  attentive  to  the  political  overtones  of  his 
statements  here.  In  earlier  drafts,  Robert  Bernasconi  notes,  in  the  Holzwege  edition 
especially,  Heidegger  hints  that  great  art  not  only  is  an  origin  but  also  destroys.  It 
destroys  the  public  in  order  to  form  a  people.  As  Robert  Bernasconi  writes:  'in 
Germany  in  the  1930s  nothing  could  have  been  more  politically  charged  00 
.  We  note, 
in  the  passage  quoted  from  Heidegger  above,  a  residue  of  such  sentiment. 
The  Temple  is  set  on  solid  ground  from  which  it  draws  support  and  stands 
firm  against  the  storm  raging  above  it.  It  is  the  presence  of  the  temple  that  makes 
manifest  the  capacity  of  the  ground  itself  to  lend  support  and  to  illustrate  the  violent 
nature  of  the  raging  storm.  The  gleaming  of  the  light  is  illustrated  by  the  temple,  the 
nature  of  the  surging  sea,  the  tree,  its  fruit  and  flower  are  defined,  enter  into  their 
distinctive  shapes,  and  come  into  what  they  are,  by  the  presence  of  the  Temple.  The 
Greeks,  Heidegger  writes,  called  this  process  of  emergence  and  becoming,  of  things 
coming  to  reside  in  their  true  essence,  physis.  All  of  this  happens  by  and  in  the 
presence  of  the  temple,  on  that  which  and  in  which  man  bases  his  dwelling,  the  earth. 
Heidegger  does  not  have  a  material  substance  in  mind  here,  the  geologist's  pre- 
occupation  with  a  physical  presence,  but  rather  a  more  abstract,  maybe  metaphysical 
idea,  of  the  earth  as  that  which  is  brought  back  by  the  temple's  arising  and  which 
shelters  everytMng  that  arises  as  such.  In  all  raised  things  the  earth  occurs  essentially 
as  the  sheltering  agent. 
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Marc  Froment-Meurice  illustrates  a  key  issue  here  about  Heidegger's 
formulation.  He  writes:  'the  temple,  as  its  Greek  name  indicates,  is  the  cut,  the 
enclosure  that  is  sacred  because  it  is  withdrawn  from  the  profane.  At  the  same  time, 
the  paradox  of  this  delimitation  is  that  it  exposes  nothing  but  pure  fagade,  a  pure  in 
front  of,  before.  The  behind,  the  inside,  remains  empty.  There  is  nothing  but  the 
purely  phenomenal,  nothing  that  would  remain  behind  and  of  which  it  would  be  but 
,  31 
the  appearance  or  representation  . 
The  Temple  first  gives  to  things  their  look  and  to  humanity  our  outlook  on 
ourselves.  This  view  is  always  open  once  the  work  is  a  work  and  the  god  has  not  fled. 
The  statue  of  the  god  is  not  there  to  make  it  easier  to  visualize  the  god  but  rather  to 
make  the  god  present,  and  is  the  god  in  that  sense.  It  is  the  same  in  the  theatre.  Here 
the  battle  of  old  and  new  gods  is  continually  being  waged,  but  they  are  always  there, 
really,  fighting  a  duel  to  the  bitter  end.  The  theatrical  or  poetic  work  transforms  the 
speech  of  the  people.  In  that  transfonnation  every  living  word  is  drawn  into  the  battle 
and  is  involved  in  deciding  what  is  in  or  out  as  holy  and  unholy,  what  is  noble  and 
what  is  lowly,  what  is  dignified  and  what  is  cowardly,  and  finally  who  is  the  master 
and  who  is  the  slave. 
Again  John  Montague's  poem  'Like  Dolmens  Round  My  Childhood,  The  Old 
People'  provides  us  with  an  example  of  this  process  at  Work32  . 
For,  it  is  only  against 
art  and  its  hint  of  pennanence  that  our  transient  lives  receive  any  definition.  Montague 
31  Marc  Froment-Meurice:  7lat  Is  To  Say.  -  Heidegger's  Poetics:  (Trans.  )  Jan  Plug:  Stanford  Univ. 
Press:  Cafifornia:  1998,  p.  158 
3'Montague:  200  1,  p.  10  -II 39 
defines  the  spaces  within  which  his  old  people  lived.  Jamie  MacCrystal  lived  in  an  old 
cottage,  Maggie  Owens  surrounded  by  'a  mongrel  bitch  and  shivering  pups',  the 
Nialls  along  a  mountain  lane,  and  Mary  Moore  in  'a  crumbling  gatehouse'.  Within  the 
Temple  of  Montague's  art  their  lives  are  finally  defined,  receive  their  ultimate 
meaning,  suggested  by  the  ritual  lost  and  associated  with  the  Dolmen,  burial  mounds 
of  a  forgotten  people. 
For  years  they  trespassed  on  my  dreams, 
Until  once,  in  a  standing  circle  of  stones, 
I  felt  their  shadows  pass 
Into  that  dark  permanence  of  ancient  forms. 
What  happens  when  the  work  of  art  is  'set  up'?  For  Heidegger,  at  this  point,  it 
is  difficult  to  separate  the  work  of  art  from  what  is  holy,  for  to  dedicate  means  to 
consecmte.  When  one  sets  up  the  work  then  the  holy  is  opened  as  holy  and  the  god  is 
invoked  into  the  openness  of  his  presence.  The  god  brings  forth  through  himself  what 
is  dignified  and  what  is  fabulous,  and  what  Heidegger  calls  'the  world'  is  reflected 
from  this  splendour.  So  the  world  emerges  from  the  radiance  of  the  god  and  achieves 
clarity.  Heidegger  argues  that  the  work  opens  itself  up  and  the  world  with  it,  and  as 
such  is  an  essential  form  that  gives  guidance.  Is  the  work  always  associated  with 
consecration  and  praise?  A  key  question  Heidegger  answers  by  saying  it  is  of  the 
essence  of  the  work-being  of  the  work  to  be  such.  In  its  work-being  it  is  orientated, 
directed  towards  this  opening  up,  opening  a  world  and  keeping  it  abidingly  in  force. 40 
Heidegger  writes  that  the  reason  for  being  of  the  work  is  to  world  worlds.  It  is 
to  stand  in  direct  relation  to  being.  -The  world  of  which  he  writes  is  not  an  object  in  the 
world  like  a  screwdriver,  car  or  bed.  It  does  not  stand  before  us  for  contemplation  and 
viewing.  We  are  subject  to  this  non-objective  world  as  long  as  we  are  human  beings 
travelling  along  the  paths  opened  up  by  birth  and  death,  blessing  and  curse,  as  long  as 
these  paths  transport  us  into  Being.  The  work  of  art  emerges  from  a  space  where 
essential  decisions  of  our  human  being  are  made,  where  we  take  up  these  questions, 
abandon  them,  where  they  go  unrecognized  for  a  while  and  need  to  be  taken  up  again, 
and  it  is  from  and  within  this  space  that  the  world  worlds.  The  opening  of  the  world 
defines  our  relationship  to  stones;  for  they  are  in  our  broader  world,  fall  under  our 
perspective.  The  opening  of  the  world  defines  all  things  and  their  relationship  to  us.  It 
is  here  that  the  remoteness  or  nearness  of  things  to  us  is  defined,  as  well  as  their  scope 
and  limits,  and  whether  these  objects  are  lingering  in  our  world  or  hastening  out  of  it. 
The  space  is  opened  by  which  the  god  may  grace  our  existence  by  the  world  of  the 
work,  and  even  in  the  doom  of  the  god  remaining  absent  can  be  found  an  inverse  way 
of  the  work  worlding  worlds. 
The  work,  as  a  work,  makes  the  space  for  this  spaciousness.  The  work 
liberates  the  free  space  of  the  open  region  and  establishes  it  in  its  structure.  As 
Heidegger  writes,  'the  work  as  work  sets  up  a  world.  The  work  holds  open  the  open 
region  of  the  world  s33 
. 
Is  this  what  Seamus  Heaney  has  achieved  in  his  poem  'The 
Peninsula'? 
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Heidegger  notes  how  a  setting-up  and  a  setting-forth  of  the  work  are 
necessary.  A  piece  of  equipment  aims  to  be  useful  and  serviceable,  and  so  the  stone 
used  in  a  hammer  is  used  and  used  up.  The  stone  disappears  into  its  usefulness. 
However,  in  Heidegger's  conception  of  things  the  Temple  is  quite  different.  When  the 
Temple  sets  up  a  world  it  does  not  cause  it  to  disappear,  but  rather  causes  it  to  come 
forth  for  the  first  time  and  causes  the  material  to  come  up,  forth  and  into  the  open 
region  of  the  work's  world.  This  comes  forth  as  the  work  rests  in  upon  the  material 
from  which  it  emerges.  The  earth  is  that  on  which  the  work  rests,  which  comes  forth 
in  the  work  and  which  shelters  it.  When  the  work  sets  up  a  world,  it  succeeds  in 
setting  forth  the  earth.  Heidegger  writes:  'this  setting  forth  must  be  thought  here  in  the 
strict  sense  of  the  word.  The  work  moves  the  earth  itself  into  the  open  region  of  a 
world  and  keeps  it  there.  The  work  lets  the  earth  be  an  earth  v.  34 
Heidegger  notes  the  essentially  mysterious  nature  of  the  earth.  We  can  weigh 
the  earth,  measure  it,  analyze  it,  but  it  remains  other  to  us  in  its  manifest  difference. 
The  earth  only  really  opens  to  us  when  we  recognize  that  it  is  essentially 
undisclosable.  He  meditates  on  the  dividing  line  that  separates  all  things  also.  How  do 
we  understand  this  figure  of  the  'earth'  in  Heidegger's  essay?  Earth  is  a  pseudonym 
for  the  'without  name'.  It  corresponds  neither  to  the  material  nor  the  sensible,  nor 
even  the  elementary,  and  resists  all  appropriation  by  meaning.  Earth  wants  to  say  or 
means  the  unsayable.  It  is  the  unsayable  that  will  nonetheless  be  said  through  the 
work.  As  Marc  Froment  -  Meurice  writes:  'the  unsayable,  as  Heidegger  puts  it 
clearly,  is  -  Nothing,  or  is  the  Origin  itself  as  the  leap  into  what  comes  before 
everAing,  including  every  work.  What  founds  the  work  "of'  the  origin  and  makes  it 
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original  is  this  leap  into  what  comes  before  everything,  35 
.  Heidegger  here  prepares  the 
way  for  other  thinkers  after  him,  primarily  Jacques  Derrida,  when  he  speaks  of  'the 
bordering  stream'  that  'delimits  everything  present  in  its  presencing'36  .  Tlere  is  an 
essential  difference  of  non-understanding,  separation,  alienation,  otherness 
highlighted  here.  So  the  separation  and  self-seclusion  of  the  earth  is  highlighted 
through  the  work  of  art.  Have  we  arrived  at  a  core  limit  for  thought?  In  fact,  is  the 
limit  itself  the  proper  place  for  thought?  Is  it  that  from  which  it  begins  to  think,  what 
gives  thought  its  identity  and  the  thought  of  identity,  and  first  of  all,  of  the  identity  of 
Being  and  thought?  We  witness  a  central  conflict  at  the  heart  of  Being,  a  conflict 
similar  to  the  one  reigning  in  art  between  earth  and  world. 
For  Heidegger  the  earth  is  not  uniform,  a  given  of  limited  form  and  capacity. 
'He  argues  that  the  earth  unfolds  itself  in  an  infinite  manner  and  by  inexhaustible 
means.  The  sculptor,  unlike  the  mason,  does  not  use  stone  up,  nor  the  painter, 
pigments,  but  rather  both  allow  the  material  'to  shine  forth'.  The  same  may  also  be 
said  for  the  poet.  She  or  he  does  not  use  words  up  but  allows  the  word  to  become  and 
remain  only  and  truly  a  word.  Heidegger  argues  that  the  world  is  the  'self-opening 
openness  of  the  broad  paths  of  the  simple  and  essential  decisions  in  the  destiny  of  a 
historical  people'37  . 
He  writes  then  that  the  earth  'is  the  spontaneous  forthcoming  of 
that  which  is  continually  self-secluding  and  to  that  extent  sheltering  and  concealing"38 
An  essential  difference  is  articulated  although  he  goes  to  a  bit  of  trouble  to  highlight 
their  inter-relatedness.  The  world  is  always  and  can  only  be  grounded  on  the  earth  and 
the  earth  always  emerges  in  the  world,  juts  through  it.  They  do  not  float  away  into 
35  Froment-Meurice:  1998,  p.  154 
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their  separate  spheres  unconcerned  with  one  another,  for  the  world,  although  resting 
on  the  earth,  strives  to  dominate  it.  As  an  opening  it  cannot  bear  what  is  closed.  The 
earth  as  something  sheltered  and  unconcealed  cannot  bear  what  is  not  and  always 
tends  towards  the  world,  drawing  it  into  itself  and  striving  to  keep  it  there.  We  are  in 
the  realm  of  a  classic  tension  or  dependent  polarity. 
There  are  key  questions  we  can  ask  of  Heidegger  here.  Marc  Froment-Meurice 
asks  the  most  pressing  one:  'What  Heidegger  does  not  determine  is  the  ontological 
status  of  this  statue  that  "is"  the  god  himself  We  cannot  understand  this  as  a  pure  and 
simple  identification.  The  god  is  not  stone,  and  yet  he  "is"  the  statue  in  the  sense  of  an 
analogy  with  Being  itself.  Just  as  the  god  manifests  himself,  makes  a  remarkable 
modality  of  presence  (visibility,  eidos)  that  has  entered  into  presence,  so  too  the  statue 
brings  the  truth  of  appearing  into  presence.  In  its  brilliance,  what  appears  effaces  all 
difference  between  the  present  and  presence,  what  appears  and  appearing.  The  work 
as  bringing  into  the  open  of  presence  "is"  presence,  difference  that  has  been  effaced 
because  returned  into  the  work.  But  the  effacement  of  difference  takes  place  in  the 
name  of  an  analogy  with  Being,  a  metaphoricity,  a  transfer  about  which  Heidegger 
does  not  speak.  The  work  has  the  divine  quality  of  bringing  the  god  into  presence, 
39 
because  presence  itself  is  quasi-divine,  or  better,  because  Aletheia  is  a  goddesss' 
Aletheia  procures  visibility,  being  the  source  of  all  and  every  image,  but  is  not  itself 
an  image.  Therein  lies  the  whole  aporia. 
Frangoise  Dastur  writes:  'if  the  metaphysical  essence  of  art  consists  in  the 
conception  of  art  as  (re)  presentation  of  something  suprasensible  in  a  sensible  matter 
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submitted  to  a  form  (FV  45),  it  means,  following  the  etymology  of  the  Dar-stellen, 
that,  accordingly  to  the  metaphysical  conception  of  art,  art  "places"  (stellen) 
something  there  (dar),  and  as  such  is  a  presentation  or  an  exhibition  -I  just  want  to 
recall  here  that  Kant  translates  the  Latin  =hibitio  by  Darstellung.  In  contrast  to  this, 
Heidegger  proposes  to  think  of  art  as  a  positio,  a  thesis,  in  the  sense  of  an  institution 
(stiflung)  of  the  'Ibere.  Heidegger's  definition  of  art  is  das  Ins-Werke-setzen  der 
Wahrheit,  the  seffing-into-work-of  truth,  and  we  should  not  forget  that  the  verb  setzen 
is  stronger  than  the  verb  stellen  (which  cannot  be  marked  in  the  English  translation). 
The  emphasis  on  the  institutional  and  positional  value  of  art  brings  forth  a  total 
reversal  of  what  seems  to  be  the  "normal  situation"  of  first  nature  and  then  art  which 
finds  in  nature  its  location.  It  is  the  work  of  art  that  primarily  gives  to  natural  beings 
their  visibility,  so  now  nature  comes  after  art.  This  is  not  only  the  case  with 
architecture,  but  also  with  sculpture  and  poetry.  The  statue  of  the  god  is  not  a  picture 
made  after  him,  but  is  the  god  himself,  that  is  to  say,  his  coming  into  presence  and  not 
the  reproduction  of  an  absent  or  remote  being.  Tragedy  is  not  the  telling  of  a  story  and 
does  not  speak  about  the  battle  of  the  gods,  but  in  it  the  battle  is  being  fought.  The 
work  of  art  initiates  presence  rather  than  being  a  (re)presentation  or  exhibition  of 
something  absent'40  . 
At  this  point  Heidegger  reaches  out  for  one  of  his  typical  tems:  strife.  This  is 
his  term  for  the  opposition  that  exists  between  world  and  earth.  For  Heidegger  this 
term  does  not  bear  negative  charges  of  discord,  disharmony,  and  destruction.  In  a 
classic  instance  of  strife  what  happens  is  that:  'the  Opponents  raise  each  other  into  the 
40  Francoise  Dastur:  'Heidegger's  Freiburg  Version  of  the  Origin  of  the  Work  of  Art':  in  Heidegger 
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self-assertion  of  their  essential  natures"I  .  What  is  asserted  here  is  not  some  contingent 
external  factor  that  is  defended  or  fought  for  in  a  fetishized  way,  but  rather,  a 
surrender  or  recognition  of  the  fconcealed  originality  of  the  provenance  of  one's  own 
42 
Being'  . 
In  the  instance  of  strife  each  opponent  carries  the  other  beyond  itself  There 
is  a  continual  cycle  of  opening,  grounding,  sustaining  and  defining  that  Heidegger 
conceives  of  as  existing  between  the  earth  and  the  world.  The  central  role  of  the  work 
of  art  is  to  bring  the  world  into  being  and  into  relation  to  the  earth  and  to  instigate  the 
moment  of  strife  between  them.  Francoise  Dastur  writes:  'it  is  now  possible  to 
conceive  that  the  essence  of  truth  understood  in  this  manner  can  only  result  from  a 
confliCt,  43 
. 
And  again:  'the  work  of  art  as  such  can  happen  only  on  the  ground  of  the 
primal  conflict  which  is  not  to  be  identified  with  the  essence  of  art  alone'44. 
Heidegger  begins  to  approach  his  notion  of  the  truth  by  an  argument  based  on 
the  idea  of  being.  In  the  past  we  have  spoken  of  the  essential  essence  of  things  as  their 
truth.  We  can  only  be  in  truth  when  we  are  what  we  are  in  truth,  that  is,  when  an 
entity  is  itself  in  truth,  is  true  to  itself,  to  what  it  is.  So  the  truth  of  an  entity  is 
determined  by  way  of  its  true  Being.  However  he  shifts  the  angle  of  the  question  by 
asking  what  is  the  essence  of  truth,  rather  than  the  truth  of  essence?  With  incredible 
confidence  Heidegger  asserts  that  the  essence  of  truth  lies  in  the  idea  of  aletheia,  in 
the  unconcealment  of  beings.  He  argues  that  Greek  thought  has  been  sent  in  the  wrong 
direction  in  its  pursuit  of  what  is  the  truth:  'unconcealment  is,  for  thought,  the  most 
concealed  thing  in  Greek  existence,  although  from  early  times  it  determines  the 
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presencing  of  everything  present'45  . 
We  have  for  a  long  time  Presumed  that  the  essence  of  truth  lies  in  its 
conformity  with  matter.  If  matter  cannot  reveal  itself  then  how  are  we  to  know 
whether  our  language  or  logic  has  properly  approached  it?  Matter  can  only  show  itself 
if  it  can  step  out  of  the  closet  of  its  own  concealment.  From  Descartes  on  we  have 
understood  truth  to  mean,  or  understand  the  definition  of  truth  to  lie  in,  an  idea  of 
correctness.  As  Heidegger  notes:  'the  essence  of  truth  which  is  familiar  to  us  - 
correctness  in  representation  -  stands  and  falls  with  truth  as  unconcealment  of 
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beings'  . 
Heidegger  notes  how  it  is  no  surprise  that  we  have  made  some  obvious  errors 
in  our  approach  to  the  truth.  For  too  long  have  we  rested  easily  and  lazily  on  - 
unquestioned  presuppositions.  With  typical  Heideggerian  logic  he  asserts  that  there 
must  be  an  obvious  and  simple  reason  why  this  is  so.  We  are  close  to  the  truth  but  yet 
stand  some  distance  from  it  also.  Again,  Heidegger:  'it  is  not  we  who  presuppose  the 
unconcealment  of  beings;  rather,  the  unconcealment  of  beings  (Being)  puts  us  into 
such  a  condition  of  being  that  in  our  representation  we  always  remain  installed  within 
and  in  attendance  upon  concealment'47  . 
This  conforming  to  something  must  already 
occur  in  the  unconcealed:  'with  all  our  correct  representations  we  would  get  nowhere, 
we  could  not  even  presuppose  that  there  already  is  manifest  something  to  which  we 
can  conform  ourselves,  unless  the  unconcealment  of  beings  had  already  exposed  us  to, 
45  BaSiC  Writings:  1999,  p.  176 
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placed  us  in  that  cleared  realm  in  which  every  being  stands  for  us  and  from  which  it 
WithdMWSv48. 
A  key  question  remains  as  to  how  all  this  happens.  How  do  we  approach  this 
truth  that  occurs  as  a  type  of  unconcealment?  Heidegger  steps  forward  with  a 
statement  of  his  credo:  what  he  believes  things  to  be.  This  is  a  significant  passage  in 
the  essay.  He  notes  in  a  rather  obvious  way  that  there  are  many  different  realities  that 
exist,  many  objects,  persons,  things  possess  being  in  one  shape  or  another.  Our 
universe  consists  of  human  beings,  gifts  and  sacrifices,  animals  and  plants,  equipment 
and  works.  The  particular  always  stands  in  the  larger  framework  of  things,  the 
concrete  being  stands  within  the  larger  Being.  We  have  the  mystic-like  sentence: 
'Through  Being  there  passes  a  veiled  fatality  that  is  ordained  between  the  godly  and 
the  countergodly  49.  The  inadequacy  of  our  intellect  and  senses  is  all  too  apparent. 
There  is  much  in  reality  that  we  see  dimly  and  can  only  inadequately  grasp.  We  are 
not  the  origin  point  of  our  own  being,  this  is  unquestionable  and  inalterable: 
,  And  yet  -  beyond  beings,  not  away  from  them  but  before  them,  there  is  still 
something  else  that  happens.  In  the  midst  of  beings  as  a  whole  an  open  place  occurs. 
There  is  a  clearing.  Thought  of  in  reference  to  beings,  this  clearing  is  more  in  being 
than  are  beings.  This  open  centre  is  therefore  not  surrounded  by  beings;  rather,  the 
clearing  centre  itself  encircles  all  that  is,  as  does  the  nothing,  which  we  scarcely 
know'50. 
Frangoise  Dastur  writes:  'setting  up  as  an  essential  feature  of  the  work  of  art  is 
different  from  the  bare  placing  of  art  works  in  a  museum  or  exhibition.  It  has  the  - 
48  p.  177 
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sense  of  dedication  and  praise  so  that  in  setting  up  the  work  the  holy  is  opened  up  as 
holy.  And  the  opening  of  the  dimension  of  holiness  is  at  the  same  time  the  setting  up 
of  a  world.  The  work  of  art  is  therefore  not  set  up  (aqýg'estellt),  but  it  is  essentially  in 
itself  a  setting  up  (Das  Werk  ist  in  sich  seinem  Wesen  nach  aufstellend)  in  the  sense 
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that  it  opens  a  world  (FV  28) 
. 
Heidegger  notes  that  beings  can  only  be  as  beings,  if  they  simultaneously 
stand  within  and  stand  without  what  is  cleared  in  this  clearing.  We  have  to  share  it  and 
we  have  to  be  deprived  of  it  in  order  to  know  what  it  is.  We  have  to  be  shadowed  by 
what  it  is  not  in  order  to  know  what  it  is;  we  assume  to  read  Heidegger  in  this  way.  As 
we  will  see  later  in  this  thesis  Being  can  only  be  known  through  the  possibility  of  its 
non-being;  this  is  how  Maurice  Blanchot  reads  Heidegger  in  his  work  The  Space  of 
Literature.  As  Heidegger  writes:  'Only  this  clearing  grants  and  guarantees  to  us 
humans  a  passage  to  those  beings  that  we  ourselves  are  not,  and  access  to  the  being 
that  we  ourselves  are'52  . 
It  is  this  clearing  that  allows  beings  to  be  unconcealed  to 
varying  degrees.  We  can  only  speak  of  the  unconcealed  in  the  context  of  this  clearing 
within  being.  In  the  moment  of  encounter  with  another  being  we  are  involved  in  an 
instance  of  clearing  that  is  also  a  concealment.  It  is  a  strange  counter-dynamic  that  is 
continuously  moving. 
As  Marc  Froment-Meurice  writes:  'How  could  a  temple  (or  a  painting)  speak 
if  speech  is  refused  to  stone?  If  the  temple  speaks,  it  is  not  for  having  a  mouth  (even 
an  oracular  one)  and  a  tongue.  Besides,  that  is  not  what  speaking  is:  the  voice  of 
Being  is  voiceless.  If  the  temple  speaks,  it  is  in  the  same  sense  that  language  speaks.  It 
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says,  shows,  or  rather  lets  itself  be  (re)said.  To  speak  is  to  show,  and  if  the  temple 
shows,  it  is  because  it  is  this  showing  without  intennediaries  such  as  words.  It  shows 
before  all  speech,  in  the  Open  of  this  essentially  voiceless  milieu  that  is  the  disclosure 
of  Being,  before  language  as  a  means  of  expression  and  communication  of  a  sense 
53 
(through  words)'  . 
We  note  the  distinctiveness  of  Heidegger's  choice  of  a  Temple  as 
an  illustration  of  his  argument. 
We  are  not  just  talking  about  the  limits  of  knowledge,  about  running  into  the 
furthest  frontier  of  what  can  be  known.  We  are  encountering  the  edge  of  what  is 
cleared.  Beings  block  other  beings,  simulate  other  beings,  in  this  space,  and  beings 
appear  sometimes  to  be  other  than  what  they  are.  Errors  occur  therefore.  We  can  be 
deceived.  This  suggests  that  the  open  clearance  is  not  a  permanent  opening  with 
rigidly  defined  edges  or  frontiers.  It  is  not  a  given,  a  state  or  stage  that  is  an  existent 
but  rather  exists  as  a  happening.  Heidegger's  thought  is  rather  fluid  and  poetic  at  this 
point,  non-dogmatic  and  non-systematic.  The  implication  thereby  is  that 
unconcealment  or  the  moment  of  truth  is  not  an  attribute  of  matter  or  one  of 
proposi  ions. 
Things  are  always  shadowed  by  their  opposite.  What  seems  ordinary  is  in  fact 
extraordinary.  The  essence  of  truth,  understood  by  Heidegger  as  articulated  in  what 
has  preceded,  as  unconcealment,  is  dominated  by  the  idea  of  a  denial.  He  does  not  see 
this  denial  as  something  defective  in  our  approach  to  the  essence  of  the  truth,  for  'this 
denial,  in  theform  ofa  double  concealment,  belongs  to  the  essence  oftruth  as 
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unconcealment'".  (Italics  are  Heidegger's).  There  is  always  an  element  of  un-truth  to 
truth.  As  he  writes:  'the  proposition  "the  essence  of  truth  is  un-truth"  is  not,  however, 
intended  to  state  that  truth  is  at  bottom  falsehood.  Nor  does  it  mean  that  truth  is  never 
itself  but,  viewed  dialectically,  is  also  its  opposite  55 
When  Heidegger  talks  about  concealing  denial  he  wishes  to  indicate,  or 
preserve,  hint  at,  denote  the  fact  that  opposition  in  the  essence  of  truth  subsists 
between  clearing  and  concealing.  We  are  dealing  with  the  opposition  of  the  original 
strife  spoken  of  earlier.  Truth  and  its  essence  in  itself  is  the  primal  strife  in  which  that 
open  centre  is  won  within  which  beings  stand  and  from  which  they  set  themselves 
back  into  themselves.  This  open  region  always  and  only  occurs  within  the  midst  of 
beings.  To  the  open  region  there  belongs  a  world  and  the  earth.  However,  we  are  not 
to  make  some  easy  connection  between  the  world  as  the  open  region  that  corresponds 
to  the  clearing  and  then  the  earth  as  its  opposite,  the  closed  region  that  corresponds  to 
concealment.  Rather,  he  writes,  'the  world  is  the  clearing  of  the  paths  of  the  essential 
guiding  directions  with  which  all  decision  complies'm.  Every  decision  inescapably 
4W-- 
rests  on  something  not  fully  comprehended,  on  what  has  not  been  fully  mastered,  on 
something  that  is  concealed  and  confusing.  The  earth  is  not  intrinsically  and 
inescapably  closed  but  rises  up  as  that  which  is  self-closing.  And  so  the  belligerence 
of  earth  and  world  emerges  and  is  inescapable.  They  exist  in  conflict  and  'only  as 
7 
such  do  they  enter  into  the  strife  of  clearing  and  concealing'5  . 
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As  soon  as  one  sets  up  the  work  of  art,  a  world  and  earth  are  set  forth  and  the 
work  exists  as  the  instigation  of  the  strife  in  which  the  unconcealment  of  beings  as  a 
whole,  or  truth,  is  won.  Truth  is  the  instance  of  unconcealment.  When  the  Temple 
stands  where  it  is  a  moment  of  truth  happens.  Heidegger  is  not  concerned  about  an 
adequate  or  correct  representation.  Rather  beings  are  brought  into  unconcealment 
through  this  process  and  are  thereby  held  therein.  We  witness  an  instance  of  truth  in 
Van  Gogh's  painting  of  the  peasant  shoes.  That  is  not  to  say  that  he  has  portrayed  the 
shoes  correctly.  Rather  the  equipmental  nature  of  their  being  is  highlighted.  The 
beings  of  things  as  a  whole  are  thereby  highlighted  and  the  world  and  earth  in  their 
counter-play  are  illustrated  and  exist  in  a  moment  of  unconcealment.  When  the  shoes 
exists  in  close  relation  to  their  essence  then  this  is  valuable  for  the  overall  truth  of 
beings  at  large.  And  therefore  we  touch  on  the  beautiful  because:  'beauty  is  one  way 
in  which  truth  essentially  occurs  as  unconcealment58.  (Italics  are  Heidegger's). 
Heidegger  feels  he  has  not  approached  the  thingly  character  of  the  work 
adequately.  We  have  ignored  the  issue  that  the  work  is  exactly  that,  a  work,  and  is 
thereby  something  that  has  been  created.  As  a  created  object  it  shares  in  the  medium 
out  of  which  and  in  which  it  has  been  created;  as  such  then  the  thingly  element  has 
entered  into  the  work.  Is  there  a  difference  in  being  made  and  created,  from  creation 
and  making?  Can  we  approach  the  innermost  essence  of  the  work  and  thereby  gauge 
the  degree  to  which  createdness  belongs  to  the  work  and  affects  its  work-being?  Does 
it  lie  within  the  essence  of  truth  to  move  towards  the  work  of  art,  to  exist  within  that 
work?  What  is  truth  that  it  can  only  exist  if  it  is  set  to  work  within  the  work?  What  is 
truth  that  it  can  happen  as  art  and  why  are  there  art  objects  at  all? 
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In  this  section  we  have  seen  Heidegger  struggle  with  the  concept  of  art  as 
origin  on  the  one  hand,  and  on  the  other  an  art  as  mere  supplement  on  the  other.  Art  as 
supplement  is  art  as  a  routine  cultural  phenomenon.  As  Robert  Bernasconi  writes: 
'what  has  to  be  decided,  according  to  Heidegger,  is  whether  art  is  to  remain 
something  secondary,  as  happens  when  it  is  conceived  in  terms  of  expression  and 
elucidated  further  in  terms  of  such  concepts  as  embellishment,  entertainment, 
recreation  and  edification,  or  whether  art  is  to  be  an  instigator  of  our  history'59.  And 
our  history  here  has  overt  connections  to  the  direction  of  the  Gennan  peoples  under 
Nazi  socialism.  It  is  impossible  to  avoid  this  conclusion.  When  Heidegger  pursues  the 
question  of  whether  or  not  we  are  in  the  vicinity  of  art  as  origin,  the  'we'  that  he  has 
in  mind  is  the  German  people.  He  is  keen  to  clarify  whether  the  German  people  are  a 
public  or  a  people.  Are  the  German  people  purely  a  passive  audience  waiting  to  be 
entertained  by  this  intellectual  or  any  other  artistic  jester,  or  are  they  a  people  with  a 
historical  destiny  and  direction?  Such  is  the  issue  he  is  pursuing  when  he  seeks  for 
clarity  about  who  we  are  and  who  we  are  not  when  in  the  vicinity  of  the  origin.  As 
Bcmasconi  writes:  so  long  as  art  was  restricted  to  being  a  fonn  of  expression,  the 
public  might  be  inspired  for  example  by  a  German  cathedral,  but  a  people  would 
never  come  to  be  founded'60. 
"at  about  Truth  and  Art? 
Between 
That  deep,  dark  pool.  To  come  upon  it, 
after  driving  across  the  Gap  in  midsummer, 
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the  hedges  freighted  with  fuchsia,  hawthom, 
blood-red  and  white  under  shining  veils  of  rain. 
A  wind  flurry  finecombing  the  growing  grain 
as  a  full-uddered  cow  precedes  us  along  the  lane, 
a  curious  calf  poking  its  lubberly  head  over  stone 
while  the  country  road  winds  betwixt  and  between. 
Sudden,  at  the  summit  of  the  Knockmealdowns, 
a  chill  black  lake,  a  glacial  corrie  or  tam, 
some  large  absence,  hacked,  torn 
from  the  far  side  of  the  dreaming  cliff. 
A  brooding  silence,  a  hoarded  font  of  nothing, 
lightless,  still,  opaque  ...  severely  alone. 
Except  when  a  shiver,  a  skirl  of  wind 
makes  the  waters  tremble,  mild  as  that  field  of  grain. 
But  on  the  shorn  flank  of  the  mountain, 
a  flowering,  flaring  bank  of  rhododendron, 
exalted  as  some  pagan  wedding  procession. 
Fathomless  darkness,  silent  raging  colour: 
A  contrast  to  make  your  secret  self  tremor, 
like  a  child  cradled  in  this  quarry's  murmur, 54 
delighted  but  lost  between  the  dark,  the  blossoming, 
On  one  side,  a  moorland's  bareness,  rufous  heather 
Sheltering  a  long-nebbed  curlew,  bog  asphodel  or  lobelia 
and,  on  the  other,  that  terraced  orchestra  of  colour, 
avenues  of  lavish  amethyst  blossom. 
Chill  of  winter.  full  warmth  of  summer, 
colliding  head  on  in  stillness,  and  a  heavy  aroma.  61 
John  Montague 
We  note  John  Montague's  initial  statement  'we  come  upon  it'.  So  the  scenario 
presented  in  the  poem  occurs  naturally,  it  happens  within  nature  as  such.  He  premises 
the  moment  central  to  the  poem,  its  instant  of  revelation,  by  a  journeying  betwixt  and 
between'.  We  re-call  the  title  of  the  poem  'Between'.  The  poem  elaborates  a  contrast. 
The  glacial  corrie  stands  as  a  moment  of  emptiness  in  stark  contrast  and  opposition  to 
a  scene  of  plenitude.  Yet  the  poem  insists  that  they  belong  to  each  other,  one  is  the 
inverse  of  the  other.  It  would  appear  that  each  needs  its  opposite  in  order  to  be: 
'Fathomless  darkness,  silent  raging  colour'.  The  poem's  implicit  argument  is  that 
poetry  exists  in  the  moment  of  the  caesura,  where  one  rolls  into  the  other,  or  in  the 
instance  of  union.  Montague  links  this  difference  to  the  country's  seasons,  for  in  this 
scene  there  is  a  trace  still  of  the  'chill  of  winter;  full  warmth  of  summer'.  We  will 
explore  Montague's  argument  further  with  the  aid  of  Heidegger's  reflections  on  the 
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centrality  of  the  primal  rift,  or  the  necessity  for  opposition  in  the  creation  of  the  work 
of  art. 
Heidegger  begins  this  third  and  final  part  of  his  essay  with  a  meditation  on  the 
workly  character  of  the  work  of  art.  The  similarity  between  the  craftsman  and  the 
artist  exists  in  the  fact  that  they  both  work  their  respective  materials.  Heidegger 
writes:  'it  is  as  difficult  to  track  down  the  essential  features  of  the  creation  of  works 
and  the  making  of  equipment  as  it  is  easy  to  distinguish  verbally  between  the  two 
modes  of  bringing  forth62 
. 
Heidegger  introduces  the  key  term  techne,  a  word  the 
Greeks  used  to  refer  both  to  craft  and  art. 
When  Heidegger  uses  the  term  techne  he  has  in  mind  a  mode  of  knowing 
rather  than  a  kind  of  practical  performance.  It  appears  to  be  a  type  of  vision,  the 
apprehension  of  what  is  present.  He  links  this  with  the  Greek  concept  of  aletheia  that 
he  developed  earlier.  For  aletheia  involves  the  essence  of  knowing,  in  that  it  is 
concerned  with  the  revealing  of  the  truth  of  beings.  Techne  is  the  bringing  forth  of 
beings  in  that  it  brings  forth  what  is  present  as  such  out  of  concealment  into  the 
unconcealment  of  its  appearance.  Thus  the  word  lechne  as  used  here  by  Heidegger  is  a 
more  sophisticated  term  than  the  modem  derivative  technique  might  suggest. 
The  artist  and  craftsman  are  people  who  utilize  techne  because  they  are  people 
involved  in  the  setting  forth  of  works  and  equipment  that  permit  both  to  come  forward 
and  be  present  in  an  outward  and  external  manner.  If  we  cannot  approach  the  creation 
of  the  work  from  the  point  of  view  of  craft  then,  a  better  approach  might  be  found  in 
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the  workly  character  of  the  work.  It  is  within  what  is  created  that  we  find  evidence  of 
its  creation.  When  we  speak  of  creation  we  are  referring  to  that  process  by  which 
something  emerges  as  a  thing  that  has  been  brought  forth.  It  is  in  the  work's  becoming 
a  work  that  truth  comes  into  being  and  happens.  Again  Heidegger  approaches  an 
essential  question:  what  is  truth  that  it  should  choose  to  reside  in  a  work,  in  something 
that  has  been  created? 
Heidegger  speaks  of  truth  as  also  being  un-truth  to  the  degree  that  it  always 
holds  something  in  reserve.  It  retains  within  itself  the  reservoir  of  the  not-yet- 
revealed,  what  is  un-covered  in  the  sense  of  still  to  be  revealed.  There  is  a  type  of 
double  refusal  here.  As  Heidegger  writes:  'truth  essentially  occurs  as  such  in  the 
opposition  of  clearing  and  double  concealing.  Truth  is  the  primal  strife  in  which, 
always  in  some  particular  way,  the  open  region  is  won  within  which  everyffiing  stands 
and  from  which  everything  withholds  itself  that  shows  itself  and  withdraws  itself  as  a 
being.  Whenever  and  however  this  strife  breaks  out  and  happens,  the  opponents, 
clearing  and  concealing,  move  apart  because  of  it.  Thus  the  open  region  of  the  place 
of  strife  is  won.  The  openness  of  this  open  region,  that  is,  truth,  can  be  what  it  is, 
namely,  this  openness,  only  if  and  as  long  as  it  establishes  itself  within  its  open 
region.  Hence  there  must  always  be  some  being  in  this  open  region  in  which  the 
openness  takes  its  stand  and  attains  its  constancy.  In  thus  taking  possession  of  the 
open  region,  openness  holds  it  open  and  sustains  it'63 
. 
As  Heidegger  notes  this  might  be  the  unique  role  Being  plays  in  things.  If  the 
unconcealment  of  beings  belongs  in  any  way  to  Being  itself,  then  Being,  by  way  of  its 
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own  essence,  lets  the  free  space  of  openness  happen,  and  introduces  this  space  as  a 
place  of  the  sort  in  which  each  being  emerges  in  its  own  way.  It  is  at  this  point  and 
place  that  truth  is  established.  It  is  only  when  beings  open  up  in  this  region  or  space 
that  a  place  for  truth  emerges.  It  does  not  exist  out  there  floating  free  but  always  exists 
within  a  particular  context.  Truth  can  only  happen  within  a  site  where  an  openness 
happens,  where  an  open  region  has  been  established.  As  Heidegger  writes:  'because  it 
is  in  the  essence  of  truth  to  establish  itself  within  beings,  in  order  thus  first  to  become 
truth,  the  impulse  toward  the  work  lies  in  the  essence  of  truth,  as  one  of  truth's 
64  distinctive  possibilities,  by  which  it  can  itself  occur  as  being  in  the  midst  of  beings'  . 
Heidegger  at  this  point  begins  to  unite  the  elements  or  terms  he  has  worked 
out  progressively  in  his  essay.  Thus  he  writes:  'truth  essentially  occurs  only  as  the 
strife  between  clearing  and  concealing  in  the  opposition  of  world  and  earth  v65  .  Truth 
aims  to  exist,  to  be  established  in  the  work  as  the  very  strife  of  world  and  earth.  The 
strife  is  started  by  it  and  does  not  just  find  a  place  there  to  dwell.  This  being  will 
always  therefore  bear  within  itself  the  essential  traits  of  the  strife.  It  is  through  the 
strife  that  the  unity  of  world  and  earth  is  won.  Once  again  we  find  Heidegger  in  a 
lyrical  frame  of  mind:  'as  a  world  opens  itself,  it  submits  to  the  decision  of  a  historical 
humanity  the  question  of  victory  and  defeat,  blessing  and  curse,  mastery  and  slavery. 
The  dawning  world  brings  out  what  is  as  yet  undecided  and  measureless,  and  thus 
discloses  the  hidden  necessity  of  measure  and  decisiveness'66 
. 
Heidegger  attempts  to  outline  further,  and  clarify  what  he  means  by  strife.  He 
reverts  to  his  terms  earth  and  world.  As  the  world  moves  towards  opening  the  earth 
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comes  into  opposition  with  it.  The  earth  seeks  to  retain  everything  within  it  according 
to  its  own  laws.  The  world  moves  in  opposition  to  this.  World  seeks  for  beings  to 
reach  their  own  open  region  and  all  of  this  against  the  resistance  of  the  earth.  The 
strife  Heidegger  has  in  mind  is  not  the  rift  of  complete  separation,  of  complete 
alienation  from  and  to  each  other,  of  earth  and  world.  Rather  it  marks  out  the  common 
ground  that  lies  between  them  as  opponents.  This  rift  carries  them  towards  a  point  of 
unity,  due  to  this  ground  that  they  share  in  common. 
Heidegger  uses  for  the  first  time  another  concept,  what  he  refers  to  as  the 
figUre.  Thefigure  is  the  name  for  the  strife  that  has  been  brought  into  the  rift  and  set 
back  into  earth  and  is  thus  fixed  in  place.  The  work  is  a  created  thing.  Therefore  we 
can  speak  of  truth's  being  Exed  in  place.  This  happens  in  thefigure.  Thefigure  is  the 
structure  (maybe  matrix)  in  whose  shape  the  rift  composes  itself  It  is  from  this  point 
that  truth  shines  forth.  When  we  speak  of  the  work  it  is  as  something  that  provides  an 
enframing  and  placing  and  the  naming  of  this  nodal  point  is  identified  by  Heidegger 
with  his  tennfigure.  As  Marc  Froment-Meurice  writes:  'the  proper  will  enter  into 
presence  only  under  the  figure  of  the  Figure,  and  even  if  it  calls  for  the  status  of  the 
proper,  in  the  statue  of  the  god,  "for  example",  this  figure  will  never  be  able  to  efface 
its  improper  origin,  its  proper  status  as  figure.  To  enter  into  presence  will  always  be  to 
enter  into  the  space  of  (re)presentation.  To  take  on  a  figure  will  be  to  enter  into 
(dis)figuration'67  . 
What  distinguishes  the  work  of  art  for  Heidegger  is  that  its  creAtedness  is  part 
of  its  existence.  This  separates  it  from  the  piece  of  equipment.  Of  course  Heidegger 
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admits  that  all  things  have  been  created,  the  pair  of  shoes  as  much  as  the  painting  of 
those  shoes  by  Vincent  Van  Gogh.  However  Heidegger  argues  that  the  fact  of  its 
being  created  stands  out  from  the  work  of  art  in  a  highly  particular  way.  What  is 
highlighted  is  not  the  originality  or  genius  of  the  artist.  For  Heidegger  what  is 
significant  is  that  we  are  aware  that  a  genuine  unconcealment  of  being  has  happened 
here.  We  must  ask  the  question  of  Heidegger  here:  What  are  the  critical  criteria  by 
which  we  determine  this?  What  is  vital  is  to  recognize  that  something  exists,  is,  before 
us  that  just  as  easily  may  not  have  been.  (Maurice  Blanchot  will  develop  this  strain  in 
Heidegger's  thought  as  we  shall  see  in  Chapter  Four).  The  self-subsistence  of  the 
work  of  art  is  to  be  located  in  this  remarkable  fact  that  it  just  is.  We  can  approach  this 
more  clearly  where  relatively  few  facts  about  the  artist  who  produced  the  work  are 
known.  We  are  confronted  thereby  with  just  the  plain  fact  of  its  existence.  We  know 
relatively  little  of  Sappho  or  Hesiod  but  we  are  familiar  with  the  poems  that  give 
currency  to  these  proper  names.  The  same  can  also  be  said  of  Homer  and,  to  a  lesser 
degree,  Shakespeare. 
Heidegger  is  keen  to  drive  his  point  home,  to  the  point  almost  of  repetition, 
and  devotes  quite  a  bit  of  space  and  thought  to  the  unique  nature  of  the  existence  of 
the  work  of  art.  All  things  are,  from  the  hammer  to  the  nail,  and  from  the  stocking  to 
the  shoe.  However  the  work  of  art  is  singular  in  the  attention  it  draws  to  the  fact  that  it 
is  as  a  work.  The  work  is  created  and  always  holds  before  it  for  inescapable 
observation  that  it  has  been  created.  When  the  work  opens  itself  up  what  is  illustrated 
is  the  unique  fact  of  its  existence  at  all.  When  this  is  highlighted  in  the  open  region  it 
highlights  the  strangeness  of  the  work  of  art  as  well  as  its  solitude. 60 
What  is  seen  as  the  unique  workly  character  of  the  work,  for  Heidegger,  is 
inescapably  bound  up  with  its  createdness.  When  we  examined  it  closely  we 
perceived  that  createdness  is  revealed  as  the  strife  that  is  fixed  in  place  in  the  figure 
by  means  of  the  rift.  The  work  cannot  escape  its  createdness.  It  is  the  work's 
createdness  that  is  thrust  into  the  open  region  of  the  'that'.  However  the  work  is  never 
exhausted  in  the  createdness. 
For  Heidegger  there  is  an  element  of  alienation  in  the  work  of  art.  The 
strangeness  of  its  being  cuts  us  off  and  forces  us  to  contemplate  the  familiarity  of  our 
surroundings  by  pushing  us  into  a  position  of  estrangement  or  alienation.  It  does  this 
through  its  self-subsistence  in  and  through  the  figure  and  its  distance  from  human 
bcings.  It  just  is.  The  extraordinary  stands  before  us  while  the  intimately  familiar  is 
placed  at  a  remove  from  us.  As  Heidegger  writes:  'To  submit  to  this  displacement 
means  to  transform  our  accustomed  ties  to  world  and  earth  and  henceforth  to  restrain 
all  usual  doing  and  prizing,  knowing  and  looking,  in  order  to  stay  within  the  truth  that 
-)68  is  happening  in  the  work  . 
This  is  intimately  tied  up  with  Heidegger's  notion  of  Origin.  The  art  of  the 
Origin  for  Heidegger  is  Greek.  The  beginning  in  the  sense  of  the  original  jump  that 
jumps  out  in  front  of  everything  that  is  going  to  come,  that  precedes  everything  and 
thus  already  contains  it,  this  beginning  takes  place  when  beings  in  their  totality  and  as 
such  want  to  be  carried  out  into  the  open.  For  Heidegger  this  occurs  for  the  first  time 
in  the  Occident  within  the  Greek  world.  It  was  here  that  what  was  subsequently 
68  Basic  Writings:  1999,  p.  191 61 
known  as  Being  was  put  to  work.  Even  with  fresh  departures  like  the  Cartesian  cogito 
we  are  still  determined  by  the  first  movement.  And  the  original  work  does  not  want  to 
emerge  from  the  source  but  to  return  to  it.  And  as  Heidegger  conceives  it,  to  return  to 
the  source  is  not  to  return  to  something,  especially  not  a  past  model.  For  it  is 
continually  to  confront  the  absence  of  models  and  precedents,  to  confront  the  without- 
origin  and  without-sense  at  the  origin  of  presence  itself  It  is  to  face  the  original  lack 
of  a  foundation,  this  founding  lack  that  is  the  secret  of  the  purely  springing-forth. 
However  the  work  of  art  has  to  be  preserved  in  its  place  as  a  work  and  thus 
requires  preservers.  What  is  created  cannot  come  into  being  without  those  who 
preserve  it.  The  setting  of  truth  to  work  in  the  work  requires  preservers.  The  work 
cannot  be  a  work  without  them.  This  also  happens  while  the  work  is  waiting  for  them 
to  arrive  on  the  scene  of  its  unveiling  of  truth. 
We  must  be  willing  to  share  in  knowledge.  Through  this  willingness  and  the 
knowledge  it  strives  after  we  enter  into  the  unconcealment  of  Being.  Human  being, 
although  captive,  reaches  towards  the  openness  found  in  Being.  Heidegger  knows 
though  that  we  cannot  move  from  some  inside  to  some  outside  and  reside  there 
completely  and  abide  within  the  outside  and  openness  as  if  it  were  our  true  and  proper 
element.  The  truth  of  our  existence  suggests  that  we  can  stand  out  while  standing 
within  the  clearing  of  beings  that  opens  up.  Knowledge  that  is  based  on  the  having 
seen  of  the  unconcealment  of  truth  within  the  work  must  be  always  resolved. 
Heidegger  writes  that  we  can  only  approach  the  truth  of  the  being  of  the  work  of  art 
through  the  work  itself  and  not  some  theory,  or  historical  scholarship,  for  'the  work  is 62 
preserved  in  the  truth  that  happens  through  the  work  itselr69.  That  is  the  work's  own 
peculiar  actuality. 
Heidegger  resolves  his  question  about  the  thingly  character  of  the  work  under 
the  symbol  of  the  earth.  The  thingly  character  of  the  work  of  art  is  its  earthly  quality 
jutting  through  the  work.  However  this  can  onlY  be  revealed  when  it  intersects  with  a 
world.  The  sense  of  the  earth  as  that  which  is  self-secluding,  and  as  that  which  bears 
patiently,  can  only  be  revealed  by  the  opposition  of  earth  to  world.  The  strife  between 
them  is  fixed  in  place  in  the  figure  of  the  work  and  is  made  manifest  by  it. 
Heidegger  asks  an  astute  question  of  his  own  schema.  How  does  the  rift 
emerge  originally?  As  he  asks  it:  'How  can  the  rift  be  drawn  out  if  it  is  not  brought 
into  the  open  region  by  the  creative  projection  as  a  rift,  which  is  to  say,  brought  out 
beforehand  as  strife  of  measure  and  unmeasure?  70  He  justifies  his  position  on  the 
grounds  that  nature  itself  possesses  a  rift  desigm  How  does  Heideggerjustify  this?  Is 
he  just  looking  for  an  easy  escape?  Linked  to  this  is  a  capacity  for  bringing  forth. 
Nature  has  a  tendency  towards  the  production  of  art.  Again  we  have  to  ask  of 
Heidegger  how  can  we  validate  this?  Paradoxically  though  'this  art  hidden  in  nature 
becomes  manifest  only  through  the  work,  because  it  lies  originally  in  the  work"71.  We 
can  illustrate  this  point  further  by  returning  to  Heidegger's  image  of  the  Temple.  The 
Temple  represents  nothing,  but  it  presents  the  scene.  We  must  think  of  it  as  the  image 
of  nothing.  This  is  not  easy.  To  aid  us  we  draw  on  the  analogy  of  the  trait.  For  she  or 
he  who  draws  a  line  retraces  the  tearing,  the  re-trait,  or  retreat  of,  the  withdrawal,  of 
the  Earth  that  does  not  want  to  be  exposed.  Art  hides  itself  as  nature  does,  in  that  it 
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encrypts  itself  And  the  retreating,  or  withdrawal  into  nature,  cannot  be  extracted 
except  in  being  re-traced  in  art,  and  as  the  art  of  the  origin.  Every  work  is  only  an 
extract,  an  excerpt  of  the  origin  in  withdrawing,  a  trace  that  makes  a  sign  towards  its 
whiteness. 
There  is  an  essential  place  for  those  who  preserve  the  work.  We  cannot 
dismiss  the  preservers  as  ranking  lower  than  the  creator  or  creators.  They  belong  to 
the  work's  createdness  in  an  essential  way.  The  work  insists  on  them.  The  essence  of 
the  work  is  to  crave  for  preservation.  The  work  allows  those  who  essentially  belong 
together  at  work,  the  creator  and  the  preserver,  originate,  each  in  his  own  essence. 
What  is  peculiar  to  art  that  it  can  function  as  a  place  of  such  origin  Heidegger  asks? 
Art  is  a  becoming  and  happening  of  truth.  The  art  object  sets  truth  to  work. 
This  process  involves  bringing  the  work-being  of  the  object  into  movement  and 
happening.  Does  this  truth  initially  emerge  from  nothing?  We  move  in  two  directions 
as  always  with  Heidegger.  Yes,  it  emerges  from  nothing  in  that  it  does  not  rely  on 
what  is  given  already.  It  also  challenges  the  ephemeral  character  of  beings.  It  emerges 
from  the  nothingness  that  precedes  them  and  which  will  swallow  them  up.  Is  this  John 
Montague's  'hoarded  font  of  nothing  2?  72  At  the  same  time  beings  are  moving  towards 
their  annihilation  as  beings  and  it  is  the  aporia  that  allows  this  moving  forward  that 
allows  truth  to  emerge.  When  one  is  an  object  thrown  in  the  world  then  the  possibility 
of  the  emergence  of  truth  through  openings  in  the  fabric  of  being  is  plausible.  As 
Frangoise  Dastur  has  written:  'because  truth  has  to  establish  itself  (sich  enrichten) 
within  that  which  is  in  order  first  to  become  truth  (truth  does  not  exist  in  itself  before 
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hand),  the  impulse  toward  the  work  lies  in  the  essence  of  truth  so  that  art  is  a 
distinguished  possibility  by  which  truth  can  happen'73 
. 
Truth  occurs  in  the  moment  of  composition.  The  truth  that  concerns  Heidegger 
here  is  the  clearing  and  concealing  of  the  being  of  things.  The  essence  of  art  for 
Heidegger  is  poetic.  The  poetic  centre  of  all  art  is  capable  of  breaking  open  into  an 
open  place,  and  this  new  space  is  a  place  wherein  everything  is  presented  in  a  new 
light,  or  is  deprived  of  its  everyday  mundane  reality  and  familiarity.  We  are  alerted  to 
the  unbeing  of  the  world  through  the  work  of  art.  It  does  this  by  its  capacity  to 
highlight  or  set  into  the  work  the  unconcealment  of  beings.  This  unconcealment 
moves  towards  us  and  challenges  everything  that  is  ordinary  and  familiar.  That  we  are 
not  talking  about  some  causal  or  physical  alteration  here  Heidegger  is  at  pains  to 
make  clear.  The  change  happens  within  the  world  of  the  work  itself,  from  out  of  the 
work  in  truth,  and  has  to  do  with  the  unconcealment  of  beings,  and  therefore  of  Being 
itself  Poetry  clears  the  ground.  It  does  this  through  the  open  region.  Simultaneous 
with  that  the  open  region  allows  poetry  to  happen.  Through  this  process  beings  are 
allowed  to  shine  and  ring  out. 
Hcidcggcr  seeks  to  continue  an  ancient  tradition  that  privileges  poetry  as  the 
most  primary  form  of  the  expressive  arts.  He  argues  that  such  a  position  is  justified  by 
the  medium  utilized  by  poetic  expression.  Language  has  unique  characteristics  that 
are  primary  to  any  discussion  of  the  distinctiveness  of  artistic  Production.  We  view 
that  language  too  narrowly  if  we  only  conceive  of  it  on  the  basis  of  a  means  of 
communication.  Heidegger  writes:  'language  alone  brings  beings  as  beings  into  the 
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open  for  the  first  time'  .  Stones,  plants  and  animals  do  not  possess  a  language  and 
thus  cannot  enter  into  the  openness  of  beings,  and  cannot  experience  non-being  and 
the  empty. 
Language  names  beings.  Thereby  it  brings  beings  to  the  word  and  into 
appearance.  It  is  this  process  of  naming  that  nominates  beings  to  their  Being  from  out 
of  their  Being.  When  we  utter  and  say  we  project  a  clearing  in  which  an 
announcement  is  made  of  what  it  is  that  beings  come  into  the  open  as.  Heidegger 
names  this  projective  saying  as  poetry.  Such  a  saying  is  a  speaking  of  the  world  and 
the  earth,  the  saying  of  the  arena  of  their  strife  and  is  the  place  of  the  nearness  and 
remoteness  of  the  gods.  In  this  saying  the  concepts  of  a  historical  people's  essence  are 
performed  for  that  people.  The  sayable  and  unsayable  are  both  brought  into  the  world 
simultaneously. 
Language  itself  is  the  original  poesy  because  it  is  the  happening  in  which 
beings  first  disclose  themselves  to  humanity  as  beings.  Language  always  preserves  the 
original  sense  and  essence  of  poetry.  Architecture  and  painting  already  occur  after 
language  in  the  open  region  of  saying  and  naming.  'They  are  an  ever  speci  poetizing 
within  the  clearing  of  beings  which  has  already  happened  unnoticed  in  language  05 
- 
Heidegger  writes  that  'the  essence  of  art  is  poetry.  The  essence  of  poetry,  in 
turn,  is  the  founding  of  truth  v76 
.  The  founding  that  Heidegger  has  in  mind  here  has  a 
tripartite  function.  It  is  founding  understood  as  bestowing,  as  grounding  and  as 
beginning.  This  founding,  however,  only  becomes  actual  in  preserving.  And  it 
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illustrates  a  unique  actuality  also.  Every  work  of  art  refutes  what  has  come  before. 
Founding  is  always  an  overflow  in  this  sense,  a  bestowal. 
Art  has  a  direction  also.  It  does  not  aim  to  speak  into  the  indeterminate  void.  It 
points  out  to,  moves  towards,  its  preservers.  It  seeks  out  a  specific,  historical  people  to 
address.  As  Heidegger  writes:  'trulY  poetic  projection  is  the  opening  up  of  that  into 
which  human  being  as  historical  is  already  cast.  This  is  the  earth  and,  for  a  historical 
people,  its  earth,  the  self-secluding  ground  on  which  it  rests  together  with  everything 
that  it  already  is,  though  still  hidden  from  itself  But  this  is  also  its  world,  which 
prevails  in  virtue  of  the  relation  of  human  being  to  the  unconcealment  of  Being.  For 
this  reason,  everything  with  which  man  is  endowed  must,  in  the  projection,  be  drawn 
up  from  the  closed  ground  and  expressly  set  upon  this  ground.  In  this  way  the  ground 
77  is  first  grounded  as  the  beatring  ground'  . 
Heidegger  argues  that  this  bestowing  and  grounding  have  an  unmediated 
character  that  we  identify  by  speaking  of  them  as  a  beginning.  This  unmediated 
character  includes  the  fact  that  the  beginning  prepares  itself  for  the  longest  time  and 
wholly  inconspicuously.  A  real  beginning  is  always  ahead,  a  leap  beyond,  in  which 
everything  that  is  still  to  come  has  been  leapt  over,  even  when  it,  or  they,  are/is  still 
veiled.  The  beginning  contains  the  end  latently  within  itself  This  genuine  beginning 
contains  always  the  undisclosed  abundance  of  the  awesome.  Therefore  it  contains 
strife  with  the  familiar  and  ordinary. 
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Whenever  art  happens  -  that  is,  when  a  beginning  occurs  -a  thrust,  a  new 
impetus  occurs  in  history.  History  will  begin  for  the  first  time  or  will  start  over  again. 
Heidegger  is  not  speaking  of  history  here  in  the  narrow  sense  of  a  sequence  of  events 
that  occur  in  time.  He  understands  history  in  the  sense  of  the  writing  of  a  people  and 
their  destiny;  history  as  the  transporting  of  a  people  into  their  appointed  task  and  entry 
into  their  own  particular  endowment  as  a  people.  Heidegger  writes:  'art  is  history  in 
the  essential  sense  that  it  grounds  history"'. 
And  so  we  find  Heidegger  return  to  his  starting  point  or  source.  The  idea  of  art 
as  a  point  of  origin.  Art  is  the  place  where  truth  originates.  Art  is  a  leap  and  as  such, 
as  founder  and  preserver,  is  a  point  of  origin.  This  is  what  to  be  an  origin  means.  Art, 
poetry,  brings  something  into  being  from  out  of  its  essential  source  in  a  founding  leap. 
And  so  Heidegger  writes  paradoxically,  but  clearly:  'The  origin  of  the  work  of  art  - 
that  is,  the  origin  of  both  the  creators  and  the  preservers,  which  is  to  say  of  a  people's 
historical  existence  -  is  art 
09 
. 
Heidgger  draws  his  meditation  to  a  close  with  the  powerful  question:  'Are  we 
in  our  existence  historically  at  the  origin?  Do  we  know,  which  means  do  we  give  heed 
to,  the  essence  of  the  origin?  Or,  in  our  relation  to  art,  do  we  still  merely  make  appeal 
to  a  cultivated  acquaintance  with  the  past?  '80 
Martin  Heidegger  finally  concludes  The  Origin  ofthe  Work  ofArt  with  a  quote 
from  Holderlin: 
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Reluctantly 
that  which  dwells  near  its  origin  abandons  the  site. 
'The  Joumey',  verses  18  -  1981 
As  should  be  clear  from  our  analysis  Heidegger's  essay  constitutes  a  break  with 
the  metaphysical  tradition  of  understanding  art.  In  that  tradition  art  has  been 
understood  right  from  the  start  as  a  fabricated  thing.  We  have  thought  of  the  work  of 
art  as  something  else,  something  more  than  a  mere  product.  We  have  conceived  of  it 
as  a  bringing  together  under  the  rubrics  of  allegory  and  symbol.  We  have  worked  with 
the  dualism  of  a  material  content  and  then  a  spiritual  meaning  added  on,  or  seen  as  an 
addition  to  the  material  dimensions  of  the  artwork.  Art  under  this  logic  is  defined  as 
the  (re)presentation  of  the  suprasensible  into  the  sensible.  We  have  a  metaphysical 
logic  of  addition  at  work  here.  In  terms  of  language,  the  phonetical  material  to  which 
is  added  meaning,  animal  body  to  which  is  added  soul,  and  thus  the  leading  idea 
behind  the  metaphysical  conception  of  things  is  that  the  spiritual  element  can  be 
represented  in  the  material.  Heidegger  marks  a  distinct  break  from  this  tradition.  As 
Frangoise  Dastur  writes,  for  Heidegger:  'the  work  of  art  does  not  (re)present  anything: 
it  is  neither  representation  of  something  else  nor  presentation  of  something  absent.  It 
has  in  fact  no  relationship  at  all  to  presence,  but,  on  the  contrary,  it  has  a  relationship 
to  the  becoming  or  happening  of  truth,  to  the  coming  into  presence  of  everything. 
That  is  why  Heidegger  puts  the  stress  on  the  initiality  of  art:  the  work  is  a 
commencement  (Anfang),  an  institution  (Stiftung),  a  creation  (schaffen)  )82  - 
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The  temple  would  no  longer  be  a  temple  if  it  resembled  anything.  It  resembles 
nothing  in  a  similar  manner  to  the  way  in  which  the  mountain  resembles  nothing.  The 
mountain  appears  as  an  apriori.  It  appears  to  be  instituted  or  installed.  The 
installment  of  the  temple  is  similar  to  that  of  the  mountain;  on  the  earth,  or  after  it?  It 
emerges  from  the  earth  and  is  made  of  the  stuff  of  earth.  Materially  it  is  no  different, 
except  it  exists  as  Temple.  This  is  the  source  of  its  radical  othemess.  We  have  here  the 
installation  of  the  There.  And  as  Marc  Froment-Meurice  writes:  'which  precisely  is 
not  there,  not  available,  but  which  always  arrives,  suddenly,  takes  place  in  giving 
place.  The  There,  first  named  Dasein,  then  Aletheia,  is  Heidegger's  major,  and 
perhaps  even  only,  discovery.  What  remains  to  be  discovered  beyond  the  Open?  83-) 
Marc  Froment-Meurice  argues  for  another  implication  of  Heidegger's  thinking 
on  art.  He  argues  that  one  of  the  implications  of  Heidegger's  thought  is  that  'sense  or 
meaning  would  never  be  whole,  present  to  itself  in  presence,  but  always  self-affected 
with  a  "without  sense".  But  it  would  also  imply  that  the  without  is  also  not  whole,  put 
differently,  that  there  is  no  pure  non-sense,  or  that  the  without-sense  is  not  non-sense, 
and  thus  that  the  without  is  not  reduced  to  a  negation  or  to  a  nihilism  that  is  always  the 
weapon  sense  uses  to  reduce  the  other  to  its  mercy.  This  also  means  that  at  the  same 
time  the  work  is  not  the  final  instance  and  remains  what  cannot  be  passed  over,  not 
because  there  would  be  nothing  else,  but  precisely  because  by  its  very  breaking  it 
testifies  for  the  other  to  whom  it  refers,  without,  however,  this  reference  making 
sen 
e84 
. 
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Chapter  Two: 
Remembering  the  Word  after  the  Shoah  in  the 
poems  of  Paul  Celan:  A  Challenge  to  Heidegger 
George  Steiner  has  written  that  one  of  the  implications  of  the  Shoah 
experience  of  the  death  of  millions  of  Jews  in  Nazi  death-camps  has  been  the 
death  of  humanity  as  rational,  'forward-dreaming'  speech-organisms.  When  we 
contemplate  how  the  death  camps  were  organized,  and  attempt  to  approach  a 
hypothesis  for  their  motivation,  and  when  we  discover  the  deathly  efficiency  with 
which  they  were  run,  we  are  left  with  profound  questions  about  the  nature  of 
human  logic  as  it  has  been  and  is  ordered  in  relation  to  social  and  psychological 
circumstance.  We  are  left  with  no  other  conclusion  to  draw  but  that  the  Shoah  is  a 
travesty  enacted  upon  meaningfulness  and  can  be  legitimately  termed  a  'cancer  of 
reason'.  The  Shoah  leaves  us  with  profound  questions  about  some  of  what  had 
been  hitherto  the  deepest  philosophical  and  theological  positions  achieved  in 
Western  thought.  For  theology  after  the  Shoah  we  are  forced  with  brutal  honesty 
to  speak  of  the  exit  of  God  from  the  bounds  of  human  experience. 
If  there  is  to  be  a  recovery  of  language  and  reason  it  must  begin  within 
Geman,  the  language  of  death  itself  If  language  is  to  be  re-humanized,  if  we  are  to 
restore  its  capacity  to  address  God  and  to  speak  to  and  about  humanity,  we  must  begin 
in  the  place  in  which  all  of  these  potentialities  were  challenged  and  eventually 
eradicated.  Steiner  has  written:  'reparation  and  restoration  can  come  only  from  within 71 
the  death-idiom  itself  1 
The  Challenge  to  Theology 
George  Steiner  addresses  the  question  of  the  uniquenesss  of  the  Shoah.  There  has 
been  a  long  history  of  anti-Semitism  in  Western  history  that  has  been  well  documented. 
However,  aside  from  anti-Jewishness  recent  history  has  seen  the  death  of  millions  of 
Russians  in  the  gulags.  We  have  had  many  massacres  on  the  continent  of  Africa  by  various 
political  dictatorships.  Minorities  have  been  assaulted  and  attempts  at  their  annihilation 
made  at  various  junctures  of  human  history. 
And  so  Steiner  concludes:  'ifthere  are  qualitative  differences  between  the 
Shoah  and  the  innumerable  examples  of  mass-murder  which  punctuate  history  both 
before  and  since,  they  must  lie  very  deep:  in  that  symbolic  and  metaphysical- 
theological  realm  which  I  want  to  point  towards'2  . 
Steiner  begins  with  St.  Paul's  Epistle  to  the  Romans  9-  12  as  a  starting 
point  for  the  framework  he  wishes  to  suggest.  Christ  was  the  Messiah  long 
awaited  by  the  Jewish  people.  He  was  the  Davidic  liberator  and  saviour  prefigured 
in  the  Psalms  and  Isaiah's  vision  of  the  Suffering  Servant.  This  Messiah  the  Jews 
had  foretold  in  their  own  Torah,  prayers  and  prophecy  and  yet  they  were  the  ones 
to  hand  him  over  to  abominable  suffering  that  resulted  in  his  death.  Understood 
from  this  perspective,  developed  in  later  Christianity,  Judaism  eradicated  from 
within  itself  the  act  of  divine  election.  This  is  the  most  plausible  of  Steiner's 
'  George  Steiner:  'Me  Long  Life  ofMelaphor.  An  Approach  to  the  Shoah':  Encounter:  1987,  p.  56 72 
scenarios. 
Steiner's  second  proposal  is  somewhat  less  reasonable.  By  their  refusal  to 
recognize  Jesus  of  Nazareth  as  the  Messiah  foretold  by  their  own  scriptures  the  Jews 
have  postponed  the  day  of  humanities'  salvation.  By  refusing  Christ  the  Jews  have 
condemned  humanity  to  the  treadmill  of  history.  We  will  not  be  liberated  from  our 
historical  bondage,  our  enslavement  to  the  agonies,  bloodshed  and  injustice  of  history 
until  the  Jewish  people  recognize  the  messianic  truth  of  Jesus's  ministry  and 
incamation. 
Another  version  of  this  scenario  runs:  the  messianic  purposes  of  Christ  the  Son 
of  God  were  not  accomplished  either  in  His  earthly  sojourn  or  in  His  resurrection. 
They  are  incomplete,  a  continuous  process  which  will  find  fulfillment  only  when 
Judaism  enters  freely  into  the  Ecclesia  of  the  Christian  Churches.  They  will  be 
consummated  when  synagogue  and  Church  are  united  in  a  common  tabernacle.  Until 
that  day  Christianity  itself  is  a  fragmentary,  often  self-contradictory  and  culpable 
institution.  We  respect  the  Jew  as  sacred  because  the  potentiality  of  the  truly 
ecumenical  contains  within  itself  the  only  access  to  the  genuine  realisation  of  God's 
promise  in  and  through  Christ.  Steiner  detects  this  strain  of  argument  in  the  late 
writings  of  Karl  Barth  and  more  explicitly  in  the  writings  of  Jurgen  Moltmann. 
Steiner  has  only  been  staking  out  the  ground  for  his  core  argument.  The  attack 
upon  the  Jewish  people  has  not  been  for  their  role  in  crucifying  God  in  the  form  of 
Jesus  Christ.  They  have  not  been  loathed  as  deicides  but,  more  radically,  'as  inventor 
'  Steiner:  1987:  p.  57 73 
of  God;  it  is  as  spokesman  for  and  remembrancer  of  an  almighty,  all-seeing,  all- 
demanding  Deity.  It  is  because  Judaism  has  kept  man  awake,  as  do  the  Prophets  in  the 
sleeping  city".  For  Steiner  Judaism  has  done  this  at  three  key  junctures  in  Western 
history;  firstly,  in  its  invention  or  discovery  of  monotheism,  secondly  in  the  message 
of  the  religious  radical  known  as  Jesus  Christ  and,  thirdly,  in  Marxism  and  messianic- 
socialism.  In  all  three  moments  Judaism  has  asked  of  ordinary  women  and  men  more 
than  human  nature  ordinarily  wishes  to  give.  And  in  fact,  possibly  more  than 
organically  and  psychically  it  is  able  to  give.  We  have  come  to  despise  those  who 
have  asked  of  us  a  self-transcendence  greater  than  our  natural  or  common  limits  of 
being.  Steiner  writes:  'our  bate  and  fear  are  the  more  intense  precisely  because  we 
know  the  absolute  rightness,  the  ultimate  desirability  of  the  demand.  In  failing  to 
respond  adequately,  we  fail  ourselves.  And  it  is  of  deep-lying  self-hatreds  that  hatreds 
spring'4  . 
And  it  is  only  such  a  deep  psychological,  metaphysical-theological  framework 
that  Steiner  feels  can  persuade  us  to  the  depth  of  loathing  and  hatred  that  underlay  the 
Nazi  drive  to  eliminate  the  Jew  from  history  through  the  death-camps.  And: 
It  is,  therefore,  no  accident  that  the  theological-metaphysical  levels  of 
language  of  metaphor,  of  symbolism  should  be  the  foundation  and  constant 
resource  of  the  one  writer  who,  to  my  knowledge,  has  not  only  taken  us  to  the 
unspeakable  centre  of  the  Shoah-experience,  but  -  and  this  is  far  more  difficult 
and  important-  has  located  the  sense  of  that  experience  within  the  definition  of 
man,  of  history,  and  of  human  speech.  ...  That  Paul  Celan  is  also  among  the 
greatest  poets  in  the  German  tongue,  indeed  in  modem  European  literature 
(being,  perhaps,  an  even  more  necessary  poet  than  was  Rilke);  that  Celan 
alone  can  stand  beside  Holderlin  in  both  his  poetry  and  his  prose-  is  almost  an 
extraneous  wonder.  The  necessary  and  sufficient  condition  for  Celan's  poems 
is  the  situation  of  all  human  saying  after  the  Shoah,  a  situation  which  Celan 
lived  and  articulated  in  the  absent  face  of  God.  In  this  one  supreme 
3  Steiner:  1987,  p.  59 
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witness  ...  the  fate  of  the  Jew,  the  night-charged  genius  of  the  German 
language,  of  the  idiom  of  Auschwitz  and  Belsen,  a  profound  intimacy  with  the 
Hebraic  and  the  Yiddish  legacy,  coalesced;  and  they  coalesced  around  the 
central  criteria  of  the  theological  and  the  metaphysical  orders  of 
questioning...  5 
Celan's  Winess  through  the  Word 
Paul  Celan  was  born  to  a  family  of  German-speaking  Jews  in  1920  in 
Czernowitz,  capital  of  the  Bukovina  region,  which  passed  to  Romania  just  before  his 
birth.  After  Soviet,  then  German  occupation  in  1940  and  1941,  after  forced  labour, 
his  parents'  deportation  and  subsequent  disappearance,  and  the  Russians'  return  in 
1944,  Celan  departed  for  Bucharest  first,  then  Vienna,  before  finally  settling  in  Paris 
in  1948.  In  Paris  he  wrote  a  body  of  poetry  that  questioned  the  possibility  of  meaning, 
commemoration,  personal  and  interpersonal  communion  open  to  a  language  soiled  by 
the  travesties  of 
hiStorY6. 
The  classic  expression  of  such  concerns  in  Celan's  body  of  work  is  the  poem 
'Psalm'.  A  cursory  glance  at  this  poem  indicates  its  radically  theological  and 
metaphysical  field  of  refeffal. 
No-one  kneads  us  again  out  of  earth  and  loam, 
No-one  bespeaks  our  dust. 
No-one. 
Praise  unto  thee,  No-one. 
For  love  of  you  will 
I  Steiner:  1987:  p.  60. 75 
we  bloom. 
Toward/against 
You. 
A  nothing 
were  we,  are  we,  will 
we  remain,  blooming: 
No-one's  rose. 
With 
the  stylus  soul-bright 
the  dust-thread  sky-waste, 
the  crown  reddened 
by  the  purple  word,  which  we  sang 
above,  o  above 
the  thoM.  7 
As  John  Felstiner  writes:  'The  psalm,  benediction,  doxology,  and  prayer  which 
this  poem  sounds  like  are  undercut  in  breath-turnings,  abysses  opened  beneath  those 
ritual  forms.  Throughout  the  Christian  West,  words  for  "psalm"  are  alike.  Identical  in 
German  and  English,  they  need  no  translating  -  whence  the  snare  of  Celan's  title.  As 
with  his  "Tenebrae",  we  assume  we  know  what  is  meant.  But  "Psalm"  can  never,  for 
this  poet,  purely  and  simply  line  up  with  the  hymns  of  lament  and  praise  that  have 
Israel  Chalfen's  Paul  Celan:  A  Biography  ofHis  Youth:  Persea  Books:  New  York:  1991 
I  use  Steiner's  translation.  From  Steiner:  1987,  p.  60. 76 
,8 
comforted  generation  unto  generation  . 
Firstly,  let  us  look  at  some  of  the  influences  behind  Celan's  poem  in  order  to 
attain  a  firmer  grasp  of  its  field  of  allusion.  Celan's  threefold  conjugation  of  time  will 
evoke  for  some  the  Christian  doxology.  There  is  also  though  the  echo  of  a  more 
ancient  hymn,  the  Hebrew  liturgy  contains  the  phrase:  'Adon  Olam'(Lord  of  the 
World):  'For  He  has  been,  for  He  is  now,  for  he  shall,  in  radiance,  For  He  is  One,  no 
Other  is'.  The  rose's  soul-bright  'pistil',  besides  being  a  flower's  seed-bearing  organ, 
Griffel  also  means  a  stylus  and  thereby  suggests  that  the  rose  blossoms  with  the 
energy  of  writing.  'The  dust-thread  sky-waste'  replaces  the  earth  of  Genesis  -  'waste 
and  void'  -  with  a  wasted  heaven  and  this  suggests  the  deep  intent  of  Celan's  poem. 
The  'crown'  or  'corolla'  with  its  association  with  the  'purple'  word  conjures  the 
bleeding  King  of  the  Jews  in  his  purple  robe,  tying  Christ's  agony  back  into  Jewish 
suffering. 
'Psalm'  is  indebted  to  Heidegger's  meditations  on  nothingness.  It  is 
indecipherable  without  the  pages  of  Principle  ofReason,  Satz  vom  Grund,  prompted 
by  Leibniz's  question:  'Why  is  there  something  rather  than  nothing?  '  Here  Lei  niz  is 
bent  on  saying  the  abyss  of  being  or  presence:  the  A  b-grund  and  the  Un-grund,  the 
without-grounds  and  the  non-ground.  Celan's  poem  also  recalls  Angelus  Silesius's 
phrase:  'The  rose  is  without  a  why,  blooms  because  it  blooms'. 
There  is,  also,  a  long  tradition  of  kabbalistic  speculation  and  ascetic  piety 
behind  Celan's  choice  of  phrase  for  his  address:  'No-one'.  It  re-calls  a  tradition  of 
'  John  Felstiner:  Paul  Celan:  Poe4  Survivor,  Jew:  Yale  Univ.  Press:  New  Haven:  1995,  p.  167  -  168 77 
witness  to  the  inconceivable,  unimaginable,  unspeakable,  anti-metaphoric  tenor  of  the 
god  of  Israel.  Celan's  biographer  notes  that  Celan  was  reading  works  of  Jewish 
mysticism  at  this  point  in  his  life.  He  had  bought  writings  by  Gershom  Scholem  in 
1957  and  was  studying  him  by  19609.  There  is  an  ancient  echo  in  the  fonnulaic 
liturgical  phrase  'Praise  unto  thee,  No-One'.  It  suggest  piety,  resignation  and  rebellion 
signaled  in  the  phrase  'blooms'  both  towards  God  -  in  that  place,  at  that  hour  -  and  a 
blooms  'against'  God.  The  word  Entgegen  signifies  a  towards  and  an  opposition. 
As  Celan  attempts  to  articulate  the  nothingness  of  the  Jew  in  Auschwitz  he 
suggests  the  nothingness  of  man  prior  to  God's  creating  him.  This  nothingness  echoes 
with  and  re-calls  the  nothingness  which  constitutes  every  individual  extinction.  And  it 
is  the  very  specific  nothingness  of  the  Jewish  person  and  people  before  their  killers  in 
the  death-camps  of  recent  history.  However  Celan  loads  this  nothingness  with  the 
issue  of  contradiction,  of  a  nothingness  ironically  'in  bloom',  a  terrible  flowering 
towards  and  against  the  'Nothingness'  of  God's  absence.  And  as  Philippe  Lacoue- 
Labarthe  notes  there  is  an  irony  in  a  poet's  concern  with  such  nothingness,  for  'a 
poem  wants  to  say;  indeed,  it  is  nothing  but  pure  wanting  to  say.  But  pure  wanting-to- 
say  nothing,  nothingness,  that  against  which  and  through  which  there  is  presence, 
what  isi'10. 
There  is  the  powerful  phrase  chosen  by  Celan  in  his  second  line.  Here  he 
suggests  there  will  be  no  bespeaking  of  their  dust,  of  those  annihilated  in  the  Shoah: 
6niemand  bespricht  unsem  Staub'.  This  echoes  with  the  story  of  God's  breathing  life 
into  the  clay  of  Adam,  to  God's  saying  ofbeing  in  the  Hebrew  scriptures: 
9  See  Felstiner:  1995,  p.  235 
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'Besprechen'  also  carries  the  sense  of  'to  talk  about'  or  'to  talk  to'  (as  one  addresses 
oneself  to  a  topic).  And  so  the  sense  becomes:  no  one  -  not,  above  all,  God  Himself  - 
will  speak  to  the  condition  of  Auschwitz,  will  speak  about  it  in  adequate  witness  or 
commemoration.  The  absence  of  God  from  the  Shoah  is  his  silence  in  the  face  of  the 
unremembered  dead,  a  lack  of  remembrance  which  makes  of  their  deaths  a  double 
annihilation. 
And  this  leads  to  the  stunning  reversal  of  perspective  in  Celan's  poem.  For  it  is 
only  the  victims  themselves,  in  the  red  flowering  of  their  anonymous,  unspeakable 
deaths,  who  can  rescue  God  from  the  void  of  His  silence.  Theirs  is  'the  purple  word', 
blood-soaked  and  royal,  theirs  is  the  song  over  the  thorn,  the  living  mystery  of  the 
Niemandsrose  above  the  lacerating  murderousness  of  'the  thorn'.  Celan  writes  a 
psalm  that  is  also  an  anti-Psalm.  The  Jew  in  the  Shoah  speaks  to  and  against  the  non- 
speaking,  the  unspeaking  of  God.  So  long  as  the  Jew  addresses  God,  God  must  listen. 
The  reversal  in  Celan  is  incredible.  For,  if  in  the  Christ-passion  it  is  understood  that  a 
divine  being,  a  Son  of  God  and  of  Man,  is  held  to  have  died  for  man,  so  in  the  Shoah, 
the  Jewish  people,  that  'Root  of  Abraham,  root  of  Jesse,  No-  one's'  ('Radix, 
Matrix')l  I  is  seen,  or  understood,  to  have  died  for  God,  to  have  taken  upon  itself  the 
inconceivable  guilt  of  God's  indifference,  or  absence,  or  impotence.  And  this  is  the 
very  small  miracle  of  Paul  Celan's  poetry.  Philippe  Lacoue-Labarthe  asks:  'How  does 
it  happen  that  in  poetry,  out  of  poetry,  all  is  not  lost,  that  a  possibility  of  articulating 
something  still  remains,  if  only  in  stuttering,  if  only  in  an  incomprehensible  and 
incommunicable  language,  an  idiolect  or  idiom?  '  12 
Trans.  by  Andrea  TarnowsId. 
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The  Poet  I's  Challenge  To  Philosophy 
The  German  philosopher  Martin  Heidegger,  whose  essay  The  Origin  ofthe 
Work  ofArt  was  the  central  preoccupation  of  our  first  chapter,  was  no  stranger  to  the 
writings  of  Paul  Celan  and,  for  years,  Paul  Celan  had  read  Heidegger  closely.  Philippe 
Lacoue-Labarthe  has  written:  'It  would  be  an  understatement  to  say  Celan  has  read 
Heidegger.  Celan's  poetry  goes  beyond  even  an  unreserved  recognition  of  Heidegger. 
I  think,  one  can  assert  that  it  is,  in  its  entirety,  a  dialogue  with  Heidegger's  thought. 
And  essentially  with  the  part  of  this  thought  that  was  a  dialogue  with  Holderlin's 
poetry' 
13 
Paul  Celan's  copy  of  Being  and  Time  contained  extensive  notes;  he  was 
familiar  with  Heidegger's  interpretations  of  Holderlin,  Trakl  and  Rilke.  His  poems 
show  numerous  Heideggerian  traces.  His  Bremen  and  Meridian  speeches  find  in 
poetry  the  truest  path  toward  Being  -  though  only  under  history's  acute  pressure. 
Heidegger,  for  his  part,  had  sent  his  books  to  Celan  and  had  wanted  to  meet  him.  'I 
know  everything  of  his',  he  said  in  1967  14 
. 
Celan's  major  biographer  in  English  John 
Felstiner  has  written  of  Celan's  first  meeting  with  Martin  Heidegger:  'if  even  some 
journalist's  insensitive  review  could  disturb  Celan,  it  is  clear  that  an  encounter  with 
the  man  who  under  Hitter  was  Rector  at  Freiburg  in  1933  -  34,  who  in  1935  declared 
Nazism's  "inner  truth  and  greatness",  who  in  1936  still  signed  his  letters  Heil  Hiller!, 
had  his  classes  give  the  salute,  and  sported  a  swastika  pin,  and  who  paid  party  dues 
until  1945  -  an  encounter  with  this  man  has  to  be  fraught,  especially  given 
12  Lacoue-Labarthe:  1999,  p.  23 
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Heidegger's  silence  about  it  all  since  the  war'15. 
Rudiger  Safranksi,  Heidegger's  biographer,  records  the  fraught  air  that 
surrounded  this  first  meeting.  He  details  the  reluctance  of  Celan  to  be  photographed 
alongside  Heidegger.  He  writes  of  Celan:  'He  was  impressed  by  Heidegger's  work 
and  personality.  He  felt  himself  attracted  and,  at  the  same  time,  blamed  himself  for  it. 
He  sought  his  presence,  yet  he  forbade  himself  to  seek 
it,  16. 
Despite  this  deep  personal  interest  of  the  two  men  in  each  other's  personality 
and  writing  Paul  Celan  is  a  strange  absence  in  the  writings  of  Heidegger.  There  is  no 
trace  of  Celan  in  the  writings  of  Heidegger  concerning  poetry  and  poetics.  We  recall 
that  Celan  was  emerging  and  being  recognized  as  one  of  the  foremost  poets  of  the 
German  language  in  the  period  that  Heidegger  and  Celan  were  in  correspondence. 
Heidegger's  silence  is  more  astonishing  given  Celan's  conscious  attempt  to  carry 
forward,  examine  and  explore  the  legacy  of  Holderlin,  Trakl  and  Rilke.  As  we  have 
noted,  a  tradition  of  poetry  Heidegger  devoted  much  attention  to. 
We  turn  to  Celan's  well-known  poem  about  his  first  meeting  with  Heidegger, 
Todtnauberg. 
Amica,  eyebright,  the 
draft  from  the  well  with  the 
staffed  die  above  it, 
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in  the 
hut, 
the  line 
-whose  name  did  the  book 
register  before  mine? 
the  line  inscribed 
in  that  book  about 
a  hope,  today, 
of  a  thinking  man's 
coming 
word 
in  the  heart, 
woodland  sward,  unlevelled, 
orchid  and  orchid,  single, 
coarse  stuff,  later,  clear 
in  passing, 
he  who  drives  us,  the  man, 
who  listens  in, 
the  half- 
Mass.:  1999,  p.  423 82 
trodden  wretched 
tracks  through  the  high  moors, 
dampness, 
much. 
17 
The  poem  re-calls  Heidegger's  rural  retreat  where  he  completed  most  of  his 
writing  and  thinking.  It  was  an  enabling  place  of  rural  simplicity  and  solitude.  The 
poet  conveys  something  of  this  through  his  presentation  of  the  essentials  of  a  plain 
homestead,  the  fountain  and  stars,  the  mountain  floors,  the  visitor's  book  and  the 
moor.  The  tranquility  of  this  agrarian-intellectual  idyll  is  menaced  by  the  intrusion  of 
history  at  the  outset.  This  intrusion  into  the  world  of  nature  also  affects  the  very 
articulation  of  language  and  thereby  the  modalities  of  manifestation.  The  star-die 
upon  the  water  brings  to  mind  the  star  of  David.  In  Todtnauberg  Celan  had  taken  a 
drink  from  Heidegger's  much-photographed  well  with  its  star-shaped  wooden  cube  on 
top,  and  signed  the  guest  book  'with  a  hope  for  a  coming  word  in  the  heart'. 
The  homestead  is  a  shack.  Does  it  echo  with  the  memory  of  army-barracks? 
This  survivor  Paul  Celan  inscribes  his  name  in  a  book.  It  is  not  a  book  of  life,  but 
rather  contains,  in  all  probability,  names  of  many  who,  directly  or  indirectly,  are 
complicit  with  those  who  committed  horrendous  crimes  and  murder  against  Jews  like 
Celan  and  his  family.  The  traditional  image  of  life-sustaining  and  cleansing  water 
from  the  fountains  is  here  transformed  into  something  suggestive  of  weeping.  We  note 
the  disabling  pervasiveness  of  the  moist  in  Celan's  poem. 
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During  the  war  in  Czernowitz  Paul  Celan  had  astonished  friends  by  using 
botanical  terms  in  several  languages.  Now,  like  Jew  Klein  in  Celan's  prose  piece 
'Conversation  in  the  Mountains'  18 
. 
he  names  the  natural  world,  and  the  particular 
flowers  named  signify  healing  -  arnica  for  bruises,  and  eyebright  is  a  balm  he  re- 
called  from  childhood.  Arnica  is  a  medicinal  herb  and  might  be  a  cure  for  the 
wounding  with  which  the  poem  closes.  There  is  a  circularity  within  the  poem  in  terms 
of  form  and  content.  There  might  well  be  an  echo  of  the  death  camps  in  the  language 
of  the  poem  chosen  to  suggest  the  'woodland  swards'.  They  are  not  a  typically  leveled 
phenomenon.  Celan's  choice  of  an  unusual  term  might  suggest  the  naturally  rolling 
ground  around  Auschwitz  that  was  leveled  with  the  ash  of  the  dead. 
The  word  'coming'  mattered  to  philosopher  and  -poet  alike.  In  a  1936  essay 
lleidegger  described  Holderlin's  sense  of  a  'new  time':  'It  is  the  time  of  the  fled  gods 
and  of  the  coming  God'19.  Holderlin's  hope  still  awaits  a  heartfelt  word,  Celan 
implies.  Again  his  poem  challenges  Heidegger  noting  the  'half-/  trod  log-  /  paths'  of 
their  aborted  walk.  Heidegger's  'Woodland  Paths',  showing  poetry  'under  way' 
toward  truth  in  language  convinced  Celan.  Yet,  in  a  deft  wordplay,  Celan's  tenn  for 
,  log'  echoes  with  the  term  'bludgeon'.  Translating  his  own  Night  and  Fog  he  had  used 
that  word  for  death  camp  prisoners  'bludgeoned  awake'  at  5  a.  m.  Along  the  paths  of 
the  German  language  Celan  could  only  go  halfway  with  Heidegger. 
With  this  poem,  Celan's  biographer  John  Felstiner  notes,  he  made  an  unusual 
step  20 
. 
He  had  his  Paris  printer  do  a  bibliophile  edition  and  he  sent  the  first  copy  to 
Heidegger.  The  response  was  a  letter  empty  of  anything  but  conventional  thanks.  How 
Is  SelectedPoents  andProse  ofPaul  Celan:  Norton:  New  York:  2001,  Trans.  by  John  Felstiner,  p.  397 
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could  the  seventy-eight-year-old  philosopher  respond?  When  Celan  readied 
'Todtnauberg'  for  his  next  book,  he  made  one  change,  taking  out  'un  -  /delayed'.  He 
was  still  waiting  for  the  coming  word.  For  Philippe  Lacoue-  Labarthe  this  word  was 
vital.  For:  'What  "Todtnaubere'  speaks  about,  then,  is  this:  the  language  in  which 
Auschwitz  was  pronounced,  and  which  pronounced  AuschwitZ,  21.  And  again,  the 
importance  of  having  this  word  uttered  lay  in  its  being  not  about  'life,  which  is  always 
possible,  which  remained  possible,  as  we  know,  even  in  Auschwitz,  but  existence, 
poetry,  speech.  Language.  That  is,  relation  to  others  22 
.  And  finally:  'the  word  that 
the  West,  in  its  pathos  of  redemption,  has  never  been  able  to  say.  The  word  it  remains 
for  us  to  learn  to  speak,  lest  we  should  sink  ourselves.  The  word  pardon'23  . 
Heidegger  has  written  of  his  experience  of  a  unity  with  nature  in  his  rural 
retreat:  it  'has  the  peculiar  and  original  power  of  not  isolating  us  but  of  projecting  our 
whole  existence  out  into  the  vast  nearness  of  the  presence  of  all  beings'.  For  Celan 
however  there  is  an  experience  of  fragmentation  and  isolation.  The  orchid  is 
replicated  in  the  landscape  but  ultimately  stands  alone,  'orchid  and  orchid,  single'. 
Speech  is  crude  and  meaning  only  dawns  on  one  after  the  moment  has  passed.  And 
one  is  left  unfulfilled,  for  the  hope  that  grows  in  the  heart  is  not  fed  by  the 
'coming/word'  that  would  or  should  spring  from  the  same  place.  Celan  owes  a  debt  to 
Heidegger's  thought  for  this  reference.  For  the  'coming/word'  is  a  line  that  responds 
to  Heidegger's  metaphysical  adventism,  to  his  'coming  God',  to  his  On  the  Way  to 
24 
Language,  which  can  bring  about  a  Turn.  Celan's  language  is  fragmented  and 
halting.  He  seeks  out  the  thinker  and  is  unsure  of  what  he  finds.  Celan  stands  before 
20  Felstiner:  1995,  p.  247 
21  Phflippe  Lacoue-Labarthe:  1999,  p.  37 
22  phifippe  Lacoue-Labarthe:  1999,  p.  38 
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the  living  person  of  the  Other.  Both  the  thinker  and  the  poet  must  respond  to  the  same 
historical  configuration.  They  are  both  called  to  responsibility.  What  is  interesting  is 
the  figure  of  the  anonymous  'man'  who  is  thoughtfully  listening.  He  is 
undistinguished.  His  technological  vocation  is  driving.  Does  the  poet  suggest  he  is 
most  'with  it'? 
Celan  Is  Thought  on  Poetry  in  the  "Meddian  -' 
One  understanding  of  Art  conceives  of  it  as  something  that  seeks  to  expand 
itsclf;  that  clamours  to  bc  expandcd.  Art  aims  to  cfface  its  differcncc  from  the  things 
and  beings  of  nature.  In  a  way  that  which  is  art's  own,  what  is  'proper'  to  art  (to  the 
Unheimlich),  is  the  tendency  to  mitigate  differentiation,  and  in  so  doing  invade  and 
contaminate  everything.  Or  mediate  everything.  We  recall  aesthetic  formulations  that 
nature  is  only  nature  because  of  art.  Celan  throws  down  a  serious  challenge  to  this 
notion  of  art  and  what  it  implies,  as  can  be  gathered  from  a  close  reading  of  his 
thoughtful  reflection  on  poetry  'Meridian'. 
What  can  we  use  to  bolster  us  against  the  estrangement  implied  in  the 
aforementioned  conception  of  Art?  Celan's  'Meridian'  suggests  a  humble  reply  to  that 
ancient  question  about  art.  What  Celan  will  say  opposes  the  Unheimlich,  the 
estrangement  of  art,  is  under  various  names  the  own  -  the  own-being:  the  'self  or  T, 
even  the  'he'  of  singularity.  We  should  strive  to  protect  the  creature  and  the 
creaturely.  Poetry  should  aim  to  shelter  the  human.  Not  one  man  or  another  -  but  that 
man  there,  here  and  now,  in  the  singular.  This  is  the  drift  of  Celan's  reflections  in 
24  Rudiger  Safransld:  1999,  p.  424 86 
'Meridian  1,25 
. 
The  estrangement  of  humanity  that  occurs  in  and  through  art  occurs 
because  of  language.  We  forget  ourselves  when  we  speak  in  words.  Poetry,  as 
understood  in  Celan's  sense,  is  'every  time'  the  interruption  of  language.  Something 
removed  from,  or  preserved  from  the  realm  of  'art'.  Poetry  is  really  the  suspension  of 
language.  Poetry  occurs  when  a  word  appears  in  the  pure  suspension  of  speech.  T'his 
is  what  Holderlin  means  by  speaking  of  the  caesura  as  'the  pure  word'.  Poetry,  then, 
says  the  human,  it  speaks  of  our  suspension  over  the  abyss.  And  so,  Philippe  Lacoue- 
Labarthe  will  write:  'the  place  of  poetry,  the  place  where  poetry  takes  place,  every 
time,  is  the  place  without  place  of  the  intimate  gaping  -  something  we  must  certainly 
conceive  of  as  the  pure  spacing  which  places  (do  not)  sup-pose  and  which  upholds 
them,  with  no  hold'.  Poetry  then  is  the  proper  abyss  of  art.  It  occurs  in  the  between 
time  of  the  caesura  and  is  always  singular,  unique. 
Celan  writes  in  the  'Meridian':  'Perhaps,  I  must  tell  myself  now  -  perhaps 
even  a  meeting  between  this  "wholly  Other"  -  I'm  using  a  familiar  term  here  -  and  a 
not  all  that  distant,  a  quite  near  "other"  becomes  thinkable  -  thinkable  again  and 
again  26 
. 
As  it  speaks  its  own  name,  or  speaks  in  its  own  individual  cause,  speaks  in 
the  language  of  singularity,  of  an  individuation  that  is  radical,  the  poem  hopes  in  is 
language  to  speak  'in  the  cause  of  the  strange'.  It  will  use  the  language  of 
estrangement.  However,  the  self  -  or  the  singular  I-  reaches  itself  within  itself  only 
via  an  'outside'.  For  the  here  and  now  of  singular  existence  is  immediately  an 
elsewhere  and  another  time  (a  date  whose  memory  must  be  kept).  We  must  substitute 
for  the  topological  division  of  here  and  strange,  near  and  far  -  which  inevitably 
23  Selected  Poems  and  Prose:  200  1,  p.  401  -  413 
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assigns  places  -  the  unlocatable  division  of  difference  or  alterity.  As  Philippe  Lacoue- 
Labarthe  writes:  'In  the  place  (without  place)  of  the  elsewhere,  an  "other"  occurs,  that 
is,  a  singular  existent  in  whose  name  -  and  this  time,  the  expression  is  apt  -  the  poem 
maintains  the  hope  of  speaking.  Estrangement  yields  ground  to  the  encounter'27  . 
However,  as  soon  as  other  occurs  there  is  the  threat  of  an  absolute  alterity,  ab- 
solute,  which  forbids  or  renders  impossible  all  relation.  The  other  is  immediately  the 
wholly  other.  Paradoxically,  the  other  is  unthinkable  without  relation  to  the  same.  As 
0 
soon  as  other  appears,  detaching  itself  from  the  same,  the  same,  in  advance,  has 
already  recovered  it  and  brought  it  back.  It  is  impossible  to  think  a  total  unbinding. 
The  same  is  itself  in  relation  to  the  Other.  Between  the  same  and  the  other 
there  is  necessarily  a  relation.  As  Lacoue-Labarthe  writes:  'in  the  "relating  to",  it  is  by 
definition  the  movement  of  alteration  that  predominates.  Or  if  one  prefers,  difference 
is  always  more  primitive.  So  that  in  the  relation  of  the  same  and  the  other  there  is  an 
imbalance.  This  means  that  it  is  the  alterity  of  the  other,  the  being-wholly-other  of  the 
other  or  a  certain  "duplicity"  in  the  other  that  institutes  the  same  as  a  relation  to  the 
other,  and  thus  always  differentiates  it,  28.  The  wholly  other  de-parts  the  other,  that  is 
approaches  it:  re-lates  it  to  the  same,  which  receives  it  in,  or  rather  as  its  most  intimate 
difference.  So  that  the  wholly  other  is  the  gift  of  the  other  as  the  possibility  of  the 
same,  that  is,  as  the  possibility  for  the  same  of  establishing  itself  as  'differance'.  The 
same  (the  Subject)  does  not  go  outside  the  self  and  pass  into  its  other,  with  a  view  to 
turning  and  relating  back  to  the  self  so  as  to  establish  itself  as  such.  But  under  the 
original  gift  of  the  other  to  which  it  already  always  relates  itself,  the  same  is  the  pure 
27  Philippe  Lacoue-Labarthe:  1999,  p.  59  -  60 
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movement  that  allows  the  'intimate  gaping'  (Lacoue-Labarthe's  phrase)  -  which  is, 
within  the  self,  its  'original  outside  self  (time)-  to  hollow  itself  out,  to  open  and 
spread. 
We  read  Celan's  poem  'Your  Being  Beyond': 
God,  so  we  read,  is 
a  part  and  a  second,  a  scattered  one: 
in  the  death 
of  all  those  mown  down 
he  grows  himself  whole. 
There 
our  looking  leads  us, 
with  this 
h  alf 
we  keep  up  relations. 
29 
And  then  we  have  'On  Either  Hand': 
find  my  way  out. 
0  this  wandering  empty 
hospitable  midst.  Apart, 
29  Selected  Poena:  1990,  p.  161 89 
I  fall  to  you,  you 
fall  to  me,  fallen  away 
from  each  other,  we  see 
through: 
One 
and  the  same 
has 
lost  us,  one 
and  the  same 
has 
forgotten  us,  one 
and  the  same 
has  _  _30 
And  thus  it  would  seem  that  what  Celan  calls  the  encounter  is  thus  first  the 
hollowing  out,  the  intimate  gaping  of  the  singularity.  The  encounter  is  the  original 
intimate  ecstasy  according  to  which  singular  being  exists.  This  is  why  one  can  say  of 
the  poem  that  is  'alone'  that  it  also  takes  place  'in  the  mystery  of  an  encounter. 
To  speak  to  the  other  being  or  thing  -  to  address  him  or  it,  is  to  let  what  speaks 
in  him  or  it  occur,  and  accept  this  word  in  the  very  heart  of  the  poem  (in  its 
immediacy  and  proximity)  as  the  gift  of  the  other.  It  is  to  prepare,  ecstatically,  for  the 
'presence'  of  the  other  within  oneself.  to  allow  this  intimacy  to  open  up.  The  other  de- 
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parts,  and  yet  remains  close  to  us  in  a  manner  such  that  it  makes  the  very  space  an 
intimacy  that  renders  possible  thought  and  word,  that  is,  dialogue.  And  so  Lacoue- 
Labarthe  writes:  'For  this  reason  the  poem  turns  within  itself,  to  the  appearing,  to 
what  is  "in  the  process  of  appearing";  it  questions  the  very  coming  into  presence.  The 
poem  (the  poetic  act),  in  this  mode  proper  to  it  (dialogue),  is  the  thought  of  the 
present's  presence,  or  of  the  other  of  what  is  present:  the  thought  of  no-thingness  (of 
Being),  that  is  to  say,  the  thought  of  time  0  1.  The  experience  of  the  You,  the 
encounter,  opens  onto  nothing  other  than  the  experience  of  Being,  of  the  no-thing  of 
being  -  which  Celan  designates  as  'openness',  'emptiness',  'freedom'. 
The  poetic  act  then  is  always  ecstatic  in  the  original  sense  of  that  tenn  as  a 
stepping  outside  of  oneself.  The  exorbitant  is  the  pure  transcendence  of  being.  The 
poem  is  turned  towards  the  open,  offered  up  to  it.  And  the  open  is  open  to  u-topia,  to 
the  place  without  place  of  the  advent.  The  poetic  act  is  in  Philippe  Lacoue-Labarthe's 
word  'catastrophiC,  32  :  an  upsetting  relation  to  what  is  an  upset,  in  being,  in  the 
direction  of  no-thingness  (the  abyss).  And  so,  after  Heidegger,  there  is  a  challenge  to 
the  art  of  representation.  For  true  poetic  art,  in  these  terms,  is  about  perceiving  rather 
than  re-presenting. 
The  Interlocution  with  Heidegger 
Heidegger  argues  in  On  the  Way  to  Language  that  the  essential  place  of  a 
poct's  poetic  saying  is  a  point  of  convergence  'at  the  tip  of  the  spcar'33  . 
This  place  or 
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point  indicates  the  'highest  and  utmost'  inner  necessity  of  the  saying.  This  extreme 
4; gathering  responds  to  or  converges  with  the  hidden  source  or  origin  of  the  saying 
which  for  Heidegger  is  dislocated  into  the  'unsaid'.  Heidegger  is  insistent  that  the 
wave  of  poetic  saying  as  it  rhythmicafly  surges  forth,  does  not  abandon  the  source,  but 
rather  'lets  all  the  movement  of  the  saying  flow  back  into  the  ever  more  concealed 
origin'.  This  origin  and  gathering  point  concealed  in  the  'unsaid'  becomes  the  locus  of 
the  interlocution  between  the  poet  and  the  thinker.  Heidegger  is  in  search  of  a 
differential  unification.  A  post-metaphysical  moment,  but  a  post-Hegelian  one  that  no 
longer  functions  within  the  closed  economy  of  the  self-unfolding  of  the  Absolute. 
Heidegger  is  in  search  of  a  place  of  unity  but  one  which  within  itself  contains  the 
power  of  transition  and  of  transformation. 
Celan  had  his  own  relationship  with  Holderlin.  It  is  articulated  in  a  poem  from 
a  posthumous  collection. 
I  drink  wine  from  two  glasses 
and  plough  away  on 
the  king's  caesura 
like  that  one 
on  Pindar, 
God  turns  in  his  tuning  fork 
as  one  among  the  least 
of  the  Just, 
the  lottery  drm  spills 92 
our  two  bits. 
34 
Holderlin  had  a  particular  understanding  of  the  poetic  caesura.  It  was 
formulated  on  the  basis  of  his  work  on  Pindar  and  Greek  tragedy.  He  conceived  of  it 
as  a  'counter-rhythmic  interruption'  by  the  'pure  word'  which  at  the  height  of  poetic 
transport,  allows  representation  to  show  itself  as  such,  in  its  law.  The  division  effected 
by  the  caesura  frustrates  both  dialectical  unification  and  decisive  orientation.  For 
Holderlin  this  has  a  cathartic  function.  It  purifies  a  tendency  to  limitless  unification  by 
limitless  separation.  The  gap  created  by  the  caesura  falls  outside  of  the  philosophical 
economy. 
The  division  of  the  caesura  is  intensified  by  Celan's  explicit  negation  of  any 
unified  source  of  poetic  inspiration  -  the  'draught  of  vintage'  of  traceable  provenance. 
Celan  is  caught  between  two  glasses.  He  is  displaced  from  the  Western  classical 
inheritance.  Holderlin's  God  has  given  over  the  'tuning  fork'  to  the  inconspicuous 
small  just  ones  of  Jewish  mysticism.  Poetic  meaning  no  longer  allows  itself  to  be 
collected  at  the  acme  of  convergence  prepared  for  by  the  craftsmanship  of 
Heideggerian  poetizing  and  thinking.  It  falls,  instead,  to  the  dictates  of  chance,  out  of 
the  spinning  drum  that  allots  destiny  -  not  because  of  the  poet's  carelessness  but 
because  the  possibility  of  the  convergence  in  the  'unsaid'  has  become  superseded.  By 
what?  Celan  writes  in  'A  la  pointe  aceree'  of  'unwritten  things'  that  in  the  cataclysms 
of  recent  history  have  'hardened  into  language  35 
. 
The  effect  on  language  is  that  it  is 
no  longer  supple  and  capable  of  the  movement  of  surging  forth  and  recollective 
confluence  so  typical  of  Heideggerian  thought,  let  alone  the  poet's  or  thinker's 
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prescriptive  collecting  of  meaning. 
In  virtue  of  an  historical  upheaval,  the  hidden  things  of  the  earth,  'the  ores 
the  crystalsj  the  geodes',  are  cast  out  and  lie  bare,  'crossways',  shamelessly  exposed 
in  disorder.  Their  exposure  'lay[s]  bare  a  sky'.  This  sky  is  insecure.  It  may  with  the 
turning  of  the  breath  become  an  abyss  before  one's  feet.  For  Celan,  there  is  no 
univocal  reading  either  of  the  symbols  of  history  (the  'killed/chalk  star')  or  of  its 
orientation.  No  saying  or  collecting  can  prepare  for  a  Heideggerian  turning  'from  out 
of  the  abyss'.  We  are  tied  to  reading  nonetheless.  It  traces  its  'spluttering  tracks'  (to 
the  site  of  the  death  camp)  in  the  quiet  of  the  'forest  hour',  and  questions  with  the 
searching  touch  of  'finger  thoughts',  what  is  unrepeatable  36 
. 
There  is  an  embedded  challenge  to  Heidegger  here.  For  Heidegger  the 
disclosive  power  of  poetic  language,  together  with  its  ability  to  open  up  the  dimension 
of  human  dwelling  and  to  give  it  a  layout,  remains  essentially  unaffected  by  history. 
So,  from  the  poets  of  classical  Greece,  to  his  contemporary  Germany,  down  to  our 
own  time,  poets  say  essentially  the  'same'  thing  without  historical  difference. 
However,  for  Celan,  the  point  of  the  metaphorics  of  home,  dwelling,  root,  or  ground  is 
to  describe  the  nature  of  the  self  in  a  disruption  for  which  the  only  oblique  analogue  in 
the  tradition  of  modernity  is  found  in  Holderlin's  late  poetics.  It  stems  ftom.  the 
Shoah's  being  a  systematic  destruction  of  the  resources  and  integrity  of  the  self  as  the 
source  of  poiesis,  the  instilling,  in  the  survivors,  of  'the  shame  of  Being'  and,  for 
poets  like  Celan,  the  useless  residue  of  the  Westem  idea  of  art.  However,  Celan's 
poetry  and  poetics,  one  that  finds  itself  dislocated  to  the  zero  point  of  this  devastation, 
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strives  nevertheless  to  reconfigure  itself  in  response  to  the  urgency  of  another 
mandate. 
We  will  look  more  closely  at  the  poem  'Engfuhrung'.  Celan  composed  this 
poem  between  February  and  May  1958.  Celan's  biographer  argues  that  Celan  wrote 
this  series  of  poems  when  he  thought  his  earlier  poem  'Todesfuge'  was  being 
appropriated  too  readily  and  easily  by  critics  and  readers.  37  He  needed  to  come  up 
with  something  that  would  resist  and  defY  any  appropriation.  This  was  part  of  the 
problem  as  Celan  conceived  of  it,  our  incapacity  to  respect  the  singularity  and 
uniqueness,  the  un-repeatability  of  things.  This  poem  consists  of  nine  sections.  It  is 
inter-linked  by  a  reprise  of  textual  fragments.  It  suggests  the  musical  form  of  the 
stretta.  The  stretta  is  the  third  and  last  part  of  the  structure  of  the  fugue.  Amidst  the 
interlacing  voices  of  the  poem  Celan  creates  a  certain  poetic  'constancy':  what 
Martin  Heidegger  calls  a  sameness  without  identity.  However,  Celan's  plurivocity 
repudiates  the  accord  of  the  'higher  univocity'  Heidegger  discerned  in  Trakl.  The 
effect  of  Celan's  technique  is  to  avoid  discursive  speech,  closure  and  a  focus  on 
textual  function  rather  than  meaning.  And  so  Veronique  Foti  can  write:  Telan's 
38 
poetic  diction  implacably  frustrates  unifying  and  crypto-eschatological.  moves' 
We  come  to  the  first  section  of  'The  Straitening  09  : 
Driven  into  the 
teffain 
with  the  urunistakable  track: 
37  See  Felstiner:  1995,  p.  118  -  119 
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grass,  written  asunder.  The  stone,  white, 
with  the  shadows  of  grassblades: 
Do  not  read  any  more  -  look! 
Do  not  look  any  more  -  go! 
Go,  your  hour 
has  no  sisters,  you  are  - 
are  at  home.  A  wheel,  slow 
rolls  out  of  itself,  the  spokes 
climb, 
climb  on  a  blackish  field,  the  night 
needs  no  stars,  nowhere 
does  anyone  ask  after  you. 
In  this  poem  we  are  deported  into  a  strange  terrain.  John  Felstiner  writes:  'we 
are  led  into  straits  of  language  that  will  constitute  the  reality  to  be  explored 
"Engfuhrung"  displaces  reality  into  a  text,  making  the  poem  into  real  time,  place  and 
event,  40 
.  Through  the  poem  one  is  transported  into  a  landscape  that  is  not  one  in 
which  humans  dwell  but  rather  is  that  of  the  trace.  We  are  in  a  textual  landscape.  The 
first  verse  ends  in  a  colon,  and  opens  on  a  descriptive  specification  of  terrain  and 
trace.  This  blank  terrain  reveals  the  trace  of  'grass,  written  asunder'.  This  grass  has  no 
trace  of  rural  innocence.  Felstiner  argues  that  the  grass  referred  to  is  that  of  the  death- 
camps.  He  notes  such  imagery  in  the  film  Night  and  Fog  that  Celan  had  translated 
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into  Germaný'.  In  being  written  asunder  the  grass  traces  its  shadow  writing  on  the 
white  stones. 
There  is  a  direct  address.  The  implied  'you'  is  singular  and  familiar.  It  is  given 
not  a  promise  but  a  command.  It  must  no  longer  'read'  and  decipher  but  'look'  upon 
what  is  inescapable.  HOWeVer,  it  Must  go  into  the  textual  terrain  that  does  not  allow 
itself  to  be  read.  This  imperative  is  not  the  Holderlin  one  of  go  and  greet  so  as  to 
achieve  recollection  in  a  sisterly  hour.  Rather  the  hour  and  time-space  into  which  it 
drives  the  one  who  is  addressed  is  cut  off  and  unrepeatable.  As  Foti  writes:  'if  what  is 
commanded  to  go  forth  is  (also)  the  poem  (Celan's  poetry  throughout  is  self-reflective 
and  self-problematizing),  the  time-space  of  origin  in  which  it  is  at  home  is  a  point  of 
effacement'42  . 
Celan's  poem  seems  to  be  at  home  in  and  must  go  forth  from  a  destinal  time 
and  space  of  refasal.  The  reference  to  the  hour  has  no  reference  to  the  calendar  and 
the  clock,  to  the  laying  out  of  times  and  seasons,  but  is  instead  rolling  blindly  'out  of 
itself.  As  the  spokes  climb,  revealing  and  inscribing,  they  convey  a  'blackish  field' 
instead  of  a  play  of  light.  The  night  here  has  no  stars  by  which  one  might  find 
orientation.  And  the  poet  or  poem  of  this  destitute  time  is  not  asked  for. 
Nowhere 
does  anyone  ask  after  you  - 
The  place  where  they  lay,  it  has 
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42  Foti:  1992,  p.  86 97 
a  name  -  it  has 
none.  They  did  not  lie  there.  Something 
lay  between  them.  They 
did  not  see  through  it. 
Did  not  see,  no 
spoke  of 
words.  None 
awoke, 
sleep 
came  over  them. 
43 
The  fact  that  the  poem  is  nowhere  asked  for  appears  to  be  linked  to  a  failure  of 
poetic  naming,  an  erasure  of  name  and  place.  By  means  of  the  poem  Celan 
paradoxically  raises  questions  about  the  representational  character  and  the  disclosive 
power  of  language.  Celan  challenges  the  assumed  reciprocity  between  word  and  thing. 
His  poem  suggests  that  those  who  lay  or  did  not  lie  in  a  nameless  place  in  the  textual 
terrain  of  the  trace  experienced  language  as  opacity  rather  than  as  granting  disclosure. 
When  they  spoke  it  was  'of/  words'  only.  Not  one  of  them  awoke  to  the  power  of  the 
logos.  All  that  came  to  them  was  sleep.  Which  shut  them  out  from  any  sort  of 
temporal  ecstasy. 
Came,  came.  Nowhere 
anyone  asks  - 
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it  is  1,1, 
I  lay  between  you,  I  was 
open,  was 
audible,  ticked  at  you,  your  breathing 
obeyed,  it  is 
I  still,  but  then 
you  are  asleep.  44 
Among  the  echoes  of  sleep's  coming  and  of  being  nowhere  asked  for,  another 
coming  announces  itself  with  the  insistence  of  repetition  and  the  directness  of  the  first 
person  singular  and  the  present  tense  -a  coming  whose  essence  is  arrival.  That  which, 
in  its  coming,  reveals  its  openness  and  the  constancy  of  its  Being  is  what  already  'lay 
between  you'.  It  is  unrecognized  but  sustains  temporality  and  interconnection.  Even 
as  they  slept  and  experienced  oblivion  this  ticking  remained  audible.  It  had  an 
awakening  touch.  For  the  breath  of  the  sleepers  responded.  Was  it  their  life  force, 
spirit,  or  speaking?  However,  as  of  now,  the  sleepers  appear  to  be  lifeless,  beyond 
recall,  and  debarred  from  the  opening. 
It  is  I  still  - 
years. 
Years,  years,  a  finger 
feels  down  and  up,  feels 
around: 
seams,  palpable,  here 
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it  is  split  wide  open,  here 
it  grew  together  again  -  who 
covered  it  up?  " 
What  is  the  call  that  asserts  itself  through  years  of  darkness?  It  is  a  call  to 
remembrance.  A  call  to  bear  witness.  The  finger,  in  a  very  personal  and  intimate 
image,  searches  around,  feels  its  own  way  into  the  terrain  of  memory  and  explores  the 
gaping  wound.  Does  it  touch  on  scar  tissue?  We  have  the  sense  of  a  wound  that  has 
been  covered  over  and  covered  up.  The  gesture  appears  to  be  ambiguous.  It  is  both 
compassionate  and  concealing. 
Covered  it 
up  -  who? 
Came,  came. 
Came  a  word,  came, 
came  through  the  night, 
wanted  to  shine,  wanted  to  shine. 
Ash. 
Ash,  ash. 
Night. 
Night-and-night.  -  Go 
to  the  eye,  the  moist  one. 
46 
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What  'cmne'  irrepressibly,  at  last,  was  a  'word'.  A  word  that  dispelled  sleep. 
A  word  that  penetrated  the  darkness.  A  word  that  rendered  manifest  what  the 
searching  finger  discovered  in  the  dark.  Felstiner  writes:  'It  may  be  Christ  the  light 
that  the  Jews  rejected  and  /or  a  language  that  passed  through  darkness  -  these  two 
histories  converge'47  . 
Some  commentators  argue  for  the  central  significance  of  this 
section  of  the  poem.  Seeing  the  sequence  in  the  fonnat  of  4+I+4  we  reach  a  vital 
transition  between  the  two  strophes  of  this  poem.  We  are  at  the  poem's  and  the 
sequence's  exact  centre.  The  word,  which  in  its  coming  sought  to  shine,  is  suffocated 
by  ashes  and  by  night  closing  in  upon  itself,  which  repudiates  all  illumination.  At  its 
nadir  the  poem  has  no  T,  'you',  'they',  or  'we'  but  a  single  word  'Ashes'.  The  poem 
had  set  out  on  a  quest  for  remembrance  and  witness  and  does  not  simply  leave  the 
present  as  it  approached  it.  Rather,  still  following  the  command  to  'look'  and  'go',  it 
now  bears  witness  in  a  new  way,  by  going  to  the  moist  eye,  which,  in  its  weeping,  is 
incapable  of  luminosity  and  panoramic  vision. 
Once  we  have  abandoned  any  notion  of  harmony,  and  accept  that  meaning  has 
withdrawn  itself,  we  witness  how  the  poetic  word  is  released  from  its  task  of 
illumination.  When  it  enters  into  the  depths  of  mourning  it  abandons  the  fiery  element 
of  illumination  and  enters  into  the  dark,  turbulent  waters  of  a  primal  sea.  It  encounters 
storms  and  whirlwinds.  Within  the  poem  the  word  begins  to  disseminate  itself  with  a 
bewildering  prolixity.  And  thus  the  sixth  section  of  this  poem  is  the  longest  and  hence 
we  will  discuss  it  in  two  parts: 
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Gales. 
Gales,  from  the  beginning  of  time, 
whirl  of  particles,  the  other, 
you 
know  it,  though,  we 
read  it  in  the  book,  was 
opinion. 
Was,  was 
opinion.  How 
did  we  touch 
each  other  -  each  other  with 
these 
hands? 
There  was  written  too,  that. 
Where?  We 
put  a  silence  over  it, 
stilled  with  poison,  great, 
a 
green 
silence,  a  sepal,  an 
Go 
to  the  eye, 
the  moist  one  - 102 
idea  of  vegetation  attached  to  it  - 
green,  yes, 
attached,  yes, 
under  a  crafty 
sky. 
Of,  yes, 
vegetation.  48 
What  emerges  from  the  word  as  it  issues  out  of  mourning?  There  is  a  total 
breakdown  of  language  and  its  drive  to  articulacy.  We  are  presented  with  a  textuality 
devoid  of  sense.  Celan  denies  fonn,  and  indirectly  any  Heideggerian  essencing,  the  fit 
order  of  any  cosmos.  Although  Celan  introduces  a  'you'  and  poignantly  addresses 
them,  we  can  speak  of  the  constitution  of  a  new  'we'.  And  so,  the  person  of  the  other 
and  the  possibility  of  communion  with  them  is  severely  problematized. 
The  'we'  of  the  third  strophe  indicates  no  community  but  rather  the  speaker's 
implication  in  a  cultural  work  of  dissembling  and  silencing.  What  this  silencing  and 
concealing  refused  to  recognize  was  the  terror  of  the  nihilistic  vision.  The  'poison- 
stilled'  silencing  calls  to  mind  such  Heideggerian  tropes  as  the  resounding  of  stillness, 
the  stilling  of  pain,  or  the  stilling  of  man's  unprotectedness.  Celan's  thematic  of  the 
cgreen"  and  'plantlike'  allude  possibly  to  the  Heideggerian  interpretation  ofphysis  as 
&W  - 
a  word  for  Being,  for  the  very  happening  of  manifestation,  to  the  mythology  of  soil 
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and  rootedness.  These  are  seen  to  be  compelling  cultural  and  intellectual  constructs. 
The  speaker  does  not  entirely  dissociate  himself  from  them,  but  sees  them  still  as 
forms  of  denial: 
Yes. 
Gales,  whirl  of  part- 
icles,  there  was 
time  left,  time 
to  try  it  out  with  the  stone  -  it 
was  hospitable,  it 
did  not  cut  in.  How 
lucky  we  were: 
Grainy, 
grainy  and  stringy.  Stalky, 
dense; 
gray  and  radiant;  kidneyish, 
flattish  and 
lumpy;  loose,  tang- 
led  -:  he,  it 
did  not  cut  in,  it 
spoke, 
willingly  spoke  to  dry  eyes,  before  closing  them. 
Spoke,  spoke 
Was,  was. 104 
We 
would  not  let  go,  stood 
in  the  midst,  a 
porous  edifice,  and 
it  came. 
Came  at  us,  came 
through  us,  patched 
invisibly,  patched 
away  at  the  last  membrane 
and 
the  world,  a  millicrystal, 
shot  up,  shot  UP. 
49 
Before  the  terrifying  vision  one  realizes  that  the  path  which  leads  to  the  moist 
eye  is  a  path  without  issue.  We  have  time,  the  whirl  rush  and  fissioning  of  particles 
and  the  fissioning  of  language.  The  only  way  left  now  for  the  poetic  word  is  'to  try  it 
out  with  the  stone'.  The  stone  is  not  plantlike.  Its  hardness,  resistance,  and  opacity 
recall  the  earlier  characterization  of  language  in  its  resistance  to  diaphonous 
prescricing  and  the  continual  effort  to  speak  'through'  it,  or'  across'  it. 
The  speaking  which'  leaves  behind  the  moist,  quasi-vegetative  realm  of 
remembrance  and  mourning,  achieves  a  synchronic  crystallization,  a  spatialization 
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and  solidification  of  time  itself,  can  be  interpreted  as  a  Mallarmean  pure  poetry.  This 
stone-speaking,  as  presented  in  the  sixth  strophe,  consists  of  strings  of  adjectives 
which  conjoin  forms  of  both  organic  and  inorganic  nature  without  any  growth 
principle,  narrative  order,  or  other  evidence  of  historicity,  without  the  metaphysical 
subject-predicate  structure,  and  without  subjectivity.  The  erasure  of  subjectivity  is 
indicated  by  the  shift  from  the  gendered  pronoun  er  (referring  to  the  stone)  to  the 
ungrammatical  neuter  pronoun  es  in  the  seventh  verse. 
What  is  the  price  for  continuing  to  speak  and  to  affirm  Being,  of  reconstituting 
the  cosmos  as  a  'thousand-crystal'  out  of  poetic  language?  It  is  a  distancing  from 
ordinary  life  involvements.  The  hospitable  stone  thus  'did  not  interrupt':  no  mourning 
or  metaphysical  anguish  disrupts  the  serenity  of  its  speaking  'to  dry  eyes'  that, 
however,  it  eventually  closes  to  the  concerns  of  the  times.  In  the  seventh  part  of  'The 
Straitening'  Celan  voices  dissatisfaction  with  the  crystalline  purity  and  consummate 
formal  play  of  pure  poetry: 
Shot  up,  shot  up. 
Then  - 
Nights,  dernixed.  Circles, 
green  or  blue,  scarlet 
squares:  the 
world  puts  its  inmost  reserves 
into  the  game  with  the  new 
z  hours.  -  Circles, 106 
red  or  black,  bright 
squares,  no 
flight  shadow, 
no 
measuring  table,  no 
smoke  soul  ascends  orjoins  in.  50 
The  emphatic  'then'  in  the  reprise  of  the  seventh  section  allows  the  crystalline 
world  to  appear  that  has,  per  impossibile,  separated  out  the  very  darkness  into  a  prism 
of  spectral  colours.  The  world  which  crystallized  and  displays  its  consummate  formal 
structure  now  'pledges  its  inmost'  in  play  with  the  'new  hours'.  The  form  of  the  poem 
is  dependent  on  shifting  constantly  the  balance  between  sense  and  sound.  This  poetry 
aims  to  restore  the  ordinary  word  back  to  its  power  for  naming.  Is  this  the  power  that 
releases  the  'new  hours'  (hours  no  longer  'without  sisters),  and  thus  initiate  a  new 
temporal  order? 
What  this  crystalline  cosmos  excludes,  however,  is  shadow  and  smoke,  as  well 
as  any  possibility  of  meaningful  human  encounter.  The  absence  of  a  flighty  shadow 
brings  home  the  ghostly  insubstantiality  of  this  poetic  'mobile'  of  geometric  simples 
and  pure  colours  (and  does  so  in  paradox,  since  shadow  itself  is  insubstantial),  but  it 
also  sets  off  the  importance  of  shadow-writing  and  tracc-writing  in  the  constitution  of 
the  poetic  text.  The  plane  table  allows  for  the  charting  of  the  meridians  of 
interconnection.  There  is  the  obvious  reference  to  the  crematoria,  but  also  perhaps  to 
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ExOdus  17.21-22,  and  again  to  certain  Heraclitean  fragments  (137,  B98)  concerning 
the  need  of  the  psyche  to  orient  itself  by  smell  in  a  smoke-world  where  vision  fails.  It 
is  clear  that  shadow  and  smoke  are  not  to  displace  the  lucid  articulation  of  the  world 
constituted  out  of  language,  but  to  takepart  in  it,  to  'play  along'. 
Ascends  or 
joins  in  - 
At  owl's  flight,  near 
the  petrified  scabs, 
near 
our  fled  hands,  in 
the  latest  rejection, 
above 
the  rifle-range  near 
the  buried  wall: 
visible,  once 
more:  the 
grooves,  the 
choirs  at  that  time,  the 
psalms.  Ho,  ho- 
sanna. 
So 108 
there  are  temples  yet.  A 
star 
probably  still  has  light. 
Nothing, 
nothing  is  lost. 
Ho- 
II  sanna. 
At  owl's  flight,  here, 
I' 
the  conversations,  day-grey, 
of  the  water-level  traces.  51 
As  the  smoke-soul  mounts  and  plays  along,  one  finds  oneself  returned  to  the 
terrain  of  the  trace  in  the  twilight  hour  of  the  owls'  (not  the  gods)  fleeing  and  flight. 
Fled  also  are  'our  hands'  (with  which  'we/  grasped  each  other');  and  the  crystal  world 
has  become  the  mineral  realm  of  a  petrified  leprosy/outcasting.  What  becomes  visible 
in  and  by  the  place/time  of  outcasting,  however,  is  'above'  the  butts  for  target  practice 
on  the  buried  wall,  surmounting  the  closure  of  the  death  camp.  Resnais'  Night  and 
Fog  showed  the  yard  of  Block  Eleven  at  Auschwitz  with  its  infamous  black  wall 
'shielded  against  the  ricochet  of  bullets'52.  The  naffow  channels  that  show  themselves 
anew  are  opened  by  'the/  choirs  at  that  time',  the  intoning  of  psalms,  the  stammering 
response  to  the  brutal  'ho,  ho'  as  'ho-siannah',  a  cry  for  divine  salvation  and  mercy. 
411110sanna"  shouts  welcome  and  praise,  like  the  glorious  Osanna  in  excelsis  in  Bach's 
51  Selected  Poem:  1990,  p.  147 
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B  Minor  Mass.  But  in  Psalms,  the  Hebrew  term  means  'Save  [us]  pleasel'  (118:  25). 
Celan's  'Ho,  ho-/  sanna'  reduces  to  a  stammer  or  derisive  laughter,  with  echoes  of  the 
German  marching  song  'For  we  are  Hitler's  brown-clad  host  -  Huzza,  ho-ho!  ' 
What  is  interesting  is  that  neither  the  poisoned  silencing  nor  the  terrifying 
nihilistic  vision  is  reinstated.  If,  then,  perhaps  temples  still  stand  or  a  (one)  star  still 
has  light  -  if  in  this  sense  'nothing  is  lost'  -  this  suffices  for  the  repudiation  of 
nothingness,  of  nihilistic  negation.  Celan,  however,  is  not  voicing  any  simplistic 
acquiesence  and  hope.  It  is,  after  all,  the  frail  word  of  the  deported,  condemned,  and 
dying  -  the  word  spoken  in  extremity  as  prayer  and  cry,  seeking  an  Other  -  which 
etched  open  the  channels  without,  for  all  that,  accomplishing  any  Heideggerian 
instituting  and  founding.  This  power  of  the  word,  at  once  slight  and  awesome,  is 
preserved  by  a  poetizing  that  insists  on  being  'here',  whose  highest  lucidity  is  the 
iffecusable  'gray'  of  the  day,  and  which  does  not  take  part  in  any  exalted  and 
prophetic  interlocution  but  rather  in  a  conversation  of  traces,  of  remembrance  and 
witness  -  the  traces,  nevertheless,  of  what  is  life-sustaining. 
(--  day-grey, 
of 
the  water-level  traces  - 
Driven  into  the 
teffain 
with 
the  umnistakable 
track: 110 
1  Grass. 
Grass. 
written  asunder. 
)53 
This  last  section,  entirely  in  parentheses,  is  itself  a  reprise  of  the  opening  -a 
repetition  that  cannot  close  the  circle  but  instead  subjects  the  opening  verses  to  greater 
fragmentation  and  attrition.  It  serves  to  call  into  question  the  achievement  of  the 
whole  straitening  duction  traced  in  and  as  the  poem.  This  calling  into  question  does 
not  come  about  through  any  correction  as  to  form,  content,  or  vision,  but  through  the 
halting  reiteration  of  the  situational  detenninates,  resulting  in  a  retracing  of  the  trace 
which  resists  all  appropriation.  In  many  ways  'The  Straitening'  responds  to  Rilke's 
tenth  Duino  elegy,  which  'sings  jubilance  and  praise'  and  traffics  with  'the  endlessly 
dead',  especially  'the  Mothers'.  Celan's  elegy  has  none  of  the  Orphean  power  so 
characteristic  of  Rilke.  Much  has  happened  in-between. 
The  duction  led  first  from  a  time/space  of  refusal  and  from  the  need  to  cast  a 
counter-light  on  the  linguistic  basis  of  memory  and  myth,  from  which  the  self  of 
atrocity  was  fonned,  to  the  fissioning  disarticulation,  of  language  and  to  the  brink  of 
nihilism.  From  this  failure  of  any  coherence  there  was  a  move  toward  pure  formal 
creation,  the  re-creation  of  the  cosmos  out  of  language  that  avoids  any  rhetoric  of 
tradition,  prophecy,  nature  or  renewal  as  modalities  of  a  'poisoned  silencing'.  As  Foti 
writes:  Telan  continues,  as  he  notes  in  conversation  in  1966,  to  seek  to  present 
"excerpts  of  a  spectrum-analysis  of  things",  showing  them  in  the  multiplicity  of  their 
53  Selected  Poena:  1990,  p.  149 III 
aspects,  showing  also  how  one  facet  veers  to  release  another,  in  quasi-dialectical 
permutation.  However  this  formal  play,  this  poetic  mathematics,  must  be  restored  to 
the  obscure  terrain  of  the  trace;  geometry  of  itself  (even  in  its  Platonic  version)  is  not 
ethical.  It  must  respond  to  the  height  and  the  daring  of  the  word  of  those  who  in  their 
extremity,  transmuted  the  very  language  of  brutalization  into  one  of  prayer  and 
invocation'54  .  In  the  hearing  of  their  word  (,  they,  -  as  Celan  himself  indicated  in  his 
late  poetry  -  are  not  limited  to  the  victims  of  the  Holocaust),  Heidegger's  position, 
that  the  destitution  of  the  age  remains  withheld  and  has  not,  as  such,  come  to 
experience  and  language,  is  untenable.  And  so,  by  this  means,  we  have  an  ethical 
corrective  to  Heidegger's  philosophical  position.  In  utmost  abandomment  and  through 
the  matrix  of  language  there  arises  the  mandate  of  extending  oneself  toward  the  Other, 
d  studying'  the  Other  in  his  or  her  otherness. 
John  Felstiner  has  written  about  'The  Straitening':  'by  far  Celan's  most 
demanding  poem,  [it]  came  just  after  the  Bremen  speech,  which  ends  with  the  poet 
"stricken  by  and  seeking  reality".  He  told  an  interviewer  in  Bremen:  "In  my  first  book 
was  still  transfiguring  things  -  I'll  never  do  that  again!  "  "Engfuhrung"  reconceives 
the  manner  and  matter  of  "Todesfuge",  going  beyond  the  pathos  of  black  milk, 
exploring  memory  itself  as  a  dimension  of  the  original  trauma.  The  poem's  close 
melds  into  its  opening,  the  way  memory  almost  coincides  with  reality.  And  there  is 
something  else  here,  easy  to  miss.  Not  only  does  an  asterisk  come  after  each  section, 
but  there  is  also  an  asterisk  between  the  title  and  the  first  line  -a  mark  devoid  of 
purpose  unless  we  are  to  link  "Stretto's"  [Felstiner's  translation  of  Celan's  title]  last 
line  to  its  first  and  set  out  again,  da  capo.  Repeat  this  to  the  six-millionth  degree,  and 
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"Nothing  is  losf'.  '55 
A  Summary: 
Our  questioning  must  return  to  the  break  between  this  'spiritual'  poetics  and 
that  of  Heidegger.  For  Heidegger,  a  major  poet's  poetic  saying  remains  obedient  to  its 
own  'highest  and  utmost'  inner  necessity  -  an  essential  necessity  to  which  thinking 
responds.  What  reason  does  Heidegger  offer  for  the  necessity  of  approaching  the 
&unsaid'  and  why  might  there  be  a  necessary  interlocution  between  the  poet  and 
thinker?  Something  of  Heidegger's  thinking  on  this  can  be  grasped  by  Robert 
Bernasconi's  comments  concerning  the  'experience  with  language'  that  Heidegger 
seeks  to  make  possible  in  his  meditation  on  George's  poem  Tas  Wort': 
The  experience  of  the  nothing  [which  'points  to  Being']  arises  in  the  anxiety  in 
which  we  are  deprived  of  speech.  Nothing  is  not  a  word  for  Being  ... 
The 
nothing  corresponds  to  the  thinker's  experience  of  the  lack  of  a  word  for 
Being.  This  speechlessness,  this  breaking  of  the  sequence  of  words  for  Being, 
comes  to  be  understood  historically  as  marking  the  end  of  the  succession  of 
words  for  Being  within  metaphysics.  56 
An  essential  culmination  and  transformation  is  thus  announced  in  what  has 
failed  to  ever  come  to  language  but  has  betrayed  itself  through  the  rupture,  the 
caesura.  One  of  the  circumlocutions  through  which  Heidegger  approaches  this 
essential  unsaid  is  'the  word  for  the  word'.  The  word  ('saying')  lacks  Being;  it  is  not  a 
being  to  which  a  word  can  be  affixed,  and  hence  it  is  not  its  essence  as  Being  which 
has  been  withheld.  The  word  is  a  marker  of  Difference,  of  the  donation  of  Being  out 
of  emptiness;  it  brings  to  pass  the  es  gibt,  which,  as  Heidegger  is  careful  to  note,  is 
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divested  of  'the  whole  spook  about  the  it  (es)  957 
. 
Since,  on  Heidegger's  understanding,  language  or  'saying'  alone  can 
accomplish  the  donation  of  Being,  of  the  Open,  and  can  also,  in  its  very  breakage  and 
failure,  let  this  donation  appear  as  such,  poetizing  and  thinking,  as  privileged  fonns  of 
saying,  stand  in  proximity.  The  challenge  presented  to  the  thinker  by  rupture  or  by  the 
caesura  is,  then,  as  Heidegger  understands  it,  the  task  of  differential  or  polemic 
unification  -  be  it  of  art  and  the  technical,  of  Earth  and  World,  of  poetizing  and 
thinking,  or  of  the  unconsummated  past  with  the  withheld  promise  of  the  future.  This 
avoidance  of  ellipsis  by  differential  integration  is,  for  him,  the  properly  spiritual  task. 
However,  Celan's  own  prominent  thematization  of  rupture,  of  the  possible 
tasks  which  remain  for  poetizing  and  thinking,  and  even  of  the  spiritual,  is  at  odds 
with  Heidegger's.  Celan's  work  does  not  offer  the  thinker  points  of  engagement  on 
his  own  terms.  As  Foti  writes:  'For  Celan,  the  rupture  that  defines  the  contemporary 
situation  is  not  essential  but  historical  in  provenance.  It  subjects  the  intellectual  and 
cultural  constructs  of  the  Western  tradition,  in  which,  of  course,  poetizing  and 
thinking  remain  implicated,  to  what  might  be  called  a  hermeneutics  of  suspicion.  It 
refuses,  furthermore,  to  leave  language  inviolate,  for  the  word  which  bestows  Being 
can  veer  almost  imperceptibly  to  bestow  devastation.  Poet  and  thinker  are  dislodged 
from  their  normative  preeminence;  for  this  preeminence  has  not  been  ethical"". 
What  can  we  expect  from  the  poet?  We  do  not  expect  a  wandering  step  and  a 
word  which  defines  a  trail  of  transition  from  out  of  the  darkness.  Rather,  we  are  given 
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the  'finger-thoughts'  that  explore  the  terrain  of  the  trace  to  bear  witness,  to  persevere 
in  remembrance,  and  to  respond  to  the  creative  word  of  those  who  dared  to  name  what 
Heidegger  might  call  the  god(s)  or  the  holy  in  the  situation  of  desolation.  Through  the 
screen  and  crystalline  matrix  of  language  Celan's  poetry  seeks  to  extend  itself  to  the 
otherness  of  the  Other,  while  repudiating  'all  oracles'  and  any  essential  unification. 
Violence  and  Poetryfrom  Northern  Ireland: 
We  will  now  place  some  of  the  above  reflections  within  a  contemporary 
context  in  order  to  illustrate  their  possible  relevance.  We  will  look  closely  at  a  poem 
of  Seamus  Heaney's  from  his  1979  volume  Field  Work.  It  is  called  'The Toome 
Roýd'.  It  begins: 
One  morning  early  I  met  armoured  cars 
in  convoy,  warbling  along  on  powerful  tyres, 
all  camouflaged  with  broken  alder  branches, 
and  headphoned  soldiers  standing  up  in  turrets.  59 
Here  there  is  a  presentation  of  the  visible  consequences  of  violence  with  the  presence 
of  an  alien  force  upon  the  known  landscape.  The  poem  dwells  upon  the  details  of  the 
instrusion  so  that  the  intrusive  dimension  is  exactly  what  stands  out.  The  poet  asks: 
'How  long  were  they  approaching  down  my  roads  /  As  if  they  owned  them?  '  The 
voice  behind  this  question  suggests  a  fixity,  a  rootedness  within  its  naffative  voice  and 
location  that  stands  against  the  observed,  intruding  force.  The  poet  enumerates  a  list 
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of  solid  possessions  that  suggest  intimate  local  knowledge: 
I  had  rights-of-way,  fields,  cattle  in  my  keeping, 
tractors  hitched  to  buckrakes  in  open  sheds, 
silos,  chill  gates,  wet  slates,  the  greens  and  reds 
of  outhouse  roofs. 
Given  the  poet's  emphasis  upon  the  local  and  familiar  we  are  struck  by  the  poem's 
ending.  The  poet  refers  to  'the  invisible,  untoppled  omphalos'.  We  note  this 
significant  poetic  turn,  this  strange  Greek  word,  omphalos,  which  brings  a  note  of 
otherness  again,  and  is  set  against  the  local  and  the  intrusive  alien  suggested  by  the 
armoured  car.  What  the  poem  stages  is  an  assertion  of  possession  and  permanence, 
through  which  the  individuality,  the  specific  nature  of  the  omphalos  stands  as  a 
moment  of  resistance  against  all  narratives  of  usurpation.  The  ancient  associations  of 
the  word  omphalos  suggest  a  pennanence  beyond  the  cuffent  conflict,  yet  it  is 
precisely  located  within  it.  So  we  have  an  excellent  movement  between  the  specific 
and  the  general,  with  the  word  omphalos  carrying  the  burden  successfully  of  both 
poetic  demands-60 
60  For  a  more  detailed  discussion  of  this  issue  within  contemporary  Northern  Irish  poetry  see  Peter 
MacDonald's  Mistaken  Identities:  Poehy  and  Northern  Ireland-.  Clarendon  Press:  Oxford:  1997,  p.  58 
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Chapter  Three: 
Through  the  Eye  of  the  Shoah: 
The  Shibboleth  in  Paul  Celan 
and  Seamus,  Heaney 
Shibboleth 
One  didn't  know  the  name  of  Tarzan's  monkey. 
Another  couldn't  strip  the  cellophane 
From  a  GI's  pack  of  cigarettes. 
By  such  minutiae  were  the  infiltrators  detected. 
By  the  second  week  of  battle 
We'd  become  obsessed  with  trivia. 
At  a  sentry  point,  at  midnight,  in  the  rain, 
An  ignorance  of  baseball  could  be  lethal. 
The  morning  of  the  first  snowfall,  I  was  shaving, 
Staring  into  a  miffor  nailed  to  a  tree, 
Intoning  the  Christian  names  of  the  Andrews  Sisters. 
'Maxine,  Laverne,  Patty'. 
Michael  Donaghy 
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Contemporary  New  York  poet  Michael  Donaghy,  now  living  in  London, 
although  hailing  originally  from  an  Irish-American  cultural  background  is  well  placed 
to  explore  and  examine  the  nature  of  c'ultural  belonging,  and  its  opposite,  exclusion. 
'Shibboleth'  with  its  biblical  title  from  his  collection  of  the  same  name  explores  in  a 
situation  of  life  and  death  how  discrimination  operates  in  separating  out  an  'in'  group 
from  an  'out'  group.  The  poem  suggests  how  this  can  occur  at  various  levels  of 
culture.  As  his  poem  presents  the  scene  the  group  excluded  by  the  empowered  group 
did  not  know  the  name  of  Tarzan's  monkey;  a  shallow  cultural  signifier  indeed,  but 
enough  to  define  one  as  not  a  member  of  twentieth-century  popular  American  culture. 
This  example  illustrates  how  what  one  knows,  one's  inside  knowledge  expressed  in 
the  language  of  a  culture,  communicates  your  familiarity  with  its  dimensions,  or  not. 
Then  there  is  the  secondary  language  of  the  body;  one's  way  of  acting  or  carrying 
oneself  Donaghy  conveys  this  in  his  poem  through  the  action  of  opening  a  packet  of 
cigarettes  in  a  certain  way.  This  might  be  enough  to  give  the  game  away,  and  signify 
onets  outsider  status. 
Again,  something  as  culturally  specific  as  baseball,  and  a  knowledge  of  its 
rules,  players  and  history  can  operate  as  a  magical  horizon,  or  a  barrier,  as  a  border 
crossing  even,  signifying  who  the  initiated  are,  as  opposed  to  the  alien,  the  strange, 
the  foreign  and  those  who  stand  outside.  Something  of  the  anxiety  that  lies  at  the  base 
of  this  need  to  define  oneself  as  belonging  on  the  inside  is  communicated  in  the  final 
verse.  The  poem's  first  two  verses  present  the  actions  of  the  empowered  group.  In  the 
final  verse  we  meet  for  the  first  time  the  voice  of  the  solitary  narrator.  He  is  anxiously 
rehearsing  his  knowledge  of  popular  culture  in  order  to  be  at  the  ready  when  he  is 
tested.  By  this  means  the  author  subtly  suggests  that  it  may  not  be  too  long  before  the 118 
group  makes  a  mistake,  or  turns  on  one  of  its  own  members.  How  long  will  it  be 
before  we  are  all  subject  to  a  scrutiny  that  may  prove  fatal? 
The  thematic  of  the  shibboleth  in  contemporary  poetry  receives  its  impetus 
from  the  corpus  bequeathed  to  us  by  the  life  and  writing  of  one  Paul  Celan  through 
poems  like  'Shibboleth'  and  others.  One  of  the  best  commentators  on  the  significance 
of  the  shibboleth  in  Paul  Celan's  body  of  work  has  been  French  writer,  thinker  and 
2 
philosopher  Jacques  Derrida  in  his  major  essay  entitled  'Shibbolethfor  Paul  Celan' 
. 
Before  we  move  on  to  an  extended  analysis  of  Derrida's  essay  we  will  look  at  one 
example  of  a  shibboleth  from  the  poetry  of  Seamus  Heaney.  The  poem  is  the  first 
from  a  sequence  Heaney  published  in  North  (1975)  called  'Singing  School'.  The  title 
of  the  specific  poem,  the  first  in  the  sequence,  is  'The  Ministry  of  Fear'.  It  is 
dedicated  to  fellow  poet,  critic  and  old  school  friend  Seamus  Deane. 
The  Ministty  of  Fear 
for  Seamus  Deane 
Well,  as  Kavanagh  said,  we  have  lived 
In  important  places.  The  lonely  scarp 
Of  St.  Columb's  College,  where  I  billeted 
For  six  years  overlooked  your  Bogside. 
I  gazed  into  new  worlds:  the  inflamed  throat 
Of  Brandywell,  its  floodlit  dogtrack, 
The  throttle  of  the  hare.  In  the  first  week 
2  Jacques  Derrida:  'Shibbolethfor  Paul  Celan,  Trans.  by  Joshua  Willner,  Word  Traces:  Readings  of 
paul  Celan:  (ed.  )  Aris  Fioretos,  John  Hopkins  Univ.  Press:  Baltimore:  1994,  p.  3-  72 119 
I  was  so  homesick  I  couldn't  even  eat 
The  biscuits  left  to  sweeten  my  exile. 
I  threw  them  over  the  fence  one  night 
In  September  1951 
When  the  lights  of  houses  in  the  Lecky  Road 
Were  amber  in  the  fog.  It  was  an  act 
Of  stealth. 
Then  Belfast,  and  then  Berkeley. 
Here's  two  on's  are  sophisticated, 
Dabbling  in  verses  till  they  have  become 
A  life:  from  bulky  envelopes  arriving 
in  vacation  time  to  slim  volumes 
Despatched  'with  the  author's  compliments'. 
Those  poems  in  longhand,  ripped  from  the  wire  spine 
Of  your  exercise  book,  bewildered  me  - 
Vowels  and  ideas  bandied  free 
As  the  seed-pods  blowing  off  our  sycamores. 
I  tried  to  write  about  the  sycamores 
And  innovated  a  South  Derry  rhyme 
With  hushed  and  lulled  full  chimes  forpushed  andpulled. 
Those  hobnailed  boots  from  beyond  the  mountain 
Were  walking,  by  God,  all  over  the  fine 
Lawns  of  elocution. 
Have  our  accents 
Changed?  'Catholics,  in  general,  don't  speak 120 
As  well  as  students  from  the  Protestant  schools'. 
Remember  that  stuM  Inferiority 
Complexes,  stuff  that  dreams  were  made  on. 
'What's  your  narne,  Heaney?  ' 
, 6TJ,  a 
Ileaney,  Father.  ' 
'Fair 
Enough.  ' 
On  my  first  day,  the  leather  strap 
Went  epileptic  in  the  Big  Study, 
Its  echoes  plashing  over  our  bowed  heads, 
But  I  still  wrote  home  that  a  boarder's  life 
Was  not  so  bad,  shying  as  usual. 
On  long  vacations,  then,  I  came  to  life 
In  the  kissing  seat  of  an  Austin  Sixteen 
Parked  at  a  gable,  the  engine  running, 
My  fingers  tight  as  ivy  on  her  shoulders, 
A  light  left  burning  for  her  in  the  kitchen. 
And  heading  back  for  home,  the  summer's 
Freedom  dwindling  night  by  night,  the  air 
All  moonlight  and  a  scent  of  hay,  policemen 
Swung  their  crimson  flashlamps,  crowding  round 
The  car  like  black  cattle,  snuffing  and  pointing 
The  muzzle  of  a  sten-gun  in  my  eye: 
'What's  your  name,  driverT 
'Seamus...  ' 121 
Seamus? 
They  once  read  my  letters  at  a  roadblock 
And  shone  their  torches  on  your  hieroglyphics, 
'Svelte  dictions'  in  a  very  florid  hand. 
Ulster  was  British,  but  with  no  rights  on 
The  English  lyric:  all  around  us,  though 
We  hadn't  named  it,  the  ministry  of  fear.  3 
Seamus  Heaney 
Though  they  haven't  named  it,  symbolic  for  their  not  having  grasped  its 
violent  essence,  the  young  Heaney  and  Deane  are  being  initiated  into  the  mores  of 
their  community.  They  are  being  sent  to  school  to  learn  the  language  of  a  society.  In 
this  school  they  must  behave  and  study  hard,  or  pay  the  price  for  it.  Sometimes 
violence  is  meted  out  regardless  of  its  having  been  deserved  or  not.  There  are  at  least 
two  violent  dimensions  to  the  community  that  Heaney  and  Deane  are  being  schooled 
in.  There  is  the  violence  of  the  religious  education  they  both  received.  It  is  an  almost 
military  regime.  The  author  uses  the  term  'billeted'.  There  is  the  beating  in  the  Big 
Study.  There  is  also  an  implicit  suggestion  of  the  driving  underground  by  the  religious 
authorities  of  the  natural  expression  of  sexual  urge.  The  illicit  nature  of  sexuality 
makes  Heaney's  intimacy  in  the  Austin  Sixteen  an  'act  of  stealth'  also.  And  then  there 
is  the  violence  of  the  state.  Its  representatives  man  sentry  posts  with  sten-guns. 
Violence  is  endemic.  This  is  suggested  by  the  throttling  of  the  hare  at  the  dog-track; 
its  blood-letting  is  part  of  an  animal  nature. 
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What  is  almost  as  striking  is  the  linguistic  dimension  to  the  schooling  process. 
How  Heaney  emphasizes  in  the  poem  the  vital  role  language  played  in  defining  arenas 
of  conflict,  of  belonging  and  struggle  within  the  domain  of  culture.  His  'hobnailed 
boots'  are  a  symbol  for  his  fanning  background.  The  boots  symbolize  what  is  rough 
and  ready,  and  thereby  lacking  the  refinement  of  the  town,  city  and  attendant  notions 
of  importance  and  supremacy.  He  is  from  'beyond  the  mountain,  a  potent  signifier  of 
his  stranger  status,  his  outsiderness.  He  is  outside  the  pale.  This  mountain  contrasts 
with  the  'fine  lawns  of  elocution'.  This  is  a  poient  image  for  the  cultivation  required 
of  civilization.  it  suggests  a  site  where  everything  has  its  place  and  is  tamed. 
Social  division  is  signified  through  the  language  and  speech  of  the  individuals 
and  their  respective  communities.  Heaney  hints  at  the  social  snobbery  that  saw 
Protestants  looking  down  snootily  upon  their  less  well-spoken  Catholic  neighbours. 
He  uses  direct  speech,  and  this  is  appropriate  given  that  the  focus  is  upon  speech  and 
language  and  how  they  signify  social  division  and  sustain  them.  This  is  picked  up  on 
two  fronts.  The  priests  in  the  school  are  happy  with  the  fact  that  his  name  is  Heaney, 
for  this  signifies  good  Catholic  stock  to  them.  The  reverse  is  explored  when  he  is 
confronted  by  the  soldiers  at  the  road  block.  The  name  'Seamus'  is  a  potent 
shibboleth,  now  defining  him  as  an  enemy  in  their  eyes,  for  it  signifies  papist, 
republican,  foreignness  and  strangeness,,  a  fact  emphasized  by  Heaney's  italicizing 
their  pronouncing  of  'Seamus'  at  the  frontier.  It  is  the  Gaelic  term  or  translation  for 
the  English  'James'.  What  is  interesting  to  note  is  the  author's  setting  of  this  incident. 
Just  prior  to  the  confrontation  we  are  in  an  almost  idyllic  pastoral  setting.  There  is  a 
description  of  a  quiet  late  summerýs  evening  with  Heaney  returning  home  after 
meeting  his  lover.  One  feels  that  the  intrusive  action  of  the  state's  forces  is  all  the 123 
more  potent  for  this.  There  is  then  a  strong  contrast  drawn  between  the  world  of 
nature  and  the  world  of  culture. 
There  is  an  irony  in  the  description  of  the  soldier's  being  unable  to  read  the 
poem's  Deane  sent  to  Heaney,  for  to  this  soldier  they  are  'hieroglyphics'.  They  define 
a  linguistic  community  once  again,  in  that  an  arena  of  belonging  shared  between 
Heaney  and  Deane  is  determined  over  and  against  that  of  the  soldier.  The  irony  in  this 
is  one  that  the  poet  is  not  slow  to  draw  out,  which  is  that  the  language  Heaney  and 
Deane  are  using  has  been  taught  to  them  by  the  occupier.  Ulster  might  be  British  but 
some  in  her  territories  have  invaded  her  language  and  made  it  their  own  in  an  act  of 
subversion  within  the  paradigm  of  the  dominant  force. 
Derrida  begins  his  essay  Shibbolethfor  Paul  Celan  by  emphasizing  the 
uniqueness  of  circumcision.  It  is  something  that  can  only  happen  once.  Through  this 
means  Derrida  sounds  the  note  that  conveys  his  preoccupation  in  this  essay  with  the 
nature  of  singularity,  the  unique  and  the  unrepeatable.  He  will  examine  the  anti- 
Semitism.  that  emerged  before  the  Second  World  War  that  resulted  in  the  deaths  of 
many,  as  well  as,  specifically,  the  death  of  German-speaking  poet  Paul  Celan's 
parents.  Particularly  Derrida  will  concern  himself  with  the  resistance  to  that  war.  This 
will  force  him  into  a  consideration  of  boundaries,  for  the  last  world  war  challenged 
many  boundaries  and  sought  to  impose  others.  In  the  light  of  recent  history  and 
atrocity  Derrida  is  forced  to  contemplate  lines  of  demarcation  and  discrimination.  He 
is  interested  in  passports  and  passwords.  By  this  means  he  will  begin  to  approach  the 
Shibboleth.  Language  itself  possesses  shibboleths,  hidden  codes  that  allow  us 
passageway.  Through  language  we  belong,  or  do  not.  For  as  soon  as  we  speak  we 124 
utter  what  is  common.  When  we  learn  to  talk  we  have  access  to  a  community  and  the 
language  that  it  speaks. 
The  Origin  of  the  Shibboleth 
Jacques  Derrida  in  his  essay  'Shibbolethfor  Paul  Celan'  will  consider  first  the 
calendar  date,  for  example  the  13'h  of  February.  In  its  outward  appearance  it  appears 
to  be  distinct  from  the  actual  writing  of  a  poem.  It  has  a  metonymic  character, 
designating  part  of  an  event  or  a  sequence  of  events  by  way  of  recalling  the  whole. 
When  we  speak  of  the  13thof  February  we  are  referring  to  a  part  of  what  happened  on 
that  day,  a  part  though  that  stands  for  the  whole  in  a  given  context. 
An  example  is  given  from  Celan's  poem  'In  One'.  The  opening  line  of  this 
poem  is  'Thirteenth  of  February'.  The  'in  one',  'all  at  once',  several  times  at  once,  all 
seem  to  constellate  in  the  uniqueness  of  this  date.  However  in  being  all  alone,  the  only 
one,  is  this  date  one?  Is  there  more  than  one  thirteenth  of  February?  For,  the  thirteenth 
of  February  recurs  every  year,  becoming  thereby,  each  year,  its  very  own  revenant. 
Could  it  be  also  that  there  is  a  multiplicity  of  events,  dispersed  at  different  periods,  in 
foreign  idioms,  that  conjoin  at  the  heart  of  the  same  anniversary? 
IN  ONE 
Thirteenth  of  February.  Shibboleth 
Roused  in  the  heart's  mouth.  With  you, 
peuple 125 
de  Paris.  No  pasaran.  4 
Derrida  considers  the  opening  of  this  poem  to  be  ciphered.  Thirteen  we  know 
has  an  idiomatic  reference  to  fate  or  chance:  what  falls  -  for  good  or  for  ill  -  together. 
The  poem  announces  the  desire  to  con-sign  and  co-sign  a  multiple  singularity.  The 
title  moves  into  the  date  of  its  first  line.  All  this  is  incorporated  into  the  poem.  They 
give  access  to  the  poem  that  they  are,  although  it  is  a  ciphered  access. 
There  is  a  sense  in  which  all  of  Paul  Celan's  poetry  is  untranslatable.  This 
becomes  apparent  as  soon  as  we  consider  the  aporia  in  Celan.  An  aporia.  is  a  barred 
passage.  It  is  suggested  in  this  poem  through  the  phrase  'No  Pasaran'.  Quite  quickly 
Celan  confronts  us  by  means  of  this  poem  with  four  languages.  In  a  single  poem,  all 
at  once,  these  four  languages  move  like  a  series  of  proper  names  or  signatures,  or  even 
like  the  face  of  a  seal. 
The  title,  the  date  and  the  first  line  are  in  Gennan.  The  second  line  confronts 
us  with  a  second  language,  the  apparently  Hebrew  word,  one  that  arises  in  the  'heart's 
mouth':  shibboleth. 
This  second  language  could  well  be  a  first  language,  the  language  of  the 
morning,  the  language  of  origin  speaking  from  and  of  the  heart.  The  word  Shibboleth 
is  found  in  a  whole  family  of  languages:  Phoenician,  Judeo-Aramaic,  Syriac.  It  has  a 
multiplicity  of  meanings  by  which  it  is  traversed:  river,  stream,  ear  of  grain,  olive- 
twig.  Beyond  all  these  meanings  however  it  has  acquired  the  value  of  a  password.  It 
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was  used  during  and  after  war  at  the  crossing  of  a  border  under  watch.  The  meaning 
of  the  word  did  not  matter  as  much  as  the  way  it  was  pronounced.  The  relation  to  the 
meaning  or  to  the  thing  was  suspended  or  neutralized.  The  army  of  Jephtah  defeated 
the  Ephraimites  and,  in  order  to  keep  the  soldiers  from  escaping  across  the  river,  each 
person  was  required  to  say  shibboleth.  Why?  Because  the  Ephraimites  were  known 
for  their  inability  to  pronounce  correctly  the  shi  of  shibboleth,  which  became  for 
them,  in  consequence,  an  "unpronounceable  nmne';  they  said  sihholeth,  and,  at  that 
invisible  border  between  shi  and  si,  they  betrayed  themselves  to  the  sentinel  at  the  risk 
of  death.  They  could  not  re-mark  a  mark  thus  coded.  These  events  occurred  at  the 
border  of  the  river  Jordan. 
With  the  fourth  language  of  Celan's  strophe,  after  the  French  of  'People  of 
Paris',  we  are  placed  at  another  border.  The  phrase  is  No  pasaran.  The  date  is 
February  1936  and  the  electoral  victory  of  the  Frente  Popular.  We  are  on  the  eve  of 
civil  war.  No  pasaran:  la  Pasionaria,  the  no  to  Franco,  to  the  Phalange  supported  by 
Mussolini  Is  troops  and  Hitler's  Condor  legion.  This  Phrase  became  a  rallying  cry  and 
sign  during  the  siege  of  Madrid  three  years  later.  No  pasaran  became  a  shibboleth  for 
the  Republican  people,  for  their  allies,  for  the  International  Brigades.  And  yet,  what 
passed  this  cry,  what  passed  despite  it,  was  the  Second  World  War,  the  war  of 
extermination.  The  Spanish  Civil  War  was  the  dress  rehearsal.  The  Spanish  phrase 
becomes  a  rallying  sign,  a  type  of  handclasp,  a  sign  of  membership  and  political 
watchword. 
into  our  hands 
he  spoke  the  word  that  we  needed,  it  was 127 
shepherd-Spanish,... 
in  icelight  of  the  cruiser  'Aurom'...  5 
We  have  the  German  language,  the  Hebrew  word  and  the  Spanish  phrase. 
Among  them  we  have  the  People  of  Paris: 
With  you, 
peuple 
de  Paris.  No  pasaran. 
The  multiplicity  of  languages  may  concelebrate,  all  at  once,  at  the  same  date, 
the  poetic  and  political  anniversary  of  singular  events,  spread  like  stars  over  the  map 
of  Europe,  and  henceforth  conjoined  by  a  secret  affinity:  the  fall  of  Vienna  and  the 
fall  of  Madrid,  for  both  cities  are  associated  in  the  same  line  by  another  poem, 
'Shibboleth';  and  still  other  memories  of  February,  the  beginnings  of  the  October 
Revolution  with  the  incidents  tied  not  only  to  the  cruiser  Aurora  and  to  Petrograd,  but 
also  to  the  Peter  and  Paul  Fortress.  The  last  stanza  of  'In  One'  recalls  other 
unforgettable  singularities: 
'Aurora': 
the  brotherly  hand,  waving  with 
the  blindfold  removed  from 
his  word-wide  eyes  -  Petropolis,  the 
roving  city  of  those  unforgotten, 
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was  Tuscanly  close  to  your  heart  also. 
Peace  to  the  cottages!  6 
Even  within  the  habitation  of  a  single  language,  French  for  example,  a 
discontinuous  swarm  of  events  are  commemorated  all  at  once,  at  thesame  date.  This 
consequently  takes  on  the  strange  character  of  a  type  of  unheimlich,  or  the  dimensions 
of  a  cryptic  predestination.  The  date  itself  comes  to  resemble  a  shibboleth,  for  the  date 
gives  a  ciphered  access  to  the  collocation,  to  this  configuration  of  places  for  memory. 
if  we  just  focus  on  Celan's  use  of  'February'  we  can  make  some  connections 
with  France,  Deffida  suggests.  On  the  twelfth  of  February  1934,  after  the  failure  of  the 
attempt  to  form  a  Common  Front  of  the  Right,  with  Doriot,  after  the  riot  of  February 
6,  a  huge  march  took  place  in  Paris  that  spontaneously  regrouped  the  masses  and  the 
leadership  of  the  parties  of  the  left.  This  was  the  origin  of  the  Popular  Front. 
However,  Celan  does  specify  the  thirteenth  of  February.  We  think  of  February 
13th,  1962  and  Celan  was  in  Paris.  This  is  the  day  of  the  funeral  for  the  Metro 
Charonne  massacre  victims,  an  anti-OAS  demonstration  at  the  end  of  the  Algerian 
war.  Several  hundred  thousand  Parisians,  the  people  of  Paris,  are  marching.  Two  days 
after  the  meetings  begin  which  lead  to  the  Evian  accords.  These  people  of  Paris  are 
still  the  people  of  the  Commune,  the  people  with  whom  one  must  band  together.  In 
the  same  event,  at  the  same  date,  national  and  civil  war,  the  end  of  one  and  the 
beginning  -  as  the  beginning  of  the  other. 
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The  poem  names  the  rallying  cry  that  brings  together  all  the  political  situations 
along  the  historical  borders  that  are  brought  together  in  the  poem's  configuration.  We 
are  talking  about  a  visa  that  is  the  shibboleth,  the  theme,  meaning  and  content  of  the 
poem.  Shibboleth  also  spells  the  anniversary  date's  singular  power  of  gathering 
together.  This  anniversary  grants  access  to  the  date's  memory,  its  future,  but  also  to 
the  poem  itself  Derrida  writes:  'Shibboleth  is  the  shibboleth  for  the  right  to  the  poem 
which  calls  itself  a  shibboleth,  its  own  shibboleth  at  the  very  moment  that  it 
commemorates  others  7.  For  Celan  the  signifying  conjunction  of  all  these  dramas  and 
historical  actors  constitutes  the  dated  signature,  the  dating  of  the  poem.  When  we 
recognize  how  the  shihboleth  functions  in  the  poem  we  are  not  at  the  moment  at 
which  it  ceases  to  be  cryptic.  Rather  the  shibboleth  remains  secret,  the  passage 
uncertain  and,  as  Derrida  writes:  'the  poem  only  unveils  this  secret  to  confirm  that 
there  is  something  secret  there,  withdrawn,  forever  beyond  the  reach  of  hermeneutic 
exhaustion'8.  It  remains  heterogeneous  to  all  interpretative  totalization,  eradicating  the 
hermeneutic  principle.  Derrida  writes:  'there  is  no  one  meaning,  from  the  moment  that 
there  is  date  and  shibboleth,  no  longer  a  sole  originary  meaning'9  . 
At  this  point  Derrida.  reaches  the  crux  of  his  meditation  on  the  word  shibboleth 
and  how  it  functions:  'a  shibboleth,  the  word  shibboleth,  if  it  is  one,  names,  in  the 
broadest  extension  of  its  generality  or  its  usage,  every  insignificant  arbitrary  mark,  for 
example  the  phonemic  difference  between  shi  and  si,  as  that  difference  becomes 
discriminative,  decisive,  and  divisive"O.  The  difference  has  no  meaning  in  and  of 
itself  However,  this  difference  becomes  what  one  must  know  how  to  recognize  and 
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above  all  to  mark  if  one  is  to  get  on,  to  get  over  the  border  of  a  place  or  the  threshold 
of  a  poem,  to  see  oneself  granted  asylum  or  the  legitimate  habitation  of  a  language. 
Deffida  writes:  'to  inhabit  a  language,  one  must  already  have  a  shihboleth  at  one's 
disposal:  not  simply  know  this  meaning  or  know  how  a  word  should  be  pronounced 
(the  difference  of  h  between  shi  and  si:  this  the  Ephraimites  knew),  but  be  able  to  say 
it  as  one  ought,  as  one  ought  to  be  able  to  say  it"'.  So  it  has  an  unavoidable 
perfonnative  dimension. 
We  are  dealing  with  a  type  of  marking.  The  difference  between  shi  and  si  has 
no  meaning.  Yet  it  is  the  ciphered  mark  which  one  must  be  able  topartake  ofwith  the 
other,  and  this  differential  power  must  be  inscribed  in  oneself,  that  is,  in  one's  own 
body,  just  as  much  as  in  the  body  of  one's  own  language,  and  the  one  to  the  same 
extent  as  the  other.  There  is  nothing  'natural'  about  this.  As  Derrida  notes:  'its  very 
origin  presupposes  participation  in  a  cultural  and  linguistic  community,  in  a  milieu  of 
apprenticeship,  in  short  an  alliance'  12 
.  Then  shibboleth  does  not  cipher  something,  but 
emerging  from  that  non-meaning  where  it  keeps  itself  in  reserve,  becomes  the  cipher 
of  the  cipher. 
Paul  Celan's  work,  like  that  of  James  Joyce,  indicates  a  multiplicity  and 
migration  of  languages  within  the  language  presented,  the  example  here  being  the 
presence  of  four  languages  within  the  one  poem.  His  poems  are  a  poetic  version  of  the 
tower  of  Babel.  In  the  poem  'CROWNED  OUT'  with  the  reference  to  the  'ghetto- 
Rose'  and  that  phallic  figure  knotted  in  the  heart  of  the  poem  ('bound  phallic  to  you") 
that  is  also  its  last  word,  its  address  and  envoy: 
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And  an  earth  arises,  ours, 
this  one. 
And  we  send 
none  of  ours  downward 
to  you, 
Babel. 
13 
The  poem's  address  and  envoy  certainly,  but  what  appears  to  be  said  to  Babel  is  that 
nothing  will  be  addressed  to  it. 
We  are  dealing  with  a  multiplicity  of  languages  and  their  migration;  and,  as 
languages  shift  and  move,  so  too  can  the  defined  boundaries  of  a  country,  for 
countries'  borders  often  shift,  change,  migrate,  transfer  and  are  transported.  As 
Derrida  writes:  'it  displaces  itself  like  those  names  and  those  stones  which  one  gives 
as  a  pledge,  from  hand  to  hand,  and  the  hand  is  given,  too,  and  what  gets  detached, 
sundered,  tom  away,  can  gather  itself  together  anew  in  the  symbol,  the  pledge,  the 
promise,  the  alliance,  the  imparted  word,  the  migration  of  the  imparted  word'  14 
-  what  ripped  apart,  grows  back  together- 
you've  got  them  now,  so  take  them  now,  so  now  you've  got 
them  both, 
the  nwne,  the  name,  the  hand,  the  hand, 
so  take  them  and  this  pledge  will  stand, 
he  takes  it  too  and  you've  got  back 
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what's  yours,  what  was  his, 
windmills 
drive  air  into  your  lungs,  you're  rowing 
We  are  struck  by  the  image  of  the  windmill.  The  windmill  might  symbolize 
chance  and  risk.  Language  itself  holds  as  much  of  wind  and  illusion  as  it  draws  from 
breath  and  spirit,  from  the  breathing  bestowed.  This  is  illustrated  within  the  body  of 
this  poem  through  its  many  references.  There  are  references  to  the  Russia  of  Osip 
Mandelshtarn  and  to  Moravia  and  the  Prague  cemetery.  With  the  reference  to 
'Normandy-Niemen'  there  is  a  reference  to  the  emigration  of  the  country  itself  and  of 
its  name.  Like  language: 
what  is  it  called,  your  land 
back  of  the  mountain,  back  of  the  year? 
I  know  what  it's  called. 
it  wanders  everywhere,  like  language, 
throw  it  away,  throw  it  away, 
then  you'll  have  it  again, 
the  pebble  from 
the  Moravian  Basin 
your  thought  carried  to  Prague.  15 
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Derrida  notes  that  the  multiplicity  and  migration  of  languages  occurs  within 
language  itself  We  can  speak  of  the  Babel  within  a  single  language.  Shibboleth  marks 
for  Derrida  the  multiplicity  within  language  and  insignificant  difference  as  the 
condition  of  meaning.  However,  language  can  only  take  on  meaning  in  relation  to  a 
place.  By  place  we  mean  the  relation  to  a  border,  country,  house,  or  threshold,  as  any 
site,  any  situation  in  general  from  within  which,  practically  and  pragmatically, 
alliances  are  fonned,  contracts,  codes  and  conventions  are  established  which  give 
meaning  to  the  insignificant,  institute  passwords,  bend  language  to  what  exceeds  it, 
make  of  it  a  moment  of  gesture  and  step. 
Derrida  emphasizes  the  heterogeneity  of  language  here.  Untranslatability  is 
connected  with  the  difficult  passage  suggested  by  no  pasaran,  the  aporia  or  the 
impasse  that  isolates  one  poetic  language  from  another.  Babel,  though,  is  also  the 
impossible  possible  step,  beyond  hope  of  transaction,  tied  to  the  multiplicity  of 
languages  within  the  uniqueness  of  the  poetic  inscription:  several  times  in  one,  several 
languages  in  a  single  poetic  act.  The  poem  is  unique,  in  itself  another  date  and 
shibboleth,  it  forges  and  seals  in  a  single  idiom,  'in  one',  the  poetic  events,  a 
multiplicity  of  languages  and  of  equally  singular  dates. 
What  will  always  remain  untranslatable  within  this  poem  are  the  marked 
differences  of  languages  within  the  poem.  There  is  a  doing  that  cannot  be  reduced  to 
knowing.  Celan's  marking  is  a  setting  into  motion  of  the  differences.  As  Derrida 
writes:  'the  shibboleth,  here  again,  does  not  resist  translation  by  reason  of  some 
semantic  secret,  but  by  virtue  of  that  in  it  which  forms  the  cut  of  a  nonsignifying 
difference  in  the  body  of  the  written  or  oral  mark,  written  in  speech  as  a  mark  within  a 134 
mark,  an  incision  marking  the  very  mark  itself,  16.  On  both  sides  of  the  historical, 
political,  and  linguistic  border  (a  border  is  never  natural),  the  meaning,  the  different 
meanings  of  the  word  shibboleth  are  known:  as  river,  ear  of  grain  and  olive  twig.  One 
can  know  how  it  should  be  pronounced.  Yet  a  single  trial  will  determine  that  some 
cannot,  while  others  can,  pronounce  it  with  the  heart's  mouth.  Some  will  not  pass, 
while  others  will  pass  the  line  -  of  the  place,  of  the  country,  of  the  community,  of 
what  takes  place  in  a  language,  in  languages  as  poems. 
For  Derrida  every  poem  has  its  own  language.  Every  poem  is  one  time  alone 
its  own  language,  even  when,  and  maybe  especially  when,  several  languages  are  able 
to  cross  there.  There  are  no  guarantees  however.  The  poem  may  become  a 
watchtower,  one  may  be  endowed  through  the  poem  with  the  vigilance  of  a  sentinel, 
one  may  see  well.  However,  the  value  of  the  shibboleth  may  always,  tragically,  be 
inverted.  The  good  will  of  men  may  sometimes  count  for  naught.  As  Derrida  notes: 
'Watchword  or  password  in  the  struggle  against  oppression,  exclusion,  fascism,  and 
racism,  it  may  also  corrupt  its  differential  value,  which  is  the  condition  of  alliance  and 
of  the  poem,  making  of  it  a  discriminatory  limit,  the  grillwork  of  policing,  of 
normalization,  and  of  methodical  subjugation'  17 
.  What  is  striking  is  how  Celan,  as  we 
shall  see,  will  work  through  this  to  develop  a  way  of  speaking  to  the  Other,  to  the 
strange,  the  different  and  the  opposite. 
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The  Centrality  of  Dates 
The  word  'Shibboleth'  speaks  in  effect  of  the  threshold,  of  the  crossing  of  the 
threshold,  of  that  which  permits  one  to  pass  or  to  cross,  to  transfer  from  one  threshold 
to  another:  to  translate.  We  find  this  word  in  the  second  line  of  'In  eins'.  We  recall  the 
earlier  poem  that  took  the  word  'Shibboleth'  as  its  title  also.  In  both  poems  there  is  a 
similar  configuration  of  events.  They  are  sealed  by  the  February  anniversary,  and  in 
both  there  is  a  linking  of  capitals,  Vienna  and  Madrid,  and  of  Paris,  Madrid  and 
Petropolis.  No  pasaran  already  figures  in  close  conjunction  with  shibboleth.  We  are 
dealing  with  the  memory  of  February  1936  -  1939,  although  neither  date  nor  year 
appear. 
Heart: 
here  too  reveal  what  you  are, 
here,  in  the  midst  of  the  market. 
Call  the  shibboleth,  call  it  out 
into  your  alien  homeland: 
February.  Nopasaran.  's 
Celan  seems  to  be  speaking  of  an  essential  strangeness,  of  an  estrangement  in 
onets  own  home,  of  not  being  at  home.  There  is  a  suggestion  also  of  being  called 
away  from  one's  homeland  or  away  from  home  in  one's  homeland,  the  'shall  not' 
pass,  which  secures  and  threatens  every  border  crossing  in  and  out  of  oneself  This 
moment  of  the  shibboleth  is  re-marked  in  the  date,  in  the  month  of,  and  in  the  word, 
February. 
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The  two  poems  beckon  to  one  another,  kindred,  complicitous,  allies,  but  as 
different  as  they  can  possibly  be.  They  bear  and  do  not  bear  the  same  date.  A 
shibboleth  secures  the  passage  from  one  to  the  other  in  the  difference,  within 
sameness,  of  the  same  date,  between  Februar  and  Feber.  They  speak,  in  the  same 
language,  two  different  languages.  They  partake  of  it. 
Let  us  pause  for  a  moment  with  the  word  'partaking'.  We  are  suggesting  a 
word  that  names  difference.  It  is  a  line  of  demarcation,  the  parting  of  the  waters, 
scission,  caesura  as  well  as  participation,  that  which  is  divided  because  it  is  shared  or 
held  in  common,  imparted  and  partaken  of  Derrida  will  speak  of  the  imparted  or 
partaken  as  shihholeth  and  symbolon.  In  both  cases  of  S-B-L,  a  pledge  is  transmitted 
to  another,  'he  spoke  /  the  word  in  our  hand'.  A  word  or  a  piece  of  a  word,  the 
complementary  part  of  an  object  divided  in  two  to  seal  an  alliance,  a  tessera.  This  is 
the  moment  of  engagement  of  signing,  of  the  pact  or  contract,  of  the  promise,  of  the 
ring. 
What  is  important  here  is  the  role  the  signature  of  the  date  plays.  Beyond  the 
singular  event  which  it  marks  and  of  which  it  would  be  the  detachable  proper  name, 
capable  of  outliving  and  thus  of  calling,  of  recalling,  the  vanished  as  vanished,  its  very 
ash,  it  gathers  together,  like  a  title,  a  more  or  less  apparent  and  secret  conjunction  of 
singularities  which  partake  of,  and  in  the  future  will  continue  to  partake  of,  the  same 
date.  We  cannot  assign  a  limit  to  such  a  conjunction.  It  is  determined  by  the  future  to 
which  a  fracture  promises  it.  No  testimony  or  knowledge  could  by  definition  exhaust 
its  deciphering. 137 
For  Celan  the  date  is  a  witness,  but  one  that  may  bless  it  vAthout  knowing  all 
of  that  for  which  and  of  those  for  whom  it  bears  witness.  It  is  possible  that  there  may 
no  longer  be  any  witnesses  for  this  witness.  The  last  words  of  'Aschenglorie': 
No  one 
bears  witness  for  the 
witness. 
19 
Folded  or  refolded  in  the  simplicity  of  the  singular,  a  certain  repetition  Derrida 
argues  assures  the  minimal  and  'internal'  readability  of  the  poem,  even  in  the  absence 
of  a  witness,  of  a  signatory  or  of  anyone  who  might  have  some  knowledge  concerning 
the  historical  reference  of  the  poetic  legacy.  The  word  shibboleth,  for  Celan,  seems 
not  to  have  this  or  that  meaning  derived  from  its  language  of  origin:  river,  ear  of 
grain,  olive-twig,  or  indeed  the  other  meanings  that  it  takes  on  in  the  two  poems.  It 
signifies:  there  is  shibboleth,  there  is  something  of  a  crypt;  it  remains  incalcuable,  it 
does  not  conceal  a  single  determinate  secret,  a  semantic  content  waiting  for  the  one 
who  holds  a  key  behind  the  door.  What  the  poem  marks,  what  enters  and  incises 
languages  in  the  fonn  of  a  date,  is  that  there  is  a  partaking  of  the  shibboleth,  a 
partaking  at  once  open  and  closed.  The  date  (signature,  moment,  place,  gathering  of 
singular  marks)  always  functions  as  a  shibboleth.  It  shows  that  there  is  something  not 
shown,  that  there  is  a  ciphered  singularity:  irreducible  to  any  concept,  to  any 
knowledge,  even  to  a  history  or  tradition,  be  it  of  a  religious  kind.  The  poem  speaks, 
even  should  none  of  its  references  be  intelligible,  none  other  than  the  Other,  the  one  to 
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whom  it  addresses  itself  and  to  whom  it  speaks  in  saying  that  it  speaks  to  him.  Even  if 
it  does  not  reach  and  leave  its  mark  on,  at  least  it  calls  to,  the  Other.  Address  takes 
place. 
Within  a  language,  in  the  poetic  writing  of  a  language,  there  is  nothing  but 
shibboleth.  Like  the  date  and  the  name  it  pennits  anniversaries,  alliances,  returns  and 
commemorations  -  even  if  there  is  no  trace,  the  subsistent  presence  of  a  remainder. 
'Tubingen,  Janner'  is  at  once  a  poem,  a  date  and  a  signature.  Like  a  shibboleth,  it 
takes  into  its  consignment  enigma  and  memory,  citing  the  enigma: 
Their  -  'a 
Riddle,  what  is  pure- 
ly  arisen'  -,  their 
memory  of 
floating  Holderlintowers,  gull 
enswirled.  20 
in  parentheses,  Ta  Contrescarpe'  writes  '(Quatorze1juillets 
... 
)'21.  We  have 
the  French  language,  and  hence,  what  is  untranslatable.  July  141  celebrates  a  political 
and  revolutionary  anniversary.  Maybe  anniversaries  in  general.  The  anniversary 
marks  the  return,  and  by  revolution,  of  the  revolutionary. 
We  note  also  how  the  '(Quatorzeljuillets  ...  )'  is  written  with  an  s.  In  its  dis- 
orthography  this  inaudible  mark  of  the  plural  insists  on  the  plurality  of  rings.  The 
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anniversaries  do  not  signal  only,  necessarily,  the  return  of  the  same  original  July  14th 
Other  more  or  less  secret  events,  other  rings,  anniversaries,  and  alliances,  other 
partakings  partake  perhaps  of  the  same  date.  A  parenthesis  sets  alongside:  aside.  The 
same  parenthesis  sets  aside,  in  reserve,  other  'quatorze  j  uillet':  '(Quatorze  Ijuillets.  Et 
plus  de  neufautres.  )'  The  poem  opens  itself  to  many  other  anniversaries.  However  the 
'I  don't  know'  it  forces  us  into  before  all  the  possibilities  indicates  a  situation.  Ile 
poem  speaks  beyond  knowledge.  As  Derrida  writes:  'it  writes,  and  what  it  writes  is, 
first  of  all,  this  very  fact,  that  it  is  addressed  and  destined  beyond  knowledge, 
inscribing  dates  and  signatures  which  one  may  encounter  and  bless,  without  knowing 
everything  of  what  they  date  or  sign'22  . 
What  we  are  dealing  with  is  a  blessing  beyond 
knowledge  commemorating  through  forgetting  or  the  unimparted  secret,  partaking  yet 
in  the  unimpartable.  The  'Quatorze/juillets'  form  the  cut  of  an  unrepeatable 
singuMty. 
In  many  ways  we  witness  how  this  poem  contains  many  dates  or  signs  of  other 
events  associated  with  July  14'h.  We  then  come  to  think  of  this  date,  July  14'h,  not  as  a 
date  of  public  and  political  history  but  more  perhaps  as  a  date  which  signs  in  secret.  it 
signals  the  advent  of  this  particular  poem.  We  re-call  that  'Conversation  in  the 
Mountains'  also  says:  'and  July  is  no  July"'.  This  occurs  in  the  course  of  a  meditation 
on  the  Jew,  son  of  a  Jew,  whose  name  is  unpronounceable,  who  possesses  nothing  of 
his  own,  who  has  nothing  that  is  not  borrowed.,  Like  a  date,  what  is  proper  to  the  Jew 
is  to  have  no  property  or  essence,  or  identity.  It  is  worth  asking,  does  Celan  open  a 
space  beyond  the  confines  of  identity  politics? 
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We  have  mentioned  before  what  we  have  designated  as  'constellations':  the 
several  heterogeneous  singukrities  that  are  consigned  to  the  starry  configuration  of  a 
single  dated  mark.  We  bring  back  to  mind  the  'constellations  of  November'.  This  time 
they  are  associated  with  an  ear  not  of  grain  as  in  shihboleth,  but  of  com: 
WITH  THE  HAILSTONE,  in 
the  rust-blighted  ear 
of  maize,  at  home, 
obedient  to  the  late,  the  hard 
November  stars: 
woven  into  your  heart-thread,  the 
conversation  of  worms-: 
a  bowstring,  from  which 
your  arrow-script  whirrs, 
archer. 
24 
Months  return  here,  March  and  September  especially.  The  month  and  its  return 
are  mentioned  without  reference  to  the  year,  and  so  it  becomes  a  sign,  a  way  of 
marking  off  the  date,  its  partaking  and  deportation.  What  is  re-called  is  the  ring  and 
fate  of  all  archival  recording.  As  Derrida  writes:  'A  date  marks  itself  and  becomes 
readable  only  in  freeing  itself  from  the  singularity  which  it  nonetheless  recalls.  It  is 
readable  in  its  ideality;  its  body  becomes  an  ideal  object:  always  the  same,  traversing 
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the  different  experiences  which  point  to  or  constitute  it,  objective,  guaranteed  by 
codes.  This  ideality  carries  forgetting  into  memory,  but  it  is  the  memory  of  forgetting 
itself,  the  truth  of  forgetting'25 
. 
This  is  because  the  reference  to  a  singular  event  is 
annulled  in  the  ring's  annulation,  when  a  month  recalls  and  annually  annuls  a  year. 
This  becomes  the  moment  when  the  year  turns  on  itself 
The  date,  in  truth,  offers  itself  up  for  annihilation.  The  threat  does  not  come 
from  without  and  it  is  not  connected  to  the  possibility  of  some  accident  suddenly 
destroying  the  archive's  material  support.  For  the  date  is  threatened  in  its  coming  due, 
in  its  conservation  and  its  readibility,  by  them,  insofar  as  it  remains,  and  permits  itself 
to  be  read.  In  its  risking  the  annulment  of  what  it  saves  from  forgetting,  it  may  always 
become  no  one's  and  nothing's  date,  the  essence  without  essence  of  ash  in  which  one 
can  no  longer  even  know  what  one  day,  one  time  alone,  under  some  proper  name,  was 
consumed.  The  name  and  the  date  partake  of  this  destiny  of  ash.  This  is  intrinsic  to  the 
functioning  and  being  of  the  date.  For  it  is  inherent  to  the  date's  erratic  essence.  to 
become  readable  and  commemorative  only  in  effacing  that  which  it  will  have 
designated,  in  becoming  each  time  no  one's  date. 
How  do  we  understand  that  'no  one's?  There  are  two  possibilities.  The  ate  is 
encrypted  and  remains  so.  That  is,  Paul  Celan  has  named  and  ciphered  an  event  that 
he  alone,  or  alone  with  a  few  others,  is  able  to  commemorate.  In  this  case,  then,  the 
26  -  date  of  this  'Nevermansday  in  September'  is  destined  no  longer  to  signify  at  all  one 
day  for  the  survivors,  that  is  to  say,  essentially,  for  the  reader,  interpreter,  or  guardian 
of  the  poem.  The  date  becomes,  once  it  has  crossed  the  threshold  of  this  survival,  or 
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spectral  return,  from  the  moment  it  crosses  the  threshold  of  the  poem,  a  no  one's  date, 
nevermansday.  We  have  just  a  moment  of  finite  survival.  The  name  of  September 
crops  up  in  a  poem  that  'speaks!  '  It  lends  itself  to  reading  to  the  extent  that  it  is  caught 
up  in,  catches  itself  up  in  a  network  of  marks  that  signify  and  are  by  convention, 
intelligible.  It  has  its  share  in  the  beauty  of  the  poem.  However,  it  pays  for  this 
readability  with  the  terrible  tribute  of  this  lost  singularity.  We  catch  a  rare  moment  of 
mourning  reading  itself  What  is  encrypted  in  the  date,  is  dated  in  the  date,  is  in  effect 
effaced.  The  date  becomes  marked  in  marking  itself  off.  And  we  have  all  the  losses, 
all  the  beings  whom  we  lament  in  this  mourning,  all  the  griefs  gathered  in  the  poem  of 
a  date  whose  effacement  does  not  await  effacement. 
The  second  possibility:  nothing  at  all  is  encrypted  in  the  date.  It  makes  itself 
available  to  all.  And  yet,  the  effect  in  the  end  is  the  same.  For  the  other's  singularity  is 
incinerated.  The  September  rose  that  is  no  one's  rose.  In  'Huhediblu'  we  find:  'Oh 
when  will  they  reflower,  of  roses,  your  Septembers?  1,27  The  future  belongs  to  dates,  to 
their  blossoming  to  come,  more  particularly  in  the  re-flowering  of  returns.  One  does 
not  place  flowers  on  the  stone  of  a  date,  but  rather  one  awaits  the  time  of  the  roses,  the 
dated  time.  What  is  significant  is  the  date  and  not  what  is  born,  flowers,  opens. 
This  double  phenomena  of  sorts  is  in  the  nature  of  things.  For  the  sameness  of 
all  dating  is  gathered  and  constituted  here.  What  we  encounter  here  is  the  possibility 
of  reading  and  recurrence,  the  ring,  the  anniversary  and  its  keeping.  We  encounter  the 
truth  of  the  poem  and  its  madness.  For  a  date  never  is  what  it  is,  or  what  it  says  it  is, 
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and  is  always  more  or  less  than  what  it  is.  Instead,  it  remains  without  being,  by  force 
of  music,  remains  for  song. 
When 
when  bloom,  when, 
when  bloom  the  hoomenclibloom, 
hoohedibloo,  yes  them,  the  September- 
roses? 
Hoo  -  on  tue  ...  when  then? 
When,  whenwhen, 
manywhens,  yes  mania- 
brother  ... 
29 
And  so  in  the  date's  annulment  in  the  anonymity  of  nothing,  as  in  that  of  the 
ring,  is  this  given  of  the  date  that  leaves  its  trace  in  the  poem.  In  fact,  this  trace  is  the 
poem.  It  is  not  just  the  trace  of  something,  of  a  non-trace  that  happened,  which  took 
place  in  that  it  was  lived  through  in  one  sense  of  the  word  and  asks  to  be 
commemorated.  It  is  this  and  more.  Firstly,  it  is  the  trace  as  date,  that  which  is  bound 
to  mark  itself  off  if  it  is  to  mark,  to  bereave  itself  if  it  is  to  remain.  it  must  expose  its 
secret,  and  risk  losing  itself  if  it  is  to  keep  it.  It  must  constantly  blur  the  border, 
crossing  and  re-crossing  it,  between  readability  and  unreadability.  This  is  the  madness 
of  fire  that  consumes  a  date  from  within.  During  the  finite  time  of  incineration  the 
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password,  however,  is  transmitted,  communication  happens,  and  the  shibboleth  is 
passed  from  hand  to  hand  and  heart  to  heart. 
This  annulment  is  proper  and  right.  For  annulment  is  at  work  everywhere  that 
a  date  describes  its  here  and  now  within  iterability,  when  it  consigns  itself  to  losing  its 
senses,  in  self-forgetfulness,  succeeding  only  thus  in  effacing  itself  These  names 
stand  for  others.  And  a  date's  destiny  is  analogous  to  that  of  every  name,  every  proper 
name.  Desire  leads  us  to  praise  and  bless  the  given  letter,  a  date  which,  in  order  to  be 
what  it  is,  must  give  itself  to  be  read  in  ash,  in  the  non-being  of  its  being.  Ash  is  that 
remainder  without  remainder.  Concerning  the  date  itself,  nothing  remains,  nothing  of 
what  it  dates,  nothing  of  what  is  dated  by  it.  Rather  no  one  remains,  a  priori. 
We  re-call  the  lines  from  'Psalm': 
Praised  be  your  name,  no  one.  29 
Or  in  'Eimnal'  ('Once'): 
One  and  Infinite, 
annihilated, 
ied. 
Light  was.  Salvation.  30 
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When  the  date  becomes  readable  its  shibboleth  says  to  you:  T  (an  almost  nothing, 
once  alone,  once  alone  endlessly  recommenced  but  ended  in  that  very  act),  I  am,  I  am 
only  a  cipher  commemorating  just  that  which  will  have  been  consigned  to  oblivion, 
destined  to  become  name,  for  a  finite  time,  the  time  of  a  rose,  name  of  nothing, 
'voices  of  no  one',  name  of  no  one.  Ash,  finally. 
Like  the  September  roses,  the  no  onevs  rose  calls  for  the  blessing  of  that  which 
remains  of  that  which  does  not  remain,  what  does  not  remain  in  this  remainder,  the 
dust  or  ash.  It  sings,  yes,  amen,  to  this  nothing  that  remains,  and  even  to  the  desert  in 
which  there  would  be  no  one  left  to  bless  the  ashes.  And  so  we  have  'Psalm'  again: 
I- 
No  one  moulds  us  again  out  of  earth  and  clay, 
no  one  conjures  our  dust, 
No  one. 
Praised  be  your  name,  no  one. 
For  your  sake 
we  shall  flower. 
Towards 
you. 
A  nothing 
we  were,  are,  shall 
remain,  flowering: 
the  nothing-,  the 146 
no-one's  rose. 
31 
To  speak  to  no  one  is  an  act  of  faith  itself  What  blessing  could  be  otherwise? 
Once  it  becomes  certitude,  it  becomes  dogma.  We  are  dealing  with  what  might  be 
given.  We  can  never  presume.  It  is  incalculable.  Thus  'Chymisch': 
Great,  grey, 
sisterly  shape 
near  like  all  that  is  lost: 
All  the  names,  all  those 
names 
burrit  with  the  rest.  So  much 
ash  to  be  blessed.  So  much 
land  won 
above 
the  weightless,  so  weightless 
rings 
of  souls. 
32 
However,  there  is  a  remainder.  What  seems  to  nourish  itself  or  quench  its 
thirst  at  the  spring  of  being-present.  Although  it  emerges  from  being,  it  uses  up  in 
advance  the  being  from  which  it  seems  to  draw.  The  remnance  of  the  remainder  -  ash, 
almost  nothing  -  is  not  the  being  that  remains.  What  is  drawn,  sucked  up,  drunk  with 
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the  scoop,  with  the  ash-scoop,  with  the  ash-ladle  comes  out  of  the  tub  of  being.  It 
comes  out  of  it  clean,  soapy: 
DRAWN  WITH  THE  ASH-LADLE 
from  the  tub  of  being 
soapy... 
33 
A  Lingedng  Relevance 
The  centrality  of  the  shibboleth  to  language,  and  thereby  to  all  human  thought, 
can  be  garnered  by  a  widening  of  our  discussion  from  the  post-war  poetry  of  Paul 
Celan  to  the  various  shibboleths  we  encounter  in  the  poetry  of  Seamus  Heaney.  We 
will  begin  by  looking  at  a  poem  from  his  1972  collection  Wintering  Out.  The  thematic 
of  the  shibboleth  is  developed  in  the  poem  'Broagh': 
Riverbank,  the  long  rigs 
ending  in  broad  docken 
and  a  canopied  pad 
down  to  the  ford. 
The  garden  mould 
bruised  easily,  the  shower 
gathering  in  your  heelmark 
was  the  black  0 
33  Jacques  Derrida:  'Shibbolethfor  Paul  Celan':  1994,  p.  47 148 
in  Broagh, 
its  low  tattoo 
among  the  windy  boortrees 
and  rhubarb-blades 
ended  almost 
suddenly,  like  that  last 
gh  the  strangers  found 
difficult  to  manage.  34 
We  note  that  the  word  'Broagh'  is  an  anglicization  of  the  Gaelic  word 
'Bruach'  which  means  'riverbank'.  The  first  three  lines  of  the  poem  conclude  with 
dialect  words:  we  have  'rigs'  for  'furrows',  a  word  brought  to  the  North  of  Ireland  by 
Scots  planters;  'docken'  is  a  Scots  and  archaic  English  word,  a  plural  for  'dock- 
leaves';  and  the  last  'pad'  is  an  English  and  Scots  dialect  word  for  'path'.  Further  into 
the  poem  we  find  the  word  'boortrees'  which  is  an  old  Scots  plural  for  the  elderberry. 
This  poem  then  celebrates  the  local  Planter's  dialect  as  well  as  the  'native'  tongue. 
What  is  interesting  is  how  Heaney  connects  the  landscape,  language  and  the  body. 
The  language  and  the  landscape  are  tattooed  like  the  body. 
The  poem  does  set  up  a  paradigm  of  exclusiveness  through  the  last  'gh  the 
strangers  found/  difficult  to  manage'.  And  this  in  the  name  of  a  type  of  inclusiveness. 
For  the  word  'Broagh'  is  a  word  available  to  Unionist  and  Nationalist  in  the  North  of 
Ireland  but  excludes  anyone  from  the  island  of  Britain,  especially,  one  imagines 
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someone  from  England  who  has  no  cultural  connection  to  the  roots  of  this  particular 
idiomatic  usage  of  the  language.  Neil  Corcoran  writes  of  this  poem:  'Exhilaratedly 
riding  on  its  own  melting,  it  acts  as  the  linguistic  paradigm  for  a  reconciliation  beyond 
sectarian  division.  Its  point  is  that  conflictual  histories  have  resulted  in  a  community 
whose  individual  members,  whatever  their  political  or  religious  affinity,  now  all  speak 
the  same  language,  whether  derived  from  Irish  or  English  or  Scots  roots.  Hence  the 
ability  of  everyone  in  this  community,  whether  Catholic  or  Protestant,  to  pronounce 
the  place  name  "Broagh"  is  intended  as  a  little  optimistic  or  hortatory  allegory  of 
potential  political,  as  well  as  linguistic,  communityv35. 
Another  poem  in  which  we  encounter  in  a  significant  way  the  'shibboleth'  in 
Heaney's  work  is  'From  the  Frontier  of  Writing'.  It  is  one  of  many  parabolic  poems 
that  mark  a  departure  in  style  and  ambition  in  Heaney's  writing.  It  is  from  the  1987 
collection  The  Haw  Lantern: 
The  tightness  and  the  nilness  round  that  space 
when  the  car  stops  in  the  road,  the  troops  inspect 
its  make  and  number  and,  as  one  bends  his  face 
towards  your  window,  you  catch  sight  of  more 
on  a  hill  beyond,  eyeing  with  intent 
down  cradled  guns  that  hold  you  under  cover 
and  everything  is  pure  interrogation 
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until  a  rifle  motions  and  you  move 
with  guarded  unconcerned  acceleration  - 
a  little  emptier,  a  little  spent 
as  always  by  that  quiver  in  the  self, 
subjugated,  yes,  and  obedient. 
So  you  drive  on  to  the  frontier  of  writing 
where  it  happens  again.  The  guns  on  tripods, 
the  sergeant  with  his  on-off  mike  repeating 
data  about  you,  waiting  for  the  squawk 
of  clearance;  the  marksman  training  down 
out  of  the  sun  upon  you  like  a  hawk. 
And  suddenly  you're  through,  arraigned  yet  freed, 
as  if  you'd  passed  from  behind  a  waterfall 
on  the  black  current  of  a  tannac  road 
past  annour-plated  vehicles,  out  between 
the  posted  soldiers  flowing  and  receding 
like  tree  shadows  into  the  polished  windscreen.  36 
What  is  new  here  is  the  vocabulary  suggestive  of  sexual  violation.  The  'little 
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emptier'  and  'a  little  spent',  the  'quiver  in  the  self'  all  convey  something  of  sexual 
transgression,  where  the  poet  has  been  left  weakened  and  powerless  by  this  encounter. 
What  is  interesting  is  the  move  from  the  reality  of  roadblocks  in  the  North  of  Ireland, 
or  somewhere  resembling  it,  to  the  land  of  language,  imagination  and  form.  In  the 
world  of  art  an  examination,  interrogation  of  the  self  occurs  also.  The  self  is 
examined,  questioned,  one  presumes  by  the  other  half  of  the  self;  is  it  that  the  ethical 
self  must  ask  questions  of  the  artistic  self?  This  presumes  an  otherness  within,  a 
division  within  the  self  A  path  must  be  cleared,  to  allow  one  to  journey  on.  In  the 
poem  Heaney  achieves  this.  There  is  a  sense  of  liberation  and  progression  by  the 
poem's  conclusion.  What  is  interesting  is  how  Heaney  imagines  the  transition.  The 
world  of  definite  objects,  soldiers,  guns,  tripods  and  surveillance  equipment,  becomes 
bluffed,  fuzzy,  indefinite,  conveyed  through  the  watery  imagery  of  a  verb  like 
'flowed'.  We  have  a  sense  of  movement  in  stasis.  Things  are  not  as  they  seem.  We  are 
in  a  liminal  space  of  the  nihilism  prior  to  creation.  We  should  be  open  to  an  element 
of  surprise  in  the  actual.  Keeping  the  ways  open  for  a  moment  of  liberation,  an 
opemng  out  to  a  moment  of  freedom,  one  has  a  release  from  the  forces  of  tyranny.  As 
Daniel  Tobin  writes:  'The  poet  is  never  completely  cleared,  though  the  hope  of 
clearance,  of  pure  transcendence,  is  a  promise  made  viable  by  our  willingness  to  forgo 
clearance  in  the  here  and  now'37  . 
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The  Cracked  Tune  Chronos  Sings 
Me  we  have  discussed  things  thus  far  the  commemorating  date  and  the 
commemorated  date  have  tended  to  rejoin  and  conjoin  in  a  secret  anniversary,  and  the 
poem  is  this  anniversary  -  the  anniversary  it  sings  and  blesses,  the  giving  of  this  ring, 
the  seal  of  an  alliance  and  of  a  promise.  It  belongs  to  the  same  date  as  the  one  it 
blesses,  gives  and  gives  back  again  -  the  date  to  which  it  at  once  both  belongs  and  is 
destined.  At  this  strange  border  point  that  has  already  passed  and  is  still  yet  to  come 
there  is  an  effacement  between  the  poem's  external  appearance,  its  'empirical'  date, 
and  its  internal  genealogy.  We  are  in  a  utopian  place,  where  the  barriers  that  nonnally 
exist  between  the  inner  and  the  outer,  between  the  empirical  and  the  essential,  break 
down.  Such  is  the  place  of  the  poem  that  is  a  blessing. 
For  Derrida  we  begin  to  cross  the  border  into  philosophical  questioning  at  this 
point.  The  philosophical  experience  begins  with  a  questioning  that  is  a  crossing  of 
limits,  and  it  always  occurs  within  the  experience  of  language;  and  as  such  it  is  as 
poetic  and  literary  as  it  is  philosophical. 
Derrida  touches  on  the  significance  of  the  clock  and  the  calendar  in  Celan's 
work.  Both  are  key  in  how  they  mark  off  the  day,  months  and  years.  We  have  the 
space  and  sound  of  the  revolution  of  the  hours  sounded  to  us  in  the  beating  of  the 
clock.  Both,  for  Derrida,  nmne  'the  return  of  the  other,  of  the  wholly  other  in  the 
same  '38.  For  Derrida  the  hour  writes  and  the  hour  speaks,  in  Celan's  poems  with  their 
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frequent  reference  to  Uhr  and  Stunde.  The  hour  calls  and  assigns  the  poem.  The  hour 
provokes,  convokes,  apostrophizes  and  addresses  the  poem  thereby,  and  the  poet  who 
is  claimed  by  the  hour.  There  is  a  summons  and  an  hour.  In  the  poem  'Nacht'  there  is 
a  sense  of  the  hour,  and  a  dialogue  or  conversation  with  the  turning  hour;  the  sharing 
of  a  word  with  it. 
Mallarme  spoke  of  the  initiative  returning  to  words.  For  Derrida  the  initiative 
also  returns  to  the  hour.  The  poet  is  provoked  and  constituted  by  it.  He  is  revealed  to 
himself  from  within  it.  The  'caesura  of  the  hours',  cadence,  chance,  and  sufferance 
scan  the  poem  from  the  moment  and  moments  of  its  origin.  This  rhythm  that  involves 
a  spacing  concerns  not  only  the  form  of  the  language,  but  also  the  origin  of  meaning, 
and  of  the  meaning  of  language.  Celan's  Bremen  address  confronts  these  questions. 
What  is  the  meaning  of  language,  of  its  sense  and  place  for  an  exile?  The  German 
language  for  a  poet  of  the  German  language  who  is  not  German: 
In  this  language  I  have  sought,  during  those  years  and  the 
years  since  then,  to  write  poems:  so  as  to  speak,  to  orient 
myself,  to  find  out  where  I  was  and  where  I  was  meant  to  go. 
It  was,  you  see,  event,  movement,  a  being  underway,  it  was 
an  attempt  to  gain  direction.  And  if  I  inquire  into  its  meaning,  I 
believe  I  must  tell  myself  that  this  also  involves  the  question  of  the 
clockhand's  direction. 
For  a  poem  is  not  timeless.  Certainly  it  lays  claim  to  infinity,  it 
seeks  to  reach  through  time  -  through  it,  not  above  and  beyond  it.  39 
This  is  a  fearful  moment.  It  is  the  moment  when  the  hour  begins  to  turn  on 
itself  We  are  at  a  moment  of  consumption.  It  is  the  becoming-ash  or  burning  up  of 
the  date:  on  the  hour,  in  the  hour  itself,  at  each  hour.  This  is  the  ever  present  threat  of 
39  Selected  Poem  and  Prose  of  Paul  Celan:  2001,  p.  395  -  396 154 
the  absolute  crypt:  the  moment  of  nonrecurrence,  unreadability,  amnesia  with  nothing 
left,  but  nonrecurrence  as  recurrence,  in  recurrence  itself 
We  are  at  the  moment  of  the  holocaust  of  each  hour.  Every  hour  within  the 
world  there  is  a  holocaust.  There  is  a  hell,  a  memory  of  the  all-consuming,  within  our 
consciousness.  To  quote  Derrida:  'every  hour  is  unique,  whether  it  comes  back,  and 
this  is  the  wheel  that  turns  on  itself,  or  whether,  the  last,  it  comes  no  more,  no  more 
than  the  sister,  its  own  the  same,  its  other  revenant 
40 
'. 
Go,  your  hour 
has  no  sisters,  you  are- 
are  at  home.  A  wheel,  slow, 
rolls  on  its  own,  the  spokes 
climb, 
1----1 
Years. 
Years,  years,  a  finger 
feels  down  and  up, 
Came,  came. 
Came  a  word,  came, 
came  through  the  night, 
wanted  to  shine,  wanted  to  shine.  41 
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In  this  poem  the  ash  and  the  night  call  to  each  other: 
Ash. 
Ash,  ash. 
Night. 
Night  -  and  -  night. 
We  have  spoken  of  the  commemorated  date  and  the  date  of  the 
commemoration,  the  commemorating.  How  do  you  distinguish  between  them  today? 
Or  on  the  anniversary  hour,  when  it  has  come?  Not  so  much  because  this  hour,  today, 
at  this  date,  this  dated  here  and  now  is  not  rigorously  the  same  as,  merely  analogous 
to,  the  other,  but  because  the  originary  date,  as  coded  mark  of  the  other  here-now,  was 
already  a  sort  of  fiction,  telling  of  singularity  only  in  the  fable  of  conventions  and 
generalities,  of  what  are  in  any  case  iterable  marks.  What  is  the  truth  of  this  fiction? 
Can  we  speak  of  the  untrue  truth  of  this  truth?  Are  we  at  the  shibboleth? 
The  Jewishness  of  Thought 
Derrida  states  that  'poetic  writing  offers  itself  up  to  dating  in  its  entirety,  42.  He 
points  out  that  Celan's  Bremen  address  hints  at  this  idea  also.  Here  Celan  suggests  the 
poem  is  always  en  route  from  a  place  toward  'something  open'  ('an  approachable 
you'),  and  it  makes  its  way  'across'  time,  it  is  never  'timeless'.  The  poem  is  cipher  of 
singularity,  offering  its  place  and  recalling  it,  offering  and  recalling  its  time  at  the  risk 
of  losing  them  in  the  holocaustic  generality  of  recurrence  and  the  readability  of  the 
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concept,  in  the  anniversary  repetition  of  the  unrepeatable.  Derrida  writes  that 
wherever  there  is  'a  signature  which  is  at  once  unique  and  iterable,  cryptic  and 
readable,  there  is  date'43 
. 
It  can  never  be  an  absolute  date,  in  the  same  way  that  there 
can  never  be  an  absolute  poem.  However,  date,  the  madness  of  when,  and  the 
terrifying  ambiguity  of  the  shibboleth,  the  sign  of  belonging  and  the  threat  of 
discrimination,  remains. 
A  date  discerns  and  concerns  a  place.  It  is  a  situation.  The  poet's  passion  is  for 
what  Derrida  calls  the  crypt.  It  occurs  every  time  a  singular  incision  marks  the 
language.  A  voice  of  a  poem  will  always  carry  beyond  the  singular  cut:  in  that  the  cut 
becomes  available  for  reading  for  those  who  have  no  part  in  the  event  or  the 
constellation  of  events  consigned  to  it,  for  those  excluded  from  partaking  but  who 
may  yet  thus  partake  and  impart.  And  thus  we  come  to  what  Deffida  calls  poetry's 
resembling  or  possessing  the  status  of  a  philosopheme.  Derrida  writes:  'Philosophy, 
hermeneutics,  and  poetics  can  only  come  into  being  within  idioms,  within  languages, 
the  body  of  events  and  dates  a  metalinguistic  overview  of  which  one  could  not  say  is 
impossible  -  but  rather  that  it  is  guaranteed,  from  within,  so  to  speak,  by  the  structure 
of  marking  off  which  pertains  to  the  date's  iterability,  that  is  to  say  its  essential 
annulment.  The  effacement  of  the  date  or  of  the  name  inside  the  ring:  here  is  the 
origin  of  philosophy,  of  hermeneutics,  of  poetics,  their  sendoff44  . 
Does  the  affirmation  of  Judaism  within  Celan  have  the  same  structure  as  that 
of  the  date?  Derrida  proceeds  to  discuss  what  the  statement  'We  are  all  Jews'  might  , 
mean.  It  suggests  a  notion  of  responsibility,  suggesting  that  we  take  it  Upon  ourselves. 
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It  suggests  an  ancient  rootedness,  and  an  accepted  memory  within  an  unchosen 
destination.  Is  there  an  essence  here?  Is  there  a  sense  of  belonging  and  of  partaking? 
Celan  recalls  the  common  theme  that  there  is  no  Jewish  property.  'Because  the 
Jew,  you  know,  what  does  he  have  that  is  really  his  own,  that  is  not  borrowed,  taken 
and  not  returned?  A5  The  hint  is  that  the  Jew  is  also  the  other,  myself  and  the  other;  I 
am  Jewish  in  saying:  the  Jew  is  the  other  who  has  no  essence,  who  has  nothing  of  his 
own  or  whose  own  essence  is  not  to  have  one.  Thus  we  have  at  one  and  the  same  time 
the  quote  from  Russian  poetess  Marina  Tsvetaeva  'All  poets  are  Jews',  with  its 
suggestion  of  the  alleged  universality  of  Jewish  witnessing,  and  the  incommunicable 
secret  of  the  Judaic  idiom.  We  have  the  singularity  of  'his  name,  his  unpronounceable 
namei,  46 
. 
What  then  of  the  Jew's  unpronouncable  name,  his  proper  name?  It  says 
shibholeth:  this  unpronouncable  name  that  cannot  be  said  by  one  who  does  not 
partake  of  the  covenant.  The  Ephraimites  know  what  one  ought  to  say  but  cannot.  If 
one  partakes  of  the  covenant  or  alliance  one  cannot  utter  the  name  of  God  also.  It  is 
unpronouncable  to  the  Jew,  who  can  say  it,  but  does  not,  a  fact  commanded  by  the 
law.  It  is  finally  the  name  of  the  Jew  which  the  non-Jew  has  trouble  pronouncing;  or, 
which  he  doesn't  wish  to  pronounce  or  derides  by  mispronounciation.  And  so  we  can 
say  that  its  unpronouncability  keeps  and  destroys  the  name.  It  can  keep  it  like  the 
name  of  God,  or  doom  it  to  annihilation  among  the  ashes.  And  so  Derrida  writes: 
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4apparently  different  or  contradictory,  these  two  possibilities  can  always  cross  the 
border  and  exchange  with  one  another'47  . 
The  Jew  and  the  name  Jew  come  to  exchange  themselves  with  the  shibboleth. 
They  are  both  in  the  name  of  the  other,  both  singular  and  universal.  Derrida  writes: 
'witness  to  the  universal  by  virtue  of  absolute  singularity,  by  virtue  of  and  in  the  name 
of  the  other,  the  stranger,  you  toward  whom  I  must  take  a  step  which,  without 
bringing  me  nearer  to  you,  without  exchanging  myself  with  you,  without  being 
assured  passage,  lets  the  word  pass  and  assigns  us,  if  not  to  the  one,  at  least  to  the 
same"8.  For  Derrida  we  are  dealing  with  the  passage  of  the  other,  toward  the  other  - 
respect  of  the  same,  of  a  same  that  respects  the  otherness  of  the  other.  In 
'Sprachgitter'  we  find  Celan  choose  the  word  Tassat'  to  say  'We  are  strangers', 
'Passat'  being  the  name  of  a  wind: 
(Were  I  like  you.  Were  you  like  me. 
Did  we  not  stand 
under  one  tradewind? 
We  are  strangers. 
)49 
They  are  both  strangers.  We  are  both  strangers  to  each  other.  Are  we  both 
strangers  then  to  outside  parties? 
We  find  in  Celan  a  temptation  to  designate  the  Judaic,  Jewishness  -  yours  and 
not  only  mine,  as  always  something  inappropriable  of  the  other's  -  found  for  example 
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in  the  poem  'Zurich,  zurn  Storchen'.  We  find  Celan  use  the  words  'I  and  You'  in 
complex  ways.  You  can  be  and  are  a  me.  So  the  word  You,  may  be  addressed  to  the 
other  as  well  as  to  myself,  to  oneself  as  other. 
Of  too  much  was  our  talk,  of 
too  little.  Of  the  You 
and  You-Again,  of 
how  clarity  troubles,  of 
Jewishness,  of 
your  God. 
I 
... 
I 
Of  your  God  was  our  talk,  I  spoke 
against  him,...  50 
The  "you',  the  'yours'  may  be  addressed  to  the  other  as  Jew  but  also  to  the  self 
as  other,  as  another  Jew  or  as  other  than  Jew.  'The  Lock  Gate'  addresses  you,  and 
your  mourning,  'all  this  mourninglof  yours".  What  has  been  lost,  and  is  beyond  a 
trace,  is  the  word,  a  word  which  opens  like  a  shibboleth,  on  what  is  most  intimate. 
This  lost  word,  the  word  that  is  to  be  mourned,  is  not  only  the  word  'that  had 
remained  with  me':  'sister'.  It  is  also  the  word  that  opens  the  possibility  of  mourning 
what  has  been  lost  beyond  a  trace  (the  exterminated  family,  the  incineration  of  the 
family  name  in  the  figure  of  the  sister  -  for  the  word  is  'sister'  -  at  the  final  hour 
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which  no  longer  has  a  sister  -  'your  hour/  has  no  sisters').  It  is  the  very  word  which 
grants  access  to  Jewish  mourning:  'Kaddish'.  This  word  addressed  me,  sought  me, 
like  the  hour's  interpellation;  it  came  before  me,  it  sought  me  out,  it  took  the 
initiative.  Then,  I  lost  it.  Like  the  word  that  had  remained  with  me:  'sister'.  I  lost  the 
word  that  had  remained  with  me,  I  lost  the  one  that  sought  me  out  to  mourn  the  one 
that  had  remained  with  me: 
To  a  mouth 
for  which  it  was  one  of  a  thousand 
I  lost  - 
I  lost  a  word 
that  had  remained  with  me: 
sister. 
To 
the  worship  of  many  gods 
I  lost  a  word  that  was  looking  for  me: 
a'h. 
52 
Celan  is  imagining  the  worst  kind  of  loss.  He  imagines  crossing  the  line,  the 
boundary  where  mourning  itself  is  denied  us,  the  interiorization  of  the  other  in 
memory,  the  preserving  of  the  other  in  the  sepulchre  or  epitaph.  Celan  names  the 
incinerated  beyond  of  the  date,  words  lost  without  sepulchre.  Once  dead,  and  without 
sepulchre,  these  words  of  mouming  which  are  themselves  incinerated  may  yet  return. 
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They  come  back  then  as  phantoms.  One  hears  them  roaming  about  the  stelae: 
like  unsepulchered  words, 
roaming 
in  the  orbit  of  attained 
goals  and  stelae  and  cradles.  53 
Celan  mentions  the  spectral  errancy  of  words.  This  spectral  return  is  partaken 
of  by  all  words,  from  their  first  emergence.  Derrida  writes:  'What  one  calls  poetry  or 
literature,  art  itself 
... 
is  nothing  perhaps  but  an  intense  familiarity  with  the  ineluctable 
54 
originarity  of  the  specter'  . 
We  can  translate  it  into  the  ineluctable  loss  of  the  origin. 
It  is  the  moment  of  mourning,  and  the  experience  of  mourning. 
The  Circumcised  Mind 
Celan  has  mentioned  the  unique  event  of  circumcision  that  marks  the 
legitimate  entry  of  the  Jew  into  his  community.  We  have  the  phrase  'it  carries  across/ 
55 
the  wound-read'  . 
We  have  a  passing  beyond,  over  that  which  is  read  to  the  quick,  to 
the  point  of  bleeding  and  wounding.  The  cipher  is  painfully  inscribed  on  the  body 
itself  It  is  readable  and  unreadable.  The  literal  word  'circumcision'  appears  rarely  in 
the  body  of  Celan's  writings.  However,  Derrida  writes  'the  tropic  of  circumcision 
56 
disposes  cuts,  caesuras,  ciphered  alliances,  and  wounded  rings  throughout  the  text'  . 
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He  argues  that  'it  is  tied  to  both  the  differential  marks  and  the  destination  of  language: 
the  inaccessibility  of  the  other  returns  there  in  the  same,  dates  and  sets  turning  the 
ring, 
57 
What  does  Celan  mean  by  saying  'all  poets  are  Jews'?  What  the  trope  comes 
to,  then,  is  locating  the  Jew  not  only  as  a  poet  but  also  in  every  man  circumcised  by 
language  or  led  to  circumcise  a  language.  We  have  three  basic  significations,  for  the 
word  'circumcision': 
(1).  The  cut  which  incises  the  male  sexual  member,  entering  and  passing  around  it  to 
fonn  a  circumvenient  ring; 
(2).  A  name  given  to  the  moment  of  covenant  or  alliance  and  of  legitimate  entry  into 
the  community:  a  shibboleth  which  cuts  and  divides,  then  distinguishes,  for  example, 
by  virtue  of  the  language  and  the  name  which  is  given  to  each  of  them,  one 
circumcision  from  another,  the  Jewish  from  the  Egyptian  operation  from  which  it  is 
said  to  derive,  or  indeed,  the  Muslim  operation  which  resembles  it,  or  many  others. 
(3).  The  experience  of  blessing  and  of  purification. 
As  Celan  develops  the  idea,  those  who  undergo  or  participate  in  a  certain 
experience  might  well  be  called  Jews.  And  that  experience  might  be  legitimately 
referred  to  as  a  type  of  circumcision.  We  can  say  that  if  all  the  poets  are  Jews,  they  are 
all,  then,  circumcisers,  or  circumcised.  Celan  is  keen  to  focus  in  on  all  ciphered 
wounds. 
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What  does  Celan  mean  by  'no  one's  circumcision'?  The  evocation  of  the 
exterminated  race  designates  the  race  and  root  of  no  one:  black  erection  in  the  sky, 
verge  and  testicle,  race  and  root  of  no  one.  Uprooting  of  the  race  and  the  sex  in 
'Radix,,  Matrix': 
Who, 
who  was  it,  that 
lineage,  the  murdered,  that  looms 
black  in  the  sky: 
rod  and  bulb- 
(Root. 
Abraham's  root.  Jesse's  root.  No  one's 
root  -0 
ours. 
58 
We  have  the  command  in  Celan  to  circumcise  the  word.  The  verb  here  has  the 
word  as  its  object,  it  speaks  about  an  operation  to  be  performed  on  the  verburn,  on  the 
word.  Its  complement  is  the  world,  or  rather  the  Word.  We  have  a  reference  to  Rabbi 
Low: 
Rebbe,  I  gnashed  my  teeth,  Rebbe 
Loew: 
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cise 
this  one's 
word  ... 
59 
This  word  given  to  be  circumcised  for  someone,  this  word  must  be  an  opened 
word.  Open  like  a  wound.  Open  like  a  door.  A  door  open  to  the  stranger,  to  the 
neighbour,  and  the  guest  and  to  whoever.  Open  to  the  one  who  will  come.  Maybe 
open  to  the  monstrous  creature.  Monstrous  because  beyond  anticipation,  form  and 
norm,  beyond  every  conceivable  and  known  genre. 
Is  there  a  reference  here  to  the  prophet  Elijah?  Is  he  the  one  to  whom 
hospitality  is  due?  He  may  come  at  any  moment.  And  then  in  Derrida  we  find:  'He 
may  cause  the  event  of  his  coming  to  happen  at  each  instant'60.  Elijah  is  not  only  the 
guest,  the  one  to  whom,  as  relationship  itself,  the  door  of  the  word  must  be  opened;  he 
is  not  only  or  simply  a  messianic  and  eschatological  prophet;  according  to  tradition 
Elijah  is  by  God's  command  to  be  present  at  all  circumcisions,  each  time,  every  time. 
He  watches  over  them.  The  one  who  holds  the  circumcised  infant  must  be  seated  on 
what  is  known  as  Elijah's  chair. 
So,  here  in  this  place,  in  the  poem,  the  monster,  or  Elijah,  the  guest  or  the 
other,  stands  before  the  door,  at  the  poem's  first  step,  on  the  threshold  of  the  text.  The 
poem's  title  in  translation  is:  'To  one  who  stood  outside  the  door...  61  He  stands 
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before  the  door,  as  before  the  law.  We  think  of  Kafka's  obtuse  parable  'Before  the 
Law'.  The  door  and  the  law  are  intimately  connected  in  Jewish  tradition. 
The  '1'  of  the  poem,  the  poet,  (as  figure  for  you  and  me  maybe?  ),  as 
representative  anyway  of  'all'  those  who  'are  Jews'.  He  opens  the  door  to  him,  but  the 
door  turns  into  the  word.  What  he  opens  to  him  is  not  the  door,  but  the  word: 
To  one  who  stood  outside  the  door,  one 
evening: 
to  him 
I  opened  my  word  -:  ) 
Can  we  read  this  poem,  then,  as  an  allegory?  We  remember  that  an  allegory 
bears  the  word  for  the  other,  to  the  other  or  from  the  other.  The  poem  follows  the 
vicissitude  of  the  hours.  The  times  in  their  turns  are  marked.  The  vicissitude  begins 
one  evening  in  the  Occident  of  the  poem  'eines  Abends'.  The  poet,  the  one  who  says 
opens  the  word  and  addresses  himself  to  the  Rabbi,  to  the  Mohel,  to  the  one  whom 
he  appoints  as  circumciser  since  he  says  to  him  'circumcise'.  What  does  he  ask  of 
him?  To  close  the  door  of  the  evening  and  to  open  the  door  of  the  morning.  If  the  door 
speaks  the  word,  he  now,  once  the  word  is  circumcised,  asks  it  for  the  word  of 
morning,  the  Oriental  word,  the  poem  of  the  origin. 
And  Rebbe,  slam  shut  evening's  door. 166 
Fip  open  morning's,  Re-  62 
Here  we  witness  a  violent  opening  and  closing.  Celan's  Gennan  suggests  the 
opening  of  something  brusquely,  rapidly  and  wide.  It  also  has  connotations  of 
breaking  something  open,  to  rend  in  one  stroke,  like  a  veil.  There  is  a  hint  also  of  a 
door  being  slammed,  of  something  brutal.  As  though  in  someone's  direction, 
signifying  its  closing  to  someone.  As  for  Re-,  the  name  interrupted  in  the  final 
caesura,  the  first  syllable  of  an  appellation  that  is  not  completed  and  finally  remains  in 
the  mouth,  the  Rabbi  cut  in  two.  It  also  carries  a  connotation  of  the  Egyptian  God  as 
well,  the  sun  or  light,  at  the  opening  of  the  'morning  door'.  This  poem  is  the 
becoming-poetic  of  the  word;  of  the  words  becoming  Jewish,  if  'all  poets  are  Jews'.  It 
attempts  to  describe  the  becoming  circumcised  of  the  word  of  origin. 
Circumcision  will  always  remain,  inescapably,  a  matter  of  the  body.  As  much 
of  the  physical  body  as  the  corpus  of  poems  Paul  Celan  bequeathed  to  us.  It  offers 
itself  for  writing  and  for  reading  on  the  body.  Or  rather:  the  sense  of  the  senses,  the 
body,  offers  itself  for  thinking,  signifying,  interpreting  thus,  as  it  is  revealed  through 
this  response  to  the  question:  'What  is  the  body  proper,  said  to  be  proper?  ':  a  place  of 
circumcision. 
In  the  Bible,  on  the  subject  of  circumcision,  the  opposition  of  the  clean  and  the 
unclean,  the  proper  and  the  improper,  the  pure  and  the  impure,  coincides  often  with 
that  of  the  circumcised  and  the  uncircumcised,  extending  without  limit  the  semantic 
62  Glottal  Stop:  2000,  p.  10 167 
field  of  circumcision  and  thus  defining  it  only  at  the  limits  of  definition,  of  limitation, 
of  circumscription  itself,  which  is  to  say,  conferring  on  it  a  singular  indefiniteness. 
The  circumcision  of  a  word  is  intimately  related,  always,  to  the  body.  There  is 
then  an  essential  analogy  between  this  event,  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  diacritical 
difference  between  shibboleth  and  sihboleth,  on  the  other.  For,  it  is  in  the  body,  by 
reason  of  a  certain  impotence  coming  over  their  vocal  organs,  but  an  impotence  of  the 
bodyproper,  of  the  already  cultivated  body,  limited  by  a  barrier  neither  organic  nor 
natural,  that  the  Ephraimites  experienced  their  inability  to  pronounce  what  they 
nonetheless  knew  ought  to  be  pronounced  shibboleth  -  and  not  sibboleth. 
So  we  have  an  'unpronounceable  name'  for  some,  shibboleth  is  a  circumcised 
word.  For  this  one,  Rabbi,  circumcise  the  word.  Give  him  the  word  of  partaking, 
impart  it  to  him,  also,  to  this  one  also. 
The  word  which  is  to  be  circumcised:  here  it  is  first  of  all,  opened,  like  a  door, 
offered,  given,  or  at  least  promised  to  the  other.  The  other  remains  indeterminate  - 
unnamed  in  the  poem.  He  has  no  identifiable  face,  he  simply  has  a  face  since  he  must 
see  the  door,  and  receive  the  word,  even  if  this  face  remains  invisible.  It  never  shows 
itself  in  the  poem.  It  is  no  one,  anyone,  the  neighbour  or  the  stranger,  for  with  the 
other  it  comes  to  the  same. 
The  one  who  is  not  yet  named,  the  one  who  perhaps  awaits  his  name,  awaits 
its  bestowal  by  a  circumcision,  is  the  one-and-only,  the  unique,  this  one.  He  draws  the 
whole  poem  towards  him.  It  is  to  him,  to  this  one,  that  one  must  open,  give, 168 
circumcise,  for  him  that  the  living  Nothing  must  be  inscribed  in  the  heart:  to  him,  for 
him,  this  one. 
to  him 
I  opened  my  word 
[ 
... 
I 
cise 
this  one's 
word,  write 
the  living 
nothing- 
ness  into 
this  one's 
heart,  spread 
this  one's 
two  crippled  fingers  into  a  healer's 
benediction. 
This  one's. 
)63 
The  offering  of  this  word  for  circumcision  is  indeed  the  giving  of  a  word,  of 
one9s  word,  since  it  is  said  that  'I  opened  my  word'.  Given  word,  promise, 
engagement,  signature,  date,  saving  word  also  in  the  form  of  a  poem  or  a  decision. 
This  word  of  opening  permits  one  to  pass  through  the  doorway.  It  is  yet  another 
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shibboleth,  the  very  shibboleth  at  the  origin  of  all  the  others,  and  yet  one  among 
others,  in  a  given  language. 
The  shibboleth  is  given  or  promised  by  me  to  the  singular  other,  'this  one'  that 
he  may  partake  of  it  and  enter,  or  leave,  that  he  may  pass  through  the  doorway,  across 
the  line,  the  border,  the  threshold.  This  word  also  asks.  It  asks  intercession,  or  rather  it 
intercedes  with  the  Rabbi  -  still  an  other  -  that  he  might  bestow  him,  the  third,  the 
value  of  circumcision  on  this  word  -  the  shibboleth  of  the  community  before  the  law, 
the  sign  of  the  covenant.  The  Rabbi  is  a  wise  man  invested  with  this  right;  he  has  the 
knowledge,  and  the  power  to  circumcise  the  word.  He  is  the  guardian  and  the 
guarantor;  it  is  through  him  that  the  transmission  of  the  shibboleth  passes  just  as  the 
doorway  is  crossed.  And  this  doorway  is  nothing  other  than  circumcision  as 
shibboleth,  the  place  of  decision  for  the  right  of  access  to  the  legitimate  community, 
the  covenant  or  alliance,  the  given  name  of  a  singular  individual,  but  the  dated  name, 
singular  but  inscribed  right  on  the  body,  on  a  given  day  in  a  genealogical 
classification. 
It  appears  that  the  intercessor  seems  to  hold  all  the  powers  and  all  the  rights, 
whether  one  thinks  of  the  poem's  intercession,  of  mine,  or  of  the  Rabbi's.  This  -a 
shibboleth  -  intercedes.  Here,  the  power  and  knowledge  are  annulled  of  themselves. 
The  knowledge  and  the  power  of  Rabbi  Low  are  annulled,  his  knowing  -  being  able  - 
to  circumcise,  which  amount  in  truth  to  the  same  thing,  which  are  but  one  -  are 
immediately  annihilated  in  the  object-less.  They  know  how  and  are  able  to  infinitely, 
but  must  also  infinitely  annihilate  themselves.  For  the  writing  of  circumcision  which  I 
ask  of  him,  for  which  I  intercede  with  the  intercessor,  is  a  writing  ofNothing.  It 170 
performs  its  operation  on  Nothing,  an  incisive  surgery  which,  to  the  point  of  bleeding, 
to  the  point  of  wounding,  embeds  the  inscription  of  Nothing  in  the  flesh,  in  the  living 
word,  in  the  flesh  of  the  pronounceable  and  circumcised  word.  In  Celan's  writing 
there  is  a  proximity  of  words  for  writing,  slicing,  inscribing,  cutting  and  separating. 
One  gives  the  word,  one's  word,  in  inscribing  this  Nothing  in  the  heart;  thus  one 
should  not  cut  in,  but  on  the  contrary  allow  the  word  passage. 
There  is  in  Celan  the  echo  of  Heidegger;  in  the  poem  'Todtnauberg  64  a  hint  of 
the  question  of  Nothing  and  the  meaning  of  being.  There  is  the  hint  of  the  truth  of  a 
being  which  passes  through  the  experience  of  Nothing.  We  have  in  Celan  the  hint 
always  of  no  one's  circumcision,  the  word's  circumcision  by  the  incision  of  Nothing 
in  the  circumcised  heart  of  the  other,  of  this  one,  you. 
What  is  meant  by  the  demand  to  circumcise  the  word  for  him,  to  circumcise 
his  word?  More  than  one  can  mean-to-say,  more  and  less  than  this  or  that  meaning, 
more  or  less  than  this  determination.  Circumcision  is  also  a  determination:  it  defines 
and  it  decides.  But  to  ask  for  circumcision  is  not  to  ask  for  something  determinate,  a 
meaning  or  an  o  ect. 
The  circumcised  word  isfirst  ofall  written,  at  once  both  incised  and  excised  in 
a  body,  which  may  be  the  body  of  a  language  and  which  in  any  case  always  binds  the 
body  to  language:  the  word  which  is  entered  into,  wounded  in  order  to  be  what  it  is, 
the  word  cut  into,  written  because  cut  into,  caesured  in  its  origin,  with  the  poem. 
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The  circumcised  word  is,  next  ofall,  readable,  starting  from  nothing,  but 
readable,  to  he  read  to  the  point  of  wounding  and  to  the  point  of  bleeding.  This 
circumcised  word  grants  access  to  the  community,  to  the  covenant  or  alliance,  to  the 
partaking  of  a  language,  in  a  language.  The  Rabbi  becomes  then  a  poet,  revealing  the 
poet  in  him.  Celan  explores  the  question:  how  can  the  German  language  receive 
circumcision  at  this  poem's  date,  that  is  to  say,  following  the  holocaust,  the  solution 
that  was  the  final  cremation,  the  ash  of  all?  How  is  one  to  bless  these  ashes  in 
German? 
And  then,  as  a  mark  at  once  both  readable  and  secret,  a  mark  of  belonging  and 
of  exclusion,  as  the  wound  of  partaking,  the  circumcised  word  reminds  us  also  of  the 
double  edge  of  a  shibboleth.  As  the  mark  of  a  covenant  or  alliance,  it  also  intervenes, 
it  interdicts,  it  signifies  the  sentence  of  exclusion,  of  discrimination,  indeed  of 
extermination.  It  may  be  turned  against  oneself:  then  it  is  the  circumcised  who  are 
proscribed  or  held  at  the  border,  excluded  from  the  community,  put  to  death,  or 
reduced  to  ashes:  at  the  mere  sight,  in  the  mere  name,  at  the  first  reading  of  a  wound. 
How  does  one  guard  oneself  against  it?  With  Nothing. 
The  circumcision  of  the  word  is  not  dated  in  history.  It  calls  forth  the  date.  It 
opens  the  word  to  the  other,  and  the  door,  it  opens  history  and  the  poem  and 
philosophy  and  hermeneutics  and  religion.  Of  all  that  calls  itself  -  of  the  name  and  the 
blessing  of  the  name,  of  yes  and  of  no,  it  sets  turning  the  ring,  to  affirm  or  to  annul. 172 
Chapter  Foun 
'Out  to  An  Other  Side:  Poetry  as  a  Way  to  the 
Transcendental  Other 
Before  proceeding  to  a  discussion  of  poems  by  Seamus  Heaney  we  will  look  at 
poems  by  two  very  different  writers.  The  poet  Cathal  0'  Searcaigh  comes  from 
Donegal  on  the  North  West  coast  of  Ireland  and  writes  in  Gaelic.  The  second  is  the 
American  contemporary  poet  Adrienne  Rich.  The  first  poem  from  0'  Searcaigh  is 
called  'Breakthrough': 
Sound  asleep,  you  put  up 
No  defences,  no  wall, 
So  at  night,  I  walk 
Your  mind's  landscape, 
Its  sky  more  naturally  blue 
Than  the  sash  God's  mother  wore. 
On  the  other  side  of  a  word 
There  is  such  a  view.  ' 
This  is  a  poem  drawn  from  the  intimacy  of  the  boudoir.  We  identify  its  context 
fairly  quickly;  it  is  a  pillow  poem.  It  is  significant  that  it  is  so  intimate.  We  are  at  a 173 
point  where  normal  boundaries  break  down.  There  is  a  possibility  of  deep  communion 
which  human  romantic  love  offers  us  the  greatest  taste  of  The  body  is  one  of  our 
primary  boundaries.  Interestingly  0'  Searcaigh  claims  the  de-limiting  power  of  this 
fact  is  challenged,  removed,  rendered  less  powerful  in  the  moment  of  human 
intimacy.  So  he  can  walk  the  'mind's  lanscape'  of  his  lover.  And  how  does  0' 
Searcaigh  envision  this  space?  It  is  a  deep  blue  -  bluer  than  the  virginal  blue  of  Mary 
the  Mother  of  God.  So  we  are  talking  about  positivity  and  purity.  There  is  a  quality  of 
absoluteness  about  this  blueness  also,  because  it  is  associated  with  the  divine.  We  re- 
call  that  0'  Searcaigh  is  in  a  very  positive  frame  of  mind  here  lying  beside  his 
sleeping  lover.  The  poem  argues  that  this  is  the  space  that  poetry  itself  emerges  from. 
0'  Searcaigh  introduces  a  very  strange  idea,  alien,  apparently  to  his  overall 
preoccupation.  He  says  poetry,  or  language  tries  to  capture  the  plenitude  he  has 
touched  on  here.  It  is  the  view  on  the  far  side  of  a  word.  So  there  is  a  gap  to  be 
traversed,  there  is  an  echo  to  be  heard,  a  promise  to  be  fulfilled  and  it  is  poetry  that 
signals  that  for  us.  In  another  translation  the  suggestion  is  of  a  melody,  a  music  where 
word  and  feeling  are  united,  the  distance  normally  or  typically  haunting  them  is 
close  own. 
2 
In  this  context  another  poem  of  0'  Searcaigh's  provocatively  titled 
'Transubstantiation'  is  worth  examining: 
Between  the  thought  and  the  word 
Are  regions  of  ice  and  fog; 
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But  all  my  life  I'll  be 
Shattering  the  frost,  scattering  the  fog 
Stirring  and  sunning 
th  my  heart's  fiery  rays 
So  that  you'll  flower  one  day 
You  that  are  only  a  shadow.  3 
0'  Searcaigh  paints  the  moment  that  exists  in  between.  The  moment  of 
poetry's  birth  is  when  the  fog  and  the  ice  are  dispersed  by  the  sun's  rays  flowing  from 
the  poet's  heart,  in  an  attempt  to  bring  the  moment  of  shadow  to  light.  What  exists 
between  the  thought  and  the  word  is  a  nebulous  region  within  which  we  cannot  dwell 
comfortably.  In  more  contemporary  terms,  is  0'  Searcaigh  speaking  of  the  gap  that 
exists  in  the  realm  between  signifier  and  signified?  0'  Searcaigh  suggests  a  moment 
of  nothingness.  For  Blanchot  it  is  the  moment  of  absence.  For  0'  Searcaigh  the 
continual  poetic  task  is  to  venture  into  this  domain  and  bring  the  poem  to  light,  to 
make  it  live,  to  allow  it  to  be.  And  he  has  succeeded  in  doing  that  here.  We  can  enter 
into  the  moment  of  nothingness  suggested  by  his  terms  'fog'  and  'ice'  and  dwell 
there.  So  his  poetry  has  succeeded.  We  can  imagine  the  moment  of  nothingness, 
approach  it  and  dwell  within  it,  all  through  the  transubstantive  poetic  world  and  word, 
where  those  terms  are  tautological. 
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Adrienne  Rich's  poem  comes  from  a  collection  suggestively  titled  The  Dream 
ofa  Common  Language:  Poems  1974  -  1977: 
Your  silence  today  is  a  pond  where  drowned  things  live 
I  want  to  see  raised  dripping  and  brought  into  the  sun. 
It's  not  my  own  face  I  see  there,  but  other  faces, 
even  your  face  at  another  age. 
Whatever's  lost  there  is  needed  by  both  of  us- 
a  watch  of  old  gold,  a  water-blurred  fever  chart, 
a  key....  Even  the  silt  and  pebbles  of  the  bottom 
deserve  their  glint  of  recognition.  I  fear  this  silence, 
this  inarticulate  life.  I'm  waiting 
for  a  wind  that  will  gently  open  this  sheeted  water 
for  once,  and  show  me  what  I  can  do 
for  you,  who  have  often  made  the  unnameable 
nameable,  for  others,  even  for  me.  4 
Rich  is  talking  about  the  nature  of  poetic  activity  here.  The  implication  of  her 
imagery  is  that  she  sees  it  as  a  sacramental,  certainly  sacred  process.  She  creates  the 
idea  of  depth  through  the  use  of  water  imagery.  The  nothingness  that  exists  before  the 
poetic  moment  and  which  always  threatens  it  from  the  outside,  at  the  edges  of  poetic 
utterance,  is  vast,  has  a  surface  and  depth  to  it.  Rich  succeeds  in  suggesting  its  spatial 
dimensions.  And  yet,  paradoxically,  drowned  things  live  there,  waiting  to  be 
retrieved.  Items,  useless  elements  from  a  past  itinerary  wait  there,  exist,  live,  awaiting 
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retrieval  by  the  poetic  word  which  is  a  type  of  personal,  maybe  racial,  memory.  It  is  a 
necessity  that  we  enter  into  this  space.  We  need  to  name  even  the  most 
inconsequential  things.  What  is  normally  passed  over  must  not  be  missed  in  our 
naming  of  creation.  Nothing  exists  outside  the  poetic  word. 
The  one  moment  of  dread  sounded  in  the  poem  is  the  fear  of  silence,  of  not 
being  able  to  utter  the  poetic  word.  The  mouth  of  Orpheus  must  never  be  silenced.  It 
is  the  voice  of  the  race,  its  past,  present  and  future  depends  on  the  ability  of  this  poetic 
word  to  name  the  world  within  which  it  exists  and  the  nothingness  from  out  of  which 
it  came:  which  always  shadows  it.  There  is  a  continual,  creative  and  constructive 
battle  going  on  between  the  poetic  naming  and  the  nothingness  that  precedes  it  and 
from  which  it  proceeds.  Wind  is  a  traditional  term  for  poetic  inspiration,  sanctioned 
by  the  Judaeo-Christian  tradition  also  as  an  image  of  the  holy  spirit.  The  poet  awaits 
this  moment  of  visitation  in  order  to  be  able  to  name.  Is  the  'you'  in  that  poem  a 
partner,  a  lover  of  the  poet?  Or  is  it  inspiration  itself  which  is  known  in  intimate 
terms?  Again,  the  key  suggestion  is  one  Of  similarity,  in  the  sense  of  familiarity. 
Something  will  affive  whi.  ch  you  will  know  and  be  able  to  name,  and  help  you  to 
name  thereby.  The  struggle  is  always  with  bringing  things  to  the  surface,  to  the  light, 
to  clarity  and  understanding  by  naming. 
Some  poems  by  Seamus  Heaney  are  informative  in  this  context.  The  first 
comes  from  his  sequence  'Glanmore  Sonnets'.  It  is  number  four,  and  a  poem  taken 
from  his  1979  collection  Field  Work. 177 
Glanmore  Sonnets 
IV 
I  used  to  lie  with  an  ear  to  the  line 
For  that  way,  they  said,  there  should  come  a  sound 
Escaping  ahead,  an  iron  tune 
Of  flange  and  piston  Pitched  along  the  ground, 
But  I  never  heard  that.  Always,  instead, 
Struck  couplings  and  shuntings  two  miles  away 
Lifted  over  the  woods.  The  head 
Of  a  horse  swirled  back  from  a  gate,  a  grey 
Turnover  of  haunch  and  mane,  and  I'd  look 
Up  to  the  cutting  where  she'd  soon  appear. 
Two  fields  back,  in  the  house,  small  ripples  shook 
Silently  across  our  drinking  water 
(As  they  are  shaking  now  across  my  heart) 
5  And  vanished  into  where  they  seemed  to  start. 
The  circumstances  described  in  this  poem  are  easy  enough  to  sketch  in.  The 
poet  had  been  told  to  listen  to  the  train  coming  by  feeling  its  vibrations  through  the 
railway  tracks.  The  poet  disputes  what  he  has  been  told,  and  received  wisdom  is  under 
question.  You  must  test  it  for  yourself  He  says  he  heard  the  train  coming  over  the 
trees.  There  is  an  interesting  play  or  reversal  at  work  here,  between  the  ground  and  the 
air  as  images  for  transmitting  presence,  between  the  below  and  the  above.  While  Rich 
favoured  the  underground  currencies  of  rivers,  the  lake  and  the  sea,  Seamus  Heaney  is 
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opting  for  the  air,  its  very  airiness  and  lightness  is  the  medium  of  travel  for  any 
message  of  significance.  Heaney  conveys  brilliantly  how  you  can  know  something 
before  it  arrives  by  its  registering  in  the  sensible  things  around  you,  in  its  vibrations. 
Its  being  is  announced  despite  its  absence.  Even  the  sensitive  although  unintelligent 
world  can  register  this.  Thus  the  image  of  the  horse  that  is  sensitive  to  and  re-acts, 
pre-empts,  is  aware  of,  the  oncoming  train  and  announces  this  moment  to  the  poet. 
Even  two  fields  back,  registering  distance  in  local  currency,  the  presence  of  the  train 
is  anticipated  in  the  rippling  water  which  also  registers  in  the  poet's  heart.  What  is 
interesting  to  note  is  the  'now'  of  that  second  last  line.  Is  Heaney  talking  about  the 
later  moment  of  poetic  creation  which  has  come  after  the  original,  originary  event  but 
which  still  retains  its  innate  force,  or  presence?  And  then  we  have  the  stunning  final 
image:  'And  vanished  into  where  they  seemed  to  start'.  And  so  we  have  the  image  of 
nothingness  and  clearance;  what  seems  to  allow  being  to  emerge  is  the  moment  of  its 
disappearance.  To  quote  Derrida  on  Heidegger  from  Aporias:  death  'signifies  the 
possibility  of  the  measureless  impossibility  of  existence  6.  The  poem  itself  exists,  is, 
can  be  read  and  understood,  just  as  the  image  that  is  inscribed  within  it  contains  the 
idea  of  its  own  disappearance. 
The  second  poem  from  Heaney  comes  from  his  sequence  of  sonnets 
'Clearances".  from  his  1987  volume  The  Haw  Lantern.  This  entire  cycle  deals  with 
the  death  of  significant  members  of  Heaney's  family,  particularly  his  mother  and  a 
favourite  aunt: 
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Clearances 
II 
Polished  linoleum  shone  there.  Brass  taps  shone. 
The  china  cups  were  very  white  and  big  - 
An  unchipped  set  with  sugar  bowl  and  jug. 
The  kettle  whistled.  Sandwich  and  tea  scone 
Were  present  and  correct.  In  case  it  run, 
The  butter  must  be  kept  out  of  the  sun. 
And  don't  be  dropping  crumbs.  Don't  tilt  your  chair. 
Don't  reach.  Don't  point.  Don't  make  noise  when  you  stir. 
It  is  Number  5,  New  Row,  Land  of  the  Dead, 
Where  grandfather  is  rising  from  his  place 
With  spectacles  pushed  back  on  a  clean  bald  head 
To  welcome  a  bewildered  homing  daughter 
Before  sh6  even  knocks.  'What's  this?  What's  thisT 
And  they  sit  down  in  the  shining  room  together.  7 
In  this  poem  Heaney  creates  and  re-creates  a  lost  world.  Simon  Critchley 
identifies  the  poetic  trope  prosopopeia  as  one  in  which  an  absent  or  imaginary  person 
is  presented  as  speaking  and  acting8-  He  speaks  of  this  as  revealing  a  failure  of 
representation,  an  inability  to  convey  the  reality  of  death  because  it  is  a  moment  when 
consciousness  disappears.  And  it  is  a  failure  of  presence.  We  will  read  Heaney  closely 
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bearing  this  reflection  in  mind,  with  the  view  that  Heaney  still  creates  a  world  that  is 
there  and  into  which  we  can  enter  and  comprehend.  So  we  enter  a  transcendental 
space  that  is  meaningful  and  can  be  comprehended.  It  exists  in  its  own  unique  space. 
Heaney  suggests  the  world  his  mother  grew  up  in.  It  is  a  very  ordered  world  where 
everything  had  its  proper  place,  from  the  children  to  the  china.  There  is  a  luminosity 
announced  in  this  world  from  the  word  go,  or  at  least  from  the  use  of  the  word  'shone' 
twice  in  the  opening  line.  A  trait  of  Heaney's  work  is  the  focus  on  the  particular  and 
the  tangible.  We  recognize  the  scones,  the  butter,  the  tea  set  and  the  sun.  The  moral 
world  is  created  or  suggested  also,  the  world  apart  from  the  material  world  that  the 
child  inhabited,  through  phrases  like  'Don't  run',  etc.  The  surprising  shift  is  the  sestet 
when  we  realize  that  the  place  described  in  the  octet  does  not  exist  any  longer.  It  is  the 
'land  of  the  dead'.  Heaney's  grandfather  is  rising  to  meet  his  spectral  daughter, 
although  he  is  a  spectre  himself  There  is  a  moment  of  recognition,  a  meeting  point 
which  the  poem  can  only  hint  at  and  not  describe  where  both  expect  the  arrival  of 
something  they  will  know,  have  expected  and  yet  not  have  understood  or  grasped  with 
the  intellect,  or  conceptual  understanding.  The  poem  suggests  that  the  world  of  the 
unknown  will  be  recognized  and  understood. 
Heaney  has  created  two  tangible  worlds.  Through  the  real  he  has  suggested  the 
liminal,  the  unreal,  the  disappeared.  We  can  enter  into  or  reside  in  the  world  of  the 
octet.  It  is  the  world  we  know,  yet  it  is  only,  although  a  significant  only,  the  world  of 
a  poem.  So  there  are  layers  of  removal.  We  have  the  poetic  re-creation  of  a  world,  of 
the  real  world  that  is  the  world  of  the  disappeared,  and  then,  in  the  sestet  we  have  the 
description  of  an  afterworld  in  terms  drawn  from  this  world,  a  world  that  we  don't 
portrait,  a  still  life,  or  whatever.  Thus,  representations  of  death  are  misrepresentations,  or  rather  they 
are  representations  of  an  absence'. 181 
know  yet.  Poetry,  the  innate  argument  of  the  poem  deals  with  the  language  of 
presence  and  absence,  is  a  practicing  of  the  sacramental  word,  and  is  the  only  means 
by  which  such  cross  over  lines,  the  traversing  of  the  chiasmus  between  being  and 
nothingness,  presence  and  absence,  can  be  achieved.  Heaney's  poem  operates  on  a 
transcendental  act  of  faith  grounded  in  the  possibilities  of  the  poetic  word.  We  are 
urged  to  travel  with  him  as  we  believe  in  the  reality  of  the  fictional  world  he  has 
constructed  or  created. 
The  idea  of  a  type  of  sacramental  presence  being  conveyed,  suggested,  created 
by  means  of  the  poetic  word  is  an  idea  Heaney  utilizes  in  another  poem  from  this 
sequence,  sonnet  three  from  'Clearances': 
III 
When  all  the  others  were  away  at  Mass 
I  was  all  hers  as  we  peeled  potatoes. 
They  broke  the  silence,  let  fall  one  by  one 
Like  solder  weeping  off  the  soldering  iron: 
Cold  comforts  set  between  us,  things  to  share 
Gleaming  in  a  bucket  of  clean  water. 
And  again  let  fall.  Little  pleasant  splashes 
From  each  other's  work  would  bring  us  to  our  senses. 
So  while  the  parish  priest  at  her  bedside 
Went  hammer  and  tongs  at  the  prayers  for  the  dying 
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I  remembered  her  head  bent  towards  my  head, 
Her  breath  in  mine,  our  fluent  dipping  knives- 
Never  closer  the  whole  rest  of  our  lives.  9 
We  note  the  daring  use  of  sexual  innuendo  in  the  second  line  'I  was  all  hers'. 
This  is  all  the  more  striking  by  being  placed  in  the  vicinity  of  the  reference  to 
religious  observation;  the  rest  of  the  family  are  at  Mass.  The  religious  ceremony  is 
aimed  at  creating  communion,  a  moment  of  unity  when  the  normally  disparate 
elements  of  the  human  world  are  united  in  harmony  through  and  with  the  body  of 
Christ.  Heaney  creates  a  secular  alternative.  Through  the  act  of  peeling  potatoes,  again 
a  solid,  everyday  reality,  also  a  life  sustaining  food  item  for  Heaney's  generation  of 
rural  Irish  folk,  a  moment  of  communion  is  created  between  Heaney  and  his  mother. 
There  is  a  sense  that  they  are  lost  in  their  work;  the  mind  is  removed  from  the  body  in 
a  way.  This  languages  and  imagery  is  suggestive  of  a  type  of  spiritual  or  mystic 
harmony;  where  the  alienated  mind  that  often  operates  at  a  remove  from  the  activities 
of  the  body  is  suspended  in  a  type  of  ecstasy.  And  so  while  the  priest  goes  through 
with  the  formal  liturgy  utilised  at  the  death-bed  Heaney  recalls  this  moment  of 
gemime  intimacy  and  closeness  as  he  mourns  for  the  loss  of  his  mother.  In  this  poem 
we  witness  the  creativity  of  the  analogical  imagination  at  work.  What  is  interesting  to 
note  is  how  Heaney  is  still  intngued  by  and  fascinated  with  the  notion  of  communion; 
it  is  what  he  is  still  trying  to  attain  poetically,  and  in  the  real  world.  The  situation 
described  by  Heaney  locates  a  sacred  power  within  the  everyday,  and  within  the 
injagination  of  the  poet  as  he  draws  it  out  through  his  verbal  act  of  poesy,  in  a  direct 
challenge  to  the  representatives  of  official  religion.  The  implication  behind  Heaney's 
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poem  is  of  a  unity  to  experience  and  the  world;  the  -poet 
draws  on  metaphor  to 
overcome  the  world's  apparent  gaps  and  breakages  in  a  narrative  moment  of 
wholeness  and  meaning. 
Enter  Maurice  Blanchot 
The  Space  ofLiterature  (1955)  by  French  novelist,  critic  and  philosopher 
Maurice  Blanchot  contains  a  chapter  entitled  'The  Work  and  Death's  Space"O.  Here 
Blanchot  expounds  a  core  argument  in  his  thesis  for  the  first  time.  A  novelist  himself, 
Blanchot  is  keenly  aware  of  the  elusive  nature  of  'creative'  writing.  The  figure  for 
this  is  Poetry.  For  him  Poetry  is  always  escaping  each  and  every  attempt  by  the  writer 
to  hold  it  or  tie  it  down,  to  formulate  and  thereby  contain  it.  There  is  no  certainty 
about  Poetry  in  terms  of  either  form  or  content.  Those  who  attempt  to  formulate  a 
moral  framework  on  the  basis  of  poetic  activity  or  its  products  are  bound  to  flounder. 
The  mark  of  the  true  poet  is  his  hesitancy  regarding  his  status  as  a  poet  at  all.  What  is 
vital  is  the  poet's  search  for  her  poetry,  or  just  Poetry.  The  poet  must  relinquish  all 
attempts  at  mastery  here  as  she  is  challenged,  tested,  investigated,  rendered  uncertain 
by  Poetry  itself  The  work  produced  by  Poetry  questions  everything.  The  work  always 
forces  the  writer  out  of  complacency,  and  forces  her  out  of  the  familiarity  of  what  she 
does  and  knows,  thereby  forcing  her  out  from  the  possibilities  of  what  she  can  do. 
What  then  is  the  nature  of  the  poetic  work?  What  is  achieved  when  the  poem 
is  finally  bom?  For  Blanchot  the  poem  is  but  one  instant  of  the  infinite  possibilities  of 
the  human  mind.  The  poem  is  the  moment  when  possibility  becomes  power,  the 
10  maurice  Blanchot:  The  Space  oftiterature:  Univ.  of  Nebraska  Press:  Nebraska:  1989,  p.  85  -  159, 
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4gra,  ed'  moment  (to  use  a  word  foreign  to  Blanchot's  formulation)  when  mind  U--c 
becomes  the  given  certainty  of  a  realised  form,  a  beautiful  body.  For  Blanchot  the 
work  is  but  one  instant,  a  privileged  moment,  along  the  path  of  infinity  which  the 
mind  is  capable  of  conceiving.  The  mind  is  infinite  and  the  work  always  recognises 
this. 
Blanchot  considers  in  detail  a  note  from  Franz  Kafka's  Diaries:  'On  the  way 
home,  I  said  to  Max  that  on  my  death  bed,  provided  the  suffering  is  not  too  great,  I 
will  be  very  content.  I  forgot  to  add,  and  later  I  omitted  this  on  purpose,  that  the  best 
of  what  I  have  written  is  based  upon  this  capacity  to  die  content".  Kafka  writes  about 
the  power  he  feels  over  his  characters  who  are  dying,  and  indirectly  the  reader  who 
will  feel  the  pathos  of  this  moment:  'I  even  enjoy  dying  in  the  character  who  is  dying. 
Thus  I  calculatingly  exploit  the  reader's  attention  which  I  have  concentrated  upon 
death;  I  keep  a  much  clearer  head  than  he,  who  will  lament,  I  suppose,  on  his 
deathbed.  My  lamentation  is  thus  as  perfect  as  possible.  It  does  not  interrupt  itself 
12 
abruptly  the  way  real  lamentation  does,  rather  it  follows  its  beautiful,  pure  course' 
The  sense  of  mastery  and  calculation  suggested  here  by  Kafka  amazes  Blanchot. 
Contemplating  this  Blanchot  wonders,  should  one  turn  the  moment  of  supreme 
dissatisfaction  to  one  of  satisfaction;  should  one  be  clearheaded  and  balanced  in  this 
moment,  the  more  so  to  the  degree  that  these  values  are  threatened?  One  should  be 
capable  of  turning  the  extreme  negative,  death,  into  the  supreme  and  absolutely 
positive,  where  possibility,  project  and  time  are  realised. 
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Blanchot  argues  that  a  concern  with  death  is  the  central  factor  in  all  of  Franz 
Kafka's  work;  from  the  stories  In  the  Penal  Colony  and  The  Metamorphosis  and  The 
Judgement  right  through  to  when  he  conceives  and  writes  his  novel  The  Trial.  What 
surprises  the  reader  who  identifies  this  line  of  enquiry  is  how  quickly  and  silently 
Kafka's  characters  die.  Blanchot  accounts  for  this  through  what  will  become  the 
central  argument  of  The  Space  ofLiterature.  He  suggests  that  not  only  when  they  die, 
even  as  they  struggle  to  live,  when  they  are  alive,  Kafka's  protagonists  exist  within 
death's  space.  It  is  to  the  indefinite  time  of  'dying'  that  they  truly  belong.  In  fact  the 
reason  that  they  exist  at  all  is  to  test  this  strangeness  out,  and  through  them  Kafka 
himself  is  also  tested.  The  reason  he  can  work,  create  work  at  all,  is  through  his  ability 
to  be  in  tune  with  this  eventual  possibility,  to  stand  trial  with  death,  to  be  its  equal. 
Enter  Kirilov,  Stage  Right 
The  figure  of  Kirilov  has  haunted  modem  writing  ever  since  Dostoyevsky 
conceived  him  for  his  novel  The  Possessed.  French  writer  and  philosopher  Albert 
Camus  devotes  some  reflections  to  this  figure  in  his  philosophical  and  political  essay 
known  in  English  as  The  Rebel.  Kirilov  is  the  cool  and  calm  rationalist.  Men  fear 
death  and  that  is  why  they  are  persistent  in  living.  Our  human  fear  of  death  is  the 
point  at  which  the  idea  of  God  originates.  The  authentic  human  challenge  is  to  liberate 
ourselves  from  this  fear,  and  to  oust  God,  and  we  can  only  conduct  this  enterprise 
satisfactorily  by  choosing  death,  to  die  in  opposition  to  what  we  fear.  It  is  here  that 
authentic  human  freedom  is  located.  Vital  to  this  is  that  we  annex  to  our 
consciousness  the  idea  of  our  own  disappearance.  Blanchot's  particular  insight  lies  in 
his  question:  'Does  he  [Kirilov]  prove  through  his  death  the  possibility  which  he 186 
received  in  advance  from  his  death,  that  power  of  not  being  which  permitted  him  to  be 
himself  -  to  be,  that  is,  though  freely  linked  to  himself,  always  other  than  himself  - 
the  power,  to  act,  speak,  take  risks,  and  be  without  being?  '  13 
Blanchot  is  here  developing  themes  that  he  touched  on  in  his  earlier  essay 
14 
'Literature  and  the  Right  to  Death'  found  in  The  Work  ofFire  (1949) 
. 
In  that  earlier 
essay  Blanchot  had  written:  'The  realm  of  the  imaginary  is  not  a  strange  region 
situated  beyond  the  world,  it  is  the  world  itself,  but  the  world  as  entire,  manifold,  the 
world  as  a  whole.  That  is  why  it  is  not  in  the  world,  because  it  is  the  world,  grasped 
and  realized  in  its  entirety  by  the  global  negation  of  all  the  individual  realities 
contained  in  it,  by  their  disqualification,  their  absence,  by  the  realization  of  that 
absence  itself,  which  is  how  literary  creation  begins,  for  when  literary  creation  goes 
back  over  each  thing  and  each  being,  it  cherishes  the  illusion  that  it  is  creating  them, 
because  now  it  is  seeing  and  naming  them  from  the  starting  point  of  everything,  from 
the  starting  point  of  the  absence  of  everything,  that  is,  from  nothing'15.  Blanchot  will 
go  on  to  say  that  literature,  like  life,  must  endure  death  and  maintain  itself  in  it.  The 
basis  for  Blanchot's  argument  lies  in  an  interpretation  of  how  language  works.  It  lies 
in  how  meaning  is  created  in  the  first  instance  in  language  itself  We  present  an  object 
in  language.  We  represent  it.  This  is  the  death,  though,  of  the  object  in  itself  and  of  the 
person.  When  we  speak  of  the  boy,  the  man,  or  of  John,  we  deny  the  boy,  the  man  and 
John  their  reality.  We  deny  them  their  flesh  and  blood  reality  in  the  realm  of 
representation  that  is  language.  The  word  is  a  place  of  deprivation  presenting  being  in 
the  absence  of  being.  For  Blanchot  the  death  that  is  to  come  is  present  in  this  moment 
of  figurative  death.  It  is  what  makes  it  possible.  The  boy,  a  man,  or  John,  or  a  woman, 
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can  be  removed  from  their  present  and  presence,  removed  from  their  existence  and  be 
plunged  into  nothingness  by  the  fact  of  their  future  death.  The  annihilation  through 
which  signification  comes  into  being  through  language  is  possible  because  of  the 
mortality  of  human  being. 
Speaking  of  the  woman,  as  figure  for  his  thought,  Blanchot  writes:  'if  this 
woman  were  not  really  capable  of  dying,  if  she  were  not  threathened  by  death  at  every 
moment  of  her  life,  bound  and  joined  to  death  by  an  essential  bond,  I  would  not  be 
able  to  carry  out  that  ideal  negation,  that  deferred  assassination  which  is  what  my 
16  17  language  is' 
. 
We  note  Gillian  Rose's  astute  criticism  of  Blanchot  here 
. 
She  notes 
the  passivity  of  this  female  subject  for  Blanchot.  Does  this  female  subject  not  have  a 
will,  identity,  personality  and  a  desire  to  work  of  her  own?  Blanchot  goes  on  to  write 
that  literature  'is  the  presence  of  things  before  the  world  exists,  their  perseverance 
after  the  world  has  disappeared,  the  stubbornness  of  what  remains  when  everything 
vanishes  and  the  dumbfoundedness  of  what  appears  when  nothing  exists"'.  And  so 
Rodolphe  Gasche  will  write:  'if  literature  is  a  marvel,  a  wonder  (une  merveille),  as 
Blanchot  holds,  it  is  so  precisely  because  its  origin  is  a  mystery.  It  occurs  in  ways  that 
are  not  predicatable.  It  happens  as  if  it  had  no  antecedents,  each  time  new  and 
singular.  The  contradictory  conditions  that  give  rise  to  literature  are  felicitious, 
precisely  because  it  remains  mysterious  how  literature  depends  on  them.  The  wonder 
15  77te  Work  of  Fire:  1995,  p.  316 
16  The  Work  of  Fire:  1995,  p.  323 
11  Gillian  Rose:  'Potter's  Field.,  death  worked  and  unworked,  in  Maurice  Blanchot.  -  The  Demand  of 
Writing:  Routledge:  London:  1996,  p.  203.  She  writes:  'nothing 
...  can  be  learnt  from  the  disparity 
between  the  evocation  of  her  name  and  her  actuality,  her  desire  and  work,  because  she  is  not  a  self- 
relation  whose  middle  term  is  equally  the  other's  self-relation,  his  desire  and  work.  The  ruin  of  love, 
with  its  always  attendant  risk  of  loss,  follows  from  the  ruin  of  action  and  the  impossibility  of  death  in 
manchot'. 
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of  literature  is  nothing  but  the  silent  wonder  about  its  existence'19.  Given  the 
impossibility  of  his  task  the  writer  will  always  produce  something  that  is  singular  and 
unique.  Gasche  writes:  'the  work  is  an  Other  in  that  it  is  unpredictable,  umnasterable 
in  its  effect,  and  escapes  reappropriation.  It  is  not  an  Other  in  the  Hegelian  sense  of 
being  the  Other  of  self.  Its  Otherness  is  not  that  of  the  alienated  self,  but  of  something 
that  refuses  derivation  from  self  and  hence  remains  irrecuperable  v20 
. 
Paradoxically 
then  in  a  moment  of  emptiness  everything  becomes  possible.  Literature  possesses  an 
infinite  power  to  endure  contradiction.  This  is  founded  ironically  on  the  death  of  the 
subject  for  Blanchot.  For  language  and  literature  to  proceed  at  all,  which  they  patently 
do,  then  I  must  not  be  fully  recuperable  to  myself  For  me  to  speak  at  all  and  become 
thereby  a  universal  subject  I  must  experience  a  distance  from  myself  And  thus  we 
reach  the  point  described  by  Christopher  Fynsk  where  we  can  speak  of  'my 
consciousness  without  me,  appearing  as  other  in  the  form  of  an  impersonal  anonymity 
that  is  less  a  presence  than  the  presence  of  an  absence,  the  intrusion  of  the  outside, 
relation  with  an  irreducible  alterity"21. 
For  Blanchot  then  to  be  is  always  determined  by  our  capacity  not  to  be. 
Shadow  determines  light.  We  are  now  beginning  to  strike  the  particular  tenor  of 
Blanchot's  thought,  what  we  might  submit  as  his  'originality'.  Blanchot  argues  that 
whoever  gives  him  or  herself  over  fully  to  negation  can  never  use  it.  For  if  you  belong 
absolutely  to  it,  you  can  never  take  leave  of  yourself,  for  you  thereby  belong  to  the 
neutrality  that  is  absence,  in  which  one  is  oneself  no  longer.  From  this  perspective 
death  is  no  longer  to  come,  for  it  is  that  which  comes  no  longer.  Death,  or  suicide, 
"  Rudolphe  Gasche:  'The  Felicities  of  Paradox:  Blanchot  on  the  nulls-space  of  literature,  in  Maujice 
Blanchot.  The  Demand  of  Witing:  Routledge:  London:  1996,  p.  45 
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more  properly  considered,  is  a  delusion  according  to  Blanchot,  if  the  desire  that  lies 
behind  suicide  is  to  kill  oneself  at  a  determined  moment.  For  Blanchot  death  can 
never  be  present.  Suicides  seek  to  abolish  the  future  as  the  mystery  of  death. 
indecipherable  death  is  rendered  readable,  is  made  transparent,  the  suicide  vainly 
hopes.  The  suicide  seeks  to  relieve  death  of  its  still-to-comeness  which  is  its  very 
essence,  to  render  it  safe  and  vulnerable,  but  substanceless  thereby.  For  Blanchot  all 
our  preparations  and  readiness,  the  careful  suicide  note  and  chosen  moment  are  vain, 
for  we  can  have  no  power  over  the  essential  indeterminacy  that  is  the  moment  of 
death  -  for  death  can  never  be  a  relation  to  a  chosen,  determined  moment  any  more 
than  it  can  bear  a  determined  relation  to  myself 
For  Blanchot  then  there  is  a  similarity  and  difference  in  art  and  suicide.  Both 
involve  an  investment  in  possibility.  Both  wish  to  extend  themselves  into  the  region 
of  the  ungraspable.  Death  as  such  is  not  the  answer.  Death  appears  to  offer  an  answer 
in  that  we  have  conceived  of  it  as  an  attempt  to  deliver  us  up  finally  into  the 
unfathomable  beyond.  For  Blanchot  all  that  death  reveals  is  the  'empty  depth  of  the 
beyond'.  Death  loosens  my  hold  upon  myself  and  casts  me  out  of  my  power  from  the 
beginning  until  the  very  finish,  and  becomes  ultimately,  without  relation  to  me,  'the 
unreality  of  the  infinite'.  This  is  what  suicide  delivers.  However,  the  work  seeks  this 
reversal  as  its  origin.  The  work  seeks,  wants  to  dwell  in  the  moment  of  absence,  when 
my  death  is  robbed  from,  or  denied  to,  me.  Suicide  or  voluntary  death  is  blind  to  this 
possibility,  refuses  to  see  the  death  one  cannot  grasp,  the  death  one  cannot  reach.  A 
call  from  this  space  reaches  out  to  the  work.  The  work  is  drawn  to  this  space  despite 
itself  It  is  absolutely  put  to  the  test  by  something  that  visits  it  from  this  space.  The 
"  Christopher  Fynsk:  'Crossing  the  Areshold.  Literature  and  the  Right  to  Death',  in  Maurice 
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work  is  drawn  to  this  moment,  space,  or  place  where  everything  is  exposed  to  the 
highest  risk,  where  being  is  put  at  risk,  where  the  right  and  power  to  die  itself  is 
gambled.  As  he  wrote  in  his  earlier  essay  'Literature  and  the  Right  to  Death':  'Death 
works  with  us  in  the  world;  it  is  a  power  that  humanizes  nature,  that  raises  existence 
to  being,  and  it  is  within  each  one  of  us  as  our  most  human  quality;  it  is  death  only  in 
the  world  -  man  knows  death  only  because  he  is  man,  and  he  is  man  only  because  he 
is  death  in  the  process  of  becoming.  But  to  die  is  to  shatter  the  world;  it  is  the  loss  of 
the  person,  the  annihilation  of  the  being;  and  so  it  is  also  the  loss  of  death,  the  loss  of 
what  in  it  and  for  me  made  it  death.  As  long  as  I  live,  I  am  a  mortal  man,  but  when  I 
die,  by  ceasing  to  be  a  man  I  also  cease  to  be  mortal,  I  am  no  longer  capable  of  dying, 
and  my  impending  death  horrifies  me  because  I  see  it  as  it  is:  no  longer  death  but  the 
-)22  impossibility  of  dying 
The  Descent  into  Hell 
In  Blanchot's  view  two  modem  poets  have  had  something  valuable,  interesting 
and  revealing  to  say  concerning  suicide  and  art.  For  a  time  Mallarme  confused  a 
concern  for  the  work  with  an  affirmation  of  suicide  and  Rilke  sought  a  relationship 
with  death  that  would  be  more  'exact'  than  that  previously  considered  under  the 
rubrics  of  voluntary  death. 
Mallarme  acknowledges  in  a  letter  to  Cazalis  (November  14,1896)  that  Igitur 
is  an  undertaking  in  which  poetry  itself  is  at  stake.  The  idea  of  igitur  suggests  an 
attempt  to  make  the  work  possible  by  grasping  it  at  the  point  where  what  is  present  is 
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the  absence  of  all  power,  a  type  of  impotence.  As  Mallarme  describes  it: 
d  unfortunately,  by  digging  this  thoroughly  into  verse,  I  have  encountered  two  abysses 
which  make  me  despair.  One  is  Nothingness 
...  The  other  void  which  I  have  found  is 
the  one  in  my  breast.  23  'And  now,  having  reached  the  horrible  vision  of  a  pure  work, 
I  have  almost  lost  my  reason  and  the  meaning  of  the  most  familiar  words.  ' 
'Everything  which,  as  a  result,  my  being  has  suffered  during  this  long  agony  is 
indescribable,  but  fortunately  I  am  perfectly  dead 
...  Which  is  to  convey  to  you  that  I 
am  now  impersonal,  and  no  longer  Stephane  whom  you  know'24 
. 
What  is  altered  for 
Mallanne  is  his  'normal'  relationships;  that  relationship  that  ordinarily  exists  to  the 
world,  to  his  habitual  use  of  the  language;  what  this  experience  alters  is  the  physical 
assurance  of  his  own  living.  Mallarme  the  poet  is  finally  yielded  up  to  the  experience 
of  death  -  the  death  of  his  person  and  its  truth;  he  meets  the  cold  face  of  death's 
impersonality.  We  hazard. 
From  outside  the  experience  we  guess  that  Mallarme  began  within  the  feeling 
or  sensation  of  nothingness.  He  was  attentive  to,  in  touch  with  the  pulsing  of  its 
vitality,  its  force  and  mystery  was  what  he  contemplated  in  order  to  accomplish  the 
poetic  task.  In  the  language  of  paradox  we  might  say  that  he  experienced  the  activity 
of  absence.  For  Blanchot,  in  the  moment  of  his  poetic  darkness  Mallarme  grasped  the 
peculiar  presence  that  shades  absence.  In  the  moment  of  abandonment  one  feels  the 
strength  of  a  persistent  presence.  Mallarme  articulated  in  his  remarks  on  language  the 
ability  of  the  word  to  render  the  absence  of  things,  to  evoke  them  in  this  absence,  and 
yet  to  somehow  authentically  transmit,  to  be  faithful  to,  the  value  of  their  absence.  We 
might  speak  paradoxically  of  a  present  absentness:  'it  subsists  as  the  dissimulated 
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presence  of  being,  and  in  this  dissimulation  it  persists  as  chance  which  cannot  be 
abolished.  And  yet  this  is  where  everything  is  at  stake,  for  the  work  is  possible  only  if 
absence  is  pure  and  perfect,  only  if  in  the  presence  of  Midnight,  the  dice  can  be 
thrown.  There  alone  the  work's  origin  speaks;  there  it  begins,  it  finds  there  the  force 
of  the  beginning'.  25 
In  the  moment  of  absolute  absence  the  poet  encounters  two  words:  it  is. 
Disengaged  from  beings  he  meets  the  mystery  of  this  reality.  In  the  flioment  of 
nothingness,  nothingness  itself  can  no  longer  be  negated,  it  is  what  is  affinned,  the 
base  line  which  is  asserted,  and  which  states  and  claims  nothingness  as  being.  This 
experience  operates  as  the  limit  upon  the  infinite  and  bears  witness  to  a  definitive 
moment  when  the  moment  of  death  partakes  in  truth.  For  the  work  which  begins  in 
negation  can  do  so  because  it  begins  in  the  certainty  of  that  distant  horizon  which  is 
its  point  of  origin,  and  ultimately,  arrival. 
The  authentic  igitur  experience  presents  to  consciousness  its  own 
disappearance.  This  is  the  ongoing  artistic  task.  We  have  to  imagine,  lucidly,  advance 
outside  ourselves,  'transcend'  our  bodily  limits,  our  present  presence,  and  grasp  the 
moment  of  our  disengagement  our  absence  and  dissolution.  We  must  appear  to 
ourselves  in  this  disappearance,  we  must  gather  up  to  ourselves  this  essential  death 
which  is  the  life  of  the  consciousness  and  form  the  unique  act  of  the  death  to  come. 
There  is  a  converging  of  emergent  and  vanishing  lines  of  thought,  consciousness, 
Being  or  Poetry,  at  the  moment  when  thought  reaches  the  point  where  its-very-setf 
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emerges  and  disappears  into  liquidation.  For  Blanchot  what  is  experienced  here  is  the 
intimacy  of  absence,  the  moment  of  night.  Essentially,  by  disappearing  into  death  we 
do  not  institute  disappearance  and  thereby  establish  the  night.  No,  it  is  always  the 
absolute  presence  of  this  disappearance,  and  that  alone,  whereby  we  are  allowed  to 
die.  Through  this  baseline  of  experience  we  are  introduced  to  our  mortal  decisions  and 
ability  to  act.  As  Blanchot  wrote  in  'Literature  and  the  Right  to  Death':  'if  we  call  this 
power  negation  or  unreality  or  death,  then  presently  death,  negation,  and  unreality,  at 
work  in  the  depths  of  language,  will  signify  the  advent  of  truth  in  the  world,  the 
construction  of  intelligible  being,  the  formation  of  meaning-)26. 
H%erein  the  Panther  Stalks 
For  Blanchot  Rainer  Maria  Rilke  of  all  modem  poets  carried  out  the  intensest 
clarification  of  our  human  task  of  what  it  means  to  live  within  this  intimacy  of 
darkness,  night,  or  death.  When  we  examine  Rilke's  poetic  images  something 
philosophically  significant  is  revealed.  Rilke  suggests  that  death  'ripens'  in  our  very 
heart.  Death  is  the  'fruit';  that  sweet,  obscure  fruit,  a  fruit  still  'green'  that,  we  'leaves 
and  bark',  must  bear  and  nouriSh27  .  For  Rilke  then  death  is  not  something  from 
outside  that  befalls  us  by  accident.  The  logic  of  his  images  suggests  that  we  should 
strive,  or  aim  to  live  with  death  as  an  intimate  amidst  our  being,  our  living.  Death 
strikes  profoundly  from  within  the  deep  heart's  core.  Death  draws  life  from  deep 
within,  from  the  centre  of  our  living.  We  have  to  strive  to  respect  the  immanence  of 
death  within  our  lives.  At  the  same  time  we  must  respect  the  transcendence  of  death  to 
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our  human  history,  life  and  experience.  So  it  is  always  there,  as  a  presence,  and  not 
there,  at  the  same  time. 
We  must  continually  strive  to  be  aware  of  'this  other  side'.  Rilke  struggled  to 
articulate  it  in  poetic  terms: 
With  all  its  eyes  the  creature  sees 
The  Open.  Our  eyes  only  are 
As  if  reversed. 
28 
For  Rilke,  if  we  could  see  things  from  the  other  side,  we  will  alter  our  perception,  or 
access  to  our  experience.  We  would  be  ready  for  transformation.  Rilke  also  calls  this 
'other  side'  'the  pure  relation',  because  the  fact  of  being  lies  in  this  relation,  outside 
oneself,  in  the  thing  itself,  and  not  in  the  representation  of  the  thing.  Through  death 
our  eyes  turn  back  and  this  return  indicates,  comes  from  the  other  side,  and  the  other 
side  is  the  fact  of  living  no  longer  turned  away  but  turned  back,  working  from  within 
the  intimacy  of  conversion,  from  within  the  night.  We  are  not  deprived  of 
consciousness,  but  established  by  consciousness  itself,  outside  of  it.  For  Rilke  this  is 
always  an  ecstatic  moment  or  movement.  What  Rilke  is  struggling  to  articulate  is  the 
space  whereby  the  reality  of  the  outdoors  is  experienced  intimately  from  within,  and 
where  the  outside  is  within  ourselves  in  all  its  intimacy  and  when  the  intimate 
vastness  of  the  outside  within  the  intimacy  is  known,  felt  and  experienced.  Rilke 
names  this  experience  by  the  term  Wellinnenraum,  the  world's  inner  space: 
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Through  all  beings  spreads  the  one  space: 
The  world's  inner  space.  Silently  fly  the  birds 
All  through  us.  01  who  want  to  grow, 
I  look  outside,  and  it  is  in  me  that  the  tree  grows  !  29 
Blanchot  notes  how  everything  is  converted  inward,  and  needs  to  be 
transmuted  by  this  experience  of  the  outside/inside,  and  the  inside/outside: 
Man  is  linked  to  things,  he  is  in  the  midst  of  them,  and  if  he  renounces  his 
realising  and  representing  activity,  if  he  apparently  withdraws  into  himself,  it  is  not  in 
order  to  dismiss  everything  which  isn't  he,  the  humble  and  outworn  realities,  but 
rather  to  take  these  with  him,  to  make  them  participate  in  this  interiorization  where 
they  lose  their  use  value,  their  falsified  nature,  and  lose  also  their  narrow  boundaries 
in  order  to  penetrate  into  their  true  profundity.  Thus  does  this  conversion  appear  as  an 
immense  task  of  transmutation,  in  which  things,  all  things,  are  transformed  and 
interiorized  by  becoming  interior  in  us  and  by  becoming  interior  to  themselves.  This 
transformation  of  the  visible  into  the  invisible  and  of  the  invisible  into  the  always 
more  invisible  takes  place  where  the  fact  of  being  unrevealed  does  not  express  a 
simple  privation,  but  access  to  the  other  side  which  is  not  turned  toward  us  nor  do  we 
shed  light  upon  it.  30 
Thus  emerges  the  poetic  task.  The  poet  introduces  all  things  into  the  space 
where  nothing  retains  them  at  all  and  where  they  are  utterly  free,  then,  to  be 
themselves,  after  having  confronted  the  possibility  of  their  very  non-being.  In 
confrontation  with  their  absolute  dispossession  they  are  released,  we  no  longer  see 
them  as  objects  of  decoration,  of  purpose  or  utility.  Theyjoin  us  in  the  intimacy  of  the 
risk  where  they  and  we  are  no  longer  sheltered.  In  the  poem  Rilke  says  that  interior 
space  'translates  things'.  Through  that  space  they  are  passed,  translated,  one  dares  to 
say  transfigured  from  one  language  to  another.  The  poet  translates  them  through  this 
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space  from  the  foreign,  exterior  language  to  the  altogether  interior,  the  interior  of 
language  even  where  language  names  in  silence  and  possibly  because  of  and  by 
silence  itself  The  poem's  space  is  one  in  which  nothing  is  no  longer  present  and  is, 
where  everything  is  spoken  in  the  midst  of  absence  and  emptiness,  and  everything 
finally  returns  into  its  true  spiritual  accord  which  is  openness,  the  dead  centre  of  the 
eternal  movement. 
The  poet's  task  as  a  bearer  of  the  Word  is  to  translate  the  visible  into  the 
invisible  and  the  invisible  into  the  visible.  As  Rilke  reflected:  'how  could  one  sustain, 
how  could  one  save  the  visible,  if  not  by  creating  the  language  of  absence,  of  the 
invisible'  ?31  The  poem  is  the  vortex  into  which  everything  dies,  where  everything  is 
reversed,  where  there  is  an  infinite  passage  between  the  two  domains  and  the  final 
space  of  metamorphosis  and  energetic  circulation.  The  figure  for  this  possibility  in 
Rilke's  writing  is  Orpheus.  Orpheus  is  the  act  of  metamorphosis:  a  singer  of  the  song 
born  at  the  moment  of  disappearance,  the  song  that  articulates  the  anguish  of  that 
disappearance.  He  is  always  more  though  than  poetic  plenitude  although  he  is  that.  He 
is  the  origin  of  the  poem.  He  is  the  sacrificial  point  which  is  no  longer  the 
reconciliation  of  the  two  domains,  but  rather  he  is  the  abyss,  the  chasm  of  the  lost  god, 
the  one  who  infinitely  traces  the  moment  of  absence: 
0  you,  lost  god!  You,  infinite  trace! 
By  dismembering  you  the  hostile  forces  had  to  disperse  you 
To  make  of  us  now  hearers  and  a  mouth  of  Nature.  32 
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There  is  an  interesting  shift  in  the  later  Rilke.  He  seems  to  allude  in  later 
writings  to  a  completed  time  that  would  hold  still  in  a  pure  circle  of  time  closed  upon 
itself  What  exactly  is  the  nature  of  that  time?  Does  Rilke  mean  a  space  wherein  this 
time  rises  above  the  specific  nature  of  a  given  moment,  or  a  space  wherein  absent 
presence  is  consumed  and  duration  is  altered  into  timelessness?  Rilke  seems  to  have 
in  mind  a  space  where  we  can  be,  but  not  just  subsisting,  a  being  there  that  is  whole, 
liberated,  complete  and  content.  We  have  as  our  task  to  aim  for  this  space,  this  state  of 
equilibrium,  to  establish  things  and  ourselves  within  this  space.  We  will  not  just 
disappear  but  perpetuate.  We  will  make  things  invisible  so  that  they  may  be  reborn  in 
their  invisibility.  Rilke  seems  to  open  up  the  horizon,  window,  or  possibility  whereby 
through  dying  we  can  escape  death: 
And  these  things  whose  life 
Is  decline  understand  that  you  praise  them;  fleeting, 
They  lend  us,  us  the  most  fleeting,  the  power  to  save. 
They  want  us  to  change  them  in  the  bottom  of  our  invisible 
heart 
Into  -0  infinite  -  into  ourselves!  Whatsover  we  may  be  in  the 
end. 
33 
For  Rilke  if  one  only  sees  death  then  one  suffers  the  error  of  a  limited  life  and 
a  poorly  converted  or  understood  consciousness.  Maybe  death  narrowly  understood  is 
the  dangerous  lie.  Death  is  the  means  by  which  we  close  down,  de-limit,  being.  It  is 
the  false  route  through  which  we  transmute,  badly,  all  things  into  objects.  When  we 
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are  unjustifiably  pre-occupied  with  our  own  finish  we  tend  to  close  off,  narrow  down 
other  objects.  If  freedom  means  anything  then  it  must  be  liberation  from  this  closing 
off,  a  real  liberation  from  death  where  we  approach  the  point  whereby  death  becomes 
transparent. 
As  Blanchot  reads  Rilke  there  is  a  key  element  to  the  human's  consent  to 
death.  It  hinges  on  our  awareness  of  our  own  passing  away.  We  are  the  only  ones  this 
side  of  death  to  be  aware  and  to  have  the  opportunity  to  consent  to  the  passing  that  is 
death.  We  are  the  only  creatures  who  articulate  through  speech,  song,  drama,  art  and 
poetry,  our  disappearance.  So,  in  humanity  death  attains  a  new  level,  a  unique  point, 
of  being,  in  that  in  and  through  us  it  sings.  For  Blanchot  then  there  is  a  pact  between 
death  and  singing,  death  is  the  moment  that  is  transmuted  in  song,  the  invisible 
transformed  by  the  invisible.  We  must  not  lose  sight  of  the  everyday  world  here.  For  it 
is  only  through  the  mediation  of  objects  towards  which  we  are  called  to  be  responsible 
that  this  transformation  is  possible: 
Being  here  below  and  being  beyond,  may  both  claim  you 
Strangely,  without  distinction.  34 
one  of  the  two  domains  must  not  be  overemphasised  at  the  expense  of  the  other:  the 
visible  is  necessary  to  the  invisible;  it  is  saved  in  the  i'visible,  but  it  is  also  what  saves 
the  invisible.  This  necessary  contrast  establishes  a  vital  equality  between  the  two 
poles. 
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This  entire  movement  is  dependent  upon  what  we  will  term  the  transcendental 
moment  oftsion.  It  is  found  in  our  gaze  as  it  no  longer  looks  forward  at  goals,  but 
that  looks  backward,  over  the  shoulder  at  things  themselves  as  they  lie  behind  in  order 
to  grasp  their  'closed  existence',  a  vision  found  in  my  attempt  to  grasp  them  in  their 
complete  separateness,  as  objects  perfected  not  defined  by  context  or  utility,  but  in  the 
pure  innocence  of  being  itself.  This  experience  lies  at  the  kernel  (this  detached  vision, 
at  the  heart)  of  Rilke's  Duino  Elegies.  For  Blanchot  this  experience  is  'an  ecstatic 
experience'  which  is  also  the  gaze  of  art  and  'an  experience  of  death  35 
.  The  writer 
does  not  begin  with  the  hierarchy  imposed  by  the  material  and  commercial  worlds. 
Art  is  only  interested  in  objects  according  to  an  absolute  disinterestedness  defined  by 
the  infinite  distance  given  it  by  death.  The  poet's  point  of  departure  is  the  approach  to 
the  point  where  nothingness  begins.  Art  searches  for  the  point  of  opening,  the 
experience  of  the  origin,  the  Open.  Art  is  in  search  of  a  true  dying.  As  Simon 
Critchley  notes:  'Orpheus  does  not  want  to  make  the  invisible  visible,  but  rather  (and 
impossibly)  to  see  the  invisible  as  invisible'36 
. 
For  Blanchot  there  is  a  dark  impurity  that  haunts  this  moment  isolated  by 
Rilke's  writings  and  reflections.  It  is  the  fearful  side  of  the  absolute  indetenninacy 
that  is  the  moment  of  death.  It  is  the  other  side  of  its  excessiveness.  It  is  the  very 
indeterminacy  that  makes  it  an  impure  transcendence,  what  makes  this  moment 
absolutely  ungraspable.  Death  is  something  beyond  its  worldly  reality,  it  is  always 
elusive,  its  face  is  always  turned  away.  Death  is  discrete,  revealing  its  essential 
intimacy  at  the  very  moment  that  it  opens  us  up  to  its  profound  unreality.  For  death  is 
an  abyss,  something  which  does  not  found  but  always  reveals  absence  and  the  loss  of 
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all  foundation.  So,  for  Rilke,  death  becomes  at  the  heart  of  its  invisibility,  a  non-event, 
a  moment  that  is  not  there,  yet  is  an  accomplishment,  a  part  of  an  event  that  is 
happening  and  yet  cannot  be  realised.  As  Rodolphe  Gasche  writes:  'Death  is  the 
power  of  an  always  other  or  alternate  possibility  (alternative)  and  hence  the  "cause" 
of  ambiguity,  because  even  though  it  allows  ideality,  universality  and  meaning  to 
come  about,  it  continues  to  perpetuate  "an  irreducible  double  meaning,  a  choice 
whose  terms  are  covered  over  with  the  ambiguity  that  makes  them  identical  to  one 
another  as  it  makes  them  opposite"  [Gasche  is  quoting  from  Blanchot's  essay 
'Literature  and  the  Right  to  Death'].  Indeed,  death  is  the  inevitable  power  of  the 
additional  possibility  of  a  foundering  of  meaning,  a  lack  of  meaning,  and  losing  the 
chance  of  its  occurrence.  Ideality  and  universality  are  always  in  jeopardy.  There  is 
always  the  possibility  that  they  may  not  occur.  This  also  means  that  all  relation  to  an 
Other,  and  all  possible  address  could  possibly  be  missing'37  . 
The  Orphic  Space  Descends 
Once  and  for  all, 
It  is  Orpheus  when  there  is  song.  He  comes  and  he  goes.  38 
In  Rilke  then,  according  to  the  reading  provided  by  Maurice  Blanchot, 
Orpheus  is  not  a  symbol  of  a  lofty  transcendence  that  the  poet  is  the  vehicle  of  and 
for.  Orpheus  is  not  the  figure  for  the  god  speaking  through  the  poet.  Orpheus  is  not  a 
symbol  for  etemity  and  the  immutability  of  the  poetic  sphere.  No,  Orpheus  is  the 
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symbol  of  the  immeasurable  demand  that  we  disappear.  Orpheus  prophetically  calls 
us  to  die  more  profoundly: 
0  seek  to  understand  that  he  must  disappear! 
Even  if  the  anguish  of  it  dismay  him, 
While  his  word  extends  this  world, 
Already  he  is  beyond  where  you  may  not  accompany  him. 
And  he  obeys  by  going  beyond.  39 
Orpheus  draws  us  towards  the  point  where  he  himself,  symbol  of  the  eternal  poem, 
enters  into  his  own  disappearance,  where  he  identifies  with  the  very  forces  that 
dismember  him  and  becomes  a  pure  contradiction,  the  'lost  god,  the  absence  of  God. 
Orpheus  is  the  bridge,  the  empty  signifier,  lying  over  the  moment  of  origin,  where  the 
poem  is  lacking,  as  well  as  the  secure  existence  and  hope  for  and  in  truth  and  the 
gods.  In  this  space  the  power  to  speak  and  the  power  to  hear  are  tested,  they  undergo 
their  own  lack,  they  endure  the  instance  of  their  impossibility. 
We  arrive,  then,  at  the  symbol  of  the  rose  in  Rilke's  poetic  oeuvre.  For  Rilke 
the  rose  is  a  symbol,  the  perceptible  presence  of  Orphic  space;  it  is  the  space  of 
outerness  and  intimacy.  It  is  a  place  where  things  do  not  de-limit  one  another,  where 
in  their  common  unfurling  they  make  room  for  each  other,  and  where  constantly  they 
f  transfonn  the  outside  world  ... 
into  a  handful  of  Within  40: 
39  The  Space  ofLiterature:  1989,  p.  156 
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Almost  a  being  without  boundaries  and  as  if  spared 
And  more  purely  inner  and  very  strangely  tender 
And  illuminating  itself  right  up  to  the  edge, 
Is  such  a  thing  known  to  US? 
41 
The  poem  -  and  in  it  the  poet  -  is  this  intimacy  exposed  to  the  world,  opened 
unreservedly  to  being.  Within  this  space,  things  and  being  itself  are  transformed  into 
innerness.  Here  the  word  touches  and  is  touched  by  the  deepest  intimacy.  The  word 
abandons  assurance  and  risks  itself  The  word  touches  this  point  where  nothing  can  be 
said  of  being  and  nothing  made.  Here  everything  starts  over,  and  here,  dying  itself  is  a 
never-ending  task: 
Rose,  oh  reiner  Widerspruch,  Lust 
Niemandes  Schlaf  zu  sein  unter  soviel 
Lidem. 
Rose,  0  pure  contradiction,  delight 
Of  being  no  one's  sleep  under  so  many 
Lids. 
42 
introducing  Jacques 
In  his  first  major  work  Of  Grammatology  Jacques  Derrida  proposed  the  thesis 
that  'differance'  is  the  source  of  linguistic  value.  For  meaning  to  be  constituted  there 
41  The  Space  ofLiterature:  1989,  p.  157 
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has  to  be  a  trace  of  otherness  within  the  smallest  portion  of  temporal  experience. 
Meaning  is  constituted  through  difference:  'Without  a  retention  in  the  minimal  unit  of 
temporal  experience,  without  a  trace  retaining  the  other  as  other  in  the  same,  no 
difference  would  do  its  work  and  no  meaning  would  appear  3,43 
.  At  this  point  we 
witness  the  birth  of  the  trace.  For  Derrida  the  traceppens  up  meaning.  It  is  neither  in 
the  world  nor  in  'another  world',  neither  in  time  or  space.  Differences  produce  the 
elements  of  texts  through  the  chains  and  systems  of  traces:  'The  trace  is  injact  the 
absolute  origin  ofsense  in  generaL  Which  amounts  to  saying  once  again  that  there  is 
no  absolute  origin  ofsense  in  general,  The  trace  is  the  difference  which  opens 
appearance  [I'apparaitre]  and  signification  A4 
Derrida  and  the  Faith  of  the  Blind 
In  Memoirs  ofthe  Blind.  The  Set(-Portrait  and  Other  Ruins,  45  Derrida  writes 
of  the  structural  blindness  that  is  built  into  all  art.  Arguably  the  core  argument  of  the 
book  is  that  all  seeing  is  inhabited  by  a  type  of  blindness.  Writing  of  this  text  by 
Derrida  John  D.  Caputo  speaks  of  a  'transcendental  blindness'46,  that  is,  the 
invisibility  of  the  act  of  drawing  itself  which  can  never  be  represented.  Drawing 
becomes  thereby  an  operation  of  the  blind. 
To  illustrate.  A  blindness  inheres  in  the  originary  act  of  drawing  itself,  at  the 
very  point  of  contact  between  pen  and  paper.  The  moment  of  the  trace  involves  both 
43  Jacques  Derrida:  Of  Grammatology:  John  Hopkins  Univ.  Press:  Baltimore:  1998,  Trans.  by  Gayatri 
Chakravorty  Spivak  p.  62 
44  of  Grammatology:  1998,  P.  65 
45  Jacques  Derrida:  Memoirs  of  the  Blind-  The  Self-Porft-ait  and  Other  Ruins:  Univ.  of  Chicago 
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memory  and  forgetting.  Even  in  the  presence  of  a  live  model,  once  the  artist  turns  his 
or  her  eye  from  their  model  to  face  the  blank  sheet  before  them,  they  must  proceed  on 
the  basis  of  memory  alone.  So  there  is  a  break  with  the  tyranny  of  the  present.  Before 
the  pen  strikes  a  line  on  the  blank  page  there  is  a  re-assembling  of  sorts  as  there  is  an 
act  of  exclusion  and  inclusion,  enlargement  and  diminishment  as  some  things  are  left 
out  and  others  are  exaggerated.  When  the  artist  proceeds  to  draw  they  become  blind  to 
the  immediacy  of  what  is  present  and  surrender  their  pens  or  brushes  and  paper  to  the 
world  that  is  instituted  in  the  dark. 
Derrida,  continuing  his  idea  of  the  trace  first  developed  in  Of  Grammatology, 
notes  how  even  the  trace  itself,  what  is  traced  out,  after  it  is  traced,  is  also  withdrawn. 
The  lines  drawn  must  not  obtrude  with  their  own  density  and  colour.  For  the  picture 
or  painting  to  work  they  must  withdraw,  become  invisible  and  allow  themselves  to  be 
eclipsed,  in  favour  of  the  visible  things  that  rise  up  into  presence  through  the  trace.  In 
the  strict  sense  of  the  term  we  do  not  see  the  lines  but  'through'  the  lines  which  are 
what  permit  the  visible  to  be  seen  by  shuttering  or  structuring  the  light.  Derrida  notes 
how  this  echoes  talk  of  the  deus  absconditus,  the  God  who  disappears,  who  withdraws 
behind  the  visible  world. 
47 
Concerning  the  self-portrait,  Derrida  notes  how  it  is  a  drawing  that  always 
arrives  too  late.  This  is  set  up  by  the  gap  or  spacing  that  exists  between  the  seeing 
glance  and  the  seen.  The  artist's  living  gaze  is  always  a  moment  of  ruin.  For  Derrida 
there  is  no  seeing  that  sees  itself  as  seeing.  The  seeing  eye  of  the  artist,  the  dead  eye  in 
the  miffor,  and  the  spectator  eye  that  sees  himself  or  herself  as  an  object  seen,  are  all 
46  John  D.  Caputo:  The  Prayers  and  Tears  of  Jacques  Derrida:  Refigon  ivithout  Religion:  Indiana 
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separated  by  an  abyss.  As  soon  as  the  artist  attempts  to  re-capture  himself,  to  see 
himself  seeing,  the  thing  itself  has  already  slipped  away. 
For  Deffida  this  ruin  is  not  a  failure  or  a  weakness;  rather  the  moment  of 
fracture  is  the  transcendental  condition  of  the  self-portrait: 
Ruin  is  that  which  happens  to  the  image  from  the  moment 
of  the  first  gaze.  Ruin  is  the  self-portrait,  this  face  looked 
at  in  the  face  as  the  memory  of  itself,  what  remains  or 
returns  as  a  specter  from  the  moment  one  first  looks  at 
oneself  and  a  figuration  is  eclipsed.  The  figure,  the  face, 
then  sees  its  visibility  being  eaten  away;  it  loses  its 
integrity  without  disintegrating.  48 
For  Deffida,  then,  rather  than  the  felicity  and  originary  integrity  of  self-knowledge, 
the  self-portrait  is  more  like  mourning  a  lost  loved  one,  the  thing  itself  having  slipped 
away.  Derrida  speaks  of  ruin  not  as  if  it  were  the  remaining  fragment  of  a  lost  totality, 
but  the  conditioning  structure  of  experience  itself,  and  of  memory,  the  inherent 
spacing  and  withdrawal  that  inhabits  experience  so  that  what  we  experience  is  never 
quite  'presence',  is  always  marked  up  and  partially  withdrawn,  marked  and  re-marked 
by  trait  and  retrait. 
And  by  such  means  Jacques  Derrida  makes  room  for  faith.  We  cannot  know 
face  to  face,  we  must  see  through  the  glass  darkly,  or  through  the  looking  glass. 
Deffida  will  say  Ue  ne  sais  pas.  11  faut  croire',  'I  don't  know,  one  has  to  believe  %49 
. 
47  The  Prayers  and  Tears  of  Jacques  Derrida:  Religion  without  Religion:  1997,  p.  320 
48  Memoirs  of  the  Blind.  The  Seff-Portrait  and  Other  Ruins:  1993,  p.  68 
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Chapter  Five: 
Un-solid  Foundations:  The  Aporetic, 
Philosophical  Faith  and  the  Plight  of 
Metaphysics  today 
We  concluded  the  last  chapter  with  a  reference  to  Jacques  Derrida's  Memoirs 
ofthe  Blind'.  That  reference  suggested  a  type  of  post-modem  faith.  We  will  explore 
this  position  in  the  current  chapter  with  the  aid'of  Seamus  Heaney's  poetry.  There  is  a 
recurrent  concern  in  Heaney's  oeuvre  with  the  act  of  writing  itself.  We  can  trace  this 
tendency  at  work  from  the  poem  that  is  often  seen  as  his  early  poetic  manifesto 
'Digging'  (found  in  the  1966  collection  Death  ofa  Naturalis?  )  right  through  to  'Field 
of  Vision'  (in  199  I's  Seeing  Things).  This  preoccupation  is  revealed  in  the  Heaney 
poems  that  concern  themselves  with  reflections  on  the  work  of  art  and  the  role  of  the 
artist.  One  of  the  finest  examples  of  this  type  of  Heaney  poem  is  'The  Forge"  found  in 
his  1969  collection  Door  Into  the  Dark4.  'The  Forge'  is  generally  seen  as  belonging  to 
a  distinctive  type  of  Heaney  poem  in  which  he  takes  the  craftsman  or  the  artisan  and 
imaginatively  re-constitutes  him  as  a  figure  for  the  poet.  Such  poems  also  include 
'The  Diviner',  'Follower,  'Digging'  from  Death  ofa  Naturalist  and  'Thatcher'  and 
'The  Given  Note'  found  in  Door  Into  the  Dark. 
1  Jacques  Derrida:  Memoirs  of  the  Blind.,  The  Sey-Portrait  and  Other  Ruins:  Trans.  by  Anne  Brault 
and  Mchael  Naas:  Univ.  of  Chicago  Press:  Chicago:  1993 
2  Seamus  Heaney:  Death  of  a  Naturalist:  Faber  &  Faber:  London:  1991,  p.  13  -  14 207 
The  Forge 
All  I  know  is  a  door  into  the  dark. 
Outside,  old  axles  and  iron  hoops  rusting; 
Inside,  the  hammered  anvil's  short-pitched  ring, 
The  unpredictable  fantail  of  sparks 
Or  hiss  when  a  new  shoe  toughens  in  water. 
The  anvil  must  be  somewhere  in  the  centre, 
Homed  as  a  unicom,  at  one  end  square, 
Set  there  immoveable:  an  altar 
Where  he  expends  himself  in  shape  and  music. 
Sometimes,  leather-aproned,  hairs  in  his  nose, 
He  leans  out  on  the  jamb,  recalls  a  clatter 
Of  hoofs  where  traffic  is  flashing  in  rows; 
Then  grunts  and  goes  in,  with  a  slam  and  flick 
To  beat  real  iron  out,  to  work  the  bellows. 
The  suggestion  of  a  negative  poetics  is  hinted  at  in  the  rather  gnomic  phrasing 
of  'The  Forge's'  opening  line:  'All  I  know  is  a  door  into  the  dark'.  There  is  a  hint  here 
of  knowledge,  transition  and  passageway.  The  "all  I  know'  is  intrinsically  negative.  It 
concerns  itself  with  the  limits  of  knowledge  about  something.  The  passage  is  not  the 
normal  voyage  into  enlightening  understanding,  for  the  poet  only  knows  a  'door  into 
the  dark',  or  maybe  the  voyage  into  'the  dark'  will  be  a  paradoxical  journey  into  a 
dark  understanding  that  will  be  illuminating?  The  knowledge  worth  knowing  might  be 
3  Seamus  Heaney:  Seeing  Things:  Faber  &  Faber:  London:  1991,  p.  22 
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located  where  we  cannot  find,  are  not  looking  for  it,  or  where  we  least  expect  to  locate 
it. 
Heaney's  use  of  the  phrases  'outside'  and  'inside'  suggest  a  barrier  crossed,  a 
before  and  an  after.  It  is  worth  noting  how  he  constructs  the  sense  of  space  in  this 
poem.  The  passage  to  the  interior  of  the  ironmonger's  forge  is  seen  as  a  journey  from 
the  mundane  and  the  transitory,  the  cold  axles  and  iron  hoops  rusting'  to  the  fantastic 
and  the  exciting,  the  'unpredictable  fantail  of  sparks'.  Although  the  end  of  the  poem 
indicates  that  the  trade  of  the  forger  is  virtually  extinct,  for  now  the  'traffic  is  flashing 
in  rows',  Heaney  still  uses  the  suggestive  phrase  'the  anvil  must  be  somewhere  at  the 
centre'.  Does  this  'centre'  indicate  a  creative,  literary,  philosophical  or  theological 
centre  removed  from  the  commercial  highways  or  the  technological  highways?  We 
are  justified  in  asking  this  question  because  the  imprecise  language  used  in  the 
poem  suggests  more  than  it  defines.  The  vagueness  of  'somewhere'  indicates  an 
appropriate  lack  of  definition  or  fixedness  that  is  somewhat  paradoxical  given  the 
very  solid  world  of  the  forge  with  its  iron  hoops,  axles,  and  anvils. 
In  fact,  the  language  of  the  poem  operates  at  two  significant  levels.  On  the  one 
hand  we  have  the  concrete  language  of  the  'clatter  of  hoofs',  of  the  'slam  and  a  flick' 
and  the  'hairs  in  the  nose'  of  the  forger  himself.  On  the  other  hand  we  have  the  anvil 
which  is  called  'an  altar'  at  one  point,  the  'unpredictable  fantail  of  sparks',  'shape 
and  music',  and  as  we  shall  see  the  'real  iron'  that  gets  beaten  out  in  the  world  of  the 
forge.  Both  tendencies  are  united  in  the  description  of  the  anvil.  It  is  'homed  as  a 
unicorn'  at  one  end  and  at  the  other  it  is  just  'square'.  The  image  of  the  unicorn 
emerges  from  the  world  of  myth  and  fantasy  while  the  phrase  'square'  suggests  the 209 
somewhat  dull,  if  reliable.  Heaney  holds  both  together  in  his  image  of  the  anvil  as 
altar.  It  is  a  place  of  transformation.  Does  the  fantastic  become  the  real,  or  does  the 
real  become  fantasy?  Or  are  elements  of  both  found  together?  Heaney  doesn't  answer 
this  'question'  after  raising  it.  In  one  sense  poetry  has  an  advantage  over  the  more 
rigorous  procedures  of  thought  found  in  philosophy  or  theology.  The  poet  does  not 
have  to  justify  his  choice  of  metaphor.  It  is  as  if  the  real  world  is  shadowed  by  the 
world  of  the  imagined.  One  seems  to  reflect  and  contain  the  other.  That  is  all  he  needs 
for  his  poem  to  work. 
For  the  farrier  to  do  his  creative  work  there  is  a  type  of  generous  giving 
required.  We  note  Heaney's  use  of  the  term  'expends'.  This  verb  suggests  more  than 
hard  physical  labour,  a  labour  of  love  maybe,  or  life-giving  birth?  There  is  something 
stubbornly  resistant  in  the  work  and  attitude  of  the  farrier.  He  returns  to  his  work  with 
defiance  even  after  observing  how  the  world  has  passed  him  and  his  trade  by.  He  goes 
'to  beat  real  iron  out'.  The  poem  suggests  that  despite  the  fact  that  his  trade  has  been 
superceded  by  modem  transport  the  farrier  is  still  involved  in  work  that  will  last, 
something  of  value.  What  is  that  value? 
To  help  us  explicitly  theorize  our  concerns  we  turn  to  the  arguments  about 
negative  theology  presented  by  Jacques  Derrida  in  his  essay  'Saufle  Nom5.  This 
5  The  first  version  of  this  text  appeared  in  English  under  the  title  Post-Scriplum  (subtitle:  Aporlas, 
Ways  and  Voices)  in  a  volume  devoted  to  negative  theology  (Harold  Coward  and  Toby  Foshay,  eds. 
Denida  and  Negative  Theology  [Albany:  State  University  of  New  York  Press,  1992]).  The  version  we 
have  worked  from  appeared  in  the  collection  of  essays  called  On  the  Name  (trans.  John  P.  Leavey  Jr.  ) 
under  the  title  Sauf  le  Nom  (Post  -  Scriptum)  (Thomas  Dutoit  ed.:  Stanford  Univ.  Press:  California: 
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essay  concerns  itself  with  the  limits  of  negative  theology.  In  particular  it  meditates  on 
the  mystic  poetry  of  Angelus  Silesius. 
The  logical  premise  of  negative  theology  is  easily  stated.  God,  the  deity, 
exceeds  all  the  boundaries  of  containment  we  can  create  for  him  in  and  through  the 
language  of  human  thought  and  argument.  The  manner  in  which  Derrida  writes  about 
this  indicates  a  recurrent  pre-occupation  of  his  own  Philosophical  meditations.  For 
him  negative  theology  deals  with  'the  singularity  of  the  unknown  God  1,6  that  always 
overflows  the  boundaries  of  essence  and  divinity.  The  unknown  God  will  always 
exceed  the  conceptions  of  negative  or  positive  theology,  of  philosophical  categories 
like  being  and  nothingness.  The  unknown  God  utterly  transcends  all  these  limiting 
categorizations.  Derrida  notes  that  he  is  not  the  first  to  arrive  on  this  scene.  Husserl 
stated  that  the  apophatic  statements  of  negative  theology  indicate  a  significant 
4moment  Of  CriSiS, 
7 
.  This  crisis  challenges  the  presumptions  of  phenomenology,  as 
well  as  ontological  and  transcendental  theology  and  philosophy.  What  challenges  the 
premises  of  these  disciplines  is  the  emptiness  articulated  by  the  apophatic  statement; 
this  is  'essential  and  necessary  to  themI8.  One  outgrowth  of  this  is  a  new  sense  of 
community,  precisely  and  paradoxically  through  this  communal,  possibly  primal 
emptiness.  Can  a  new  tongue,  a  new  speech,  a  new  language  be  translated  from  the 
depths  of  this  silence,  this  primitive  inarticulateness  that  negative  theology  concerns 
itself  with? 
6  Jacques  Derrida:  Samf  k  Now  1995,  p.  52 
7  Jacques  Derrida:  Sauf  k  Now  1995,  p.  50 
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Deffida's  Saufle  Nom  opens  up  a  'window',  a  door  into  the  world  of  Heaney's 
forger  that  allows  us  read  this  world  as  a  world  that  always  contains  something 
'more'.  There  is  a  plus  factor,  an  alternative  dimension  to  the  world  as  we  have 
conceived  it.  It  is  simply  not  enough  to  see  things  as  they  are.  In  the  words  of 
conventional  clichd:  there  is  more  to  the  world  of  the  forger  than  meets  the  eye. 
Heaney  has  something  in  common  with  the  forger.  Indicative  of  this  is  our  question: 
Why  does  Heaney  deploy  the  forger  as  a  figure  for  the  artist,  if  we  concede  that  that  is 
that  he  is  doing  in  this  poem,  and  in  similar  poems  like  'The  Diviner'  and  'The  Given 
Note'9?  Heaney  is  clearly  working  in  the  world  of  metaphor  but  is  this  dependent,  and 
does  it  revolve  or  hinge  on  the  possibility  of  transcendence  as  deployed  by  linguistic 
and  imaginative  substitution?  Are  we  in  the  world  of  Derridean  'differance'?  Is  the 
imaginative  act  at  work  in  Heaney's  poem  (where  the  forger  can  come  to  stand  for  so 
much  more  than  the  manual  worker  he  is)  indicative  of  something  profound  in  the 
way  language  works,  wWch  is  of  profound  significance  to  any  discourse  that 
presupposes  to  speak  of  'God'? 
As  we  have  noted  before,  in  his  first  major  work  OfGrammatology  Jacques 
Deffida  proposed  the  thesis  that  'differance'  is  the  source  of  linguistic  value.  For 
meaning  to  be  constituted  there  has  to  be  a  trace  of  otherness  within  the  smallest 
portion  of  temporal  experience.  As  we  saw  earlier,  meaning  is  constituted  through 
difference:  'Without  a  retention  in  the  minimal  unit  of  temporal  experience,  without  a 
trace  retaining  the  other  as  other  in  the  same,  no  difference  would  do  its  work  and  no 
meaning  would  appear''O.  At  this  point  we  witness  the  birth  of  the  trace.  For  Deffida 
the  trace  opens  up  meaning.  It  is  neither  in  the  world  nor  in  'another  world',  neither  in 
9  Seamus  Heaney:  Opened  Ground.  Poenn  1966  -  1996:  Faber  &  Faber:  London:  1998,  p.  13,  p.  36 212 
time  nor  space.  Differences  produce  the  elements  of  texts  through  the  chains  and 
systems  of  traces:  'The  trace  is  infact  the  absolute  origin  ofsense  in  generaL  Which 
amounts  to  saying  once  again  that  there  is  no  absolute  origin  ofsense  in  generaL  The 
ication'  trace  is  the  difference  which  opens  appearance  [I'apparaitre]  and  signif 
John  D.  Caputo  argues  that  Derrida's  concept  of  differance  is  not  a 
transcendental  category.  12  The  Deffidean  term  differance  is  not  a  symbol  for  the 
hidden  God,  it  is  not  a  manifest  presence,  it  has  no  truth.  Still  and  all  we  have  to  allow 
for  the  fact  that  it  is  what  enables  what  is  manifest  to  appear  in  the  first  place.  In  the 
passage  quoted  above  from  OfGrammatology  Derrida  is  dealing  with  the  conditions 
under  which  words  and  concepts  come  to  be  conceived,  formed  or  articulated  in  the 
very  first  instance.  The  term  is  a  substitute,  all  we  have,  for  the  differential  matrix 
from  which  all  names,  concepts  and  identities  emerge.  For  Deffida  the  term  differance 
indicates  a  certain  nervous  breakdown  of  language.  It  extends  a  challenge  to  all 
discourses  from  negative  theology,  with  its  attempt  to  non-speak  God's  ground  and 
soul,  as  if  from  within  the  inner  sanctum  of  divine  being  itself,  to  the  representational 
thinking,  conceptual  formation  and  discursive  reasoning  of  traditional  philosophy  and 
theology.  Negative  theology  is  always  an  event  within  language,  something  that 
occurs  to  language,  a  fear  and  trembling  of  language.  As  such  it  will  always  be  tainted 
by  the  brush  of  differance. 
Can  we  speak  of  differance  then  as  a  primary  category,  to  speak  the  language 
of  a  more  conventional  and  traditional  metaphysics?  Any  sufficient  or  enabling 
10  Jacques  Derrida:  Of  Grammatology:  John  Hopkins  Univ.  Press:  Baltimore:  1998,  Trans.  by  Gayatri 
Chakraworty  Spivak,  p.  62 
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condition  would  be  traditionally  referred  to  as  a  transcendental  condition.  A  classic 
expression  of  this  type  of  formulation  is  David  Tracy's  arguments  in  Blessed  Ragefor 
Order  13 
.  Here  Tracy  argues  that  there  are  two  'moments'  that  give  birth  to  each  and 
every  fonn  of  philosophical  reflection.  Tracy  identifies  the  first  by  the  tenn  'the 
phenomenological  moment'  and  the  second  by  'the  transcendental  moment'.  The 
phenomenological  moment  has  been  with  us  since  the  birth  of  Western  philosophy 
(even  though  it  might  find  the  terminology  strange)  insofar  as  one  of  the  primary  aims 
of  classical  philosophy  was  to  initiate  and  sustain  a  detailed  exploration  of  the  very 
ground,  that  is,  basis,  of  every  phenomenon  which  presented  itself  to  human 
consciousness.  By  its  very  self-definition  philosophy  was  obliged  to  seek  out  the 
fundamental  presuppositions  of  every  discipline,  method  and  phenomenon.  The 
transcendental  moment  has  also  shadowed  Western  philosophy  from  the  very  outset, 
for  philosophy  has  always  sought  to  rise  above  or  delve  below  each  and  every 
phenomenon,  discipline  and  method  in  an  attempt  at  unearthing  the  'conditions  of 
possibility'  of  that  phenomenon,  that  discipline  and  that  method. 
It  is  a  fundamental  tenet  of  Western  philosophy  in  its  transcendentalist  mode 
that  every  phenomenon  or  object  possesses  'a  priori'  conditions.  These  conditions  are 
constitutive  of  all  human  experience  and  knowledge  to  the  extent  that  we  might  call 
them  conditions  ofpossibility,  that  is,  they  are  so  constitutive  of  any  performance  of 
action  or  cognition  that  we  can  exhibit  them  deductively  from  it.  Modem  philosophy 
is  still  pursuing  this  task  when  it  addresses  the  question:  what  are  the  basic  'a  priori' 
conditions  of  all  human  living  and  thought? 
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One  suspects  the  reason  why  Tracy  uses  the  term  'moment'  is  that  he  wishes 
to  suggest  the  basic  unity  behind  what  is  really  a  philosophical  movement,  that  the 
metaphysical  moment  is  an  essential  part  of  the  phenomenological  moment  itself;  that 
the  phenomenological  moment  moves  on  into  the  transcendental  moment;  that  both 
are  different  dimensions  of  the  one  philosophical  movement.  We  witness  this  clearly 
when  phenomenological  self-awareness  is  raised  to  the  point  where  a  reflective  and 
explicit  examination  of  the  problematic  status  of  phenomenological  reflection  itself 
becomes  unavoidable.  At  this  point  the  phenomenologist  is  obliged  not  only  to 
explore  phenomena  but  must  reformulate  the  transcendental  question  itself  since  logic 
demands  that  she  or  he  address  the  primary  question  of  the  basic  ground  or 
presuppositions  of  every  and  all  phenomena,  of  any  or  all  phenomenological 
reflection.  To  phrase  it  differently,  the  phenomenological  moment  discloses  the 
meaning  and  meaningfulness  of  any  given  experience  while  the  transcendental 
moment  discloses  the  true  conditions  of  possibility  of  that  experience. 
For  John  D.  Caputo  this  is  indicative  of  traditional  metaphysics'  attempt  to  tie 
things  up,  nail  things  down,  seal  up  the  case.  Caputo  argues  that  it  is  a  better  and  more 
adequate  description  to  refer  to  differance  as  a  quasi-transcendental  condition.  It  is  all 
too  aware  of  its  own  inadequacy  and  feebleness.  Differance  always  indicates  a 
moment  when  meaning  slips  away,  when  sense  squirms  free  from  the  strict 
demarcations  of  surrounding,  enclosing  horizons.  It  always  exceeds,  overflows, 
transcends  its  own  margins.  14 
Univ.  Press:  Bloomington:  1997,  p.  12 
13  David  Tracy:  Blessed  Ragefor  Order.  The  Seabury  Press:  New  York:  1975 
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In  the  light  of  such  a  position  'The  Forger'  can  represent  Heaney  and  his 
world,  it  can  be  itself,  as  well  as  being  a  figure  for  the  artist,  as  well  as  standing  for  all 
of  creative  humanity,  in  an  infinite  variety  of  creative  possibilities.  It  is  surely 
liberating  to  conceive  of  poetry,  language  and  meaning  in  such  playful  terms. 
In  Saufle  Nom  it  is  interesting  to  observe  how  Derrida  deals  with  the  logical 
incongruities  of  the  negative  theological  tradition  that  always  threatens  to  deconstruct 
its  own  premises  from  within  before  it  even  utters  a  word.  A  distinctive  tradition  of 
negative  theology  exists  because  it  has  left  behind  the  traces  of  its  thought  in  its  own 
classic  texts  and  its  own  style.  The  most  creative  metaphor  or  symbol  of  this  tradition 
is  'the  desert'.  From  within  this  desert  though  negative  theology  cultivates  itself  as  an 
oasis  of  memory,  an  institution,  a  history:  'it  is  a  culture,  with  its  archives  and  its 
traditions  A5 
. 
For  Deffida  the  language  utilized  in  negative  theology  tests  the  very 
limits  of  language  itself  It  is  no  surprise  to  find  the  author  of  Of  Grammatology 
interested  in  such  a  prospect.  Through  the  moment  of  witness  negative  theology  finds 
its  presence:  'by  testifying  it  remains'  16 
. 
Let  us  look  at  the  poem  with  which  Heaney  closes  Door  Into  the  Dark, 
Togland'.  Togland'  is  the  starting  point  of  a  major  concern  of  Heaney's  that  grows 
in  stature  in  subsequent  volumes  of  verse.  The  image  of  the  bog  as  a  source,  as  a 
repository  of  the  past,  as  a  transcendental  space  within  which  it  is  possible  to  re- 
imagine  our  past,  our  present  and  ourselves  will  grow  in  interest  for  Heaney,  reaching 
its  logical  conclusion  in  his  volume  North: 
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Bogland 
for  T.  P.  Flanagan 
We  have  no  prairies 
To  slice  a  big  sun  at  evening- 
Everywhere  the  eye  concedes  to 
Encroaching  horizon, 
Is  wooed  into  the  cyclop's  eye 
Of  a  tam.  Our  unfenced  country 
Is  bog  that  keeps  crusting 
Between  the  sigbts  of  the  sun. 
They've  taken  the  skeleton 
Of  the  Great  Irish  Elk 
Out  of  the  peat,  set  it  up 
An  astounding  crate  full  of  air. 
Butter  sunk  under 
More  than  a  hundred  years 
Was  recovered  salty  and  white. 
The  ground  itself  is  kind,  black  butter 
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Melting  and  opening  underfoot, 
Missing  its  last  definition 
By  millons  of  years. 
They'll  never  dig  coal  here, 
Only  the  waterlogged  trunks 
Of  great  firs,  soft  as  pulp. 
Our  pioneers  keep  striking 
Inwards  and  downwards, 
Every  layer  they  strip 
Seems  camped  on  before. 
The  bogholes  might  be  Atlantic  seepage. 
The  wet  centre  is  bottomless.  17 
For  Heaney  Ireland's  values  are  epitomized  by  its  spiritual  heartland,  as 
expressed  in  'Bogland'.  What  are  the  values  associated  with  this  terrain?  The 
openness,  the  freedom  and  imaginative  sense  of  adventure  suggested  by  the  prairies  of 
America  is  found  in  'our  unfenced  country',  the  bog.  We  can  be  astounded  in  the 
present  by  the  past  that  has  been  preserved  by  the  bog.  The  skeleton  of  the  Great  Irish 
Elk  has  been  retrieved  from  the  bog:  'an  astounding  crate  full  of  air'.  We  note 
Heaney  9s  suggestion  of  hollowness  at  the  core  of  this  image:  air  lacks  substance. 
Butter  has  been  retrieved  from  the  bog  fully  preserved.  At  the  centre  of  the  bog  itself 
we  discover  a  peculiar,  maybe  necessary,  certainly  customary  hollowness:  'Missing 
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its  last  definition/By  millions  of  years'.  Let  us  not,  in  a  moment  of  theological  nayvetd, 
miss  the  political  implications  of  Heaney's  rhetoric.  Heaney  sets  up  a  contrast  with 
the  landscapes  of  the  Industrial  Revolution  that  made  Britain  great.  England's  coal- 
fields  provided  the  power  that  fuelled  the  Empire.  For  Heaney  the  coal-fields  are 
symbolic  of  imperial  might,  strength,  brutality:  'They'll  never  dig  coal  here,  //Only 
the  waterlogged  trunks/Of  great  firs,  soft  as  pulp'.  The  Irish  bog  is  softer,  feminine, 
and  pliable.  The  bog  is  an  inexhaustible  source  of  excavation  and  exploration:  'every 
layer  they  strip/seems  camped  on  before'.  In  fact  the  bog  is  so  rich  for  explorative 
possibilities  that  it  almost  seems  endless:  'the  wet  centre  is  bottomless'.  What  is 
interesting  in  this  poem'is  how  Heaney  constructs  a  sense  of  never-ending  space  that 
is  open  to  continual  and  expanding  definition.  Is  Heaney's  poem  sitting  at  the  center 
of  an  aporia  that  we  can  locate  at  the  heart  of  language  usage  and  creation  itself?  Can 
we  read  Heaney's  poem  as  a  potent  symbol  of  language  itself,  of  language  chasing  its 
own  tail?  Is  it  revealing  in  the  context  of  our  discussion  of  the  possibilities  of  God- 
talk?  Let's  look  again  at  Derrida  in  Saufle  Nom. 
For  Derrida  negative  theology  has  one  pre-eminent  word  in  and  through  which 
we  glimpse  many  fraught  questions.  That  word  is  'God'  and  negative  theology's  most 
potent  symbol  of  bottomless  collapse.  It  indicates  the  continual  desertification  of 
language".  Heaney's  bog,  it  could  be  argued,  is  a  slightly  colder  and  wetter  version  of 
Derrida's  desert.  What  is  surprising  and  worth  noting  is  that  we  can  always  state  this. 
We  can  name  this  name.  This  is  an  event  possible  to  language.  We  can  say  'God' 
equals  'Desert'  equals  'Bog';  although  the  tradition  of  negative  theology  argues  that 
we  can  never  exhaust  the  name  of  'God'.  Is  he  the  arche-type  of  Heaney's  bottomless 
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centre?  God  is  beyond  all  giving,  even  the  giving  of  the  name,  his  name.  Is  it  God  that 
lies  at  the  bottom  of  Heaney's  soggy  wet  bog? 
Derrida  is  intrigued  by  the  re-configuring  of  space  that  seems  to  always  occur 
in  the  traditions  of  negative  theology.  For  Derrida  this  has  a  long  and  honoured 
history  and  manifests  itself  in  many  different  cultural  traditions:  the  Jewish,  the 
Christian  and  the  Greek  networks  of  thought.  The  name  of  God  is  often  referred  to 
within  the  context  and  experience  of  place.  When  one  hangs  out  in  the  locality  of  the 
word  'God'  one  often  develops  interesting  re-configurations  of  this  spatiality.  They 
often  have  a  distinctly  desert  hue  to  them.  In  fact  the  desert  is  'a  figure  of  the  pure 
place'19.  This  place  has  no  geographical  location  and  does  not  play  host  to  a  single 
object  or  subject.  Have  we  witnessed  an  exemplary  indication  of  this  in  the  reading  of 
Heaney  we  have  offered?  We  recall  that  Heaney  wrote  in  an  early  essay  called  The 
Sense  ofPlace:  'We  are  dwellers,  we  are  namers,  we  are  lovers,  we  make  homes  and 
search  for  our  histories'20  . 
What  is  worth  noting  here  is  Heaney's  use  of  verbs  that 
suggest  continual  activity.  Is  this  cultural  and  personal  work  that  we  are  always  doing, 
work  we  will  always  need  to  do  and  with  which  we  will  never  be  finished?  Are  we 
always  left  to  chase  the  tail  of  the  trace? 
There  is  a  lexical  peculiarity  to  the  words  developed  in  negative  theology  to 
speak  of  'God'.  These  words,  metaphors,  symbols  attempt  to  name  God,  to  speak 
God,  to  speak  to  him.  The  names  used  are  always  shadowed  by  uncertainty.  They 
attempt  to  name  something  beyond  themselves.  They  point  to  the  unnameable  beyond 
the  name.  This  is  where  Deffida  develops  his  phrase  saufle  nom.  He  develops  this 
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French  phrase  in  an  attempt  to  protect  the  name  of  God  itself  One  is  caught  in 
paradoxical  terrain.  One  needs  to  save  the  name  and  everything  except  the  name, 
everything  outside  the  name  which  isn't  tangible  but  there  nevertheless,  which 
escapes  the  name  but  which  the  name  'shadows':  'as  if  it  was  necessary  to  lose  the 
name  in  order  to  save  what  bears  the  name"'.  There  is  a  reversal  of  'normal  logic':  if 
you  lose  the  name  you  respect  it.  By  losing  the  name  you  do  not  undermine, 
disrespect  or  attack  it.  In  pronouncing  the  name  you  travel  through  and  across  it 
toward  the  other. 
Let  us  look  at  some  poems  Heaney  published  in  his  1972  collection  Wintering 
Out.  These  are  Heaney's  well-known  'word'  poems.  They  include  'Anahorish', 
'Toome'  and  'Broagh'.  We  can  also  include  'Gifts  of  Rain'  and  'A  New  Song'22.  We 
can  include  the  poem  'Song'  from  1979's  collection  Field  Work  due  to  its  provocative 
last  line:  'And  that  moment  when  the  bird  sings  very  close/To  the  music  of  what 
happens  723  . 
There  is  something  of  Genesis  about  this  group  of  poems.  Throughout 
these  poems  Heaney  uses  words  'to  call  into  play'  the  qualities  of  a  place.  We  will 
look  in  detail  at  just  two  of  these  poems:  'Anahorish'  and  'Toome'. 
Anahorish 
My  'place  of  clear  water', 
the  first  hill'in  the  world 
where  springs  washed  into 
the  shiny  grass 
20  Seamus  Heaney:  Preoccupations:  Selected  Prose  1968  -  1978:  Faber  &  Faber:  London:  1998,  p.  148 
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and  darkened  cobbles 
in  the  bed  of  the  lane. 
Anahorish,  soft  gradient 
of  consonant,  vowel-meadow, 
after-image  of  lamps 
swung  through  the  yards 
on  winter  evenings. 
With  pails  and  barrows 
those  mound-dwellers 
go  waist-deep  in  mist 
to  break  the  light  ice 
at  wells  and  dunghillS.  24 
In  the  poem  'Anahorish"  the  title  is  an  Irish  place  name  translated  by  Heaney 
as  4my  place  of  clear  water'.  So  Heaney  is  on  home  ground.  For  Heaney  the  poet  the 
name  of  the  place  calls  into  being  the  place  itself  The  world  of  this  poem  is  almost 
primeval.  For  Heaney  this  'first  place  in  the  world'  is  his  first  place,  and  thereby 
resembles  all  first  places.  His  experience  of  this  place  can  be  translated  into  a 
transcendental  metaphor  for  all  persons,  and  all  places,  all  homes  possibly.  When 
Heaney  pronounces  the  name  Anahorish  in  the  poem  it  conjures  up  a  world  of  'soft 
gradient/of  consonant,  vowel-meadow'.  This  world  then  translates  into  an  afterglow 
22  Seamus  Heaney:  Opened  Ground.  Poems  1966  -  1996:  Faber  &  Faber:  London:  1998 
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of  lights  swung  in  farmyards.  Heaney  uses  the  phrase  'mound-dwellers'.  The 
inhabitants,  the  natives,  of  this  world  work  as  they  have  always  worked,  disappearing 
in  'the  mist'  to  break  the  ice  that  has  formed  over  their  water  supplies.  Things  have 
not  changed  all  that  much.  There  is  an  element  of  continuity  in  this  world.  What  are 
the  links  in  this  chain  of  light  and  language?  The  words  themselves  possibly,  as 
articulated  by  the  memory  bank  of  the  poet,  caught  in  the  world  imagined  through  the 
language  of  image  and  metaphor  in  the  poem. 
In  the  poem  'Toome'  the  place  name  becomes  for  the  poet  an  historical 
repository  and  then  the  place  itself: 
Toome 
My  mouth  holds  round 
the  soft  blastings, 
Toome,,  Toome 
as  under  the  dislodged 
slab  of  the  tongue 
I  push  into  a  souteffain 
prospecting  what  new 
in  a  hundred  centuries' 
loam,  flints,  musket-balls, 
fragmented  ware, 
torcs  and  fish-bones 223 
till  I  am  sleeved  in 
alluvial  mud  that  shelves 
suddenly  under 
bogwater  and  tributaries, 
and  elvers  tail  my  hair. 
25 
When  Heaney  pronounces  the  name  Toome,  Toome  as  an  incantation  in  the  poem,  he 
enters  into  the  world  of  the  place  name's  past  to  unearth  a  troubled  history.  The 
historical  struggle  is  inscribed  into  the  name  of  the  place  until  both  arc  inextricable. 
The  weapons  of  ancient  and  modem  warfare  have  collected  here,  from  the  primitive 
flints  to  the  musket-balls.  The  artworks  have  a  similar  genealogy,  from  the  more 
primitive  fish-bones  to  the  advanced  torcs.  However  Heaney  digs  so  deep  in  this 
poem  that  he  enters  into  an  underground  torrent.  He  digs  down 
till  I  am  sleeved  in 
alluvial  mud  that  shelves 
suddenly  under 
bogwater  and  tributaries, 
and  elvers  tail  my  hair. 
Heaney  has  become  part  of  the  landscape  itself  Has  he  become  a  part  of  the 
life-giving  streams  that  bubble  creatively  underground,  under  the  world  of  the  real, 
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the  tangible,  the  historical  and  the  linguistic?  In  becoming  part  of  this  unifying  and 
assuaging  current,  does  he  escape  the  narrow  definitions  that  have  become  so  central 
to  our  intransigent  and  intractable  history?  What  transcendental  possibility  inherent  in 
language  has  allowed  Heaney  this  creative  leap? 
The  poem  'Toome'  can  be  read  as  a  poem  which  offers  us  a  positive  way  out 
of  the  intractable  linguistic  (read  as  symbolic  for  the  many  religious,  social,  and 
economic)  barriers  that  exist  in  Northern  Irish  society.  In  its  conception  of  an 
originary,  benign  river  as  resting  place  for  the  creative  imagination  the  poem  can 
become  a  space  of  imaginative  renewal.  However,  there  is  the  issue  of  the  ethical 
responsibility  of  the  artist  himself  or  herself  For  we  see  Heaney  in  the  poem  'A  New 
Song'  write  a  poem  that  implicitly  calls  for  a  linguisitic  re-clamation  or  re-plantation, 
with  the  poem's  title  itself  sounding  a  rather  eschatological  tone,  which  is  somewhat 
woffying: 
But  now  our  river  tongues  must  rise 
From  licking  deep  in  native  haunts 
To  flood  with  vowelling  embmce, 
Demesnes  staked  out  in  consonants. 
And  Castledawson  we'll  enlist 
And  Upperlands,  each  planted  bawn- 
Like  bleaching-greens  resumed  by  grass- 
A  vocable,  as  rath  and  bullaun.  26 
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Let  us  not  be  found  guilty  of  offering  a  theological  or  aesthetic  reading  of 
Heaney  that  is  not  attentive  to  political  overtones  and  implications  from  within  his 
work. 
From  a  reading  of  Jacques  Derrida's  essay  Saufle  Nom  we  discover  that 
language  is  opened  up  by  the  reference  to  what  is  named  by  the  word  'God'  but  at  the 
same  time  this  phrase  always  points  to  and  indicates  its  own  inadequacy.  It  is  at  this 
juncture  that  we  might  conceive  of  poetry  as  a  continuing  theological  exercise.  The 
language  used  by  negative  theology  always  declares  its  own  inadequacy  concerning 
that  about  which  it  claims  to  know  something.  So  there  is  a  continual  desire  and  need 
for  re-invention.  This  might  be  the  basis  for  the  negative  poetics  we  have  argued  is  at 
work  in  the  poetry  of  Seamus  Heaney.  For  Derrida.  the  symbols  used  in  negative 
theology  always  traverse  across  a  mighty  chasm.  There  is  no  common  measure  found 
between  the  moment  of  revelation  and  knowledge  on  the  one  hand  and  the  suggestion 
of  an  absolute  secret  on  the  other.  Paradoxically  we  are  ushered  into  that  place  where 
we  are  not  able  to  go.  We  are  invited  into  a  concern  with  place:  'over  there,  toward 
the  name,  toward  the  beyond  of  the  name  in  the  name'27  .  Is  this  why  Heaney  values 
the  work  of  the  diviner,  the  farrier  and  the  poet  even  though  this  defies  common 
sense?  Through  the  ordinary  we  are  invited  into  the  extraordinary.  Heaney's  forger  is 
a  paradigm  for  one  who  can  point  us  towards,  send  us  off  in  the  direction  of  the  other. 
Is  this  why  the  forger,  the  diviner  and  the  thatcher  are  emblems  for  the  poet?  The  poet 
is  one  who  sends  us  in  new  and  unexpected  directions.  As  the  cultural  archivist  of 
language,  the  high  priest  who  serves  at  the  altar  of  language,  the  poet  is  a  channel  for 
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the  other.  In  keeping  language  alive  the  poet  keeps  open  the  channels  of 
communication  to  the  other. 
In  Saufle  Nom  the  word  of  negative  theology  is  always  a  post-scriplum.  "  It  is 
always  trailing  behind  the  event  itself  The  phrases  used  in  the  poetry  produced  by 
negative  theology  always  occur  at  the  edge  of  language,  the  border  of  reference  itself 
As  it  flows  over  the  edge  negative  theology  draws  its  energy  from  having  occurred, 
having  carried  off  the  legible-illegible  text  of  itself  So  the  text  always  operates  as  a 
post-scriptum;  it  trails  behind  the  event. 
Derrida  develops  a  key  metaphor  at  this  juncture.  The  language  of  negative 
theology  is  for  him  an  arrow.  An  arrow  is  only  that,  an  arrow,  and  an  end  in  itself  It  is 
pointed  towards  something,  destined  to  strike  it,  but  it  can  never  become  that  towards 
which  it  is  directed.  So  the  arrow  misses,  even  as  it  touches,  and  that  is  what  makes  it 
safe 
So  there  is  a  peculiar  passiveness  about  this  work.  One  thinks  of  the  writer 
Heaney  in  the  poem  'Digging'  observing  his  father  at  work.  Heaney  is  in  a  passive 
position  in  relation  to  the  activity  of  his  father.  Heaney's  father  works  the  land  while 
he  works  his  pen.  Heaney  constructs  an  archaeological  dig  from  his  personal  past,  a 
family  memorial  and  a  type  of  the  poetic  archive.  Heaney  refers  to  the  grandfather 
who  'cut  more  turf  in  a  day/Than  any  other  man  in  Toner's  bog  29 
.  There  is  an  anxiety 
at  work  in  this  poem,  the  primal  anxiety  of  procreation  maybe.  Heaney  wonders 
whether  he  is  following  his  ancestors  in  a  fitting  and  worthy  manner:  'I've  no  spade  to 
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follow  men  like  them'.  He  is  trailing  behind.  Heaney  develops  this  theme  more 
explicitly  in  his  poem  'Follower'.  Referring  to  his  father's  ability  with  the  plough 
Heaney  notes:  'I  stumbled  in  his  hob-nailed  wake',  and  'All  I  ever  did  was  follow/In 
his  broad  shadow  round  the  farmOO.  What  is  revealing  in  these  poems  is  the  anxiety 
about  following,  trailing  in  a  past  which  the  poet  worries  about  catching  in  his  poetry. 
Are  they  indirectly  meditations  on  the  inability  of  the  writer  to  hold  meaning  down  in 
words?  Are  words  always  shooting  off  somewhere  else,  pointing  where  you  want 
them  to  go  but  not  getting  there  fully?  Are  these  poems  fraught  with  the  anxieties  of 
Deffida's  arrow?  Can  we  read  them  as  metaphors  for  the  anxiety  of  writing  itself? 
Derrida  himself  does  not  use  the  term  metaphor.  He  opts  for  a  more  resonant 
tenn.  He  seizes  on  Plato's  use  of  the  tenn  huperbole  in  The  Republic.  For  Plato,  as 
read  by  Derrida,  the  term  suggests  the  movement  of  transcendence  that  carries  or 
transports  beyond  being  or  beingness,  epekeina  tes  ousias.  This  hyperbole  always 
announceS:  it  indicates  an  open  possibility,  but  it  also  provokes  thereby  the  opening  of 
the  possibility.  It  reveals  as  it  produces.  It  will  precipitate  discourse,  and  hence  being, 
existence.  For  Derrida:  'the  Platonic,  Plotinian,  or  Neoplatonic  style  will  not  only 
precipitate  beyond  being  or  God  insofar  as  he  is  (the  supreme  being),  but  beyond  God 
even  as  name,  as  naming,  named  or  nameable,  insofar  as  reference  is  made  there  to 
some  ing 
Ol 
. 
The  beyond,  what  is  conceived  of  as  beyond  God,  is  for  Derrida  radically 
conceived  behind,  before  and  after,  beyond  place  itself.  This  movement  of 
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transcendence  surpasses  God  himself  It  surpasses  the  being,  the  essence,  the  proper 
self,  the  divinity  of  God.  This  is  the  source  of  the  radical  thought  that  lies  behind 
negative  theology.  For  Derrida  this  movement  of  thought  has  radical  implications  for 
all  philosophizing.  In  its  transcendental  gusto  this  movement  radically  shatters  being 
and  knowing,  existence  and  knowledge.  Such  thought  shatters,  fractures,  and  opens  up 
the  cogito  as  conceived  by  St  Augustine  or  Descartes. 
Do  we  witness  this  at  work  in  the  poems  we  have  examined  by  Heaney?  The 
moment  of  the  poem  opens  us  into  a  vista  we  could  not  enter  otherwise.  We  are 
invited  into  the  world  of  Heaney's  farrier  in  order  to  enter  into  the  graced  world  of 
poetry  itself  We  are  called  into  a  unique  place  of  consciousness  caught  only  in  the 
language  of  the  poet.  In  the  being  of  the  world  of  the  poem  we  have  our  existence  and 
knowledge.  Eric  Voegelin  in  his  collection  of  essays  Anamnesis  has  an  essay 
'Reason:  The  Classic  Experience'  in  which  he  articulates  ideas  concerning  human 
understanding  that  may  be  of  use  to  us  here  32 
. 
Eric  Voegelin  argues  that  the  classic  philosophers  developed  key  symbols  or 
terms  -around  which  any  discussion  of  the  psyche  of  humanity  should  be  developed. 
For  Plato  a  central  symbol  was  the  'philosopher"  in  whose  psyche  humanity  had 
become  luminous  for  its  noetic  order.  This  is  most  apparent  in  the  writings  of  Plato 
where  'man,  in  'his'  tension  toward  the  ground  of  existence,  is  opened  towards  a 
depth  of  divine  reality  beyond  the  stratum  that  has  revealed  itself  as  the  nous.  So  in 
the  Platonic  system  a  window  is  opened  to  a  theophanic  understanding  of  reality.  An 
extension  of  this  opening  is  the  type  of  pneumatic  revelation  found  in  the  history  of 
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Judaeo-Christianity.  There  is  also  an  opening  for  the  arguments  and  insights  gained 
from  the  later  traditions  of  mysticism.  Can  we  extend  this  definition  and 
understanding  to  include  moments  of  poetic  insight?  Let  us  explore  further. 
As  Voegelin  understands  it  reason  in  the  noetic  sense  does  not  end  history  in 
an  apocalyptic  sense.  Rather  it  pervades  history  with  a  new  luminosity.  The  primary 
state  of  humanity  for  Plato  and  Socrates  is  our  existence  in  a  state  of  unrest.  Humanity 
is  not  a  self-sufficient  end  in  itself  We  are  aware  that  we  do  not  bear  the  origin  and 
end  of  our  existence  within  ourselves.  The  human  is  not  a  divine  causa  sui;  from  the 
experience  of  his  or  her  life  in  precarious  existence  within  the  limits  of  birth  and  death 
there  rather  rises  the  wondering  question  about  the  ultimate  ground,  the  aitia  orprote 
arche,  of  all  reality  and  specifically  her  or  his  own.  Our  humanity  is  defined  through 
our  questions  about  the  where  to  and  the  where  from  of  our  existence.  As  Plato  and 
Aristotle  explore  the  issue  humanity's  questioning  unrest  carries  within  itself  the 
assuaging  answer.  This  is  so  because  the  human  is  moved  to  his  or  her  search  for  the 
ground  of  existence  by  the  very  divine  ground  of  which  he  or  she  is  in  search.  As 
Voegelin  argues:  'The  man  who  asks  questions,  and  the  divine  ground  about  which 
the  questions  are  asked,  will  merge  in  the  experience  of  questioning  as  a  divine- 
human  encounter  and  reemerge  as  the  participants  in  the  encounter  that  has  the 
luminosity  and  structure  of  consciousness  33 
. 
The  ground  of  which  Voegelin  speaks  is 
not  a  spatially  distant  thing.  It  is  rather  the  divine  presence  that  becomes  manifest  in 
the  experience  of  unrest  and  the  desire  to  know.  The  wondering  and  questioning  is 
sensed  as  the  beginning  of  a  theophanic  event  that  can  become  fully  luminous  to  itself 
if  it  finds  the  proper  response  in  the  psyche  of  concrete  human  beings.  The  responsive 
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pursuit  to  the  divine  mover  requires  the  effort  of  articulating  the  experience  through 
appropriate  language  symbols.  The  product  of  this  effort  is  insight  into  the  noetic 
structure  of  the  psyche.  It  is  my  contention  that  it  also  produces  poems.  It  opens  the 
way  to  a  type  of  revelatory  theology  based  on  the  presence  of  God  as  articulated 
through  the  language  of  the  poem  as  it  traces  its  own  inadequacy  or  search  for  the 
basis  of  its  own  being.  The  poem  is  fraught  with  this  anxiety.  As  is  the  question  of 
'God'  as  explored  by  Derrida  in  Saufle  Nom,  and  as  a  human  being  is  all  too  aware  of 
their  fragile  hold  on  existence.  What  is  the  net  effect  of  all  this? 
'For  Derrida  this  post-scriptum  has  the  character  of  a  countersignature,  even  as 
it  effaces  itself  Even  as  it  effaces  itself  before  the  face  of  God,  it  effaces  itself  before 
that  which  it  names.  It  is  necessary  for  this  to  happen.  The  name  is  not  enough.  It  is 
lacking  and  it  is  necessary  because  it  is  lacking.  We  must  continue  to  re-name  even  as 
we  are  aware  of  the  inadequacy  of  naming  itself  (One  wonders  if  this  is  why  we  keep 
writing  poetry).  In  saying  'God  is  not,  neither  this  nor  that'  you  are  still  saying 
something  about  what  the  being  is.  You  are  still  saying  the  entity.  One  keeps  to  the 
promise  of  telling  the  truth.  One  renders  an  account  of  oneself  before  the  name:  'it  is  a 
matter  of  recording  the  referential  transcendence  of  which  the  negative  way  is  only 
one  way,  one  methodic  approach,  one  series  of  stages.  A  prayer,  too,  and  a  testimony 
of  love,  but  an  I  love  you"  on  the  way  to  pmyer  and  to  love,  always  on  the  way  s34 
. 
Derrida  goes  so  far  as  to  say  that  he  trusts  no  text  'that  is  not  contaminated  by 
negative  theology'.  For  him  negative  theology  is  an  attempt  to  record  the  'referential 
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transcendence  of  language  35.  This  form  of  theological  iconoclasm  is  attempting  to 
suggest  God  as  he  is,  beyond,  behind,  before  his  images.  It  attempts  to  shatter  the 
idols  of  positive  theology.  The  name  that  we  know  God  by,  to  be  and  to  hear  and 
respond  to.  The  negative  theological  approach  favors  non-saying  over  the  inadequate 
attribution  to  the  point  of  denial  and  refiisal.  Such  defiance  is  carried  out  and  justified 
on  the  basis  of  being  a  way  of  truth  and  in  the  name  ofiustice. 
What  is  significant  for  a  theological  poetics  is  the  independent  stance  of 
negative  theology.  Derrida  calls  it  its  translatability.  The  apophatic  mode  of  discourse 
steps  outside  of  revelatory  modes,  of  the  literal  language  of  New  Testament 
eventness:  the  birth  of  Christ,  the  Passion  of  Christ,  and  the  subsequent  dogmas  of 
Christ's  divinity  and  the  Trinity  as  well  as  the  credal  formulations.  At  its  extreme 
limit  the  logic  of  this  mysticism  points  to  an  independence  from  the  history  of 
Christianity. 
For  Deffida  there  is  a  great  playfulness  in  the  dynamics  illustrated  by  negative 
theology.,  For  him  it  allows  an  approach  to  the  other.  Through  the  poetic  forms 
explored  in  this  tradition  of  thinking  we  can  approach  the  other  without  crossing  the 
threshold  into  the  other.  One  can  learn  to  respect  and  love  the  invisibility  that  shrouds 
the  other.  One  can  lay  one's  weapons  down.  We  are  allowed  an  entry  into  the 
playfulness  of  the  divine  creation.  We  can  be  co-creators  with  God.  To  quote  Angelus 
Silesius: 
Godplays  with  creation. 
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All  that  is  play  that  the  Deity  gives  Itself: 
It  has  imagined  the  creature  for  Its  pleasure.  36 
(2:  198) 
What  we  do  not  know  on  this  side  of  our  experience  is  whether  this  event,  testified  to 
by  the  classic  texts  of  negative  theology,  is  opened  by  God,  or  the  name  of  'God',  or 
if  it  is  older  than  creation,  older  than  Time,  History  or  the  Word  itself  We  do  not 
know  whether  we  can  appeal  to  this  event.  We  do  not  know  whether  it  is  impervious 
to  our  pleading.  This  is  the  j  ourney  of  faith. 
The  Era  of  the  Question: 
Can  we  formulate  a  philosophical  foundation  for  the  issues  we  have  explored 
thus  far?  To  aid  us  in  this  task  we  will  now  consider  the  writings  of  a  thinker  very 
different  from  Martin  Heidegger,  Maurice  Blanchot  or  Jacques  Derrida,  and  that  is 
Emmanuel  Levinas.  In  his  writings  Emmanuel  Levinas  indicates  an  awareness  of  and 
attentiveness  to  the  post-modem  scene  of  intellectual  thought-,  however  what  is 
distinctive  about  his  writings  is  their  consistent  attempt  at  constructing  and 
maintaining  a  broadly  religious  framework  for  contemporary  thought.  We  will  deal 
with  his  thought  through  the  critical  probing  of  one  of  Levinas'  closest  readers, 
Jacques  Derrida.  In  Derrida's  essay  'Violence  and  Metaphysics:  An  Essay  on  the 
Thought  ofEmmanuel  Levinaswe  find  a  fascinating  meeting  of  two  significant 
contemporary  min 
37 
. 
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In  the  essay's  opening  paragraph  Jacques  Derrida  begins  by  writing  that  we 
are  living  in  an  era  ripe  with  new  possibilities.  Our  era  is  a  time  of  questioning,  with 
the  question  having  liberated  us  from  past  tyranny.  We  can  now  question  the  totalities 
that  surround  us.  We  can  interrogate  the  totality  of  beings  in  our  world  as  well  as  the 
many  objects  that  exist  within  it  and  the  determinations  that  appear  to  secure  them  and 
us;  the  question  is  our  ultimate  point  of  reference.  We  live  with  its  discipline.  We 
must  consider  the  origin  point  of  this  question.  There  is  still  a  distinctly  holy, 
metaphysical,  religious  dimension  to  this  line  of  inquiry  insofar  as  Derrida  speaks  of 
the  absolute  origin'  of  this  question,  of  an  origin  that  is  absolute  and  other.  The 
question  and  its  history  may  be  'grounded'  in  the  'other  absolute  decision,  38.  we 
witness  the  emergence  of  the  questioning  of  the  question  in  Emmanuel  Levinas"  work 
Totality  and  InfiniV9.  Here  we  stand  close  to  the  essentially  metaphysical  nature  of 
philosophy  itself,  for  when  we  ask  this  type  of  question  we  discuss  the  very  possibility 
of  philosophy  itself,  what  might  be  termed  the  'fundamentals  of  philosophy'.  The 
question  corresponds  with  itself,  remembers  its  point  of  origin  and  yearns  for  it,  and  is 
haunted  by  this  place  of  beginnings  and  return. 
A  Copernican  Revolution: 
What  Emmanuel  Levinas'  project  in  TOtafitY  andInjinity  entails  for  Derrida  is 
a  questioning  of  the  origin  of  Western  philosophy  from  plato  through  to  Kant  and 
Heidegger.  In  the  discipline  of  Western  philosophical  thinking  there  exists  a  particular 
history,  pattern  of  thought,  a  tracing  of  a  series  of  questions  through  definite  texts 
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ascribed  to  individual  writers.  The  definite  paradigm  is  that  of  Being  or  being,  from 
Plato  through  to  Heidegger.  Levinas  however  attempts  to  exist  outside  that  line  of 
questioning,  this  history,  those  texts  and  the  question  or  questions  they  attempt  to 
clarify,  expand  and  explore.  In  Levinas  an  attempt  is  made  at  a  new  beginning  and  a 
total  re-thinking  of  the  question.  This  may  be  a  valuable,  and  certainly  is  an  intriguing 
project.  There  has,  by  necessity,  to  be  a  dislocation  of  our  Greek  origins  here,  our 
Greek  identity  as  Western  European  thinkers  and  citizens.  We  are  urged,  provoked 
and  challenged  to  move  from  the  safe,  secure  site  of  our  usual  preoccupations  and 
concerns  to  reconsider  them,  to  put  them  under  question!  Derrida  describes  this 
departure  as  an  'exhalation  40.  Derrida.  hints  at  the  distinctively  Jewish  nature  of  this 
project.  When  the  adjective  'prophetic'  is  placed  before  speech  we  are  in  the  territory 
of  the  Old  Testament  and  the  origin  of  the  prophetic  word.  Derrida  gambles  that  this 
word  that  emerges  from  this  fresh  source  point  may  be  close  to,  related  through 
othemess,  to  the  word  and  words  of  the  Greek  philosophers.  With  these  two 
distinctive  conjunctions  we  stand  within  the  bosom  or  cradle  of  our  civilisation. 
Distinctive  to  Levinas's  position  is  his  consideration  of  an  ethical  relationship 
that  exists  in  relation  to  its  infinitely  other,  to  the  Other.  For  Levinas  this  is  the  only 
place  that  transcendence  and  metaphysics  can  begin.  Ethics  and  metaphysics  thereby 
become  self-supporting  and  autonomous  entities.  Levinas  justifies  his  position  on  the 
basis  of  analyzed  experience.  It  is  within  the  ambit  of  our  experience  to  witness  the 
birth  of  metaphysical  thinking  and  ethics  from  within  experience  as  it  departs  from 
itself  in  the  direction  of  the  other.  Everything  is  shadowed,  or  halved,  communicates 
with,  travels  towards  that  which  is  irreducibly  other  within  it:  Others.  As  Derek 
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Walcott  described  it  in  an  early  poem;  the  artist  is  in  possession  of  'Only  the  gift/  To 
see  things  as  they  are,  halved  by  a  darkness/  From  which  they  cannot  shifl'41.  This 
hollow  space  is  not  one  opening  amongst  many.  For  Levinas  this  aporia  does  not  exist 
in  equality  alongside  many  other  fissures  in  the  fabric  of  experience.  Rather  this  is  the 
opening  of  openings,  and  thus  is  irreducible,  cannot  be  enclosed,  shut  off  or  limited  by 
any  category  or  totality,  that  is,  everything  within  experience  that  cannot  be 
articulated,  touched,  understood  by  traditional  concepts,  and  thus  is  the  place  of 
resistance  to  all  being  thought. 
Levinas  probes  many  traditional  stances  of  Western  philosophy.  He  challenges 
some  of  the  presumptions  surrounding  the  sun  of  the  epekina  tes  ousias.  This  has 
always  illuminated  the  awakening  of  our  capacity  to  reason  and  has  been  seen  as  the 
inexhaustible  source  of  all  our  thinking.  It  is  the  ancestor  of  the  Greek  Infinite  that 
transcends  totality.  It  is  also  the  instrument  of  destruction  for  the  phenomenology  and 
ontology  subjected  to  the  neutral  totality  of  the  Same  as  Being  or  as  Ego.  Ever  since 
Plato  the  Western  mind  has  had  a  tendency  to  place  the  Good  beyond  Being.  For 
Levinas  this  movement  is  not  theological  and  is  not  an  instance  of  transcendence 
toward  a  superior  existence.  He  calls  it  instead  'excendence'.  It  begins  from  being  but 
excendence  is  a  'departure  from  being  and  from  the  categories  which  describe  its42. 
The  term  6  excendence'  names  the  site  from  which  metaphysics  begins  as  meta- 
theology,  meta-ontology  and  meta-phenomenology. 
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Levinas  takes  issue  with  Husserl's  positions  as  outlined  in  the  Fifth 
Untersuchung.  As  Levinas  reads  it  this  work  gives  a  primal  position  to  the  theoretical 
consciousness.  This  is  the  means  by  which  we  access,  create  the  being  of  the  object.  If 
,  the  existing  world,  which  is  revealed  to  us,  has  the  mode  of  existence  of  the  object 
given  over  to  the  theoretical  glance',  if  'the  real  world  is  the  world  of  knowledge',  if 
'in  his  [Husserl's]  philosophy  ..  knowledge  and  representation  is  not  a  mode  of  life  to 
the  same  degree  as  the  others,  nor  a  secondary  mode'  then  Levinas  is  obliged  to 
depart  from  this  conception  of  understanding  or  philoSophy43  .  Levinas  reads 
Heidegger  in  the  light  of  his  opposition  to  this  placing  of  the  centre  of  our  being  as 
consciousness  by  Husserl.  Heidegger,  as  read  by  Levinas,  does  not  see  this  world  as 
primarily  given  over  to  the  theoretical  glance,  but  rather,  in  the  words  of  Levinas  is, 
'in  its  very  Being  like  a  center  of  action,  a  field  of  activity  or  of  solicitude  A4 
.  For 
Levinas  there  is  in  man  a  historicity  and  temporality  that  are  predicates  for,  and 
indeed  are,  the  substantiality  of  his  substance.  And  it  is  'this  structure  ...  which 
occupies  such  an  important  place  in  Heidegger's  thought  A5 
. 
Levinas  however  does  not  let  Heidegger  away  too  easily  either.  He  directs  also 
a  critical  ray  over  Heidegger's  writings.  Heidegger  fails  to  question  key  metaphors  in 
the  Greco-Platonic  tradition  of  thought,  for  example  the  surveillance  of  the  agency  of 
the  glance  and  the  metaphor  of  light.  That  is,  by  the  spatial  pair  of  inside-outside 
which  gives  life  to  the  familiar  opposition  of  subject  and  object.  'Heideggerean  care, 
illuminated  as  it  is  by  comprehension  (even  if  comprehension  offers  itself  as  care),  is 
already  determined  by  the  structure  "inside-outside"  that  characterizes  light'46. 
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Levinas  does  not  deny  or  pretend  to  erase  the  existence  and  power  of  the  structure 
'inside-outside'.  As  such  Levinas  respects  the  layers  of  'traditional  truth'  and  does  not 
criticize  the  philosophies  he  describes,  nor  does  he  refute  them.  Rather  he  seeks  to 
reveal  what  founds  them,  what  is  dissimulated  within  them,  'a  situation  which 
precedes  the  division  of  Being  into  an  inside  and  an  outside  A7 
.  His  aim  is  to 
inaugura!  e  a  new  metaphysics  of  radical  separation  and  exteriority.  Quite  correctly 
Derrida  suggests  that  this  new  departure  will  find  it  difficult  to  create  a  language  in 
the  medium  of  the  traditional  logos  governed,  as  it  is,  by  the  structure  'inside-outside', 
'interior-exterior'.  Tradition  illustrates  how  the  Eleatic  stranger  and  disciple  of 
Parmenides  had  to  give  language  its  due  for  having  vanquished  him:  shaping  non- 
Being  according  to  Being,  he  had  to  say  'farewell  to  an  unnameable  opposite  of 
Being'  and  had  to  confine  non-Being  to  its  relativity  to  Being,  that  is  to  the  movement 
of  alterity48. 
The  Origin  of  the  Altedor  Motive: 
For  Levinas  multiplicity  and  alterity  are  to  be  understood  as  the  absolute 
solitude  of  the  existent  in  its  existence.  The  relationship  to  the  other  arises  from  the 
depths  of  this  solitude.  To  understand  the  secret  on  the  basis  of  the  unity  of  existence, 
on  the  pretext  that  it  exists  or  that  it  is  the  secret  of  the  existent  'is  to  confine  oneself 
to  unity  49 
. 
To  escape  this  Levinas  moves  towards  the  thought  of  original  difference. 
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Levinas  seeks  a  direct  and  umnediated  encounter  with  the  face,  using  phrases 
like  'face  to  face  without  intermediary'  and  without  'communion'50.  Having  no 
intermediary,  having  no  communion,  without  being  mediate,  or  immediate,  the  truth 
of  our  relation  with  the  other  is  the  truth  to  which  the  logos,  traditionally  conceived,  is 
by  definition  inhospitable.  Levinas  seeks  to  persuade  us  that  this  is  a  living  of  the 
truth  of  experience  that  is  unthinkable,  and  which  cannot  be  encompassed  or 
contained  by  philosophical  speech  without  its  fractures  being  illuminated  by  that  very 
speech  itself  What  appears  to  be  solidity  is  really  rigidity.  Metaphor  to  which 
philosophy  is  so  often  reduced  at  key  junctures  is  an  illustration  of  this;  for  metaphors 
provide  an  opening  in  and  through  which  experience  itself  is  silently  revealed.  We  are 
dealing  with  a  type  of  non-presence  and  a  non-phenomenality.  It  is  the  totally  other 
that  illustrates  or  manifests  itself  prior  to  the  moment  of  shared  truth,  as  a  type  of 
nonmanifestation  or  as  a  certain  absence.  The  implications  of  this  for  philosophical 
thought  are  immense.  Traditional  philosophy  in  its  overlooking  of  the  absolute  Other 
cannot  have  time.  Without  time  they  have  no  history.  And  the  absolute  alterity  of  each 
instant,  without  which  there  would  be  no  time,  cannot  be  constituted  within  the 
identity  of  the  subject  or  the  existent.  This  can  only  emerge  in  time  through  the  Other. 
If  one  renounces  the  Other  one  becomes  enclosed  within  solitude,  and  it  is  the 
negative  solitude  of  solidity  and  self-identity.  By  this  route  one  suppresses  ethical 
transcendence.,  For  Levinas  the  tradition  disregards  the  irreducible  solitude  of  the 
existent  and  thereby  disregards  the  relationship  to  the  other.  Its  solitude  is  that  of 
totality  and  opacity.  There  emerges  a  soliloquy  of  reason  and  of  light  in  all  its 
solitude.  The  tradition  cannot  respect  Being  and  the  meaning  of  the  other,  and  by  this 
means  phenomenology  and  ontology  become  philosophies  of  violence.  Through  them 
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communion  is  made  with  oppression  as  philosophy  is  bound  to  the  totalitarianism  of 
the  same.  The  other  is  seized,  possessed  and  known  as  we  attempt  to  conquer  it  in  the 
name  of  power  and  control.  Under  the  aegis  of  this  light  everything  that  is  given 
appears  to  be  given  from  myself  to  myself. 
How  does  Levinas  envisage  a  way  out  or  beyond  the  current  impasse  in  our 
thinking?  We  begin  with  conceiving  of  metaphysics  or  ethics  as  desire.  We  see 
beyond  our  disdain  or  disregard  of  the  other  in  a  transcendental  movement  that  breaks 
us  free  from  the  limits  that  constrain  the  other  as  we  attempt  to  understand  and 
possess  it.  For  Levinas  desire  has  nothing  but  respect  for  the  other  as  other,  and 
knowledge  of  it  as  such,  and  consciousness  must  forbid  itself  the  transgression  of  this 
respect.  This  desire  is  always  inadequate  before  the  claims  of  the  other,  as  it  is 
appealed  to  by  the  absolutely  irreducible  exteriority  of  the  other.  No  totality  can  ever 
encompass  this  desire  and  the  vastness  of  difference  to  which  it  is  drawn  and  by 
which  it  is  defined.  There  is  a  great  gulf  between  desire  and  its  other.  As  Derrida 
reads  Levinas  we  are  dealing  with  a  metaphysics  of  separation,  and  a  distance  that 
creates  an  opening  within  which  freedoln  is  bom. 
We  have  been  trapped  within  our  egos.  Levinas  argues  that  the  apparent 
alterity  or  negativity  of  the  ego,  the  interior  difference,  is  but  an  illusion,  for  it  is  but 
the  play  of  the  same.  The  ego  alters  itself  from  within  itself  We  are  caught  within  a 
moment  of  the  same,  a  finite  moment  that  forms  a  system  and  a  totality  with  the 
ag,  ent.,  History  is  but  the  tracing'out  of  this  'progression'  as  we  are  blinded  to  the 
other,  and  as  the  same  moves  laboriously  in  procession.  Derrida  asks  whether  we  can 
truly  have  history  if  work  is  not  met  with  resistance  through  alterity.  Does  history  not 240 
begin  with  this  relationship  to  the  other  that  Levinas  places  beyond  history?  Derrida 
wonders  whether  the  ego  can  engender  alterity  within  itself  without  encountering  the 
Other? 
For  Levinas  the  ego  and  the  other  do  not  permit  themselves  to  be  dominated  or 
made  into  totalities  by  a  concept  of  relationship.  Language  is  always  given  to  the 
other,  never  encompasses  the  other  and  never  includes  the  other.  We  cannot, 
conceptualise  our  encounter  with  otherness  then:  it  is  made  possible  by  the  other  that 
is  the  unforeseeable  'resistant  to  all  categories'51.  The  infinitely-other  is  by  definition 
beyond  our  capacity  for  conceptualisation.  The  idea  of  horizon  implies  always  a 
horizon  of  the  same.  Within  this  conception  of  things  there  is  always  a  unity  as 
eruptions  and  surprises  are  welcomed  by  understanding  and  recognized.  To  escape 
this  conceptualisation  Levinas  conceives  of  the  presence  of  the  other  as  trace.  This 
other  can  achieve  the  only  possible  opening  of  time  not  by  any  industry  of  ours.  And 
it  is  found  at  the  heart  of  experience  as  a  presence.  It  is  not  wholly  present  but  exists 
there  as  a  trace.  Before  all  systems  of  thought,  before  all  dogmatic  systems  of  belief, 
before  theology  and  before  philosophy,  there  exists  this  opening  of  experience  to  an 
eschatological  ending  which  is  also  its  beginning,  and  which  is  to  be  found  or  traced 
throughout  all  its  varying  aspects. 
We  are  called  to  recognise  as  our  primary  relation  respect  for  the  other,  and 
thereby  ethics  precedes  metaphysics.  Metaphysics  is  bom  at  the  point  when  theory  is 
forced  to  criticise  itself  as  ontology,  'as  the  dogmatism  and  spontaneity  of  the  same, 
and  when  metaphysics,  in  departing  from  itself,  is  put  into  question  by  the  other  in  the 
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movement  of  ethics.  Levinas  argues  for  the  primary  nature  of  metaphysics  over  that  of 
ontology.  He  thus  proceeds  to  critique  Heidegger.  Heidegger,  in  affinning  the  priority 
of  Being  over  the  existent,  makes  a  decision  about  the  essence  of  philosophy.  As 
Levinas  reads  this  move,  Heidegger  subordinates  the  relation  With  someone,  who  is  an 
existent,  to  a  relation  with  the  Being  ofthe  existeW2-  The  impersonal  nature  of  this 
relation  permits,  or  allows,  the  domination  of  the  existent  and  subordinates  justice  to 
freedom.  True  metaphysical  transcendence  occurs  when  we  conceive  of  infinity 
beyond  the  restraints  of  totality.  This  is  the  infinity  that  is  irreducible  to  the 
representations  or  thought  of  infinity,  it  exceeds,  goes  beyond,  transcends,  the  ideation 
in  which  it  is  thought.  It  is  in  truth  that  which  cannot  be  an  object  or  a  simple 
tobjective  reality'  of  the  idea.  The  expression  of  this  idea  of  infinity  is  theface.  This 
face  is  not  only  a  visage  that  may  only  be  a  surface,  it  is  that  which  is  seen  because  it 
is  naked,  but  also  that  which  sees.  And  it  is  not  only  that  which  sees  things,  but  also 
that  which  exchanges  its  glance.  This  visage  only  becomes  a  face  in  the  moment  of 
face-to-face  encounter. 
This  face  is  presence,  ousia.  The  face  represents  the  original  unity  of  glance 
and  speech,  eyes  and  mouth.  The  primary  unity  of  the  face  exists  prior  to  the 
dispersion  into  the  organs  of  sensibility:  the  eyes,  ears  and  mouth.  The  other  is  given 
'in  person',  truly  and  completely,  without  allegory,  in  the  face.  It  is  the  origin  point  of 
space,  orienting  space  through  speech  and  glance,  through  the  face.  The  face  is  not  a 
signifier,  does  not  understand  or  present  itself  as  a  chief  sign,  but  expresses  itself, 
offers  itself  in  person,  in  itself.  the  thing  in  itself  expresses  itself,  Living  speech  in  its 
mastery  and  magisteriality  is  the  only  thing  able  to  assist  itself;  it  is  not  a  servile  sign 
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but  a  genuine  expression,  the  only  genuine  expression  that  living  speech  can  be.  For 
Levinas  then  the  written  and  the  work  are  not  expressions  but  signs. 
Deffida  points  out  how  Levinas  is  keen  to  preserve  the  living  dimension  of 
original  speech  itself  Outside  of  this  horizon  writing  itself  becomes  nothing.  Writing 
is  secondary.  To  be  behind  the  sign  that  is  in  the  world  is  afterward  to  remain 
invisible  to  the  world  within  epiphany.  In  and  through  the  face,  the  other  is  given  over 
in  person  as  other,  that  is,  as  that  which  does  not  reveal  its  very  self,  and  as  that  which 
cannot  be  made  thematic.  We  can  only  speak  to  the  other.  The  other  appears  within 
our  missing  categories  as  non-presence,  or  present  as  absence,  appearing  as  the  non- 
--I- phenomenal.  Lurking  behind  its  signs  and  works,  always  dwelling  within  its  secret 
interior,  forever  discreet,  interrupting  all  historical  totalities  through  its  freedom  of 
speech,  the  face  is  not,  and  cannot  be,  'of  this  world'.  Thought  is  always  related  to  the 
other.  However  it  is  the  relation  to  an  irreducible  other  who  summons  me  without 
possibility  of  return  from  without.  It  is  through  this  order  that  we  are  presented  with 
the  idea  of  the  infinity  that  no  thought  can  enclose  and  which  forbids  all  monologue. 
Through  this  means  we  arrive  at  a  cornerstone  of  Emmanuel  Levinas's  thinking:  the 
other  is  and  can  only  be  the  other  only  if  his  or  her  alterity  is  absolutely  irreducible, 
that  is  infinitely  irreducible;  and  the  infinitely  Other  can  only  be  Infinity.  As  speech 
and  glance  the  face  does  not  belong  to  the  world,  because  it  opens  and  exceeds  the 
totality.  Due  to  this  it  marks  the  limit  of  all  power,  all  violence,  and  the  beginnings  or 
origin  of  the  ethical. 
Derrida  asks  some  serious  questions  of  Levinas's  thesis.  Levinas  stresses  the 
invisible  transcendence  of  the  Other.  As  such  it  is  not  possible  to  conceive  of  the  face 243 
as  a  moment  of  religious,  or  other,  revelation.  What  is  termed  the  unrevealable  is 
expressed  thereby  beyond  all  thematization,  beyond  all  constitutive  analysis  and 
beyond  all  phenomenology.  Philosophers,  theologians  and  poets  are  all  out  of  ajob.  In 
Levinas's  schema  the  infinitely-Other  is  not  an  object  because  it  is  speech,  speech  as 
the  origin  of  meaning  and  the  world.  By  means  of  this  schematic  phenomenology  is 
ruled  out  as  a  means  by  which  to  account  for  ethics,  speech  and  justice.  We  witness 
Levinas  explore  these  ideas  through  the  theme  of  nudity.  Speech  is  obliged  to  uncover 
the  nudity  of  the  face,  without  which  no  nudity  would  have  any  meaning.  All  nudity, 
$even  the  nudity  of  the  body  experienced  in  shame',  is  a  'figure  of  speech'  in  relation 
to  the  non-metaphorical  nudity  of  the  faCe53 
. 
This  nudity  is  not  an  opening,  for  an 
opening  is  always  relative  to  a  surrounding  plenitude.  So  the  word  nudity  is 
effectively  erased  as  soon  as  it  serves  to  indicate  something  beyond  itself  What  is  the 
appropriate  response  to  this  exposure  to  and  by  the  nude  face?  The  demand  is  for 
supplication,  as  the  unthinkable  unity  of  a  speech  able  to  assist  itself  and  a  glance  that 
calls  for  assistance  summons  to  us  in  all  its  nakedness. 
Deffida  points  out  that  for  Levinas  a  basic  presupposition  is  the  idea  of  a  finite 
totality.  When  Levinas  speaks  of  infinity,  what  is  infinitely  other,  he  is  always 
speaking  of  a  non-violent  reality.  This  is  different  to  his  presumptions  surrounding 
totality.  The  figure  of  God  redeems  the  world  for  Levinas  insofar  as  a  world  without 
this  figure  of  infinite  otherness  would  be  torn  apart  by  strife  of  the  worst  kind 
imaginable.  A  world  without  God  is  unimaginable.  We  are  not  able  to  imagine  this 
world  at  all,  a  world  of  primary  violence,  inescapable  immorality,  of  pure  blood  lust 
and  uninhibited  violence.  War  as  we  know  it  would  not  be  definable,  approachable, 
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without  our  experience  of  the  face  of  God.  In  the  network  of  thought  or  understanding 
expounded  by  Levinas  then,  Derrida.  argues,  the  figure  or  face  of  God  is  implicated  in 
war.  War  implies  the  presence  of  God  as  a  form  of  denial  of  that  presence.  War  would 
be  meaningless  without  the  presence  of  God  as  absence.  War,  the  reality  of  which  we 
cannot  deny,  is  the  difference  between  the  revelation  of  the  face  and  the  finite  world 
without  a  face. 
Derrida  points  out  that  in  Levinas'  conception  of  things  we  are  always  too  late 
as  human  beings.  We  are  an  after  image  of  the  already  primary  divine  presence.  We 
are  gods  arrived  too  late,  or  emerging  on  the  plane  of  a  pre-existent,  primary  Being. 
We  can  walk  upright,  but  only  after  or  in  the  midst  of  being  drawn  to  the  face  existing 
before,  above  and  beyond  us.  It  is  this  originary  face  that  draws  us  up  from  our  knees 
and  allows  us  to  walk  upright  at  all.  Metaphysical  thought  begins  when  we  recognise 
this  a  priori  basis.  We  must  return  to  our  true  selves,  the  point  of  recognition, 
comparison  or  similarity  where  we  acknowledge  the  resemblance  between  or  with  our 
face  and  the  face  of  God.  However,  Levinas  argues  that  we  must  converse  with  God, 
and  not  as  a  god  or  gods,  we  are  not  in  God  as  co-equals  in  a  conversation  of 
participation.  God  is  after  all  infinitely  Other.  We  enter  into  the  space  of  separation 
where  God  properly  dwells.  This  is  what  creatio  ex  nihilo  means.  We  are  outside  the 
world  of  incarnation  here.  We  are  dwellers  in  the  presence  of  the  trace  of  God.  We 
note  the  distinctive  note  of  post-modernity  that  rings  through  such  a  thought. 
As  Gods  face  emerges,  so  it  disappears.  In  Totality  and  Infinity  then,  the  Face 
of  Yahweh  is  evoked  in  many  different  guises  and  locations.  We  are  in  the  primary 
site  of  Old  Testament  theology:  'Thou  canst  not  see  my  face:  for  there  shal  I  be  no  man 245 
see  me  and  live 
...  thou  shalt  stand  upon  a  rock:  and  it  shall  come  to  pass,  while  my 
glory  passeth  by,  that  I  will  put  thee  in  a  clift  of  the  rock,  and  will  cover  thee  with  my 
hand  while  I  pass  by:  And  I  will  take  away  mine  hand,  and  thou  shalt  see  my  back 
parts:  but  my  face  shall  not  be  seed  (Exodus  33:  20  -  23)54.  Edmond  Jabes  has  written 
in  the  Book  ofQuestions:  'All  faces  are  I-Iis:  this  is  why  HE  has  no  face?  '55  The  face 
outlined  by  Levinas  then  is  not  the  face  of  God  or  the  face  of  man:  it  is  their 
resemblance.  Derrida  points  out  though  that  this  face  that  is  a  resemblance  must  be 
thought  before,  or  without,  the  idea  of  the  Same,  without  its  assistance  or  as  a  means 
or  road,  guarantee,  to  its  possibility.  This  is  a  strongbone  of  contention'  for  Derrida 
and  the  means  by  which  he  deconstructs,  or  questions  the  premises  of  Levinas' 
thinking  in  Totality  andInfinity. 
Stubbornly  Jacky: 
Derrida  will  begin  his  deconstruction  of  Levinas  by  pointing  out  the  linguistic 
game  within  which  Levinas's  thought  is  encircled,  caught  up,  played  out  and  engaged. 
We  are  within  'the  system'of  Levinas's  thought  that  is  self-referential  and  self- 
defined.  It  makes  sense  within  the  terms  defined  by  its  own  internal  logic:  'the  route 
followed  by  Levinas's  thought  is  such  that  all  our  questions  already  belong  to  his  own 
interior  dialogue,  are  displaced  into  his  discourse  and  only  listen  to  it,  ftom  many 
vantage  points  and  in  many  ways  v56 
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Levinas  has  argued  consistently  and  thoroughly  in  Totality  andInfinity  that 
there  is  no  interior  difference,  no  fundamental  and  autochthonous  alterity  within  the 
cgo.  The  other  is  not  myself  (Dcrrida  asks:  who  has  ever  maintained  that  it  was  or  is?  ) 
but  it  is  an  Ego,  and  has  to  be  if  Levinas  is  to  maintain  his  own  discourse.  The  journey 
from  Ego  to  other  as  an  Ego  is  the  passage  to  the  essential,  non-empirical  egoity  of 
subjective  existence  in  general.  When  Soren  Kierkegaard  speaks  of  himself  it  is  not 
just  the  Danish  Protestant  writing  of  his  own  egotistical  and  'self-centred'  concerns  for 
personal  salvation,  but  this  name  becomes  a  pseudonym  within  which  we  all  stand  for 
ourselves  and  everybody  else.  Otherwise  he  would  not  be  writing  philosophy  and  we 
would  not  be  concerned  with  reading  it.  It  would  be  a  self-contained  and  meaningless 
babble,  the  ravings  of  a  madman  and  lunatic.  For  example,  the'l'of  Walt  Whitman's 
Song  qf*seýfcontains  all  of  our  individual  'I's  past,  present  and  future,  otherwise  it 
could  not  be  the  poem  of  a  new  nation,  or  indeed  a  poem  for  us  all  as  children  of  the 
human  species.  Unless  we  could  enter  into  or  be  contained  by  the  'subjectivity'  that 
speaks  to  us,  or  speaks  for  us,  in  this  poem,  we  would  not  converse  with  it  at  all. 
Derrida  asks:  'is  not  this  essence  of  subjective  existence  presupposed  by  the  respect 
for  the  other,  which  can  be  what  it  is  -  the  other  -  only  as  subjective  existence?  57'The 
logic  of  Levinas's  position  Derrida  points  out  would  seem  to  require  the  elimination  of 
all  discussion  of  the  essence  or  truth  of  subjective  existence.  Here  lies  the  radical 
break  with  previous  conceptions  of  phenomenology  and  ontology.  Derrida  points  out 
that  Levinas,  cannot  do  this  without  renouncing  philosophical  discourse  itself  in  the 
first  instance.  As  such  this  cannot  be  done  outside  of  the  arena  of  language.  The 
attempt  to  attain,  speak  toward,  or  from,  the  beyond  of  philosophical  discourse,  by 
means  of  philosophical  discourse,  impossible  by  definition,  cannot  possibly  succeed 
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within  language,  unless  we,  formally  and  thematically  pose  the  question  of  the 
relations  between  belonging  and  the  opening,  the  question  of  closure.  Are  we  moving 
towards  the  beginnings  of  poetry?  Derrida  speaks  of  departing  from  logic  and  writing 
from  within  an  inscribed  description,  in  an  inscription  of  the  relations  between  the 
philosophical  and  the  non-philosophical,  in  a  kind  of  unheard  of  graphics. 
Levinas  attempts  to  radically  restructure  our  notions  of  exteriority  in  Totality 
andInfinity.  Previously  when  we  spoke  of  exteriority  we  spoke  of  a  unity  of  space 
that  neutralised  radical  alterity:  the  relation  to  the  other,  the  relation  of  instants  to  each 
other,  the  relation  to  death.  All  of  these  issues  revolve  around  notions  of  an  Inside  to 
an  Outside.  We  are  all  post-Heidegger  in  this  sense:  read  Blanchot's  The  Space  of 
Literature.  Levinas  writes  in  Totality  and  Infinity:  'the  relation  with  the  other  is  a 
relation  with  a  Mystery.  It  is  the  other's  exteriority,  or  rather  his  alterity,  for  exteriority 
is  a  property  of  space,  and  brings  the  subject  back  to  himself  through  the  light  which 
constitutes  his  entire  being58.  We  recall  the  subtitle  of  this  work  by  Levinas,  Essay  on 
Exteriority,  which  abundantly  employs  the  notion  of  exteriority,  but  true  exteriority, 
according  to  Levinas,  is  not  spatial  for  space  is  always  the  site  of  the  same;  the  Site  is 
always  the  site  of  the  Same.  Can  we  truly  speak  of  an  exteriority  outside  of  a 
conception  of  space?  Derrida  argues  that  we  find  Levinas  here  attempting  to  obliterate 
our  notion  of  exteriority  but  without  erasing  that  notion  altogether.  Can  we  not  avoid 
speaking  of  infinitys  excess  over  totality  within  the  language  of  totality  itself?  Can  we 
possibly  conceive  or  speak  of  the  other  without  using  the  language  of  the  Same? 
Derrida  argues  that  we  cannot  avoid  the  Inside-Outside  structure  and  spatial 
metaphors.  We  cannot  but  speak  from  within  the  ruined  metaphor  and  we  are  obliged 
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to  wear  the  patchy  clothes  of  the  tradition.  For  Derrida,  we  must  be  deported  from  our 
own  site  towards  the  Site,  toward  the  spatial  locale  that  is  the  metaphor  congenital  to 
the  philosophical  word  or  logos.  Is  all  thought  therefore  primarily  poetic,  insofar  as  its 
point  of  beginning  is  concerned,  dependent  on  and  emerges  from  the  world  of 
metaphor?  Metaphor  is  the  emergence  of  language  itself,  referring  to  itself  within 
itself  prior  to  being  a  rhetorical  procedure  within  language.  For  Derrida  all  philosophy 
can  do  is,  is  a  speaking  of  this  metaphor,  a  stating  of  the  metaphor  itself,  which 
amounts  to  thinking  through  this  metaphor  within  the  silent  horizon  of  the  non- 
metaphor  that  we  identify  as  Being.  Space  is  the  primary  wound  without  which  we 
cannot  even  open  language,  without  which  one  would  not  have  a  true  or  false 
exteriority  to  speak  of 
For  Derrida  one  can  only  write  by  crossing  out,  by  crossing  out  what  has  been 
already  crossed  out:  for  crossing  out  writes,  still  draws  in  space.  And  thus  we  find 
Heaney  going  down  and  down  for  the'good  turf  in  poems  likeDigging!  or  the  bog  in 
'Bogland!  'missing  its  last  definition/  By  millions  of  years'59.  We  can  only  re-write, 
have  or  operate  our  discourse  within  a  tradition.  And  thus  we  find  poets  re-writing  on 
the  words  of  previous  poets.  Thus  is  T.  S.  Eliot's  The  Waste  Land  a  compendium  of  the 
best  lines  written  in  the  tradition  of  Western  (and  Eastern)  writing  and  poetry.  We  can 
also  read  Cathal  USearcaigWs  selected  poems  Out  in  the  Open  as  a  commentary,  a 
modem  re-inscription  of  the  classical  conventions  of  Gaelic  poetry,  or  as  a  re-writing 
of  poets  of  the  Irish  tradition  writing  in  Englise.  For  Derrida  we  cannot  conceive  of 
language  without  the  rupture  of  space.  An  aquatic  or  aerial  language  would  be 
meaningless,  unless  we  could  trace  alterity  within  it.  Derrida  pursues  Heidegger  in 
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arguing  that  the  meanings  that  emerge  from,  radiate  outwards,  the  concepts  Inside- 
Outside,  from  Light-Night,  inhabit  proscribed  words,  and  are  embedded  in  person  or 
vicariously,  at  the  heart  of  conceptuality  itself.  Why  or  how,  we  might  be  tempted  to 
ask? 
Derrida  argues  that  the  structures  Inside-Outside,  Night-Day  do  not  signify  an 
immersion  in  space.  These  structures  have  no  meaning  in  a  pure  space  given  over  to 
itself  and  disorientated.  It  is  because  of  an  included  origin  that  this  structure  emerges, 
an  inscribed  eastern  horizon  that  is  neither  within  nor  without  space.  The  text  of  the 
glance  is  the  text  of  speech.  It  is  on  this  basis  that  we  can  speak  of  it  as  Face. 
Language  and  space  are  inseparable.  Language  rises  with  the  day  to  face  the  sun. 
Surely  what  Levinas  is  attempting  to  do  when  he  speaks  of  the  infinite  exteriority  of 
the  other  as  non-spatial,  as  non-exteriority  and  non-interiority,  is  to  acknowledge  that 
the  infinite  cannot  be  stated?  Is  this  not  to  say  that  the  structure  'inside-outside'  which 
is  the  very  structure  of  language  itself  is  marked  by  the  original  finitude  of  speech? 
Derrida  writes:  Thilosophical  language  belongs  to  a  system  of  language(s).  Thereby, 
its  nonspeculative  ancestry  always  brings  a  certain  equivocality  into  speculation. 
Since  this  equivocality  is  original  and  irreducible,  perhaps  philosophy  must  adopt  it, 
think  it  and  be  thought  in  it,  must  accommodate  duplicity  and  difference  within 
speculation,  within  the  very  purity  of  philosophical  meaning  61 
For  Derrida  the  infinitely  other,  the  infinity  of  the  other,  is  not  the  other  as  a 
positive  infinity,  as  God,  or  as  resemblance  with  God.  The  infinitely  Other  would  not 
60  Cathal  0'  Searcaigh:  Out  in  the  Open:  Clo  -  lar  Chonnachta:  Conamara:  1997,  trans.  by  Frank 
Sewell,  especially  a  poem  Eke  'Dear  Dark-Haired  Love',  p.  113 
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be  what  it  is,  other,  if  it  was  a  positive  infinity,  and  if  it  did  not  maintain  within  itself 
the  negativity  of  the  indefinite,  of  the  apeiron.  To  speak  of  the  'infinitely  othee  is  to 
talk  about  that  which  does  not  end  despite  my  endless  labours  and  continual  and 
continuous  experience.  Derrida,  tackles  Levinas,  on  the  grounds  that  we  cannot  expel 
negativity  -  understood  as  labour,  work,  or  maybe  'care'  -  from  within  the  realms  of 
transcendence,  for  to  do  so  would  disrespect  the  Other  as  Other.  What  we  speak  of  as 
the  positive  Infinity  (God)  cannot  be  infinitely  Other.  We  can  only  understand  infinity 
as  Other  in  the  form  of  the  in-finite.  When  one  attempts  to  speak  of  Infinity  as  a 
positive  plenitude  purely  and  absolutely  then  one  banishes  the  other  as  the 
unthinkable,  the  impossible  and  the  unutterable. 
If  we  are  to  follow  Levinas  all  the  way  down  his  street  then  we  are  required  to 
neutralise  space  within  the  description  of  the  other  in  order  thereby  to  liberate  positive 
infinity.  Does  this  not  require  that  we  neutralise  the  essential  finitude  of  the  face  as 
speech  and  glance  that  is  always  a  body,  and  not,  as  Levinas  continually  insists,  the 
corporeal  metaphor  of  etherealized.  thought?  When  we  speak  of  the  body  and 
embodiment  we  are  talking  about  the  literal  body,  an  exteriority  embedded  in  a  locale 
that  is  fully  spatial  and  literally  so.  Thereby  the  point  of  origin  is  inseparable  from  the 
space  it  engenders  and  orients.  It  is  inescapably  an  inscribed  origin.  The  inscription  is 
the  written  origin:  traced  and  inscribed  within  a  system.  Unless  this  inscription  is 
written  in,  then  we  would  no  longer  possess,  have  or  be  a  body  proper  to  ourselves. 
The  entire  metaphysics  of  the  Face  would  literally  collapse,  but  not  fall  on  its  face. 
Deffida  argues  that  within  philosophy  and  within  language,  within  what  he  terms 
philosophical  discourse  we  cannot  simultaneously  maintain,  save,  preserve  or  speak 
of  the  ideas  or  themes  of  positive  infinity  and  of  the  face.  We  can  only  preserve  or 251 
unify  them  and  hold  them  together  within  the  horizon  of  infinite  and  indefinite  alterity 
as  the  irreducibly  common  horizon  of  Death  and  the  Other.  What  he  terms  'the 
horizon  of  finitude  or  the  finitude  of  the  horizon". 
If  the  face  is  body  it  is  mortal.  Logic  illustrates  an  infinite  chiasmus,  as  such, 
for  if  we  speak  of  infinite  alterity  as  death  then  we  cannot  reconcile  this  with  infinite 
alterity  as  positivity  and  presence  (God).  What  we  are  identifying  as  a  metaphysical 
transcendence  cannot  be  at  once  both  transcendence  toward  the  other  as  Death  and 
transcendence  toward  the  other  as  God,  unless  of  course  that  God  means  death.  Can 
he  appear,  or  is  he  named  within  the  difference  that  exists  between  all  and  nothing? 
Can  God  be  both  all  and  nothing?  Is  God  both  life  and  death?  Is  God  inscribed  here 
within  difference,  as  Difference  itself?  Negative  theology  is  bom  at  this  frontier.  It 
speaks  a  speech  that  knows  itself  doomed  to  failure,  enmeshed  as  it  is  in  the  finite. 
Levinas  has  landed  himself  in  troublesome  waters.  What  happens  when  within  your 
conception  of  things  metaphysical  responsibility  is  responsibility  for  language, 
because  as  Levinas  writes  in  Totality  and  Infinity,  'thought  consists  of  speaking',  and 
metaphysics  aims  to  be  a  language  of  communication  with  God?  63  How  does  one 
begin  to  think  the  other,  if  the  other  can  be  spoken  only  as  exteriority  and  through 
exteriority,  that  is,  nonalterity?  How  does  one  do  this  if  the  speech  that  must 
inaugurate  and  maintain  absolute  separation  is  by  its  essence  rooted  in  space,  which 
cannot  conceive  of  separation  and  absolute  alterity? 
Where  do  we  find  peace  then?  We  recall  what  Levinas  wished  to  achieve  in 
Totality  andInfinity.  He  was  hoping  to  establish  a  modem  ethic,  and  this  was  and  is  a 
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commendable  aim.  All  Levinas  wished  to  do  was  re-situate  the  ethical  question. 
Having  criticised  the  foundations  of  Levinas!  s  thought  does  Derrida  attempt  to 
recapture  or  redirect,  reclaim  Levinas's  original  aim  when  he  set  out  the  arguments 
contained  within  Totality  andInfinity?  Derrida  argues  that  peace  is  a  certain  silence,  a 
certain  beyond  of  speech,  a  certain  possibility,  albeit  as  a  type  of  future  presence,  a 
certain  silent  horizon  of  speech.  As  soon  as  discourse  opens  war  begins.  Peace  and 
silence  are  the  strange  vocation  of  a  language  called  outside  itself  by  itself  Finite 
silence  is  a  medium  of  violence.  We  experience  it  as  such.  What  then?  Language  can 
only  indefinitely  tend  toward  justice  by  acknowledging  and  practising  the  violence 
within  it.  We  must  use  violence  within  violence  within  an  economy  of  violence.  We 
must  use  light  against  light,  in  order  to  avoid  the  worst  violence,  mainly  the  violence 
of  the  night  of  repression  that  precedes  discourse.  If  we  take  history  seriously  we  must 
be  vigilant.  Philosophy  must  be  aware  of  its  historical  stature,  its  stature  as  an 
economy.  Speech  is  the  first  victory  against  violence,  and  yet  violence  did  not  exist 
before  our  possibilities  for  speech. 
Vlolence  and  the  Transcendental: 
Levinas  has  argued  that  the  Talse-infinity'  (a  Hegelian  tenn  not  used  by 
Levinas)  is,  or  would  be,  the  indefinite,  negative  form  of  infinie.  Levinas  himself 
conceives  true  altenty  as  non-negativity  (non-negative  transcendence),  and  so  he  can 
make  the  other  the  true  infinity,  and  make  the  same  (in  a  strange  complicity  with 
negativity)  into  the  false-infinity.  We  ask  a  basic  question  here:  how  can  you  separate 
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alterity  from  negativity?  How  can  alterity  be  separated  from  the  'false  infinity'?  To  put 
it  simply,  how  can  absolute  sameness  not  be  infinity? 
If  we  follow  Levinas  we  are  led  to  believe  that  the  same  is  a  violent  totality, 
and  as  such  it  is  finite.  Again,  as  such  it  is  abstract.  It  is  more  other  than  the  other.  He 
would  have  us  believe  that  the  same  as  finite  totality  would  not  be  the  same,  but  still 
the  other.  He  appears  to  be  speaking  of  the  other  under  the  rubric  of  the  same,  and  of 
the  same  under  the  rubric  of  the  other.  For,  if  the  finite  totality  was  the  same,  it  could 
not  be  thought  or  posed  as  such,  without  becoming  other  than  itself  Failing  to  do  so 
would  mean  that  it  could  not  enter  into  war  with  others  (finite  totalities)  and  could  not 
be  violent.  No  longer  being  violent  it  could  not  be  the  swne  in  Levinas's  sense,  of 
what  we  call  a  finite  totality.  When  war  is  engaged  in,  we  must  begin  to  speak  of  the 
other's  other,  gaining  access  thereby  to  the  other  as  an  other  self  At  this  point  then  it 
no  longer  exists  as  a  totality  in  Levinas's  sense. 
How  do  we  escape  this  minotaufS  maze?  We  might  begin  by  conceiving  the 
false-infinity  as  irreducible.  Where  can  we  find  a  tenable  position?  One  position  we 
can  live  with  is  found  in  the  writings  of  Edmund  Hussert.  He  set  about  demonstrating 
the  irreducible  nature  of  intentional  incompleteness,  and  therefore  of  alterity.  If 
consciousness  is  irreducible  then  it  can  never  become  absolute  self-consciousness.  In 
some  future  parousia  of  an  absolute  knowledge  it  cannot  be  reassembled  absolutely 
close  to  itself  by  its  very  self-definition.  Can  we  think  of  the  Talse-infinity'  without 
the  true  infinity  lurking  too  far  behind,  near,  alongside  it,  for  we  cannot  conceive  of 
the  false  without  thinking  of  the  true?  Husserl  consistently  argued  that  vision  always 
calls  into  question  the  necessity,  utility,  function,  or  adequate  nature  of  the  division  or 254 
structure,  inside-outside.  We  are  continually  forced  by  our  vision  to  the  point  where 
we  overflow  our  constricting  horizons.  We  deal  with  incompleteness  the  minute  we 
set  out  on  the  path  of  pursuit  that  leads  us  toward  the  transcendent.  Husserl's  position 
is  that  we  are  creatures  of  immanent  perception  that  are  placed  or  occur  within  the 
infinite  horizon  of  the  flux  of  experience. 
V- 
For  example,  we  can  speak  of  the  Idea  in  the  Kantian  sense.  This  designates 
the  infinite  overflowing  of  a  horizon,  which  due  to  an  absolute  and  essential  necessity 
can  never  be,  or  become,  an  object  itself  The  horizon  cannot  become  an  object 
because  it  is  the  unobjectiflable  wellspring  of  every  object  in  general.  The  concept  of 
horizon  turns  every  constitutive  act  into  an  object,  and  in  that  very  move  opens  the 
work  of  objectification  to  infinity.  We  must  reverse  our  perspective  and  realise  that  in 
phenomenology  we  do  not  speak  of  the  constitution  of  horizons  but  rather  the  horizon 
of  constitution.  This  is  valuable  in  the  context  of  Derrida!  s  debate  with  Levinas.  This 
is  because  the  Husserlian  horizon  takes  the  form  of  an  indefinite  opening  and  thus 
offers  itself,  ceaselessly,  without  any  possible  end  to  the  negativity  of  constitution. 
This  project,  role  or  task,  Derrida  implies,  keeps  it  from  all  totalization  while  at  the 
same  time  preserves  it  from  the  illusion  of  the  immediate  presence  of  a  plenitudinous 
infinity  in  which  the  other  is  absolutely  and  untraceably  swallowed.  We  respect 
exteriority,  thereby,  realising  that  our  consciousness  cannot  but  be  infinitely 
inadequate  in  its  approach  to  the  infinite  (and  indeed  the  finite).  We  dwell  within  the 
thought  of  the  eternal  irreducibility  of  the  other  to  the  same,  but  of  the  other  appearing 
as  other  for  the  same.  And  it  is  at  this  point  within  the  world  of  phenomenology  that 
ethics  finds  its  true  freedom  and  its  absolute  radicality. 255 
What  are  the  implications  of  Husserl's  concept  of  horizon?  It  means  that  the 
ultimate  jurisdiction  of  evident  truths  is  infinitely  open,  is  open  for  every  type  of 
possible  object,  that  is,  for  every  conceivable  sense  present  for  consciousness  in 
general.  Derrida  posits  that  no  discourse  (for  example,  the  one  offered  by  Levinas  in 
Totality  andInfinity)  can  be  meaningful,  can  even  be  thought  or  understood,  without 
drawing  upon  the  layer  of  phenomenological  truth  proposed  by  the  writings  of 
Husserl.  When  we  begin  to  speak  of  the  possibilities  of  essence;  that  which  guides  all 
concepts;  what  is  presupposed  or  assumed  when  one  proceeds  to  speak  of  ethics, 
transcendence,  of  infinity,  et  al,  we  have  to  be  in  the  domain  of  ideas  accessible  to 
concrete  consciousness  at  the  most  general  level,  for,  if  not  no  human  discourse  or 
thought  would  be  possible  at  all.  We  are  in  the  domain  of  a  transcendental 
phenomenology  and  prior  truths,  from  which  a  phenomenology  of  ethics  must  take 
root.  We  are  at  the  beginnings  of  thought,  truth,  value,  before  concrete  positions  are 
argued  for,  created,  begin,  or  are  held,  even  acted  upon. 
Derrida  notes  the  surprise  of  reading  in  Levinas's  work  Totality  and  Infinity 
the  phrase:  Trom  beyond  the  totality  or 
hiStorY65 
.  There  is  a  presupposition  in  the 
phrase  that  the  totality  is  finite  and  that  history  can  be  a  finite  totality,  and  finally  that 
there  is  no  history  beyond  the  finite  totality.  Deffida  will  argue  for  the  position  that 
history  is  impossible,  actually  meaningless  within  a  finite  totality,  and  that  it  is 
impossible  and  meaningless  within  the  positive  and  actual  infinity.  Derrida.  elaborates 
ideas  here  that  will  preoccupy  him  for  the  rest  of  his  writing  life:  the  idea  of 
differance  developed  in  OfGrammatology  and  the  aporetic  developed  in  Khora,  Sauf 
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le  Nom,  and.  4porias.  66Derrida  argues  that  history  keeps  to  the  difference  between 
totality  and  infinity,  history  being  precisely  that  which  Levinas  calls  transcendence 
and  eschatology,  a  system  that  is  neither  finite  nor  infinite,  but  a  structural  totality  that 
escapes  this  alternative  in  its  functioning,  escaping  the  archaeological  and  the 
eschatological  by  inscribing  them  within  itself 
Levinas's  tussle  with  Husserk 
Levinas  has  a  disagreement  with  Husserl,  with  positions  developed  and 
outlined  by  Husserl  in  his  Cartesian  Meditations.  According  to  Levinas,  by  making 
the  other  the  ego!  s  phenomenon  constituted  by  analogical  appresentation  on  the  basis 
of  belonging  to  the  ego's  own  sphere,  Husserl  allegedly  missed  the  infinite  alterity  of 
the  other  and  ultimately  reduced  it  to  the  same.  Levinas  reiterates  often  that  as  soon  as 
one  makes  of  the  other  an  alter  ego  then  one  neutralises  its  absolute  alterity. 
'V- 
For  Derrida.  Husserl  is  involved  in  a  different  strategy  in  the  Cartesian 
Meditations  than  Levinas  is  prepared  to  admit.  What  preoccupies  Husserl  according  to 
Deffida  is  how  the  other  as  other,  in  its  irreducible  alterity,  is  presented  to  me.  Husserl 
will  argue  it  is  presented  to  me  as  originary  non-presence.  The  ego's  phenomenon  is 
the  other  as  other:  the  phenomenon  of  a  certain  non-phenomenality  that  is  irreducible 
for  the  ego  as  ego  in  general.  We  cannot  encounter  the  alter  ego  (in  the  very  form  of 
the  encounter  set  up  by  Levinas's  thought),  it  is  impossible  to  meet  and  know  it,  with 
respect,  in  language  or  experience,  if  this  other,  in  its  alterity,  does  not  appear  for  an 
ego  (in  general).  To  quote  Deffida:  'one  could  neither  speak,  nor  have  any  sense  of  the 
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totally  other,  if  there  was  not  a  phenomenon  of  the  totally  other,  or  evidence  of  the 
totally  other  as  SUCh67  - 
And  to  allow  Husserl  speak  of  his  dilemma  in  his  own  voice: 
They,  (the  other  egos)  however,  are  not  simple  representations  or  objects  represented 
within  me,  synthetic  unities  of  a  process  of  verification  taking  place  "within  me",  but 
precisely  "others  .......  subjects  for  this  same  world  ...  subjects  who  perceive  the 
world  ...  and  who  thereby  experience  me,  just  as  I  experience  the  world  and  in  it, 
"others"'  (Cartesian  MeditationS)68. 
Here  we  meet  a  core  issue  for  Husserl  in  the  fifth  of  the  Cartesian 
Meditations.  His  most  central  affirmation  concerns  the  irreducibly  mediate  nature  of 
the  intentionality  aiming  at  the  other  as  other.  The  other  as  transcendental  other  (other 
absolute  origin  and  other  zero  point  in  the  orientation  of  the  world),  can  never  be 
given  to  me  in  an  original  way  and  in  person,  but  only  through  analogical 
presentation.  The  world  of  poetry  begins  here.  The  essence  of  metaphor  is  a  respect 
and  confirmation  of  separation  and  does  not  reduce  the  other  to  the  same.  We  can 
only  approach  the  other  through  analogy,  for,  if  I  did  not  approach  the  other  by  way  of 
analogy,  but  immediately,  originally  and  silently,  in  communion  with  the  other's 
experience,  the  other  would  immediately  cease  to  be  the  other.  Husserl's  theme  of 
appresentative  transposition  indicates,  preserves,  recognises,  the  radical  separation  of 
the  absolute  origins. 
Bodies,  transcendent  and  natural  things,  are  others  in  general  for  my 
consciousness.  They  are  always  outside,  and  thereby  their  transcendence  is  the  sign  of 
an  already  irreducible  alterity.  We  also  have  something  hidden  within  us.  We  can  only 
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approach  this  hidden  "somethingness'  through  poetry,  that  is,  by  means  of  analogy, 
anticipation  and  appresentation.  Derrida  argues  that  in  relation  to  the  other  as 
transcendent  thing,  in  principle,  it  is  always  open  to  a  presentation  of  the  originary 
and  original  hidden  visage.  In  Levinas'thought  this  is  never  possible.  We  are  talking 
about  a  distant  and  absolute  incompleteness  that  is  unapproachable.  It  would  be 
radically  impossible  to  go  around  and  see  things  from  the  other  side.  The  stranger  will 
always  be  infinitely  other  because,  in  essence,  no  enrichment  of  his  or  her  profile  can 
give  me  the  subjective  face  of  his  or  her  experiencefirom  his  or  herperspective  such 
as  he  or  she  has  lived  it. 
Derrida  points  out  the  key  difference  between  Husserl's  conception  of  things 
and  that  of  Levinas.  For  Husserl  when  he  speaks  of  the  infinitely  other  what  appears 
to  us  as  such,  Husserl  legitimates,  founds  and  authorises  his  discussion,  through 
speaking  of  the  intentional  modification  of  the  ego.  However,  Levinas  speaks  of  the 
infinitely  other  without  speaking  of  the  intentional  modification  of  the  ego  which 
would  be  a  violent  act  for  him,  depriving  himself  thereby  of  a  foundation  for  his 
discussion.  How  can  he  begin  to  speak  of  the  infinitely  other  if  it  does  not  appear  in 
the  zone  of  the  same?  If  to  follow  Husserl  is  indeed  violent  then  a  primary  level  of 
transcendental  violence  is  inescapable  and  exists  prior  to  every  ethical  choice. 
Levinas  has  written  in  Totality  and  Infinity:  'The  other,  as  other,  is  not  only  an  alter 
ego.  It  is  what  I  myself  am  not.  He  has  also  written  that'decency'  and'everyday  life' 
incorrectly  lead  us  to  believe  that'the  other  is  known  through  sympathy,  as  an  other 
like  myself,  as  alter  ego69.  Husserl  adopts  a  totally  different  stance.  He  stresses  the 
other  as  Other  only  in  its  fonn  as  ego,  in  its  form  of  alterity,  which  cannot  be  that  of 
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things  in  the  world.  If  the  other  were  not  recognized  as  a  transcendental  alter  ego,  it 
would  be  entirely  in  the  world  and  not,  as  ego,  the  origin  of  the  world.  Husserl 
stresses  the  point  that  the  other  as  alter  ego  signifies  the  other  as  other,  irreducible  to 
my  ego,  precisely  because  it  is  an  ego,  because  it  has  the  form  of  the  ego.  This  is  why 
he  is  face,  can  speak  to  me  and  understand  me.  Dissymmetry  itself  would  be 
impossible  without  this  symmetry,  which  is  not  of  the  world,  and  which,  having  no 
real  aspect  imposes  no  limit  upon  alterity  and  dissymmetry  -  in  fact,  probably  makes 
them,  on  the  contrary,  possible. 
A  basic  position  of  Derri(las  against  Levinas  is  crystal  clear  at  this  point:  we 
cannot  move  transcendentally  toward  the  other,  unless,  in  my  ipseity  I  know  myself  to 
be  other  for  the  other.  Unless  this  was  the  case  violence  would  have  no  victim  or 
author.  It  is  only  when  all  egos  are  others  for  others  that  we  can  legitimately  speak  of 
violence  and  its  victims  and  the  authors  of  violence.  The  infinitely  other  can  be  what 
it  is  only  if  it  is  other,  other  than.  Other  than  must  always  be  other  than  myself  It 
cannot  be  absolved  of  a  relation  to  an  ego.  If  it  were  it  would  no  longer  be  infinitely, 
absolutely  other.  It  could  no  longer  be  what  it  is.  Deffida  argues  that  this  is  not  some 
form  of  self-enclosed  game  available  to  language.  If  it  were  then  the  expression 
'infinitely  othee  or'absolutely  othee  could  not  be  stated  and  thought  simultaneously. 
The  other  cannot  be  absolutely  exterior  to  the  same  without  ceasing  to  be  other.  The 
same  is  not  and  cannot  be  a  totality  closed  in  upon  itself,  an  identity  playing  with 
itself,  possessing  only  the  appearance  of  alterity  in  what  Levinas  calls  economy,  work 
and  history.  There  could  not  be  a'play  of  the  same'  if  alterity  itself  was  not  already  in 
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the  same.  Unless  there  was  alterity  the  play  of  the  Same  could  not  occur  in  the  sense 
of  playful  activity,  or  of  dislocation. 
What  does  Derrida  achieve  with  these  thoughts?  Derrida!  s  basic  position  is 
that:  the  other  is  absolutely  other  only  if  she  or  he  is  an  ego,  that  is  in  a  certain  way  if 
he  or  she  is  the  same  as  1.  Simultaneously  less  other  and  less  'the  same'  than  1.  Are  we 
encountering  a  form  of  'irrationality?  It  appears  that  we  find  it  difficult  to  translate  my 
relation  to  the  Other  into  the  rational  coherence  of  language.  What  does  this  suggest? 
Deffida  bravely  ventures  to  suggest  that  we  can  no  longer  draw  inspiration  from 
within  the  coherence  of  the  Logos,  but  that  thought  is  stifled  in  the  region  of  the  origin 
of  language  as  dialogue  and  difference.  We  are  dealing  with  an  origin  that  is  an 
inscribed  inscription  and  with  the  'irrational'  concrete  condition  of  rationality,  that 
which  cannot  be'included!  within  language. 
For  Derrida  to  access  the  egoity  of  the  alter  ego  as  if  to  its  alterity  itself  can  be 
a  peaceful  gesture.  He  has  acknowledged  the  existence  of  a  transcendental  and  pre- 
ethical  violence.  This  exists,  though,  as  a  general  dissymmetry  whose  archia  is  the 
same  and  permits,  actually,  the  inverse  dissymmetry,  that  is,  the  very  ethical  non- 
violence  that  Levinas's  thought  attempts  to  approach.  This  transcendental  violence, 
what  Levinas  might  call  an  ethical  violence  is  the  original  point  that  institutes  the 
relationship  between  two  finite  ipseities  according  to  Derrida.  To  gain  access  to  the 
other  as  other  may  well  be  a  violent  act.  To  understand  and  approach  the  other 
involves  an  approach  to  their  territory.  We  are  in  the  domain  of  paradox,  for,  as 
Derrida  writes:  'this  transcendental  origin,  as  the  irreducible  violence  of  the  relation  to 261 
the  other,  is  at  the  same  time  nonviolence,  since  it  opens  the  relation  to  the  other70. 
we  are  within  an  economy.  It  is  the  nature  of  the  economy  itself,  which,  by  this 
opening,  will  permit  access  to  the  other  to  be  determined  in  ethical  freedom  as  moral 
violence  or  nonviolence. 
For  Derrida.  violence  is  the  origin  of  meaning  and  of  discourse  during  the  reign 
of  finitude.  The  difference  between  the  same  and  the  other,  which  is  not  a  difference 
or  a  relation  among  others,  has  no  meaning  in  the  infinite,  except  to  speak  as  Hegel 
does  of  the  anxiety  of  the  infinite  that  determines  and  negates  itself  So  violence 
necessarily  appears  within  the  horizon  of  an  idea  of  the  infinite.  What  the  idea  of 
otherness  means  is  phenomenality  as  disappearance.  We  are  not  in  search  of  a  third 
elusive  path  or  route.  Rather  we  witness  the  birth  of  the  trace,  the  word  as  metaphor 
whose  philosophical  elucidation  will  result  in  the  exploration  of  contradictions. 
Without  this  metaphor  or  word  its  originality  would  not  emerge  or  appear.  It  must  be 
made  to  appear.  And  the  phenomenon  itself  supposes  an  original  contamination  by  the 
sign.  War  is  the  emergence  of  speech  and  of  appearing.  We  are  it  seems,  within  the 
realm  of  strife  as  first  suggested  by  Martin  Heidegger. 
Discourse  does  itself  violence,  negates  itself  in  order  to  affirm  itself  and  wages 
war  against  the  war  that  institutes  it  without  ever  being  able  to  re-appropriate  this 
negativity.  We  must  utter  the  word  in  order  to  avoid  the  nothingness  of  pure  non- 
sense.  It  is  the  task  of  philosophy  against  nihilism,  or  the  task  of  discourse  to  choose 
itself  violently  in  opposition  to  nothingness  or  pure  non-sense.  We  witness  Derrida's 
awareness  of  the  contemporary  philosophical  scene  here.  And,  what  is  interesting, 
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writing  against  it,  or  at  least  creatively  countering  it.  Derrida  takes  Levinas  to  task  for 
not  taking  proper  responsibility  for  the  terms  and  implications  of  his  philosophical 
discourse.  Levinas  spoke  in  Totality  andInfinity  of  the  horizon  which'overflows  its 
frameworle7  1.  By  this  means  Levinas  wishes  to  suggest  the  abolition  of  violence  by 
the  suspension  of  the  difference  between  the  same  and  the  other.  However  this  also 
leads  to  the  banishment  of  any  possibility  for  peace.  Levinas's  goal  can  only  be 
achieved  through  violence.  As  such,  the  passage  through  violence  is  what  we  know  as 
history.  Levinas  is  harshly  rebuked  by  Derrida  at  this  point  in  so  far  as  Derrida  re- 
asserts  his  position  thatno  philosophy  responsible  for  its  language  can  renounce 
ipseity  in  general,  and  the  philosophy  or  eschatology  of  separation  may  do  so  less  than 
any  othe?  72.  Philosophy  exists  as  the  discourse  between  original  tragedy  and 
messianic  triumph.  Through  philosophy  violence  is  returned  against  violence  within 
knowledge,  in  which  original  finitude  appears 
3 
-, 
and  in  which  the  other  is  respected 
within,  and  by,  the  same.  Why  is  an  experience  Outside  of  my  own  unthinkable  and 
impossible?  We  are  at  the  limits  of  reason  in  general.  We  can  only  answer  in 
language,  and  language  itself  is  only  opened  by  the  question.  Philosophy  opens  itself 
to  the  question  within  it  and  by  it.  It  can  only  let  itself  be  questioned. 
Violence  might  be  inescapable.  When  we  free  absolute  alterity  in  the  absolute 
same  we  are  liberating  temporality  to  its  movement  and  so  we  open  access  to  the 
living  present.  This  living  present  might  be  the  absolute  form  of  egological  life  insofar 
as  it  is  the  absolute  form  of  the  opening  of  time  to  the  other  in  itself  If  egoity  is  the 
absolute  form  of  experience,  then  the  present,  the  presence  of  the  present,  and  the 
present  of  presence,  are  all  originally  and  forever  violent.  Our  living  present  is  always 
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marked  by  the  absence  of  death.  We  speak  of  presence  as  a  form  of  violence  in  the 
sense  of  being  the  meaning  of  finitude  and  the  meaning  of  meaning  as  history.  Derrida 
suggests  that  when  we  begin  to  question  the  very  grounds  of  'transcendental 
phenomenoloe  we  encounter  the  origin  and  end  of  phenomenoloes  logos,  in  that 
the  naked  opening  of  the  question,  its  silent  opening  always  escapes  phenomenology. 
Yet  the  silent  opening  of  the  question  about  history  as  finitude  and  violence  permits 
the  appearance  of  history  as  such.  We  are  in  pursuit  of  the  origins  of  the  strange 
dialogue  between  speech  and  silence. 
Ontology  and  Violence: 
Derrida  argues  that  after  Heidegger  we  have  a  tendency  to  hold  the  position 
that  Being  is  not  simply  a  predicate  of  the  existent,  any  more  than  it  is  the  existenfs 
subject.  When  we  take  Being,  and  he  is  inclined  to  do  so,  contra  Levinas,  as  essence 
or  existence  (as  Being-such  or  Being-there),  if  it  is  taken  as  copula  or  the  unitary  focal 
point  of  all  these  possibilities,  then  the  Being  of  the  existent  does  not  belong  to  the 
realm  of  predication  because  it  is  already  implied  in  all  predication  in  general  and 
makes  predication  possible.  The  question  of  Being  becomes  the  basis  for  every 
synthetic  or  analytic  judgement,  it  exists  beyond  genre  and  category,  as  well  as  being 
the  most  concrete  thought  of  all  thoughts,  the  common  root  of  essence  and  existence, 
what  allows  for  every  judgement  and  language  itself  We  are  at  the  centre  of  a  new 
understanding  or  basis  of  metaphysics.  Can  we  speak  of  and  from  the  strange 
difference  that  exists  between  Being  and  the  existent?  Does  this  have  any  meaning? 
Can  we  talk  about  the  'prioriW  of  Being  in  relation  to  the  existent?  This  is  where 
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Levinas  begins  his  case  against  core  presumptions  of  Western  thought  and  is  the 
impetus  behind  much  of  Totality  and  Infinity.  Levinas  had  sought  to  question  the 
enslaving  of  ethics  to'ontology. 
Derrida.  states:  'there  can  be  an  order  of  priority  only  between  two  detennined 
things,  two  existentst73.  As  Heidegger  has  made  clear  though,  Being  is  nothing  outside 
of  the  existent  and  in  no  way  precedes  the  existent  in  terms  of  time  or  dignity.  One 
cannot  legitimately  speak  of  the  'subordination'  of  the  existent  to  Being  or  of  the 
ethical  relation  to  the  ontological  relation.  There  is  no  violent  subordination  here  for 
Being  is  but  always  the  Being-of  this  existent.  As  explicated  by  Heidegger  Being  is 
not  a  principle  and  Being  is  not  a  principal  existent  in  the  form  of  an  archia  that 
would  permit  Levinas,  to  insert  the  face  of  a  faceless  tyrant  under  the  name  of  Being. 
The  thought  of  Being  is  alien  to  the  search  for  a  primary  principle,  as  it  exists  beyond 
theory  and  outside  all  hierarchies.  As  Derrida  writes:  'if  every  "philosophy",  every 
"metaphysics",  has  always  sought  to  determine  the  first  existent,  the  excellent  and 
truly  existent  existent,  then  the  thought  of  the  Being  of  the  existent  is  not  this 
metaphyics  or  first  philosophy.  It  is  not  even  ontology,  if  ontology  is  another  name  for 
first  philosophyt74  .  The  thought  of  Being  is  not  concerned  with  and  does  not  yield  any 
power,  for  power  relationships  only  exist  between  existents.  Levinas  has  written  in 
Totality  andInfinity:  'Ontology,  as  first  philosophy,  is  a  philosophy  of  power75.  This 
may  well  be  true,  but,  as  developed  by  Heidegger,  the  thought  of  Being  is  not  an 
ontology,  a  first  philosophy,  and  neither  is  it  a  philosophy  of  power.  If  it  is  true,  as 
Heidegger  suggests,  that  the  Logos  'is  the  Logos  of  no  one',  he  does  not  mean  the 
anonymity  of  oppression,  the  impersonality  of  the  State,  or  the  neutrality  of  'one 
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say  s06.  It  is  anonymous  only  as  the  possibility  of  the  name  and  of  responsibility.  In 
his  Letter  on  Humanism  Heidegger  has  written:  'But  if  man  must  one  day  arrive  in  the 
neighbourhood  of  Being,  he  must  first  learn  to  exist  in  that  which  has  no  name'77  . 
For  Derrida  there  can  be  no  ethics  without  this  thought  of  Being.  Moreover 
this  thought  of  Being  conditions  our  respect  for  the  other  as  what  it  is:  other.  Being  is 
nothing  outside  of  the  existent.  The  opening  itself  amounts  to  the  ontic-ontological 
difference,  and  it  is  impossible  to  avoid  the  ontic  metaphor  in  order  to  articulate  Being 
in  language,  in  order  to  let  Being  circulate  in  language.  Language  both  illuminates  and 
hides  Being  itself  Being  is  alone  though  in  its  absolute  resistance  to  every  metaphor. 
Thought  reaches  a  point  where  metaphor  itself  must  be  thought  of  as  metaphor,  and 
that  is  the  moment  when  it  has  been  ripped  apart  as  the  moment  when  it  is  lifted  as  the 
veil  which  hides  or  discloses  Being.  The  moment  of  metaphoricity  is  the  moment 
when  the  thought  of  Being  itself  emerges.  This  emergence  occurs  always  under  or 
beneath  the  emergence  of  another  metaphor.  We  can  only  think  through  and  with 
metaphor,  and  so,  at  some  level,  we  are  always  involved  in  a  poetic  world. 
To  treat  Being  and  the  same  as  categories,  or  to  treat  the  relationship  to  Being 
as  a  relation  to  a  category  which  itself  could  be  posed  afterward,  or  subordinated  to  a 
determined  relation  (an  ethical  relation,  for  example),  Derrida  asks,  is  this  not  to 
forbid  oneself  every  determination  from  the  outset?  Following  a  classical 
Heideggerian  line  Derrida  argues  that  every  determination  in  effect  presupposes  the 
thought  of  Being.  It  is  only  through  this  thought  that  we  can  ground  or  give  meaning 
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to  Being  as  other,  as  other  self,  to  the  irreducibility  of  the  existence  and  the  essence  of 
the  other,  and  to  consequent  responsibility.  If  Being  is  always  to  be  let  be,  and  if  to 
think  is  to  let  Being  be,  then  Being  is  indeed  the  other  of  thought.  But  since  it  is  what 
it  is  only  by  the  letting-be  of  thought,  and  since  the  latter  is  thought  only  by  virtue  of 
the  presence  of  the  Being  which  it  lets  be,  then  thought  and  Being,  thought  and  the 
other  are  the'same;  which  does  not  mean  identical,  or  one,  or  equal. 
Like  the  Other  Being  is  not  at  all  the  accomplice  of  the  totality,  whether  of  the 
finite  totality,  the  violent  totality  of  which  Levinas  speaks,  or  of  an  infinite  totality. 
Being  cannot  and  could  not  oppress  or  enclose  the  existent  and  its  differences  and 
thereby  is  foreign  to  the  idea  of  the  finite  totality,  to  the  infinity  of  existents,  foreign 
without  being  another  existent  or  another  totality  of  existents.  If,  as  Levinas  would 
have  it,  the  glance  of  the  other  is  to  command  me,  then  I  must  be  able  to  let  be  the 
other  in  his  freedom  as  Other.  Being  itself,  however,  commands  nothing  or  no  one. 
Being  does  not  lord  it  over  the  existent  and  it  is  not,  in  its  priority  (an  inescapably 
ontic  metaphor)  is  not  an  archia.  In  order  to  be  liberated  we  must  set  the  question  free 
that  will  make  our  search  for  the  archia  tremble.  The  thought  of  Being  is  the  best, 
maybe  only,  means  of  doing  this.  For  Derrida  the  pre-conceptual  unity  of  Being,  and 
pre-analogical,  is  the  only  road  that  can  break  open  the  possibility  of  relation  between 
man  and  God,  possibly  the  most  ancient  of  metaphysical  preoccupations. 
Could  we  possibly  speak  of  the  face,  without  reference  to  the  question  of 
Being?  Eyes  and  mouth  can  only  make  a  face  if  they'let  be',  if  they  can  reach  the 
Being  of  what  is.  Since  Being  is,  we  do  not  produce  it,  but  respect  it  through  the 
glance  and  speech.  There  can  be  no  speech  without  the  statement  of  Being.  However, 267 
as  Being  is  nothing  outside  the  determined  existent  it  could  not  appear  outside  of  the 
possibility  of  speech.  And  so  Being  is  dominated  by  the  theme  of  unveiling.  Derrida 
speaks  of  the  birth  of  history  and  of  the  world  in  the  ontic  detenninations  unveiled, 
uttered,  in  the  history  of  metaphysics.  Historical  'epochs'  are  metaphysical  or  onto- 
theological  determinations  of  the  Being  that  thus  brackets  and  reserves  itself  beneath 
metaphysical  concepts. 
Therefore  the  Site  is  not  an  empirical  Here  but  always  an  Iffic:  for  Heidegger, 
as  for  the  Jew,  the  Irishman  and  the  Poet.  This  site  is  never  a  given  proximity  but  a 
promised  one.  The  Sacred  of  which  it  speaks  belongs  not  to  religion  in  general,  nor  to 
a  particular  theology,  and  cannot  be  determined  by  any  history  of  religion.  It  is  first 
the  essential  experience  of  divinity  or  of  deity.  It  precedes  every  relationship  to  God 
or  the  gods.  It  presupposes  some  pre-comprehension  of  the  Deity,  of  God!  s  Being- 
god,  of  the  Sacred.  Heidegger  writes  in  his  Letter  on  Humanism  that  it  is  the'only 
essential  space  of  divinity  which  in  turn  opens  only  a  dimension  for  the  gods  and  the 
78v 
This  space  is  within  faith  and  atheism  for  both  presuppose  it:  'it  is  only  on  the 
basis  of  the  truth  of  Being  that  the  essence  of  the  Sacred  can  be  thought.  It  is  only  on 
the  basis  of  the  essence  of  the  Sacred  that  the  essence  of  Divinity  must  be  thought.  It 
is  only  in  the  light  of  the  essence  of  Divinity  that  one  can  think  and  say  what  the  word 
"God"  must  designate',  writes  Heidegger,  again  in  the  Letter  on  Humanism  79.  m 
Derrida  writes:  'that  the  gods  or  God  cannot  be  indicated  except  in  the  Space  of  the 
Sacred  and  in  the  light  of  the  deity,  is  at  once  the  limit  and  the  wellspring  of  finite- 
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Being  as  history'80.  We  cannot  grasp  God  but  we  can  see  him  coming.  The  sacred 
appears  but  God  remains  distant.  And  so  we  are  at  the  beginnings  of  a  negative 
theology,  a  thought  concerned  with  liberating  and  acknowledging  the  ineffable 
transcendence  of  an  infinite  existent.  And  "'ontological"  anticipation,  transcendence 
toward  Being,  permits,  then,  an  understanding  of  the  term  "God",  for  example,  even  if 
this  understanding  is  but  the  ether  in  which  dissonance  can  resonate.  This 
transcendence  inhabits  and  founds  language,  and  along  with  it  the  possibility  of  all 
81  Being-together'  . 
Derrida  dwells  in  the  paradoxical  by  arguing  that  only  a  face  can  arrest 
violence,  and  can  do  so  only  because  it  is  a  face  alone  which  can  provoke  it.  It  is  the 
thought  of  Being  itself  which  opens  the  face,  without  it  there  would  be  only  pure 
violence  or  non-violence.  The  thought  of  Being  in  its  unveiling  is  never  far  removed 
from  the  idea  of  violence.  Being  dissimulates  itself  in  order  to  appear  and  does 
violence  to  itself  in  order  to  be  stated.  A  speech  produced  without  violence  would 
offer  nothing  to  the  other;  it  would  not  be  history,  and  it  would  show  nothing.  Such  a 
language  would  be  without  the  verb  to  be  and  one  wonders  hypothetically  what  sort  of 
language  it  would  be.  It  would  be  a  language  of  pure  adoration  and  pure  invocation, 
Levinas  suggests.  It  appears  that  violence  emerges  with  articulation.  And  so  the 
unhistoricity  of  meaning  at  its  origin,  therefore,  is  what  profoundly  separates  Levinas 
from  Heidegger.  For  Heidegger  Being  is  history,  and  so  it  is  not  outside  difference, 
and  thus  it  originally  occurs  as  (non-ethical)  violence,  as  dissimulation  of  itself  in  its 
own  unveiling. 
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Derrida  concludes  by  paying  homage  to  Greek  thought  and  the  birthplace  of 
his  own  philosophizing.  He  acknowledges  the  site  of  philosophical  encounter  as  a 
place  that  does  not  offerjust  occasional  hospitality  to  a  thought  that  remains  foreign 
to  it.  The  Greek  is  not  absent  when  the  Jew  and  the  Christian  meet  in  his  home. 
Greece  can  never  be  a  neutral,  provisional  site.  Why?  The  Greek  logos  can  house 
eschatological  prophecy  and  does  not  remain  outside  and  accidental  for  any  thought. 
AS!  Saint  John  Chrysostom  noted  no  one  can  treat  the  Greek  sages  as  'sages  of  the 
outside'.  Greek  thought  recognizes  that  alterity  has  to  circulate  at  the  origin  of 
meaning,  and  by  this  welcoming  of  alterity  into  the  heart  of  the  logos,  the  Greek 
thought  of  Being  has  forever  protected  itself  against  any  and  every  absolutely 
surprising  convocation. 270 
Conclusion: 
FVF. 
I  ne  State  of  Play:  Some  Useful  Tipsfrom  Hans-Georg 
Gadamer  and  Paul  Ricoeur,  with  illustrationsfrom 
Seam  us  Hean  ey  an  d  Mich  ael  L  ongley 
in  the  previous  chapter  we  noted  the  line  from  Angelus  Silesius'  poem  in 
which  he  scandalously  observes:  'God  plays  with  creation".  We  re-call  Jacques 
Derrida's  reference  to  the  significance  of  play  in  his  work  OfGrammatology.  There 
Deffida  wrote:  'one  could  call  play  the  absence  of  the  transcendental  signified  as 
limitlessness  of  play,  that  is  to  say  as  the  destruction  of  onto-theology  and  the 
metaphysics  of  presence',  but  we  will  hope  to  illustrate,  not  necessarily  the  end  of  all 
theology  but  maybe  even  the  place  of  a  new  and  different  beginningý.  What  can  we 
say  for  this  theme  of  playfulness  as  expressed  in  language  and  art?  Has  it  any 
relevance  for  the  noble,  serious  and  sublime  subjects  of  philosophy  and  theology,  as 
they  are  traditionally  understood?  In  order  to  clarify  our  thought,  and  in  fact,  as  an 
elaboration  of  thought  on  the  subject,  we  call  to  our  aid  Hans-Georg  Gadamer, 
especially  his  work  Truth  andMethod  in  which  he  devotes  a  considerable  amount  of 
time  and  space  to  the  theme  and  act  of  play. 
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Hans-Georg  Gadamer  on  Play 
The  first  thing  that  Gadamer  wishes  to  make  clear  is  that  when  we  speak  of  the 
event,  or  activity,  of  'play'  we  are  not  referring  to  a  state  of  mind  of  the  creator  or 
even  of  the  spectator  who  is  caught  up  in  and  enjoying  the  world  of  the  art  object. 
When  we  speak  of  'play'  we  are  not  even  referring  to  the  freedom  of  subjectivity 
engaged  in  play,  but  rather  we  are  referring  to  the  mode  of  being  of  the  work  of  art 
itself.  3 
Firstly  we  can  make  a  valid  distinction  between  the  activity  of  play  and  the 
behaviour  of  the  player.  We  note  that  for  the  player  play  is  not  serious,  for  that  is  the 
reason  why  he  plays  in  the  first  instance.  However,  play  exists  in  a  special  relation 
with  what  is  serious,  and  indeed  has  its  own  sacred  aura  of  seriousness  about  it.  In  the 
moment  of  play  the  usual  purposive  relations  that  pertain  to  human  activity  are 
curiously  suspended.  Gadamer  notes  that  'play  fulfils  its  purpose  only  if  the  player 
loses  himself  in  play.  Seriousness  is  not  merely  something  that  calls  us  away  from 
play,  rather,  seriousness  in  playing  is  necessary  to  make  the  play  wholly  play. 
Someone  who  doesn't  take  the  game  seriously  is  a  spoilsport.  The  mode  of  being  of 
play  does  not  allow  the  player  to  behave  toward  play  as  if  toward  an  objeCt'4. 
Our  aim  is  to  discover  more  about  the  nature  of  play  itself  What  the  concept 
of  play  forces  us  to  recognise  is  that  the  work  of  art  is  not  an  object  that  stands  over 
against  a  subject  for  itself,  but  instead,  the  work  of  art's  true  being  resides  in  the  fact 
3  Hans-Georg  Gadamer:  Truth  and  Method-  Continuum:  New  York:  1998,  trans.  by  Joel  Weinsheimer 
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that  it  becomes  an  experience  or  event  that  alters  the  person  who  has  undergone  it,  or 
has  experienced  it.  If  we  can  say  that  the  'subject'  of  the  experience  of  art  is  not 
actually  the  subjectivity  of  the  person  who  experiences  it  but  the  work  itself,  then  we 
must  recognise  that  play  has  its  own  essence,  independent  of  the  consciousness  of 
those  who  engage  in  the  act  of  play. 
Let  us  focus  briefly  on  common  usages  of  the  word  play.  In  common  speech 
we  speak  of  the  play  of  light  and  the  play  of  forces;  there  again  we  note  the  play  of 
the  waves,  and  we  note  somebody's  deft  use  of  wordplay.  What  such  colloquial  usage 
suggests  is  an  event  or  happening  of  a  to-and-fro  movement  that  is  not  tied  to  a 
particular  goal  that  would  bring  it  to  an  end.  So,  the  event  of  play  has  no  goal  that 
brings  it  to  an  end,  but  rather  it  is  an  activity  that  renews  itself  through  the  means  of 
constant  repetition.  The  play  is  the  occurrence  of  the  movement  and  thus  a  play  of 
colours  does  not  mean  the  happening  of  one  colour  playing  against  another,  but  rather 
a  process  underway  in  which  to  sight  there  is  displayed  a  changing  variety  of  colours. 
,5  Gadamer  notes:  'the  primordial  sense  of  playing  is  the  medial  one  . 
One  can  then 
speak  of  'the  primacy  ofplay  over  the  consciousness  ofthe  player,  6  (Gadamer's 
italics). 
We  can  all  relate  to  the  view  that  a  vital  part  of  the  play  is  t  at  its  movement 
must  not  only  be  without  goal  or  purpose,  but  also  without  effort.  It  must  happen  by 
itself,  and  have  the  appearance  of  something  that  is  spontaneously  overflowing.  Real 
play,  ironically  enough,  must  exist  without  strain,  and  is  most  often  experienced  as  a 
relaxation.  The  structure  of  play  is  such  that  it  absorbs  the  player  and  thereby  rids  her 
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or  him  of  the  burden  of  taking  initiatives,  which  is  a  typical  burden  of  everyday, 
mundane  existence.  Real  play  artlessly  tends  towards  a  refreshing  repetition  and 
constant  self-renewal.  Could  we  legitimately  and  ironically  speak  of  it  as  a  type  of 
spirit  at  work? 
Can  we  say  that  nature  itself  is  without  purpose  and  intention,  in  fact  is 
without  exertion,  and  is  a  very  model  of  constantly  self-renewing  play?  Is  it  through 
this  fact  that  it  can  appear  as  a  very  model  for  art?  Are  we  beginning  to  come  close  to 
a  sense  of  how  the  Godhead  might  play  with  creation,  in  a  way  that  is  joyous, 
refreshing,  and  liberating? 
Gadamer  observes  'the  movement  to-and-fro  obviously  belongs  so  essentially 
to  the  game  that  there  is  an  ultimate  sense  in  which  you  cannot  have  a  game  by 
yourselfv7  . 
This  does  not  mean  that  there  is  always,  necessarily  and  literally  another 
player.  Rather,  there  must  be  something  else  with  which  the  player  plays,  responding 
to  her  or  his  countermove.  Allied  to  this  is  the  notion  of  risk.  For  the  game  itself  is  a 
risk  for  the  player.  One  can  only  play  with  serious  possibilities,  and  so  through  the 
play  of  the  game  we  enjoy  a  freedom  of  decision  that  is  endangered  and  limited. 
What  is  reflected  here  is  the  idea  that  all  play  is  a  being-played.  For  whoever 
tries  a  game  is  in  fact  the  one  who  is  being  tried.  When  we  start  to  play  the  game  once 
again,  we  gamble  with  the  fact  that  this  time  around  the  game  may  not  succeed,  it  may 
not  work  out,  and  we  might  fail.  From  this  we  can  ascertain  that  the  real  subject  of  the 
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game  is  and  can  only  be  the  game  itself,  for  it  is  that  alone  which  draws  in,  seduces 
and  engages  us  in  its  spell,  and  thereby  retains  us  in  the  there. 
The  empirical  fact  of  their  being  many  games  in  our  world  makes  obvious  that 
there  is  not  just  one  game  played  within  the  one  spirit.  Rather  there  are  many  games 
that  differ  widely  with  each  other  in  terms  of  the  spirit  with  which  each  is  played,  and 
which,  more  properly,  each  engenders.  The  particular  nature  of  a  game  properly  lies 
in  the  rules  and  regulations  that  prescribe  the  way  the  field  of  the  game  is  filled. 
interestingly  the  playing  field  in  which  the  game  is  played  is  set  by  the  nature  of  the 
game  itself  and  is  defined  most  by  the  structure  that  determines  the  movement  of  the 
game  from  within  than  by  what  it  confronts. 
The  game  does  play  something.  We  want  to  play,  and  we  choose  one  game 
over  another,  and  this  is  for  the  movement  of  that  game  over  another.  The  movement 
of  the  game  is  especially  marked  out  and  reserved  for  that  particular  game.  When  we 
set  off  a  playing  field  we  set  off  the  sphere  of  play  as  a  closed  world.  Within  this 
sphere  the  players  comport  themselves  in  a  particular  way.  Gadamer  writes:  'every 
game  presents  the  man  who  plays  it  with  a  task.  He  cannot  enjoy  the  freedom  of 
playing  himself  out  without  transforming  the  aims  of  his  purposive  behaviour  into 
mere  tasks  of  the  game.  Thus  the  child  gives  itself  a  task  in  playing  with  a  ball,  and 
such  tasks  are  playful  ones  because  the  purpose  of  the  game  is  not  really  solving  the 
task,  but  ordering  and  shaping  the  movement  of  the  game  itself  8. 
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The  Benefit  of  One  ExanWle 
Let  us  look  at  an  example  from  Seamus  Heaney's  body  of  poetry. 
Markings 
We  marked  the  pitch:  fourjackets  for  four  goalposts, 
That  was  all.  The  comers  and  the  squares 
Were  there  like  longitude  and  latitude 
Under  the  bumpy  ground,  to  be 
Agreed  about  or  disagreed  about 
When  the  time  came.  And  then  we  picked  the  teams 
And  crossed  the  line  our  called  names  drew  between  us. 
Youngsters  shouting  their  heads  off  in  a  field 
As  the  light  died  and  they  kept  on  playing 
Because  by  then  they  were  playing  in  their  heads 
And  the  actual  kicked  ball  came  to  them 
Like  a  dream  heaviness,  and  their  own  hard 
Breathing  in  the  dark  and  skids  on  grass 
Sounded  like  effort  in  another  world 
It  was  quick  and  constant,  a  game  that  never  need 
Be  played  out.  Some  limit  had  been  passed, 
There  was  fleetness,  furtherance,  untiredness 
In  time  that  was  extra,  unforeseen  and  free. 276 
II 
You  also  loved  lines  pegged  out  in  the  garden, 
The  spade  nicking  the  first  straight  edge  along 
The  tight  white  string.  Or  string  stretched  perfectly 
To  make  the  outline  of  a  house  foundation, 
Pale  timber  battens  set  at  right  angles 
For  every  comer,  each  freshly  sawn  new  board 
Spick  and  span  in  the  oddly  passive  grass. 
Or  the  imaginary  line  straight  down 
A  field  of  grazing,  to  be  ploughed  open 
From  the  rod  struck  in  one  headrig  to  the  rod 
Stuck  in  the  other. 
III 
All  these  things  entered  you 
As  if  they  were  both  the  door  and  what  came  through  it. 
They  marked  the  spot,  marked  time  and  held  it  open. 
A  mower  parted  the  bronze  sea  of  corn. 
A  windlass  hauled  the  centre  out  of  water. 
Two  men  with  a  cross-cut  kept  it  swimming 
Into  a  felled  beech  backwards  and  forwards 
So  that  they  seemed  to  row  the  steady  earth.  9 
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Heaney  captures  well  the  sense  of  the  role  of  the  imagination  in  this  world  of 
the  game.  It  might  be  clearer  to  speak  of  his  obliquely  suggesting  the  invisible 
boundaries  defined  by  the  rules  of  the  game.  This  is  suggested  by  the  lack  of 
definition  conveyed  by  a  field  of  play  hinted  at  by  the  fourjacket  goalposts  within 
which  the  game  is  played;  what  is  left  open  are  the  exact  parameters  of  the  field  of 
play  which  will  be  argued  about  later  by  the  boys  in  the  course  of  the  game.  Then 
there  is  the  imaginary  line  drawn  between  the  players  on  one  team  as  opposed  to 
another.  It  is  arbitrary  but  allows  the  game  to  proceed.  The  sense  of  otherness  hinted 
at  by  Heaney  in  the  direction  of  which  we  are  invited  or  lifted  up  to  in  the  playing  of 
the  game,  is  found  in  the  phrases  'dream  heaviness'  and  the  'another  world'  towards 
which  the  players  are  playing.  What  is  the  effect  of  this  activity?  It  alters  the  world 
within  which  the  boys  exist.  They  are  lifted  to  a  place  where  time  is  transformed  and 
their  movement  within  it.  They  are  brought  to  a  place  where  a  nimbleness  of  activity 
is  experienced  and  time's  heaviness  is  removed  as  they  move  into  an  extra  temporal 
dimension.  Understandably  enough  this  is  experienced  as  a  liberation. 
Heaney  extends  the  field  of  reference  of  his  own  poem  in  the  second  part.  He 
refers  there  to  a  gardener's  activity  of  marking  out  parts  of  the  garden  design. 
Builders  use  a  similar  method  to  construct  on  the  ground  the  foundation  plans  of  a 
house.  There  is  something  ethereal,  unreal,  unrealised  about  the  builder's  plans  as 
sketched  out  on  the  ground,  but  before  too  long  they  will  become  something  solid, 
founded  and  very  real  and  tangible.  The  hint  of  the  poem  is  that  both  realities  depend 
on  each  other  for  their  existence.  The  moment  of  unity  of  these  two  separate  domains 
is  contained  within  the  line:  'all  these  things  entered  you/  As  if  they  were  both  the 
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odd  sets  of  diction,  unusual  and  striking  in  the  sense  that  they  clash  against  each  other 
when  placed  side  by  side  within  the  world  of  this  poem.  The  last  sentence  quoted 
above  contrasts  with  the  concrete  tenns  of  ploughing,  gardening  and  playing  football. 
Its  reference  is  to  an  abstraction:  as  are  the  reference  points  of  terms  like  'dream 
heaviness'  and  'some  limit'.  Phrases  like  these  contrast  with  the  concreteness  of 
reference  behind  'the  actual  kicked  ball'.  The  opposite  of  actual  is  imagined  or  unreal, 
and  that  ball  is  also  kicked  in  this  poem,  strangely  enough,  and  has  to  be  if  the  'actual 
kicked  ball'  line  is  to  make  any  sense.  That  is  part  of  Heaney's  magical  achievement 
in  the  poem. 
The  poem's  movement  is  contained  in  its  paradoxical  final  image.  We  have 
the  two  men  rowing  the  steady  earth.  The  key  verb  is  'seeming'  and  the  argument  of 
the  poem  is  that  the  imagined,  virtual  world  is  as  important,  significant  and  influential 
as  the  'real'.  narrowly  defined.  And  one  key  way  to  enter  or  access  this  world  is 
through  the  play  of  the  game. 
Let  us  return  to  Gadamer.  Gadamer  argues  that  performing  a  task  successfully 
rpresents  it'.  Play  is  limited  to  presenting  itself  It,  like  the  world  of  nature,  is  a  form 
of  self-presentation.  This  draws  on  the  player  to  present  him  or  herself  in  the  course  of 
the  game  too.  Gadamer  writes:  'only  because  play  is  always  presentation  is  human 
play  able  to  make  representation  itself  the  task  of  a  game"  10.  And  this  representation  is 
always  for  someone,  especially  so  when  we  are  in  the  realm  of  art  or  the  religious  rite. 
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We  note  the  'in  between'  nature  of  the  game.  We  have  said  that  a  game  does 
not  have  its  being  within  the  consciousness  of  the  player  or  within  his  or  her  attitude, 
but  rather  that  the  play  draws  either  her  or  him  into  its  dominion  and  fills  them  with 
its  spirit.  In  this  activity  the  player  experiences  the  game  as  a  reality  that  surpasses 
him  or  her.  In  a  sense  artistic  presentation  exists  always  for  someone  even  if  there  is 
no  evident  presence  of  someone  listening  or  watching. 
Gadamer  calls  the  change  in  which  human  play  comes  to  its  true 
consummation  in  being  art  a  'transformation  into  structure"'  (Gadamer's  italics). 
The  word  transformation  means  that  something  is  suddenly  and  as  a  whole  something 
else,  with  the  ftansformed  thing  that  it  has  become  being  its  true  being.  In  the  play  too 
the  playwright  and  the  players  cease  to  be  themselves  in  a  way  and  become  utterly 
only  what  they  are  playing.  The  world  of  the  play  is  another  world,  maybe  a  closed 
world,  and  is  its  own  measure  and  measures  itself  by  nothing  outside  of  itself  The 
action  of  the  drama  exists  entirely  within  itself  Gadamer  notes:  'it  no  longer  permits 
of  any  comparison  with  reality  as  the  secret  measure  of  all  verisimilitude.  It  is  raised 
above  all  such  comparisons  -  and  hence  also  above  the  question  of  whether  it  is  all 
real  -  because  a  superior  truth  speaks  from  it'  12 
. 
What  happens  in  art  in  this  instance?  What  is  emerges.  What  is  produced  and 
brought  to  the  light  is  what  has  been  constantly  hidden  and  withdrawn.  And  so  what 
we  experience  in  a  work  of  art  and  what  invites  our  attention  and  sustains  it  is  how 
true  the  work  of  art  is.  Within  the  work  of  art  we  know  and  recognise  something  and 
ourselves.  The  real  joy  of  recognition  is  the  discovery  of  knowing  more  than  is 
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already  familiar.  We  touch  upon  the  essence  of  things.  And  so  the  play  has  a 
revelatory  dimension  to  it.  We  cannot  then  define  the  being  of  art  as  of  something  that 
is  an  object  for  aesthetic  consciousness,  for  the  aesthetic  attitude  is  more  than  it 
knows  of  itself  For  art  is  a  part  of  the  event  of  being  that  occurs  in  presentation.  And 
so  Gadamer  can  write:  'what  we  have  called  a  structure  is  one  insofar  as  it  presents 
itself  as  a  meaningful  whole.  It  does  not  exist  in  itself,  nor  is  it  encountered  in  a 
mediation  (Vermittlung)  accidental  to  it;  rather,  it  acquires  its  proper  being  in  being 
mediated'  13 
.  There  is  primarily  the  event  or  fact  of  its  being  embodied.  And  yet  the 
work  can  only  open  up  from  itself  its  own  possibilities  of  being.  We  are  in  a  situation 
where  we  are  both  bound  and  free. 
Play  in  the  Concrete  Instance 
Let  us  test  our  analysis  by  looking  closely  at  some  poems.  We  will  look  at  a 
clutch  of  poems  by  contemporary  Belfast  poet  Michael  Longley  from  his  collection 
Gorse  Fires. 
The  Velocipede 
He  walks  past  my  bedroom  window  carrying  a  spade. 
That  Joseph  Murphy,  father  of  four  sets  of  twins, 
Jockey,  lover  of  horses,  the  gun  club's  secretary, 
Should  hide  in  his  cottage  a  ledger  full  of  poems 
Is  hardly  surprising:  consider  his  grandfather 
Who  beachcombed  from  the  strand  barrels  and  spars 
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And  built  the  first  velocipede  in  Thallabaun. 
Out  of  an  umbrella  and  old  sheets  he  improvised 
A  parachute,  launched  himself  from  the  byre  roof 
And  after  a  brief  flight  was  taken  to  hospital. 
On  home-made  crutches  and  slipping  all  the  tethers 
Joseph  Murphy's  grandfather  swings  past  my  window.  14 
This  poem  tells  the  story  of  Joseph  Murphy,  and  at  one  level  it  is  a 
straightforward  narrative  poem.  Longley  presents  us  with  a  picture  of  a  man  solidly 
rooted  in  the  communal  world  in  which  he  was  born  and  raised.  He  loves  horses  and 
shooting  and  so  is  well  grounded  in  'real'  life;  the  poem  presents  his  being  involved 
in  what  are  the  respectable  pursuits  of  the  average  individual  of  those  parts.  The 
surprise  is  the  revelation  that  he  is  a  closet  poet.  Longley  traces  a  genealogy  of  oddity 
for  him,  his  grandfather  was  a  bit  of  an  innovator,  a  man  who  followed  his  own  star, 
let  his  creativity  lift  him  out  of  the  ordinary  world  to  which  he  customarily  belonged. 
Joseph  Murphy's  grandfather  risked  social  ridicule  by  being  childish  and  indulging  a 
type  of  play  normally  reserved  for  naive  children,  as  well  as  eventually  enduring 
physical  injury,  by  building  the  first  velocipede  in  Thallabaun.  He  aimed  for  freedom 
but  found  he  was  bound  to  the  world  in  a  way  that  he  could  not  ultimately  escape.  He 
was  motivated  by  a  desire  to  fly,  to  move  above  the  ordinary  and  see  it  from  a  new 
perspective,  from  within  a  new  and  different  element.  Longley  uses  the  telling  phrase 
4slipping  all  the  tethers'. 
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Was  Joseph  Murphy  and  his  grandfather  in  search  of  what  a  conventional 
theology  might  call  'elevating  grace'?  In  terms  of  Gadamer's  analysis  there  is  an 
expression  of  desire  for  transformation,  of  needing  to  escape  one  element  by  moving 
through  another.  One  sought  for  it  through  poetry  and  the  other  through  the  act  of 
flying.  Were  they  pursuing  an  intuition  that  there  was  more  to  their  humanity  than 
their  mundane  world  and  social  networks  allowed  or  grasped?  The  poet  hints  at  his 
participation  in  this  desire  and  world  in  the  final  image  of  the  poem.  Longley  says  he 
can  see  Joseph  Murphy's  grandfather  swinging  outside  his  window.  At  a  literal  level 
we  could  say  this  must  be  a  lie.  For  he  has  only  imagined  it  after  watching  Joseph 
Murphy  pass  by  his  window  with  a  spade  and  his  subsequent  reflections  on  his 
possessing  a  ledger  full  of  poems  and  then  the  meditation  on  his  family's  past. 
However,  the  story  of  the  grandfather  was  only  recollected;  yet  Longley  hints  at  the 
truth  and  substance  of  his  recollection  through  the  concrete  imagery  of  the  grandfather 
swaying  outside  his  window.  Within  the  world  of  the  poem  such  a  statement  has  its 
own  truth  and  validity.  Real  art  does  not  and  cannot  lie. 
The  second  poem  we  look  at  from  Gorse  Fires  deals  with  Longley's  mother. 
The  Balloon 
You  are  a  child  in  the  dream  and  not  my  mother. 
I  float  above  your  ahead  as  in  a  hot  air  balloon 
That  casts  no  shadow  on  you  looking  up  at  me 
Across  the  shallow  streams  and  fields  of  shiny  grass 
As  though  there  were  neither  malformation  nor  pain. 
This  is  the  first  time  ever  I  have  seen  you  running. 283 
You  are  a  child  in  the  dream  and  not  my  mother 
Which  may  be  why  I  call  out  from  the  balloon  to  you: 
'Jump  over  the  hedges,  Connie,  jump  over  the  trees'.  13 
From  the  circumstances  revealed  in  the  poem  we  gather  that  Longley's  mother  was 
disabled  in  'real'  life,  certainly  she  could  not  walk  'properly',  for  she  has  suffered 
from  'malformation'  and  'pain'  and  the  poet  has  never  seen  her  running.  The  scenario 
imagined  by  Longley  in  the  world  of  his  poem  is  his  having  a  vision  of  his  mother 
running  and  jumping  and  being  so  agile,  fit  and  able,  to  an  almost  superhuman  degree, 
that  she  can  spring  over  hedges  and  trees.  Longley  imagines  himself  as  if  in  a  balloon 
floating  above  the  world  in  which  this  is  happening.  Once  again  we  see  him  develop 
the  image  of  flight  as  a  type  of  transcendental  metaphor  that  symbolizes  the 
possibilities  of  poetry  itself.  The  idea  of  flight  allows  one  to  rise  above  the  mundane, 
the  real,  and  the  ordinary  into  the  world  of  the  imagined  and  open-ended  possibility. 
Thus  he  looks  at  the  world  of  his  mother's  real  suffering  and  disability  by 
constructing  a  counter-world.  This  suggests  a  dissatisfaction  with  the  given  and  a 
yearning  for  something  more,  an  'other'.  We  appear  to  be  people  of  a  dual  identity 
too.  There  is  another  part  of  ourselves  that  can  think  again  of  other  possibilities  apart 
from  the  concrete  facts  of  our  being  in  the  world.  What  is  this  strange  capacity? 
Again,  is  the  poet  in  pursing  the  possibilities  of  his  imagination  and  the  medium  in 
which  he  works  language  and  metaphor  moving  towards  a  world  of  'other-ness'?  So 
we  see  the  poet  enter  a  dreamscape  that  moves  him  to  an-other  place  of  better  things. 
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The  last  poem  is  a  fascinating  observation  of  the  ritual  life  of  a  rural  Irish 
village.  Watch  how  Longley  constructs  the  role  of  the  narrator  of  the  poem: 
Detour 
I  want  my  funeral  to  include  this  detour 
Down  the  single  street  of  a  small  market  town, 
On  either  side  of  the  procession  such  names 
As  Philbin,  O'Malley,  MacNamara,  Keane. 
A  reverent  pause  to  let  a  herd  of  milkers  pass 
Will  bring  me  face  to  face  with  grubby  parsnips, 
Cauliflowers  that  glitter  after  a  sunshower, 
Then  hay  rakes,  broom  handles,  gas  cylinders. 
Reflected  in  the  slow  sequence  of  shop  windows 
I  shall  be  part  of  the  action  when  his  wife 
Draining  the  potatoes  into  a  steamy  sink 
Calls  to  the  butcher  to  get  ready  for  dinner 
And  the  publican  descends  to  change  a  baffel. 
From  behind  the  one  locked  door  for  miles  around 
I  shall  prolong  a  detailed  conversation 
With  the  man  in  the  concrete  telephone  kiosk 
About  where  my  funeral  might  be  going  next.  16 
Ostensibly  marking  the  passing  of  a  hearse  down  a  village  street,  what  the  poet 
actually  achieves  is  a  description  of  the  life  of  the  village  in  which  the  individual 
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being  buried  once  partook.  Through  the  ritual  of  death  we  are  forced  into  observing 
the  daily  rituals  of  living.  And  in  asking,  maybe  praying,  that  his  funeral  will  be  like 
the  one  being  enacted  before  him,  the  poet  is  in  fact  elevating  the  life  he  witnesses.  It 
is  worthy  of  emulation.  In  disappearing  into  the  everyday  Longley  finds  something  to 
elevate,  to  praise.  We  notice  the  daily  rituals:  the  wife  cooking  dinner  for  the  butcher, 
the  changing  of  the  barrels.  Longley  casts  a  loving  eye  over  the  debris  of  the  village, 
as  if  seeing  it  for  the  last,  maybe  first  time:  the  hay  rakes,  the  broom  handles,  the  gas 
cylinders. 
The  really  striking  achievement  of  the  poem  is  Longley's  construction  though 
of  the  T  of  the  poem.  While  dead  he  also  maintains  a  presence  and  effectiveness  in 
the  world,  for  it  is  he  who  watches  and  participates  in  the  event  of  his  own  funeral.  He 
is  conversing  with,  playing  against  the  other  characters  in  the  poem's  world.  His 
identity,  his  concrete  place  and  location  are  constantly  called  into  question,  or  are 
shifting  and  changing  in  a  fluid  movement.  He  will  move  through  the  street  observing 
the  everyday  goings  on  of  village  life,  but  he  will  also  be  conducting  a  conversation 
with  the  person  at  the  other  end  of  the  telephone  line  about  this  funeral.  Is  that  what 
he  is  actually  doing  in  this  poem?  Because  the  poem  is  about  a  hypothetical  event  that 
will  one  day  be  real,  for  he  will  have  a  funeral  at  some  point  in  the  future.  The  whole 
poem  is  an  invention  and  so  can  consider  this  possibility.  We  know  what  the  poet  is 
talking  about,  we  can  understand  him  and  validate  his  desires. 286 
Within  the  Playground  of  Philosophy 
What  are  the  benefits  of  such  an  understanding  of  'play'  and  its  importance  for 
philosophical  thought  as  outlined  by  Gadamer?  As  John  Caputo  writes  in  Radical 
Hermeneutics:  'the  "principle  of  reason7  is  all  around  us  today.  As  a  principle,  reason 
is  an  arche,  aprinceps,  a  prince,  which  like  all  royalty  makes  its  presence  felt 
everywhere.  It  has  an  enormous  sphere  of  influence  (Machtbereich),  leaving  nothing 
out,  no  entity  untouched  by  the  claim  it  makes.  It  demands  reasons,  sufficiency,  the 
rendering  of  a  sufficient  reason,  for  everything.  So  how  can  we  speak  of  the  play  of 
reason  if  reason  is  a  deadly  serious  principleT  17  Poetry  as  a  manifestation  of  play  can 
rescue  us  from  the  deathly  efficiency  of  reason. 
Martin  Heidegger  was  aware  of  this,  especially  as  he  lived  through  the 
dawning  of  the  nuclear  age,  and  in  his  later  writings  set  about  de-limiting  the  sphere 
of  influence  en  oyed  by  reason.  This  is  part  of  Heidegger's  well-noted  turn  towards  j 
the  poets.  Heidegger  spoke  of  the  Ab-grund,  the  Abyss,  with  which  the  poet  is  an 
intimate  familiar,  a  sphere  of  groundlessness.  It  is  a  region  where  play  is  to  be  found 
and  which  is  outside  the  reach  of  principle.  Heidegger  was  in  search  of  a  sphere  of 
poeticising  and  thinking  which  eluded  rationalization,  especially  when  he  arrived  at 
the  point  in  his  thought  where  he  discovered  that  the  principle  of  reason  can  offer  no 
reason  for  its  reasonableness. 
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Pla  's  Importfor  Theology  y 
Jean-Luc  Marion  notes  in  God  Without  Being  that  the  real  challenge  of 
theology  lies  in  the  Eucharist  and  'the  theologian  must  go  heyond  the  text  to  the  Word, 
interpreting  itfrom  thepoint  ofview  ofthe  Word'18  (Marion's  italics).  Yet  we  accept 
as  Christian  theologians  that  we  cannot  through  any  hermeneutic  reach  a  view  that 
could  open  our  eyes  to  see  the  exegete  of  the  Father  (John  1:  18).  However,  we  can 
reach  a  shining  through  an  absence,  when  we  realise  that  once  the  Word  has  been 
announced  it  disappears  in  favour,  or  towards  the  benefit  of  the  eucharistic  moment 
(Luke  24:  28  -  33).  The  Word  intervenes  in  person  in  the  Eucharist  to  accomplish  in 
this  way  the  hermeneutic.  There  is  a  profound  implication  for  theology:  the  text, 
where  the  Word's  effect  of  meaning  is  fixed  in  verbal  signs,  consigns  the 
incommensurability  of  the  Word:  the  Scriptures  thus  exceed  the  limits  of  the  world 
(John  19:  30,21:  35).  Potentially  then  we  have  an  infinite  reserve  of  meaning.  Do  we 
witness  an  expression  of  this  in  the  poetic  word?  The  implication  of  this  for 
interpretation  is  immediately  obvious;  there  must  also  be  an  infinite  response  on  the 
part  of  interpreters,  with  each  one  leading  a  fragment  of  the  text  back  to  the  Word,  in 
taking  the  point  of  view  of  the  Word;  so,  we  must  have  then  an  infinite  amount  of 
eucharistic  hermeneutic  activity.  Marion  writes:  'in  order  to  give  an  (infinite) 
hernieneutic  of  the  (finite)  text  in  view  of  the  (infinite)  Word,  an  infinity  of  situations 
are  mobilized  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  Word,  hence  an  infinity  of  Eucharists, 
celebrated  by  an  infinity  of  different  communities,  each  of  which  leads  a  fragment  of 
18  Jean-Luc  Marion:  God  Without  Being:  Hors-Texte:  Univ.  of  Chicago  Press:  Chicago:  1995,  Trans. 
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the  words  back  to  the  Word,  to  the  exact  degree  that  each  one  repeats  and  welcomes 
eucharistically  the  Word  in  person' 
19 
. 
This  opens  up  some  room  for  play.  Theology  can  learn  from  the  achievements 
of  play  in  poetry  as  we  have  examined  them  above.  The  flexibility  of  play  as  a  mode 
of  comprehending  aesthetic  activity  and  interpretation  lends  itself  quite  readily  as  a 
model  for  activity  in  theological  thought.  Maybe  they  provide  the  base  model  that 
theology  should  be  following?  We  can  learn  from  the  new  horizons  opened  up  by  the 
poet,  and  can  learn  something  about  the  nature  of  communion  as  pursued  through  the 
poet's  natural  reliance  on  metaphoric  strands  of  thought.  We  see  this  in  the  examples 
given  above.  Michael  Longley  in  the  poems  examined  above  illustrates  a  community 
orientation  worth  emulating;  in  the  poem  'The  Velocipede'  there  is  a  sense  of  familial 
ancestry,  of  communal  activity  between  father  and  son,  but  also  indirectly  the  poet 
who  shares  a  similar  activity  to  the  son  in  the  poem.  In  'Detour'  a  community  and  its 
ritual  is  observed  and  the  poet  aims  to  participate  in  that  ritual  in  a  centrally  important 
way.  The  poet  offers  to  theology  a  way  of  opening  up  new  horizons  of  thought  and 
connection,  and  his  or  her  exuberance  of  thought  as  evidenced  by  the  many  examples 
provided  counters  nihilistic  conceptions  of  the  world,  through  a  radical  re-thinking  of 
the  human  situation,  and  a  continually  striking  representation  of  human  ways  of  being 
within  new  contexts. 
Paul  Ricoeur  and  10nesey'as  Another' 
To  help  us  pursue  our  strain  of  thought  we  turn  to  philosophy  once  again.  in 
his  book  OneselfAs  Another  Paul  Ricoeur  is  interested  in  pursuing  the  question:  what 
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mode  of  being  belongs  to  the  self,  and  what  sort  of  being  and  entity  is  it?  He  is  also 
interested  in  the  relation  of  the  self  to  others,  or  the  relation  of  selfhood  to  otherness. 
He  writes  that  'only  a  being  that  is  a  self  is  in  the  world;  correlatively,  the  world  in 
which  this  being  is,  is  not  the  sum  of  beings  composing  the  universe  of  subsisting 
things  or  things  ready-to-hand.  The  being  of  the  self  presupposes  the  totality  of  a 
world  that  is  the  horizon  of  its  thinking,  acting,  feeling  -  in  short,  of  its  care  20.  Again 
he  notes:  'there  is  no  world  without  a  self  who  finds  itself  in  it  and  acts  in  it;  there  is 
no  self  without  a  world  that  is  practicable  in  some  fashion'21  . 
In  what  ways  do  we  note  our  activity  as  human  beings?  One  example  is  our 
move  from  inadequate  to  adequate  ideas  about  the  world,  at  least  about  ourselves  and 
things  within  the  world.  This  signals  the  possibility  of  our  being  truly  active.  It  also 
constitutes  an  ethical  activity.  Hereby  we  note  a  close  connection  between  the  internal 
dynamism  that  is  life  and  the  power  of  human  intelligence  that  presides  over  the 
movement  from  inadequate  to  adequate  ideas.  We  become  powerful  as  human  beings 
when  we  note  our  horizontal  and  external  dependence  upon  all  things,  as  well  as  our  ' 
vertical  and  immanent  dependence  with  regard  to  the  primordial  power  that  motivates 
us  as  human  beings. 
How  do  we  account  for  the  work  of  otherness  that  we  experience  at  the  heart 
of  self-hood?  Firstly  we  have  an  experience  of  our  own  body  as  a  mediator  between 
the  self  and  the  world  that  is  itself  taken  in,  in  accordance  with  variable  degrees  of 
practicability  and  foreignness.  The  self  finds  itself  in  relation  to  the  foreign,  in  the 
very  precise  sense  of  other  than  self,  which  implies  an  otherness  at  the  very  heart  of 
20  Paul  Ricoeur:  OneseyAs  Another:  Univ.  of  Chicago  Press:  Chicago:  1994,  p.  3  10 
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inter-subjectivity.  Then  there  is  the  relation  of  the  self  to  itself  So  our  sense  of 
otherness  indicates  a  high  degree  of  complexity  and  relational  density. 
Let  us  look  a  little  closer  at  Ricoeur's  understanding  of  the  importance  of  our 
bodies  and  of  the  flesh  in  any  analysis  of  the  self  and  otherness.  We  note  that  if  others 
are  bodies,  it  is  so  because  we  have  a  body  ourselves  or  are  a  body.  I  am  for  myself 
my  own  body.  And  thus  we  can  ascribe  mental  and  physical  predicates  to  one  and  the 
same  entity  because  the  human  body  is  at  one  and  the  same  time  a  body  among  others 
and  my  body.  We  note  also  the  twofold  adherence  of  our  bodies  to  the  domain  of 
things  and  to  that  of  the  self  due  to  our  observing  that  human  action  constitutes  an 
event  in  the  world,  designating  its  author  in  a  self-referential  manner,  because  the 
latter  belongs  to  the  world  in  a  mode  in  which  the  self  is  constitutive  of  the  very  sense 
of  this  belonging.  -  Our  body  is  the  very  place  of  this  belonging. 
Ricoeur  notes  'this  global  phenomenon  of  anchoring'.  In  any  ontology  of  the 
flesh  we  must  emphasize  one  important  dimension  of  the  body,  and  that  is  its 
passivity  in  the  presence  of  suffering  which  is  undergone  and  endured.  Ricoeur 
writes:  'most  of  the  evil  in  the  world  comes  from  violence  among  human  beings. 
Here,  the  passivity  belonging  to  the  metacategory  of  one's  own  body  overlaps  with 
the  passivity  belonging  to  the  category  of  other  people;  the  passivity  of  the  suffering 
self  becomes  indistinguishable  from  the  passivity  of  being  the  victim  of  the  other 
(than)  self  22.  This  alerts  us  to  the  body  as  a  place  where  resistance  gives  way  to 
effort.  We  are  aware  of  our  body  and  its  intimate  diversity,  as  well  as  its  extension 
irreducible  to  any  imagined  or  represented  extension,  its  mass  as  well  as  its  gravity. 
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Through  active  touch  things  attest  to  their  existence  as  indubitably  as  our  own. 
Existence  is  a  form  of  resistance,  attesting  to  our  existence  and  that  of  the  world. 
Ricoeur  will  also  recognise  the  otherness  of  our  own  flesh.  We  can  reign  over 
our  bodies.  But  they  resist  us  in  their  strangeness.  And  so  Ricoeur  will  write: 
6ontologically,  the  flesh  precedes  the  distinction  between  the  voluntary  and  the 
involuntary'23 
. 
Thereby  selffiood  implies  its  own  proper  ownness  for  which  the  flesh 
is  the  support.  And  so,  even  if  the  otherness  of  the  stranger  can  by  some  impossibility 
be  derived  from  the  sphere  of  ownness,  the  otherness  of  the  flesh  will  always  precede 
it.  Husserl  noted  that  I  must  make  the  flesh  part  of  the  world  if  it  is  to  appear  as  a 
body  among  bodies. 
We  note  in  this  context  Heidegger's  concept  of  thrownness.  This  phrase 
suggests  the  way  in  which  Dasein  becomes  a  burden  for  itself,  and  suggests  the 
character  of  the  weight  of  existence  being  such  as  to  constitute  a  burden  for  oneself, 
of  being  delivered  over  to  oneself,  which  suggests  a  certain  being  there  and  self- 
intimacy.  And  so  we  touch  upon  what  Ricoeur  will  describe  as  'the  strangeness  of 
human  finiteness,  insofar  as  it  is  sealed  by  embodiment,  hence  what  we  call  here 
primary  otherness,  in  order  to  distinguish  it  from  the  otherness  of  the  foreign  v24 
. 
We  will  examine  now  the  otherness  of  other  people.  We  will  realize  that  the 
Other  is  not  only  the  counterpart  of  the  Same  but  belongs  to  the  intimate  constitution 
of  its  sense.  In  fact  the  seýf  is  differentiated  from  the  ego  by  the  degree  to  which  it  is 
23  Paul  Ricoeur:  Onesey'As  Another.  1994,  p.  324 
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affected  by  the  activities  of  others.  One  obvious  example  is  the  way  in  which  we  are 
affected  by  the  address  of  others  to  us  in  speech.  Ricoeur  notes  that  this  is  the  premise 
on  which  fiction  operates.  Rather  than  distracting  us  with  the  unreal,  the  reception  of 
fictional  works  widens  our  experience  and  makes  a  vital  contribution  to  the  imaginary 
and  symbolic  constitution  of  the  actual  exchanges  of  words  and  actions.  Ricoeur  notes 
that  in  any  given  moment  of  ethical  decision  there  is  both  an  agent  and  a  patient,  with 
the  possibility  that  at  any  point  in  the  future  these  roles  may  be  reversed,  and  so,  we 
must  retain  a  necessary  plurality  in  our  thinking,  for  the  acting  beings  in  any  ethical 
moment  are  each  affected  by  forces  operating  reciprocally.  And  so  we  are  enjoined  to 
conceive  of  a  'two-pronged  conception  of  otherness',  one  'that  does  justice  in  turn  to 
the  primacy  of  self-esteem  and  also  to  the  primacy  of  the  convocation  to  justice 
coming  from  the  other25  . 
Ricoeur  notes  that  we  can  only  really  speak  of  a  'world'  when  we  have 
established  a  'common  nature'.  And  we  can  only  build  an  analogy  when  we  recognise 
that  my  body  is  already  held  to  be  a  body  among  bodies.  'Only  a  flesh  (for  me)  that  is 
a  body  (for  others)  can  play  the  role  of  first  analogon  in  the  analogical  transfer  from 
flesh  to  flesh  926  .  We  must  also  acknowledge  the  other's  givenness,  which  we  do  when 
we  recognise  that  intentionalities  that  are  directed  to  the  other  as  foreign,  that  is,  as 
other  than  me,  go  beyond  the  sphere  of  ownness  in  which  they  are  nevertheless 
rooted.  We  can  never  live  the  experience  of  others  although  we  can  commute  between 
our  separate  selves  on  the  basis  of  an  analogising  apprehension  whereby  we  gather  the 
other  possesses  a  body  like  my  own.  It  can  only  be  analogical  as  I  can  never  convert 
the  other"s  experience  into  an  event  of  originary  presentation.  We  bear  in  mind  that 
25  Paul  Ricoeur:  OnesetfAs  Another.  1994,  p.  331 
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there  will  always  be  a  gap  both  implied  and  real  in  this  procedure,  for  the  notion  of 
analogising  grasp  suggests  the  assimilation  of  one  term  to  another,  and  what  is 
implied  in  the  necessity  of  the  use  of  analogues  is  the  notion  or  fact  of  a  fundamental 
dissymmetry. 
For  Ricoeur,  Immanuel  Levinas'  criticism  of  Husserl  touches  uPOn  this  fact. 
As  Levinas  understood  Husserl,  if  one  represents  something  to  oneself  one  assimilates 
it  to  oneself,  and  thus  includes  it  in  oneself,  and  hence  you  deny  it  thereby  of  its 
otherness.  For  Levinas  the  face  of  the  other  when  raised  before  me  is  not  an 
appearance  that  I  can  include  within  the  sphere  of  my  own  representations  but  is 
rather  a  spectacle,  a  voice  that  tells  me  'Thou  shalt  not  kill'.  In  me  the  movement 
from  the  Other  completes  its  trajectory,  with  the  other  constituting  me  as  responsible. 
In  Levinas  there  is  a  desire  to  avoid  the  Same  as  it  speaks  a  language  of  totalization. 
With  Levinas  there  is  a  desire  to  protect  the  exteriority  of  the  other  which  can  never 
be  expressed  in  the  language  of  relation.  However,  Ricoeur  points  out  we  are  left  with 
the  question  of  'how  are  we  to  think  the  iffelation  implied  by  this  otherness  in  its 
movement  of  absolution?  '27Ricoeur  also  notes  that  Levinas'  conception  of  the  self  is 
such  that  it  renders  selfhood  devoid  of  any  openness  and  capacity  for  discovery. 
Ricoeur  then  proceeds  to  emphasize  the  importance  of  the  conscience  in  any 
consideration  of  the  sense  of  the  self,  and  conscience  is  implicitly  connected  to 
notions  of  otherness.  For,  under  the  impetus  of  conscience  the  self  is  capable  of  taking 
hold  of  itself  in  the  anonymity  of  the  'they'.  We  experience  conscience  as  a  sort  of 
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call  or  appeal  indicated  by  the  metaphor  of  the  voice.  In  this  interior,  intimate 
conversation  the  self  appears  to  be  called  upon  and  to  be  affected  in  a  unique  way.  It 
is  Heidegger  who  notes  that  conscience  does  not  say  anythfng,  defivers  no  message  A7 
the  midst  of  a  commotion  but  rather  is  completely  immanent:  'the  call  undoubtedly 
does  not  come  from  someone  else  who  is  with  me  in  the  world.  The  call  comesfrom 
me  and  yetfrom  heyond  me  and  over  me  28 
. 
Ricoeur  sees  this  as  a  moment  of 
otherness  proper  to  the  phenomenon  of  conscience,  for  listening  to  the  voice  of 
conscience  signifies  the  being-enjoined  by  the  Other.  And,  after  Hegel,  Ricoeur  will 
ask:  is  this  Other  not,  in  one  way  or  another,  other  people? 
In  the  concluding  pages  of  the  last  chapter  of  Oneseý(As  Another,  'What 
Ontology  in  View?  ',  Paul  Ricoeur  notes  Sigmund  Freud's  notions  about  moral 
conscience.  For  Freud  moral  conscience  is  another  name  for  the  superego.  The 
superego  itself  is  made  up  of  sedimented  and  forgotten,  often  repressed  identifications 
with  parental  and  ancestral  figures.  Freud's  notions  although  dressed  up  in  the 
garments  of  science  really  concur  with  populist  notions  that  the  voices  of  our 
ancestors  continue  to  make  themselves  heard  among  the  living,  thereby  ensuring  the 
transmission  of  wisdom,  but  also  its  intimate  personal  reception  each  step  along  the 
way.  An  interesting  thought,  although  Ricoeur  points  out  that  the  generational  model 
of  conscience  runs  into  problems  when  we  consider  that  there  is  an  unavoidable 
movement  of  infinite  regress  in  which  the  Other  progressively  loses  from  generation 
to  generation  its  initial,  presumed  familiarity.  And  whence  does  the  ancestor  draw  the 
authority  of  their  voice,  if  not  from  their  privileged  tie  to  the  Law,  immemorial  just  as 
they  are? 
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coeur  is  cn  ica  oe  re  uc  ion  resu  s  rom  e  wor  o  mmanue 
Levinas  as  a  whole.  With  Levinas  all  we  are  finally  left  with  is  the  reduction  of  the 
otherness  of  conscience  to  the  otherness  of  other  people.  With  Heidegger  we  are  left 
with  the  reduction  of  being-in-debt  to  the  strange(r)ness  tied  to  the  facticity  of  our 
being-in-the-world.  Writing  continually  against  the  backdrop  of  Heidegger's  thought 
Immanuel  Levinas  is  left  only  with  the  modality  of  otherness  derived  from  reflection 
upon  the  externality  of  the  face.  In  short,  for  Levinas,  'the  model  of  all  otherness  is 
the  other  person'.  Ricoeur  sees  that  as  restrictive,  and  seeks  to  retain  a  third  modality 
of  otherness,  'being  enjoined  as  the  structure  ofsetMood  -ý29  (italics  Ricoeur's).  For 
him  if  the  injunction  coming  from  the  other  is  not  part  and  parcel  of  self-attestation,  it 
loses  its  character  of  injunction,  for  lack  of  the  existence  of  a  being-enjoined  standing 
before  it  as  its  respondent.  Ricoeur  concludes  his  reflection  humbly:  'Perhaps  the 
. -I-  philosopher  as  philosopher  has  to  admit  that  one  does  not  know  and  cannot  say 
whether  this  Other,  the  source  of  the  injunction,  is  another  person  whom  I  can  look  in 
the  face  or  who  can  stare  at  me,  or  my  ancestors  for  whom  there  is  no  representation, 
to  so  great  an  extent  does  my  debt  to  them  constitute  my  very  self,  or  God  -  living 
God,  absent  God  -  or  an  empty  place.  With  this  aporia  of  the  Other,  philosophical 
discourse  comes  to  an  end  M. 
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